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This thesis examines the material dimensions of ethnic identity constructions and 
identity claims through the study of Japanese-Filipino children in the Philippines and of 
the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) advocating on their behalf. Most Japanese-
Filipino clients of NGOs in the Philippines were raised by their Filipino families with 
little knowledge of their Japanese fathers and no lived experience of Japan.  Although 
these children and young adults are often called ‘multi-cultural’ by NGO workers, they 
grow up as Filipinos with no connection to Japan other than the awareness of their 
Japanese parentage and the availability of global Japanese cultural products equally 
accessible to most Filipinos.  
In this study, I examine the construction of the “JFC”, the Japanese-Filipino 
Child, through NGO discourses as well as the utilization of Japanese-Filipino children’s 
Japanese descent in claims-making and in struggles over resources. I argue that filiation 
can be leveraged on to gain access to resources not only through the legal implications 
that are provided by biological relationships, but also through the symbolically salient 
claims for belonging to a nation or people, by virtue of descent. I employ the concept of 
consanguinal capital which I consider as a form of capital, drawing upon Bourdieusian 
arguments. Consanguinal capital should primarily be understood in politically symbolic 
terms, mobilized in processes of claims-making and based on notions of ‘blood’ and 
belonging and their frequent conflation with ethnicity.  
In politicizing the issue, NGOs have endorsed essentialist ideas of ‘Japanese 
blood’ and framed their Japanese-Filipino clients as Japanese ex-patria, making claims 
for recognition from their ‘other homeland’. The abstraction of actual filiation between 
Japanese fathers and their children into politically symbolic ‘blood ties’ linking Japanese-
Filipino children as a whole to the imagined community of Japanese, is part of the 
ideological work performed by NGOs to transform consanguinal capital into other forms 
of capital: economic, cultural and social.  




 “I have doubts about being integrated into the society fully. I 
could probably hope just to be close to them, observe them, learn 
from them and integrate it with...you know, my Filipino side. I’m 
Filipino by citizenship, I have Japanese blood. But at some point 
I can neither be fully Filipino, I can never be fully Japanese.” 
(Ken in Yasuo, A Geography of Memory)1 
Ken was born in the Philippines in the 1970s. His Japanese father was a 
businessman who had opened a shop in Manila where he also met Ken’s mother. 
Ken’s parents separated while he was still a toddler and Ken subsequently grew 
up in Manila in the absence of his father. Japanese-Filipinos, like Ken, are a 
consequence of over three decades of gendered cross-border mobility connecting 
people from Japan and the Philippines. In the 1970s, Ferdinand Marcos sought to 
attract foreign capital by promoting the Philippines both as a “holiday haven” and 
a business paradise, opening up the country to investments and tourism. Most 
businessmen and tourists were male and a considerable number came from Japan 
(Muroi & Sasaki 1997). In the late 1970s, as Japanese men had made the 
Philippines one of their favourite destinations for so called “holiday sex tours”, 
protests by activist groups severely curbed the systematized and often company-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  “Yasuo”	  is	  a	  short	  documentary	  I	  made	  in	  2011	  with	  the	  help	  of	  Ken,	  my	  Japanese-­‐Filipino	  protagonist	   and	   respondent	   in	   the	   film.	   Ken	   brings	  me	   through	  Manila.	  We	   visit	   places	   to	  which	  he	  connects	  memories	  of	  his	  absent	  Japanese	  father.	  	  
2	  	  
sponsored sex-tourism to Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, these protests did not stop 
Japanese men from purchasing erotic entertainment. Instead, the migration flow 
reversed. Numerous Filipino women have since then entered Japan on so called 
“entertainer” visas to seek employment in Japan’s clubs, pubs and “snack bars”2.  
Young Filipino women’s stay in Japan was initially thought to be 
temporary, but the flow of “entertainers” to Japan has firmly established Filipino 
women’s presence as part of the country’s social landscape: as the opportunities 
for encounters increased, Filipino women and Japanese men developed affective 
and sexual relationships from which children were born. By 1995, Filipino 
women were among the top three foreign nationalities Japanese men would get 
married to3 and in 2010 the number of registered Filipino nationals residing in 
Japan reached 210 1814.  
Hitherto, numerous marriages ended in divorce5, a significant number of 
marriages concluded in the Philippines were not registered in Japan, and many 
relationships often did not lead to matrimony to begin with.6 Numerous women 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  A	  “snack	  bar”	  is	  a	  type	  of	  hostess	  bar	  where	  “entertainers”	  facilitate	  social	  intercourse.	  	   	  3	  According	   to	   statistics	   of	   Japan’s	   Ministry	   of	   Health	   Labour	   and	  Welfare,	   the	   number	   of	  Filipina	  spouses	  of	  Japanese	  men	  was	  first	  recorded	  in	  1995.	  That	  year	  7188	  Filipino	  women	  had	  married	  Japanese	  men,	  out	  of	  a	  total	  of	  20	  787	  couples	  composed	  of	  a	  Japanese	  man	  and	  a	  foreign	  woman.	  (original	  table	  available	  at	  http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/db-­‐hh/1-­‐2.html,	  cf.	  Table	  1-­‐37,	  access	  30	  September	  2013)	  	  4	  Male	  and	  female	  Filipino	  nationals,	  according	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  (cf.	  Statistical	  table	  2-­‐14	   “Registered	   Foreigners	   by	   Nationality	   (1990-­‐-­‐2010)”	   available	   at	  http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/1431-­‐02.htm,	  access	  30	  September,	  2013)	  5	  According	   to	  calculations	  based	  on	  the	  statistics	  of	   Japan’s	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  Labour	  and	  Welfare,	  divorcing	  Filipina-­‐Japanese	  couples	  made	  up	  30%	  on	  average	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  divorces	  of	  Japanese	  men	  and	  foreign	  women	  between	  the	  years	  2000-­‐2011	  (original	  table	  available	   at	   http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/db-­‐hh/1-­‐2.html,	   cf.	   Table	   1-­‐42,	  access	  30	  September	  2013)	  6 	  According	   to	   the	   Citizens	   Network	   for	   Japanese-­‐Filipino	   Children	   (CNJFC),	   an	   NGO	  providing	  legal	  support	  for	  Japanese-­‐Filipinos	  claiming	  their	  Japanese	  nationality,	  numerous	  marriages	  concluded	  in	  the	  Philippines	  are	  not	  registered	  in	  Japan:	  “Without	  the	  notification	  
3	  	  
thus returned to the Philippines with their Japanese-Filipino children after 
separating from their Japanese partners, or did so to give birth to the children they 
had conceived with Japanese men. Others remained in Japan, often undocumented 
if they had neither married nor given birth to a Japanese national who would 
enable their residence visa7. The highly gendered migration of Filipino women to 
Japan has thus produced both social and legal complications which affect Filipino 
women and their Japanese-Filipino children both in Japan and the Philippines till 
today. In reaction to the rising numbers of Japanese-Filipino children born to 
former “entertainers”, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the 
Philippines and in Japan have started shedding light on and speaking up against 
the consequences of Filipina migration to Japan. Points of contention were not 
merely questions of legal status of Japanese-Filipinos in Japan, but also matters of 
paternal acknowledgment, unpaid alimony as well as sentiments of injustice 
stemming from the relative ease with which Japanese fathers of Japanese-Filipino 
children could deny parental responsibilities.  
Japanese-Filipino children and youths in the Philippines are, in most cases, 
non-migrants. In contrast to second generation migrants, these children and 
youths grow up as Filipinos with their Filipino mothers or maternal families. A 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  letter,	   the	   marriage	   goes	   unrecorded	   in	   the	   Japanese	   husband’s	   family	   register.	  […]Furthermore,	   the	  husband’s	  place	  of	  residence	  that	   is	  recorded	   in	  the	  Filipino	  marriage	  register	  is	  often	  wrong	  and	  attempting	  to	  locate	  him	  through	  his	  home	  address	  can	  often	  be	  very	   difficult,	   particularly	   if	   a	   long	   time	   has	   passed	   and	   he	   may	   have	   moved	   or	   been	  relocated	  elsewhere	  due	  to	  work.”	  (CNJFC	  [Citizen's	  Network	  for	  Japanese-­‐Filipino	  Children],	  2005,	  p.	  7)	  7	  Rhacel	  Parreñas	  (2011)points	  out	  that	  “long-­‐term	  residency	  [of	  Filipino	  women	  in	  Japan]	  is	  conditional	   on	   marrying	   or	   giving	   birth	   to	   a	   Japanese	   citizen”	   (p.	   179).	   The	   Japanese	  government	   has	   since	   1996	   extended	   residency	   rights	   to	   foreign	   custodians	   of	   Japanese	  citizens.	  
4	  	  
large number of Japanese-Filipinos are raised exclusively by their Filipino kin, in 
a cultural environment no different from that of other Filipino children and youths 
of similar socio-economic backgrounds. Japanese-Filipinos in the Philippines are 
not a community preserving distinct cultural practices nor do they consider 
themselves part of a diasporic community. Like many of their Filipino 
countrymen and -women, numerous Japanese-Filipinos in the Philippines foster 
desires to live and work abroad. Migration overseas has since the onset of the 
Philippine labour export policies become a common means for Filipinos to deal 
with financial shortage, un- or underemployment, as well as to achieve social 
upward mobility. Japanese-Filipino Children’s desires to migrate are often 
motivated by similar aspirations.  
Japanese-Filipinos in the Philippines present a case in migration studies 
insofar as Japanese-Filipinos’ efforts to cross borders to Japan are intertwined 
with issues of ethnic identity formation, rights-claims towards the Japanese state, 
and the migration histories of their mothers. Also, there has been little scholarly 
work done on these children of migration. Scholarship on migration and 
transnationalism has predominantly focused on mobile populations; emigrants, 
immigrants, transient and circular migrants. Studies with a focus on non-migrant 
populations yet directly affected by migration have tended to enquire about the 
social and economic consequences of prolonged absences on migrants’ home 
communities, their families, and on familial relationships (Al-Ali and Koser 2002, 
Horton 2008, Parreñas 2005).  A large body of academic work has also looked at 
‘second generation migrants’ who have not experienced migration first-hand but 
5	  	  
remain associated with their parents’ relocation prior to their birth and are often 
discussed in relation to issues revolving around integration, assimilation, 
belonging, multiculturalism and social mobility (Levitt and Waters 2002, Pratt 
2004, Soehl & Waldinger 2012). Numerous Japanese-Filipinos based in the 
Philippines however are would-be migrants and potential8 Japanese citizens who 
have yet to obtain Japanese passports and cross international borders. 
Nonetheless, numerous Japanese-Filipinos draw upon an imagined other 
‘homeland’, upon the possibility of migration, and upon their mother’s or father’s 
migration histories to construct a sense of who they are with regards to their 
mixed-ethnic and cross-national parentage.  
This study is concerned with the discursive construction of Japanese-
Filipinos as “JFC”9 by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as well as by 
Japanese-Filipino activists in the process of claims-making. The construction of 
the “JFC” is part of a political and a symbolic struggle by individuals and NGOs 
which have established themselves as legitimate mouthpieces of the “JFC” and 
their Filipino mothers. As will be shown, NGOs have deployed various discursive 
resources in the processes of advocating for “JFC”, notably drawing on discourses 
of universal rights to challenge Japan’s politics of exclusion, on discourses on 
Japanese descent and ‘Japanese blood’, in addition to making use of the ideals of 
the “normal” family and of childhood. Most importantly, this dissertation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Japanese-­‐Filipinos	  are	  potential	  Japanese	  citizens	  by	  virtue	  of	  having	  a	  Japanese	  father	  and	  Japan’s	  nationality	  law	  being	  based	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  jus	  sanguinis.	  Through	  circumstances	  further	  elaborated	  below,	  numerous	  Japanese-­‐Filipinos	  have	  been	  unable	  to	  obtain	  Japanese	  citizenship	  at	  birth.	  But	  efforts	  by	  NGOs	  have	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  more	  Japanese-­‐Filipinos	  to	  obtain	  Japanese	  nationality	  and	  citizenship.	  	  9	  “JFC”	  stands	  for	  Japanese-­‐Filipino	  Children.	  It	  is	  an	  acronym	  coined	  by	  the	  NGOs	  included	  in	  this	  study.	  
6	  	  
examines processes of claims-making as a means to enhance one’s life chances, 
enabling cross-border mobility, and tied to the latter, fulfilling expectations of 
upward social mobility. This research also addresses the importance of citizenship 
as legal status: as a right to participate in particular labour markets and as a right 
of abode in particular countries within the context of global economic inequalities 
and selective migration regimes. It also addresses legally codified practices of 
exclusion, making some children of Japanese fathers ‘legitimate’ and others 
‘illegitimate’ heirs of Japanese citizenship (and nationality).  
I argue that processes of ethnic identity formation by Japanese-Filipinos 
raised and based in the Philippines are dependent, among others, on perceived 
opportunities in transnational contexts and remain in dialogue with practices of 
claims-making and rights assertion towards the Japanese State. The debate about 
ethnic identity ascription and ethnic identification thus needs to be placed within 
the context of global economic inequalities10 which afford greater privileges and 
rights to individuals with certain citizenships rather than others, and within the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  “There	   is	   little	  doubt	   that	  securing	  membership	  status	   in	  a	  given	  state	  or	  region-­‐with	   its	  specific	   level	  of	  wealth,	  degree	  of	  stability,	  and	  human	  rights	  record-­‐is,	  even	  in	  the	  current	  age	  of	  increased	  globalization	  and	  privatization,	  a	  crucial	  factor	  in	  the	  determination	  of	  life	  chances”,	   write	   Shachar	   &	   Hirschl	   (2007,	   p.254).	   Citizenship	   is	   thus	   an	   important	   factor	  enabling	   (or	   disabling)	   access	   to	   opportunities	   and	   security.	   Moreover,	   the	   possession	   of	  citizenship	   is	   usually	   a	   pre-­‐requisite	   for	   access	   to	   particular	   labour	   markets,	   thus	  determining	   income	   levels,	   impacting	   career	   chances	   and	   employment	   opportunities.	   For	  Japanese-­‐Filipino	  children,	  the	  economic	  inequalities	  between	  Japan	  and	  the	  Philippines	  play	  out	   in	   form	   of	   potential	   opportunities	   to	   find	   paid	   employment	   in	   Japan	   and	   to	   earn	   a	  significantly	   higher	   income	   than	   they	  would	   in	   the	   Philippines.	  Moreover,	   “[t]ransnational	  labor	  migration	  is	  not	  just	  a	  means	  to	  manage	  politico-­‐economic	  marginality.	  It	  is	  also	  about	  the	  imaginative	  dreams	  and	  pleasures	  that	  can	  be	  found	  abroad.”	  (Faier	  2009,	  p.	  82)	  Faier’s	  (2009)	   migrant	   Filipina	   respondents	   frequently	   mentioned	   that	   they	   had	   come	   to	   Japan	  expecting	   to	   live	   in	   a	   place	   “like	   America”,	   a	   “modern”	   (p.81)	   urban	   centre,	   which	   they	  dichotomously	  opposed	   to	   their	  expereince	  of	   the	  Philippines.	   In	   this	   research	   I	   show	  that	  identifying	   as	   Japanese	   (or	   half-­‐Japanese)	   is	   partly	   encouraged	   by	   the	   benefits	   associated	  with	  these	  rights.	  The	  process	  of	  claiming	  rights	  and	  privileges	  is	  intertwined	  with	  processes	  of	  ethnic	  identity	  construction	  and	  identity	  ascription.	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context of ethnically and ‘racially’ stratified societies which tend to provide 
people with a claim to particular ethnic or ‘racial’ groups with greater prestige 
and sometimes with greater opportunities.  
Hence, claims for Japanese nationality as well as the construction of 
Japanese or Japanese-Filipino ethnic identities by Philippine-based Japanese-
Filipinos should be considered as part of strategies to accumulate capital and 
status. I employ the concept of consanguinal capital which I consider as a form of 
capital, drawing upon Bourdieusian arguments. I argue that filiation can be 
leveraged on to gain access to resources not only through the legal implications 
that are provided by biological relationships, but also through the symbolically 
salient claims for belonging to a nation or people, by virtue of descent11. 
This does not mean that national or ethnic identities of Japanese-Filipinos in 
the Philippines are exclusively strategic. But it means that they are more than 
mere affectionate bonds to Japan; the emotive bond to the imagined second 
‘homeland’ arises within an understanding of Japan as technologically and 
economically advanced “First World” country, as well as within the knowledge of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Here	   I	   subscribe	   to	  Fortes’	   (1959,	   p.207)	  differentiation	  of	   filiation	   and	  descent,	  writing	  that	   “whereas	   filiation	   is	   the	   relation	   that	   exists	   between	   a	   person	   and	   his	   parent	   only,	  descent	  refers	  to	  a	  relation	  mediated	  by	  a	  parent	  between	  himself	  and	  an	  ancestor,	  defined	  as	  an	  genealogical	  predecessor	  of	   the	  grandparental	  or	  earlier	  generation.”	   I	  would	   like	   to	  add	   that	  within	   the	   context	   of	   ethnic	   identity	   formation	  and	  ascription,	   the	   link	   to	  oneself	  and	   one’s	   ancestors	   can	   be	   perceived	   as	   a	   link	   to	   a	   larger	   ethnicity	   or	   a	   nation,	   wherein	  ethnicity	   and	   nation	   are	   largely	   conflated.	   Consanguinity,	   or	   blood	   relations,	   usually	  describes	   biological	   relationships	   acquired	   through,	   for	   instance,	   filiation.	   Consanguinity	  also	   implies	   social	   ties	   emerging	   from	   these	   biological	   relationships.	   Moreover,	  consanguinity	  can	  be	  perceived	  to	  derive	  from	  descent,	  meaning	  from	  the	  belief	  in	  common	  ancestors,	   ethnicity	   and/or	   nationality.	   Indeed,	   numerous	   laws	   guiding	   the	   acquisition	   of	  nationality	  are	  based	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  ‘blood’,	  jus	  sanguinis	  (i.e.	  Japan	  and	  the	  Philippines).	  When	   understood	   broadly,	   consanguinity	   can	   still	   be	   utilized	   as	   grounds	   for	   social	   or	  political	   ties	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   “ethnic	   returnees”	   having	   been	   extended	   special	   visas	   by	  countries	  like	  Japan,	  Korea,	  Germany	  and	  many	  others	  (cf.	  Tsuda	  2010).	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cross-border mobility as possible road to social upward mobility. In this research I 
also consider the changes in the legal codifications of the Japanese nationality law 
as an important step in NGO claims-making, indicating a change of perception 
with regards to dominant and institutionalized understandings of who ought to be 
Japanese and under what conditions.  
Existing literature on Japanese-Filipino Children 
 The prevailing myth of ethnic homogeneity of Japanese society has 
provided a fascinating backdrop against which ethnic identity formations of 
children of “mixed” parentage could be studied. The focus of such studies usually 
centres upon the negotiation of personal ethnic identities given the narrow 
definitions of Japaneseness and on the disruptive effects of migration on these 
ethnic identities. The increasing number of so called “international marriages” 
since the 1980s has triggered questions of what it meant to be Japanese in an age 
of globalization, involving intensified cross-border human mobility and 
increasing numbers of cross-border affective and sexual relationships followed by 
childbirth. Japan’s myth of ethnic homogeneity has been tested by recent 
immigration (Douglass & Roberts (eds.), 2003; Weiner (ed.), 2009), rising 
numbers of children born to Japanese-foreign couples, and by Japan’s historical 
ethnic minorities demanding recognition as part of Japanese society, such as the 
Ainu as well as Korean special permanent residents and Japanese of Korean 
descent (Chung, 2009, 2010; Weiner & Chapman, 1997). However, constricted 
definitions of who ought to be Japanese remain, and therefore being ‘mixed’ in 
9	  	  
Japan presents an intricate puzzle to be solved by the individuals and institutions 
concerned. 
Processes of ethnic identity formation by Japanese-Filipinos have been 
observed with regards to the historical, economic and sociocultural circumstances 
under which these children and youth were born, grew up and learned to develop 
a sense of self (De Dios 2012).  These circumstances include not merely Japanese 
society’s general unawareness of its ethnic minorities, but also the meanings 
associated with having a Japanese father in the Philippines following popular 
knowledge of the massive migration of Filipina “entertainers” into Japan’s sex-
industry. De Dios (2012) concludes that the process of how Japanese-Filipino 
youth12 arrive at their ethnic identities is marked by the assertion of differences 
that set Japanese-Filipinos apart from ‘regular’ Japanese as well as from ‘regular’ 
Filipinos. These differences are cultural and linguistic when compared with the 
Japanese, but there are also perceived advantages associated with being of 
Japanese descent because of the opportunities of earning an income in Japan 
which sets Japanese-Filipinos apart from Filipinos (p.33). This observation is 
interesting as the distinction from other Filipinos is not cultural or linguistic in 
nature, but a matter of benefits provided by Japanese-Filipinos’ Japanese ancestry.   
The question about how certain ethnic identities are constructed also 
involves the examination of why particular identities are claimed rather than 
others. As Lieberson & Waters argue, the development of an ethnic identity for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  De	   Dios	   (2012)	   studied	   Japanese-­‐Filipino	   youths	   who	   spent	   a	   significant	   time	   of	   their	  childhood	  in	  the	  Philippines	  and	  migrated	  to	  Japan	  in	  their	  mid-­‐	  and	  late	  teens.	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children of mixed-ethnic backgrounds “becomes a question and a decision” (in De 
Dios, p.26). Considering that there is an element of decision involved in 
constructing and determining one’s ethnic identity, we ought to also investigate 
the reasons behind particular choices as well as the people involved in them. 
Indeed, Japanese-Filipino children do not make these decisions all by themselves, 
but are embedded in a network of ‘significant others’13 as well as located within 
socio-economic contexts and institutional frameworks which make certain ethnic 
identities more feasible and more desirable than others.  
The ease with which Japanese-Filipinos can establish their ethnic 
identities has also been linked to their ability to obtain Japanese nationality 
(Suzuki 2010). Without it, these children and youths are said to suffer “the 
uncertainty of their citizenships, identities and future” (Suzuki, 2010, p. 36). 
Considering that a sizeable number of Japanese-Filipino children grow up in 
Japan as Japanese, yet without the legal status of a Japanese citizen, gaining that 
legal status is indeed central to secure their futures in their homeland. In this 
endeavour, NGOs have put forward the Human Rights framework14 to claim 
Japanese nationality for Japanese-Filipinos who are thus far excluded from 
acquiring it. Yet for Japanese-Filipinos in the Philippines, obtaining Japanese 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Here	  ‘significant	  others’	  refer	  to	  people	  within	  a	  person’s	  immediate	  environment	  who	  are	  of	  importance	  in	  their	  development	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  self	  as	  defined	  by	  Cooley	  (1902).	  	  14	  The	   Human	   Rights	   framework	   as	   defined	   by	   the	   United	   Nations	   and	   as	   codified	   in	  numerous	  conventions	  signed	  by	  both	  Japan	  and	  the	  Philippines	  has	  provided	  NGOs	  with	  a	  symbolic	  resource	  to	  challenge	  national	  policies	  by	  referring	  to	  supra-­‐national	  agreements.	  Due	  to	  its	  symbolic	  salience,	  the	  Human	  Rights	  framework	  has	  been	  utilized	  as	  a	  means	  for	  NGOs	  to	  gather	  support	   for	   their	  cause	  and	  challenge	  the	   Japanese	  state	  on	  moral	  grounds	  with	  reference	  to	  Japanese-­‐Filipinos’	  rights,	  and	  the	  failure	  of	  individual	  Japanese	  fathers	  as	  well	  as	  of	  the	  Japanese	  state	  to	  acknowledge	  and	  take	  responsibility	  for	  the	  injustice	  and	  the	  many	  difficulties	  faced	  by	  Japanese-­‐Filipinos.	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nationality is tied to reasons other than securing their right to remain in the 
country they have grown up in. In this thesis, I argue that assertions of ethnic 
identities as Japanese or half-Japanese by Japanese-Filipino children in the 
Philippines are not merely emotive but also linked to considerations of how this 
particular identity fares in the Philippine context. Furthermore, Japaneseness 
needs to be affirmed to substantiate claims, in particular the claim for Japanese 
nationality and citizenship15.  
Another point I would like to address in this study is the vital role played 
by NGOs in shaping the identities of their Japanese-Filipino clients and in 
creating a meta-narrative about Japanese-Filipino children for purposes of 
advocacy. As Bourdieu (1989) argues, symbolic power influences the perceptions 
of the world and thus ‘makes’ the world. In their symbolic struggles, NGOs do 
not merely aim to redefining boundaries of who ought to be Japanese in the 
course of making claims, but also create categories, and a name, for and of the 
people they are speaking about. In this study, I am looking at the political and 
symbolic struggles16 engaged by four NGOs in particular: the Manila-based 
youth-group Batis Youth Organization that gives Hope and Inspiration (Batis 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Nationality	   and	   Citizenship	   in	   Japan	   largely	   overlap.	   Japanese	   nationals	   are	   entitled	   to	  citizenship	  in	  Japan.	  Foreign	  nationals	  however	  cannot	  acquire	  formal	  citizenship.	  However,	  other	   residence	   titles	   may	   accord	   foreign	   nationals	   with	   privileges	   similar	   to	   those	   of	  citizens.	  Dual-­‐nationality	  (or	  dual-­‐citizenship)	  is	  not	  accepted	  under	  Japan’s	  nationality	  law.	  16	  These	   struggles	   include	   claims	   for	   recognition	   of	   Japanese-­‐Filipino	   children	   as	   part	   of	  Japan’s	   history,	   responsibility,	   and	   by	   consequence	   of	   the	   Japanese	   nation.	   These	   claims	  include	   struggles	   over	   the	   ‘correct’	   perception	   of	   the	   problems	   faced	   by	   many	   Japanese-­‐Filipino	   children	   not	   as	   merely	   private	   issues,	   but	   as	   arising	   from	   economic	   inequalities	  existing	  between	  the	  two	  countries,	  and	  as	  aftermaths	  of	  policies	  formulated	  by	  the	  Japanese	  and	   the	   Philippine	   governments.	  Moreover,	   the	   framing	   of	   former	   Filipina	   entertainers	   as	  victims/survivors	   and	   good	   mothers,	   as	   well	   as	   efforts	   to	   highlight	   Japanese-­‐Filipino	  children’s	  link	  to	  Japan	  are	  part	  of	  the	  overall	  process	  of	  claims-­‐making.	  Lastly,	  the	  political	  struggles	  engaged	  in	  by	  NGOs	  have	  taken	  form	  in	  litigation.	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YOGHI) and its parent-organization the Batis Center for Women, the 
Development Action for Women Network (DAWN), Maligaya House and its 
Tokyo office the Citizen’s Network for Japanese-Filipino Children (CNJFC)17 (cf. 
Appendix for further details about the NGOs).  
Synopsis 
In the following chapters I expound on NGOs’ discursive construction of their 
clients and on the shifts in such constructions, as well as on the change in Japan’s 
nationality law implemented in January 2009 following a court case against the 
Japanese state. In Chapter 1, I begin with describing in greater detail the historical 
circumstances from which Japanese-Filipino children were born, and how the 
latter became the subjects of NGO support and advocacy. This first chapter 
contextualizes current claims by and on behalf of Japanese-Filipinos against the 
backdrop of existing claims by people of Japanese descent similarly emphasizing 
Japaneseness, as well as Japan’s experiences with ethnic return migration. I argue 
that the malleability of ethnicity and the flexibility of ethnic boundaries may be 
discerned when political and economic changes occur. Certain ethnic identities 
can thus be more practical and more desirable than others at some times or under 
certain circumstances. Nikkeijin18 in the Philippines, for instance, have adopted 
Filipino or Chinese-Filipino ethnic identities to escape discrimination following 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Maligaya	   House	   and	   the	   CNJFC	   are	   the	   same	   group.	   They	   share	   publications,	   cases	   and	  management	  and	  will	  thus	  be	  treated	  as	  one	  NGO	  although	  they	  operate	  using	  two	  different	  names.	  18	  Nikkeijin	  (日系人;	   literally:	  person	  of	   Japanese	   lineage)	  designates	  foreigners	  of	   Japanese	  descent,	   as	   well	   as	   Japanese	   descendants	   who	   have	   acquired	   Japanese	   citizenship	   yet	  continue	  to	  indentify	  as	  Nikkeijin.	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Japan’s defeat in World War Two.  Today, on the other hand, numerous Nikkeijin 
in the Philippines claim a Japanese or Japanese-Filipino ethnic identity.   
In chapter 2, I expound on the idea of consanguinal capital as a conceptual 
tool to grasp the strategic use of descent in endeavours to accumulate status and 
other forms of capital.  In chapter 3 I provide details about my methodology and 
the research process. 
I analyse the discursive shifts in NGO depictions of Filipino women migrant 
returnees from Japan in chapter 4. The depiction of Filipino women is crucial as 
the perceived legitimacy of claims for and on behalf of their children with 
Japanese men largely depends on distancing Filipino women migrant returnees 
from the negative image of the sex worker. Japanese-Filipino Children were born 
from the encounters that largely developed from what Parreñas (2011) terms 
“illicit flirtations”, but which have popularly been depicted in both Japan and the 
Philippines as commercial sex. The personal experiences of Japanese-Filipino 
children and youths, their legal struggles as well as the ways their problems are 
framed by non-governmental support organizations can thus neither be fully 
separated from the migration histories of their mothers, nor the global economic 
inequalities underlying their migration in the first place.  
I analyse the discursive construction of Japanese-Filipino children by NGOs 
in chapter 5. I argue that NGOs have invested in a particular language and have 
drawn upon powerful discourses to frame their causes. The deployment of rights 
discourses, including the discourse on universal rights and the potent idea of 
14	  	  
“birthright”, as well as discourses on the ideals of the “normal” family and 
childhood have lent themselves as widely recognized, salient ideological and 
semantic resources to understand as well as depict the issues and claims by and on 
behalf of Japanese-Filipino children. Moreover, the mobilization of Japanese-
Filipinos’ Japanese descent and ‘Japanese blood’ in the discursive constructions 
of the “JFC” draws on widespread layman understandings of ethnicity and ‘race’ 
which often conflate culture with Japanese descent and therefore perpetuate 
essentialist ideas. Combined with the claims for their “birthright”, discursive 
constructions of the “JFC” resonate with the recurring conflations of nationality, 
ethnicity and culture as well as with ideas of Japanese uniqueness as popularized 
by writers of the Nihonjinron19.  
Eventually, rights-claims facilitated by NGOs have led to a class-action suit 
that was filed in 2005 and which concluded in June 2008. This law-suit has 
engendered an important change in Japan’s nationality law implemented in 2009 
which is the focus of my discussion in chapter 6. The discursive shifts concerning 
ideas about what constitutes a family, and thus pertaining to the possible forms of 
this primary social unit responsible for the reproduction of future Japanese 
nationals, are of central importance for the outcome of the law-suit. Although the 
change in the law was chiefly based on the decision that, as is, the law was 
discriminatory, the ability of various non-nuclear family forms to raise bona fide 
Japanese was recognized. This change in law has increased the numbers of 
Japanese-Filipinos eligible to live and work in Japan. Chapter 7 is thus dedicated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Literally,	   Nihonjinron	  means	   “theories	   of	   the	   Japanese”.	   Nihonjinron	   refers	   to	   a	   set	   of	  discourses	  feeding	  into	  the	  idea	  of	  Japanese	  uniqueness.	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to the various views by Japanese-Filipinos on NGO work, reflections on being 
Japanese-Filipino in the Philippines and most importantly their experiences in 
Japan upon migration. In conclusion, I revisit the process and the consequences of 
mobilizing of consanguinal capital in the particular case of Japanese-Filipino 















Chapter 1: Contextualizing 
Nationality and Rights Claims 
 
Processes of rights-assertion on behalf of Japanese-Filipinos born since 
the late 1970s are not the first instances of claims for recognition from the 
Japanese state. Since the early 1980s, descendants of pre-war Japanese settlers in 
the Philippines have demanded Japanese nationality and compensation for having 
been ‘abandoned’ at the dusk of World War Two. At about the same time, Japan 
initiated efforts to repatriate descendants of Japanese settlers in Manchuria who 
had been orphaned or left behind when their families fled back to Japan upon 
Japan’s defeat. Moreover, Japan implemented a special visa in 1991 enabling 
foreigners of Japanese descent, or Nikkeijin, to live and work in Japan. This visa 
attracted numerous Nikkeijin from Latin America, especially from Brazil. These 
developments which have brought together foreigners of Japanese descent with 
‘mainland’ Japanese, have had an important influence on understandings of who 
ought to be ‘Japanese’. These “ethnic return”20 migrations also illustrate that 
ethnicity is malleable, strategic, and contextual. Furthermore, increasing numbers 
of children born to ‘international’ couples in Japan challenge the boundaries 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  “Ethnic	  return”	  migration	  is	  attributed	  to	  ‘ethnic	  nationalism’,	  defining	  national	  membership	  and	  citizenship	  based	  on	  shared	  ethnicity;	  “The	  clearest	  examples	  of	  ethnic	  nations	  are	  those	  in	  which	  certain	  ethnic	  requirements	  are	  written	  into	  the	  conception	  of	  citizenship.”(Poole	  1999,	  p.	  40)	  Nevertheless,	  the	  differentiation	  of	  ‘ethnic’	  and	  ‘civic’	  nationalism	  has	  been	  criticized	  for	  being	  too	  dichotomous	  (Jenkins	  2008;	  Poole	  1999)	  since	  “from	  the	  perspective	  of	  those	  who	  were	  excluded	  –	  Jews,	  Blacks,	  Gypsies	  –	  the	  most	  civic	  of	  nations	  always	  had	  an	  ‘ethnic’	  side	  to	  them.”	  (Poole	  1999,	  p.	  41) 
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between Japanese and foreigners. In this chapter, I aim to illustrate that ethnicity 
can be part of the strategies of gaining status and entitlements, and that sometimes 
certain ethnic identities are more practical and advantageous than others. Also, 
Japan’s experiences with ‘ethnic returnees’ have simultaneously challenged 
widely held primordial assumptions equating lineage with ethno-cultural and 
linguistic abilities, and contributed to a narrowing conception of Japaneseness in 
Japan21.  
Descendants of pre-war Japanese emigrants: the Nikkeijin 
The migration endeavours of Japanese-Filipinos based in the Philippines 
as well as their claims for Japanese nationality resonate with other instances of 
desired return to an ‘ethnic homeland’, such as the ‘return’ of Nikkeijin or the 
repatriation of left-behind offspring of war-time Japanese settlers in Manchuria. 
These ‘return’ migrations were motivated and institutionally supported by beliefs 
in a ritual homecoming to a ‘true’ origin as well as by the assumed social 
assimilability22 of ethnic returnees into the nation and culture of ‘origin’. In Japan, 
the Nikkeijin have been the most prominent group of ‘ethnic returnees’. 
Nikkeijin are the descendants of Japanese emigrants who settled in the 
Americas, Hawai’i and in parts of Asia including the Philippines before and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21 	  Tsuda	   (2008,	   p.125)	   writes	   that	   Japanese	   lineage	   and	   cultural	   competence	   were	  commonly	   accepted	   as	   correlated	   which	   is	   a	   consequence	   of	   Japan’s	   ideology	   of	   ethnic	  homogeneity.	   But,	   when	   the	   culturally	   distinct	   Nikkeijin	   settled	   in	   Japan,	   behaviour,	  mannerism,	  and	  language	  became	  markers	  of	  difference	  superseding	  the	  commonality	  found	  in	  ‘blood’.	  Tsuda	  (pp.	  127-­‐128)	  writes	  that	  “although	  the	  ethnic	  encounter	  with	  the	  Nikkeijin	  de-­‐essentializes	   Japanese	   ethnic	   identity	   by	   problematizing	   the	   assumption	   that	   shared	  racial	   descent	   is	   the	   fundamental	   determinant	   of	  who	   is	   Japanese,	   it	  may	   produce	   a	  more	  restrictive	  definition	  of	  Japanese	  identity	  based	  on	  increased	  cultural	  nationalism.”	  22	  Japanese	  lawmakers	  assumed	  that	  foreigners	  of	   Japanese	  descent	  would	  assimilate	  more	  quickly	   into	  Japanese	  society	  and	  would	  thus	  not	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	   Japan’s	  ostensible	  ethnic	  homogeneity	  (Tsuda,	  2010).	  	  
18	  	  
during World War II.  In the 1980s, Japan’s fast growing economy pushed the 
Japanese government to seek solutions which would satisfy the arising needs for 
cheap labour while avoiding the ethnic disruption usually associated with 
immigrants. Notably the Ministry of Justice, known to be conservative and  
strongly invested in the preservation of Japan’s ostensible ethnic homogeneity and 
cultural purity, was opposed to relaxing Japan’s ban on unskilled foreign workers 
for ethno-national reasons (Tsuda 2010). Allowing Nikkeijin to access the 
Japanese labour market thus appeared to be the most suitable option (ibid.). The 
revision of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act in 1990 thus 
created special conditions23 easing the settlement and employment of foreigners 
of Japanese descent. The Ministry of Justice, also the chief authority in the 
formulation of immigration policies and citizenship laws, appeared content. Tsuda 
(2010, p.627) quotes a Justice bureaucrat who was involved in the immigration 
debate:  
Kettoshugi [the principle of blood/lineage] and the privileging of 
foreigners with blood ties with Japanese was a fundamental concern of the 
Ministry of Justice from the very beginning when thinking about 
immigration policy because of concerns about preserving Japan’s ethnic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  The	  revision	  of	  the	  Immigration	  Control	  and	  Refugee	  Recognition	  Act	  in	  1990	  created	  the	  legal	   basis	   for	   Nikkeijin	   to	   live	   and	   work	   in	   Japan	   long-­‐term.	   The	   category	   “long	   term	  resident”	  was	  created	  under	  the	  revised	  law	  which	  allowed	  third	  generation	  Nikkeijin	  as	  well	  as	  the	  spouses	  of	  second-­‐	  and	  third-­‐	  generation	  Nikkeijin	  to	  live	  and	  work	  in	  Japan	  without	  activity	   restrictions	   (Sellek	   1997,	   p.189).	   Second	   generation	   Nikkeijn	   could	   apply	   for	   a	  “spouse	  or	  child	  of	  Japanese	  national”	  visa.	  The	  law	  revision	  allowed	  foreigners	  of	  Japanese	  descent	   up	   to	   the	   third	   generation	   to	   ‘return’	   to	   Japan	   for	   up	   to	   3	   years,	   the	   visa	   being	  renewable.	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homogeneity. So admitting the nikkeijin was not seen as a problem in this 
respect and they were the most acceptable out of all foreigners. 
 
The preference for people of Japanese descent over other foreign workers 
not only reinforced the primacy of Japanese lineage but also “underpinned the 
naturalized assumption that bloodline equates with cultural competence.” (Mackie 
2010, p.79). However, Nikkeijin were not given citizenship. Their primary role 
was to help Japan overcome its economic impasse. When the recent financial 
crisis hit in late 2008, the Japanese government attempted to ease its 
unemployment by offering out-of-job Nikkeijin a one-time payment24 in exchange 
for their return. Not possessing citizenship, Nikkeijin constitute an available 
labour force which can also be disposed of easily.  
The creation of such privileges effectively institutionalized essentialist 
ideas of Japanese uniqueness and primordial25 understandings of belonging by 
conflating ‘Japanese blood’ with cultural and linguistic abilities as expectations of 
similarity and eased assimilation have shown. The Nikkeijin experience eventually 
challenged the idea that Japanese ‘blood’ guaranteed cultural similarity and quick 
assimilability. Due to their cultural differences, Nikkeijin had become the anti-
thesis of Nihonjin (Japanese) (Cordova Quero 2008), reinforcing the boundaries 
between Japanese and non-Japanese rather than blurring them. Nikkeijin had 
challenged the “restrictive definitions of Japaneseness by causing the Japanese to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  US$3000	  for	  each	  Nikkeijin	  and	  2000US$	  for	  each	  family	  member	  in	  Japan	  (Tabuchi,	  2009)	  25	  Primordialism	   refers	   to	   “the	   idea	   that	   ethnicity	   is	   fixed,	   fundamental,	   and	   rooted	   in	   the	  unchangeable	  circumstances	  of	  birth”	  (Cornell	  and	  Hartmann	  1998,	  p.48)	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realize that cultural diversity exists among Japanese descendants.” (Tsuda 2008, 
p.119) This challenge has not led to a more inclusive definition of who ought to 
be ‘Japanese’, but on the contrary, to “a more restrictive cultural definition of 
Japanese identity based on an increased cultural nationalism.” (pp. 127-128) The 
cultural and linguistic differences between these ‘ethnic returnees’ and the 
Japanese resulted in a “boundary dissonance” (Efird 2010, p.231), rocking 
widely-held definitions of Japaneseness which blend cultural expectations with 
pseudo-biological notions of the Japanese ‘race’ (Sellek, 1997), and prompting 
questions of how to define a ‘Japanese’ if ‘blood’ was no longer sufficient.  
Although Japanese descent remains an important factor in determining 
whether a person can be considered ‘duly Japanese’, Japanese lineage needs to be 
substantiated by cultural performance. Mackie (2010) notes that the assumption 
that bloodline is equated with cultural competence is found in many national 
cultures (p.79). Supposed ‘authenticity’ thus has to be performative, meaning that 
individuals need to convey the authenticity of their Japaneseness by 
demonstrating cultural competence through mannerism, language skills, and 
fluency in cultural norms. When the descendants of Japanese settlers in the 
Philippines started to claim their right to be recognized as Japanese and obtain 
Japanese nationality, their arguments would highlight their ethnic Japaneseness as 
well as their emotive bond to Japan. 
Philippine Nikkeijin and the mobilization of Japaneseness 
Today’s claims by the Philippine Nikkeijin are made by the children and 
grand-children of Japanese farmers and labourers who settled in the Philippines in 
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the latter 19th and early 20th century26.  These settlers had come to the Philippines 
following the industrial revolution in Japan which has led to a dramatic increase 
in population, and by consequence a deterioration of living conditions as well as 
food shortages (Yamato, 1931). Today’s Southeast Asia, referred to as nan’you at 
the beginning of the 20th century, had attracted Japanese labourers and investors 
searching for better lives beyond Japanese shores (Jose, 1996).27 Contrary to 
emigration to Hawai’i, Peru, Brazil, Canada and the United States, migration to 
the Philippines was initially expected to be transient. Yet with a growing 
population of Japanese emigrants, the length of stay also increased. Soon, 
Japanese women joined the predominantly initial wave of male emigrants. 
Numerous Japanese men also intermarried with local Filipino women.   
Demands made by Philippine Nikkeijin for Japanese nationality are 
interesting to observe as they illustrate the malleable nature of ethnic 
identification and the strategic importance of citizenship. Prior to American-
Japanese war, Japanese settlers in the Philippines faced numerous difficulties in 
establishing businesses and owning property due to discriminatory laws. Only 
Philippine and American citizens were allowed to possess arable land according 
to the Public Land Act of 1919, which caused serious disadvantages to Japanese 
citizens who had heavily invested in the production of Manila hemp and rubber. 
One way of overcoming the disadvantages stemming from discrimination based 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Emigration	  of	   Japanese	  to	   the	  Philippines	   is	  said	   to	  have	  occurred	  as	  early	  as	   in	   the	  12th	  century,	  but	  people	  in	  the	  Philippines	  identifying	  as	  Japanese	  descendants	  today	  are	  largely	  offspring	   of	   pre-­‐WWII	   Japanese	   settlers	   as	   well	   as	   the	   children	   of	   Japanese-­‐Filipina	  relationships	  born	  since	  the	  late	  1970s.	  	  	  	  27	  Between	   1885	   and	   1924,	   the	   total	   number	   of	   Japanese	   emigrants	   in	   the	   Philippines	  amounted	  to	  21,323	  (Yamato,	  1931).	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on citizenship was to encourage the immigration to the Philippines of American-
born Japanese who held U.S. citizenship. In practice though, a number of 
Japanese either employed locals to act as their ‘dummies’, masking de facto 
Japanese ownership, or the land was registered under the name of one’s local 
spouse.  The naturalization of the second generation Japanese born in the 
Philippines was another option. Marriage to a local and naturalization of the 
second generation were two popular solutions against the State-imposed 
limitations of land ownership. However, to prevent local women from acquiring 
Japanese citizenship upon marriage and therefore lose the right to own arable land 
in the Philippines, their unions were often not registered in the Japanese koseki 
system28.  Children born from the union between Japanese settlers and their local 
Filipino wives were equally not registered as they too would become Japanese 
citizens. Thus, citizenship was carefully managed as it was instrumental in the 
efforts of Japanese settlers and their families to gain access to the same rights as 
Philippine and U.S. American citizens, and to own and do business.  
Despite being Filipinos by citizenship, children of Japanese settlers were 
educated similarly to children in Japan. Assimilation with locals was considered 
undesirable as Issei emigrants had begun to pride themselves as ittou kokumin 
(first class nationals), situating Japan on the same plane as the United States in an 
international political hierarchy, versus Filipinos who were considered santou 
kokumin (third class nationals) (Ohno, 2007, p.246). The desire of Issei emigrants 
to preserve Japanese nationalism among the next generations prompted the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Family	  register	  in	  Japan.	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establishment of Japanese elementary schools in Manila, Davao, and Baguio. The 
extensive contact with Filipino language and culture that these Japanese-Filipino 
‘mixed’ children had experienced in the course of their upbringing urged Japanese 
school teachers to instil in their students Yamato-damashii (Japanese spirit), 
shuushin (morals), and loyalty to the Emperor. Also, the use of any Filipino 
language was prohibited at school in efforts to replicate and preserve the Japanese 
nation abroad. These Filipino-Japanese children were thus educated as Japanese 
and fashioned into subjects of the Emperor despite their exposure to the local 
culture, their connection to their Filipino families, and their de facto Philippine 
citizenship.  A survey of 1939 shows that of about 2358 Filipino-Japanese below 
20 years of age, 1618 were “citizens of the Commonwealth of the Philippines”, 
while only 740 were reported to be “citizens of Japan” (Ohno 2007). The absence 
of formal Japanese citizenship, which in itself was a pragmatic decision, did not 
dissuade educators from instilling the Nisei (second generation) with Japanese 
nationalism.  
Thus, citizenship has been instrumental for capital accumulation long 
before the intensification of transnational migration after World War Two. In the 
early 20th century, Philippine citizenship was a precious status sought after by 
Japanese settlers who struggled for the necessary rights and privileges to build up 
their assets. However, with Japan’s rapid economic development after the war, 
economic difficulties in the Philippines, and the strong value of the yen, the 
income gap between the two countries widened and access to Japan’s labour 
market in turn became attractive. The (re-) gaining of Japanese citizenship, which 
24	  	  
is tied to Japanese nationality, thus became increasingly interesting to Philippine 
Nikkeijin. The generation who had initially functioned as anchors for their parents’ 
businesses and properties by virtue of their Philippine citizenship, began to claim 
Japanese nationality in the early 1980s.  
In their claims for Japanese nationality, Philippine Nikkeijin deployed 
notably two discourses: the discourse on Japaneseness and the victim narrative. 
The mobilization of Japaneseness meant that demands for Japanese nationality 
were supported by conflations of Japanese descent with cultural competence as 
well as character traits deemed ‘typical’ for Japanese. The victim narrative was 
largely realized by linking the experiences of Philippine Nikkeijin to those of the 
“orphans left behind” in Manchuria at the dusk of the war, thus deploying images 
of the innocent child entitled to reparation from the parent who abandoned them, 
the Japanese State.  
The 1990s was a beneficial period for organized Philippine Nikkeijin as 
the consequences of Japan’s imperialism slowly began to be discussed publicly in 
Japan and other Asian countries. Demands for reparations for former “comfort 
women” and compensation as well as recognition of the offspring of Japanese 
left-behind in Japan’s former colonies surfaced throughout Asia. Philippine 
Nikkeijin also began to identify themselves as victims of war after agreeing that 
their problems were due to their Japanese ethnic background. Within this 
narrative, Japan was pressured into assuming responsibility for its forgotten 
‘children’. Soon, Philippine Nikkeijin labelled themselves as Firipin Zanryuu 
Nihonjin (Japanese left behind in the Philippines) following the designation 
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Chuugoku Zanryuu Nihonjin-koji (Japanese orphans left behind in China) (Ohno, 
2007). The Nikkeijin Kai meeting of 1992 identified several more concerns faced 
by Nikkeijin such as the lack of knowledge on the whereabouts of the Issei (first 
generation) father, unpaid pensions for Nisei veterans who had collaborated with 
Japanese forces, and the confiscation of property after the war. 
It thus proved fruitful for the Philippine Nikkeijin to draw an association 
between themselves and Japanese orphans left behind in China and to position 
themselves as victims of war. In 1995, the year of the 50th commemoration of the 
end of the war, heightened media interest in Japan’s war legacies also placed the 
spotlight on Japan’s ‘left behind orphans’. The Japanese mass media widely 
reported on the unresolved after-effects of the war, including “returned” Nikkeijin 
in Japan who were referred to as Firipin Zanryuu-koji (orphans left behind in the 
Philippines) (Ohno, 2007). Gradually, Philippine Nikkeijin gained public 
sympathy as victims of war and soon Japanese government officials began 
changing their attitude towards them (p.252). In that year, the acceptance of an 
application by Takezawa Daisuke, a Nisei Filipino, to register his name in his 
father’s koseki marked an important step in the acknowledgment of Philippine 
Nikkeijin. Takezawa had spent three years collecting all necessary documents and 
preparing his trip to Japan where he eventually was allowed to add his name to 
the family register and thus “regain” Japanese nationality (ibid.). Many more 
Philippine Nikkeijin undertook the same procedure after his success. Interestingly, 
when documenting the demands for Japanese nationality, newspaper reports 
overemphasized the strong identification of claimants with the Japanese nation 
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and downplayed their desires to access Japan and its labour market (cf. Reuters 
1995; Reuters News 1995; Kyodo News Int. 1995). In doing so, mass media 
reiterated the importance of blood ties and the emotional aspect of “ethnic return” 
while overlooking the more pragmatic intentions underlying claims for Japanese 
ethnic identity and by consequence claims for Japanese nationality.  Yet, it was 
precisely this pragmatism which decades ago caused the non-registration of 
Philippine Nikkeijin in their father’s koseki and the non-registration of their 
parents’ marriages to preserve their Philippine citizenship to secure land 
ownership. A similarly practical judgment pushed Nikkeijin to hide their Japanese 
ancestry in the years that followed the end of World War Two. Then, as Japan 
rose to economic power and numerous Filipinos sought employment abroad, 
pragmatism still played a crucial role.  
Indeed, the 1990s brought about one more significant change for 
Philippine Nikkeijin. The Ministry of Justice of Japan had revised its immigration 
control act in 1990 and had created a special visa for immigrants of Japanese 
descent to participate in the labour market for several years. This provided 
opportunities for the offspring of Philippine Nikkeijin to gain access to Japan and 
earn a better living, if their elderly, second-generation Japanese parent was able to 
obtain Japanese citizenship. Second generation Philippine Nikkeijin thus sought 
Japanese nationality in an effort to ‘upgrade’ their own and their offspring’s status 
(Ohno, 2007). Most Nikkeijin seeking Japanese nationality in the 1990s and early 
2000s were already of mature age -many in their 70s or 80s- and therefore were 
unlikely to seek employment in Japan. However their offspring could benefit from 
27	  	  
the privileges extended to foreigners of Japanese descent if they were able to 
secure Japanese nationality. Nisei Nikkeijin’s efforts to obtain Japanese nationality 
were thus geared at making it possible for their offspring to enter Japan as 
children of Japanese nationals and to take advantage of the change in Japan’s 
Immigration Control Act of 1990.  
“Ethnic returnees”: ethnicity contested  
In claims for Japanese nationality and their recognition as Japanese, 
Nikkeijin have emphasized their affective ties with Japan as well as their 
presumed ‘natural’ cultural dispositions. Also, the framing of Philippine Nikkeijin 
as ‘orphans left behind’ and as “war-displaced” people (Kyodo News Int. 1995) 
conceptually established their rightful link to Japan. Despite growing up in 
Filipino families and holding Philippine citizenship, the connection with Japan 
through the father remained strongly emphasized in Nikkeijin’s claims. At public 
appearances and during press conferences held in the Philippines and occasionally 
in Japan, Philippine Nikkeijin would reflect on their belonging to Japan and 
emphasize their descent by ‘blood’ usually by highlighting or performing their 
Japaneseness.  
Leticia Daruca, 65, was born to two Japanese parents, but was orphaned at a 
young age. She said ''I was raised by Filipino people but I've always felt that I am 
a Japanese. I hope my request (for the registration) will be accepted.'' (in Kyodo 
News, 2005). Another Nikkeijin stated that "It is really hard for us because we are 
torn between two races, the Filipino and the Japanese." He also said "I might have 
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been raised as a Filipino, but my heart remains Japanese." (The Daily Yomiuri 
2008) 
Some Nikkeijin attributed their Japaneseness to something that they had 
learned in the past. During a press-conference in 2008, one elderly woman sang 
the song "Aikoku Koshinkyoku" (Patriot March) which she learned at school (in 
Takanashi, 2008). Another Philippine Nikkeijin born in 1931 and who obtained 
Japanese nationality stated in Japanese: 
Even after the war, I have continued to consider myself Japanese. I had been 
educated as Japanese by my father, and always educated in Japanese manner 
[at the Japanese elementary school]. I have never had a sense as Filipino. I had 
a conversation with my Bagobo mother in Japanese, and told her that I would 
remain Japanese forever. (in Ohno, 2007, p.251) 
 
Instances of “feeling” Japanese despite being raised by a Filipino family, being 
“torn between races” and explaining one’s ‘natural’ dispositions as a genetic 
inheritance, are examples of how Japaneseness is substantiated by descent or 
‘blood’. Displaying Japaneseness proved necessary to convince an audience, 
comprising both the public and Japanese lawmakers, of the rightful claim to 
formal membership of the Japanese nation and consequently, for legal pathways 
to (re-)gain nationality of that country.  
The opportunity to live and work in Japan was an important motive for 
Philippine Nikkeijin (re)-claiming their Japanese nationality (Ohno, 2007). As 
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many second-generation Nikkeijin were too old to join the workforce in Japan 
upon obtaining their papers, claiming Japanese nationality would mainly benefit 
their children and grand-children as they could enter Japan under the category 
“child of a Japanese national” and under the preferential visa for Nikkeijin 
introduced in 1990. Ohno (2007, p.251) cites one second-generation Nikkeijin 
stating: “My grandchildren are also able to work in Japan after I got Japanese 
nationality”. This motive is reiterated by others; in a news report in 2008 one 
second-generation Nikkeijin states ''If I acquire Japanese nationality, I want to 
make my children and grandchildren come to work in Japan'' (Yasumoto, 2008 a).  
Obtaining a Japanese passport however created a dissonance between self-
identification and formal citizenship for Philippine Nikkeijin who were confronted 
with how others in Japanese society perceived them. Illustrating this point, Ohno 
(2007, p.255) cites another of his respondents, a third-generation Philippine 
Nikkeijin who had worked in Japan since 1998. He identifies himself primarily as 
Filipino, partly because he is not recognized as “fully” Japanese in Japan. He 
says: 
Japanese employers regard me as Filipino and keep my wage amount lower 
than Japanese workers even after I became Japanese. My identity is Filipino. 
But, I wish to work in Japan until reaching the age of 60. I and my Filipino 
wife living with me make a remittance amounting around 100,000 yen to our 
relatives every month. It’s very difficult to find such amount job in the 




The rise of Japan’s economic power and the improvement of its image in the 
Philippines have encouraged Philippine Nikkeijin to “come out” and assert their 
Japaneseness. These Nikkei Japanese-Filipinos have thus gone from being painful 
and despised reminders of the Japanese occupation to being able to enjoy the 
privilege of cross-border mobility by virtue of that very same descent. Yet once in 
Japan, the espousal of Japanesness was frequently challenged by much stricter 
definitions of who ought to be Japanese, basing Japaneseness not merely on 
descent but also on performance.  
Nikkeijin’s claims for Japanese nationality, their framing as “orphans of 
war”, and their subsequent migration to Japan brought about another consequence. 
Meetings between “orphans left behind” and their relatives in Japan did not 
always turn out to be the teary reunions that widespread media reports have 
portrayed (Efird 2010, p.826). On the contrary, reunions have often been made 
difficult by “fears over inheritance, conflicts with other family members, and an 
understandable absence of affection between people who are family in biology 
and name only” (ibid.). Furthermore, Japanese returnees’ lacking cultural 
competence associated with being Japanese often disappointed assumptions of 
unity and cultural competence based on blood (Efird 2010). Thus, the pursuit of 
Japanese nationality by “orphans left behind”, which largely hinged on notions of 
shared lineage, Japaneseness and ‘blood’, resulted in disappointment in spite of 
blood relationships.  
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Following this experience, similar discourses attributing cultural sameness 
to diasporic Japanese are encountered with greater skepticism. As I will show in 
more detail in Chapter 6, Japanese descendants’ ability to develop and 
demonstrate a ‘tie’ to Japan has been an important matter in discussions 
pertaining to the right to acquire Japanese birthright citizenship and nationality. 
This does not mean that Japan has abandoned its notion of ethnic homogeneity, 
but understandings of who ought to be Japanese have tightened and now not only 
call for a biological tie to a Japanese national, but also require the proper 
performance of Japaneseness (including a specific mannerism, language skills, 
and fluency in ethno-cultural norms).  
The belief in a Japanese ‘ethnic essence’ is largely based on popular 
discourses theorizing the alleged uniqueness of the Japanese. This discursive and 
literary genre is termed Nihonjinron and is commonly translated as ‘discussions 
of Japaneseness’ or ‘theories of Japanese’.  Publications assigned to Nihonjinron 
contributed to the production of a new Japanese identity by coming to terms with 
the ordeals and successes Japan had undergone during the 20th century. These 
include Japan’s defeat and subsequent occupation after the Pacific war and its 
tremendous economic success since the 1960s. Nihonjinron has seen contributions 
by the Japanese and foreign academe, by journalists, and by the Japanese business 
elite, but Nihonjinron is also popular culture29. Most of it are expressions of non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Sugimoto	   (1999,	   p.81)	  writes	   that	  major	   bookshops	   in	   Japan	   have	   corners	   dedicated	   to	  
Nihonjinron,	  accommodating	  the	  numerous	  “[b]ooks	  and	  articles	  which	  claim	  to	  identify	  the	  essence	   of	   ‘Japaneseness’	   [which]	   have	   flooded	   the	   market	   with	   some	   selling	   millions	   of	  copies”	   Sugimoto	   estimates	   that	   about	   1000	   publications	   falling	   into	   the	   category	  “Nihonjinron”	  have	  been	  published	  between	  1948	  and	  1999,	  and	  that	  about	  one	  quarter	  of	  
32	  	  
official popular nationalism heavily relying on “primordial sentiments inherent in 
the presumed ‘ethnic essence’ of the Japanese- blood, purity of race, language, 
mystique- which are the basic ‘stuff’ of Nihonjinron, pre- and post-war” (Befu in 
McVeigh, 2006, p. 193). Nihonjinron highlights what it perceives as Japanese 
uniqueness as well as ‘racial’, social and cultural homogeneity of Japanese society. 
But being confronted with Nikkeijin immigration to Japan, the greatest challenge 
to Nihonjinron orthodoxy comes “from individuals and groups that are at once 
seemingly “Japanese” in appearance and kinship or descent terms, yet 
demonstrably “Other” in cultural terms (language, values, behavior, and so forth.)” 
(Efird, 2010, p.230). The ‘return’ of Japan’s so called “war orphans” and the 
immigration of large number of Nikkeijin were thus events which prompted the 
redrawing of boundaries between bona fide Japanese and Others30. 
Claims for Japanese nationality made by and on behalf of Japanese-
Filipinos are thus exacted against the backdrop of already occurring nationality 
claims by other groups of Japanese descendants and experiences of immigration 
of foreigners of Japanese descent to Japan. NGOs and Japanese-Filipinos in the 
Philippines are therefore likely to encounter some reservation from their Japanese 
audiences and Japanese lawmakers stemming from the disappointed primordial 
assumptions of cultural and linguistic similarity. For advocacy to gain foothold, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  contemporary	   Japanese	  population	  have	   read	  one	  or	  more	  books	  of	   the	  genre,	  making	  
Nihonjinron	  a	  sizeable	  and	  tenacious	  phenomenon	  (p.	  82).	  30	  Tsuda	   (2008,	   p.119)	   observes	   a	   resurgence	   of	   cultural	   nationalism	   and	   of	   Nihonjinron	  discourses	  among	  ordinary	   Japanese	  citizens	   following	   increased	   immigration	  of	   culturally	  distinct	   Nikkeijin.	   Efird	   (2010,	   pp.828-­‐829)	   states	   that	   Japan’s	   “war	   orphans”	   posed	   “a	  paradox	   for	   conventional	   Japanese	   definitions	   of	   Japaneseness	   that	   rest	   upon	   an	   implicit	  (and	  often	  explicit)	  equivalency	  between	  biology	  and	  culture”,	  due	  to	  their	  Japanese	  descent	  yet	  their	  being	  culturally	  Chinese.	  Subsequently,	  these	  groups	  of	  ‘returnees’	  were	  considered	  foreigners,	  rather	  than	  Japanese.	  
33	  	  
Japanese-Filipinos thus need to be framed not only as Japanese, but also as 
adaptive and willing to learn new things (an ability largely associated with 
children) including ‘things Japanese’, as offspring of Japanese who occupy a 
central role in the children’s lives, and as deprived of their claimed-for rights.  
Japanese-Filipino children 
Japanese-Filipino children born since the late 1970s are children of 
transnational migration: either one of their parents had to cross borders to meet 
the other. This border-crossing was facilitated by income inequalities bringing 
numerous Japanese tourists and investors to the Philippines, and driving 
thousands of Filipino women into employment in Japan’s red light districts as 
“entertainers”. From 1979 (the year termed Japayuki gannen31) to 2005, the 
number of Filipino migrants to Japan on “entertainer” visas had steadily increased. 
The earliest available statistics by the Philippine Overseas Employment 
Administration (POEA) indicating the number of Filipinos bound for Japan as 
overseas performing artists (OPA) 32  date from 1993. In that year, 41,408 
performing artists left the country, out of which 39,426 were women. Ten years 
later, in 2003, the number had increased to 58,230 individuals, out of which 
55,659 were female33. Consequently, the growing feminization of the Philippine 
labour force bound overseas has provoked concern about women’s safety abroad 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Literally	  ‘Japayuki	  Year	  One’.	  It	  is	  said	  to	  have	  been	  the	  year	  when	  the	  number	  of	  migrant	  women	  bound	  for	  Japan’s	  night-­‐clubs	  first	  exceeded	  10	  000	  (Suzuki	  2007).	  Japayuki	  literally	  means	  ‘Japan-­‐bound’	  and	  is	  a	  play	  on	  words	  based	  on	  the	  term	  Karayuki-­‐	  ‘bound	  overseas’-­‐	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  often	  impoverished	  Japanese	  women	  deployed	  to	  brothels	  in	  Asia	  before	  and	  during	  World	  War	  Two.	  	  32	  The	   category	   ‘OPA’	   includes	   following	   titles:	   ‘Performing	   Artists’,	   ‘Choreographers	   and	  Dancers’,	  ‘Composers,	  Musicians,	  and	  Singers’	  33	  Statistics	  about	  Overseas	  Filipino	  Workers’	  deployment	  available	  at	  http://www.poea.gov.ph/stats/statistics.html	  	  (accessed	  on	  16	  January,	  2013)	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and has sparked public concern about the decline of the Filipino family and the 
welfare of children who have been ‘left behind’.  These panics were highly 
gendered and saturated with normative ideas about womanhood and femininity, 
mourning the breakup of the nuclear family (Horton 2008, Parreñas 2005) as well 
as displaying great anxiety over women’s sexualities (Parreñas 2011). Filipina 
migrants to Japan have particularly been affected by feminist activist discourses 
equating hostessing with prostitution and by their labelling as victims of human 
trafficking under the assumption of their “sexual exploitation” (ibid.). Despite the 
absence of a comprehensive study on the plight of “entertainers” in Japan, 
Filipina hostesses have been called the largest group of sex-trafficked persons in 
the world by the 2004 and 2005 U.S. Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons 
Reports (ibid.). This identification and Japan’s placement into the “Tier 2 Watch 
List” category within the said reports (The Japan Times online 2004), have led to 
a drastic curbing of the number of entrants on “entertainer” visas since 2005. 
Indeed, the number of “entertainers” entering Japan in 2004 was as high as 82,741. 
Two years later, it dropped to 8,607 (Parreñas 2011, p.4).  
The high numbers of Filipino women migrating to Japan and working in the 
night business has also led to increasing instances of affective and sexual 
relationships between Filipino women and Japanese men.  From these, numerous 
Japanese-Filipino children were born. In 1994, the Philippine Ambassador to 
Japan pointed out that the number of children born to Japanese-Filipina couples 
was on the rise, and that most of these children were born out of wedlock. 
Between 1991 and 1993 the embassy had recorded the births of 605 Japanese-
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Filipino children, 60% of which were “illegitimate” (Kyodo News Int. 1994 a). In 
November 1994, then-President of the Philippines Fidel Ramos asked for Japan’s 
cooperation in helping to settle the issue of Japanese-Filipino children abandoned 
by their Japanese fathers, which would include the determining and legalization of 
their status in Japan. (Kyodo News Int. 1994 e).  The request for cooperation 
emerged at around the same time as the case of “Baby Andrew”, an abandoned 
new-born child in Japan whose parents’ identities could not be determined and 
who thereby was stateless at birth. The issue of legal status of babies born out of 
wedlock to foreign women and Japanese men became increasingly pressing. 
Coincidentally, Japan ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in 
1994, making the problems of out-of-wedlock births, children’s precarious legal 
status in Japan, and abandonment by Japanese fathers even more relevant. The 
exact number of Japanese-Filipino children residing in Japan and the Philippines 
remains unknown as neither of both countries register their population using 
ethnic or ‘racial’ categories. Estimates by NGOs range from 100,000 to 400,00034  
Japanese-Filipino children born since the late 1970s (JFC Multisectoral 
Networking Project 2011). Japanese-Filipinos are diverse in age, residency, 
nationality, familial situation, socio-economic background, and educational 
attainment.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  DAWN	  (2010)	  estimates	  100,000	   to	  200,000	   Japanese-­‐Filipinos	   living	   in	  both	   Japan	  and	  the	   Philippines.	   In	   a	   statement	   given	   by	   Japanese-­‐Filipino	   youth	   made	   in	   2009,	   300,000	  Japanese-­‐Filipino	  children	  were	  mentioned	  (United	   Japanese	  Filipino	  Children	  2009).	  Batis	  (2009)	  counts	  300,000	  to	  400,000	  Japanese-­‐Filipino	  children	  and	  youths	  currently	  living	  in	  the	  Philippines.	  
36	  	  
Detailed profiles of Japanese-Filipino children and their Filipino mothers are 
available only through data collected by NGOs catering to the said population. 
However NGO data collection excluded individuals not seeking their help, and 
thus may paint a more drastic picture of Japanese-Filipinos’ deprivation since 
individuals not considering themselves in need of support, or not wanting to 
associate with an NGO out of fear of being considered deprived, would not be 
featured in such data. With this limitation in mind, we may however look at the 
profiling of Japanese-Filipinos and their mothers carried out by DAWN and the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM). DAWN’s data is derived from 
respondents located in the Philippines, while the IOM has included Japanese-
Filipinos in both Japan and the Philippines.  
In 2007, DAWN conducted a Philippine-wide registration of Japanese-
Filipino children coupled with two questionnaires, one to be answered by the 
Japanese-Filipino child the other by his/her mother. A total of 994 Filipino 
mothers and 1,173 Japanese-Filipino children registered (DAWN 2010). The 
nation-wide registration collected data on Japanese-Filipinos aged up to 33 years 
old. The mean age was 11 years, with 67% aged 0-12, 26% aged 13-19, and 7% 
aged 19 and above in 2007 (ibid.). According to DAWN, the registration was 
conducted to identify the needs and situations of Filipino mothers and their 
Japanese-Filipino children. The questionnaire thus enquired about the status of 
support received from Japanese fathers, communication sustained with the father, 
and whether the child had ever lived in Japan. Approximately 10% of all 
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respondents said that they had lived in Japan35.  A third of all Japanese-Filipino 
respondents indicated that they had never met their Japanese father. About a third 
had received or still receives financial support from their fathers, and about 20% 
maintain or used to maintain regular communication with their father. 
The IOM is not regularly involved with the issue of Japanese-Filipino 
children, but has initiated a project targeted at identifying pathways of safe 
migration to Japan for Philippine based Japanese-Filipinos following the change 
in Japan’s nationality law. To do so, the IOM has conducted a study with the help 
of other NGOs, including the CNJFC, Batis, Batis YOGHI, and DAWN, aimed at 
identifying the general profile of Japanese-Filipinos in Japan and the Philippines, 
as well as their desires and concerns. According to the IOM’s findings, a little 
over 40 out of 106 Japanese-Filipinos residing in the Philippines are aged 11 to 
15, while close to 50 are aged 16 to 20 (IOM 2009).36 Out of these 106, only 
around 10% speak Japanese, while all others speak Filipino and various 
Philippine dialects as well as English. Thirty-six percent were recognized by their 
Japanese fathers, while 39% were not, and 25% did not indicate. Only 16 
respondents were registered in their father’s family registry, but only 10 were 
Japanese nationals. Sixty-five percent did not receive financial support, 17% 
indicated that they did. Fifty-six percent had no communication with their fathers 
(ibid.).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  rest	  has	  replied	  “no”	  to	  the	  question	  as	  some	  respondents	  may	  have	  left	  the	  answer	  field	  blank.	  DAWN	  does	  not	  provide	  the	  number	  of	  negative	  responses.	  	  36	  Some	   of	   the	   graphs	   featured	   in	   the	   IOM	   report	   do	   not	   provide	   exact	   numbers	   or	  percentages	  which	  makes	  an	  accurate	  reading	  difficult.	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Similarly, out of 106 surveyed Japanese-Filipino based in Japan, most are 
aged between 15 and 21 years (ibid.). Of these, 83% indicated that their parents 
were married, and 83 respondents had Japanese passports. Thirty-eight percent 
indicated that they spoke only Japanese at home, while 47% indicated that they 
spoke Japanese and English, or Japanese and Filipino, or Japanese, English, and 
Filipino. Only 9% did not speak Japanese at home. 87% were registered in their 
father’s family registry, 52% received financial support from their fathers and 
59% maintained regular communication with him (ibid.). The IOM’s data shows 
that Japanese-Filipinos in Japan face very different situation from their 
Philippine-based counterparts, notably so if they were born and raised in the 
country, for which Japanese spoken at home (38% sole language, 47% part of the 
languages spoken) would be a good indicator. They are more often in possession 
of Japanese passports and receive financial support from their fathers more 
frequently.   
The expression “Japanese-Filipino children” refers to individuals in their mid-
30s as well as babies. “Children” is thus not a reference to people in their 
childhood, but used in reference to offspring of Japanese-Filipina relationships. 
“JFC” (short for Japanese- Filipino Child) is the acronym coined by the NGOs 
included in this study. Although not the first group of Filipino of Japanese 
descent, a semantic difference was made between these offspring born since the 
late 1970s and the descendants of pre-war Japanese settlers. The latter called 
themselves Nikkeijin, with reference to the Japanese diaspora. Their claims and 
their appearance in mass-media occurred barely a decade before claims by and on 
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behalf of “JFC”. Post-war born Japanese-Filipinos have also been referred to as 
Shin-Nikkeijin37, whereby the additive “shin” (new) again upholds the difference 
between Japanese-Filipinos born since the late 1970s and the descendants of 
Japanese emigrants who settled in the Philippines in the early 20th century. Both 
the acronym “JFC” and Shin-Nikkeijin were utilized by groups in the Philippines 
and Japan to popularize alternatives to the more demeaning labels such as Japino 
which bears a reference to children born to women associated with sex-work. 
More importantly though, the maintenance of a certain “correct” designation for 
Japanese-Filipinos are avowals of authority and expertise on issues pertaining to 
the said population, as well as of rightful representation. 
 Claims for Japanese nationality by and on behalf of “JFC” are, as 
illustrated above, not the first instance of claims-making by Japanese descendants. 
However, what their claims have in common with those by the other groups of 
Japanese descendants previously discussed is that demands for Japanese 
nationality by “JFC” similarly invoke the construction and endorsement of a 
Japanese ethnic identity.   Moreover, as studies of Nikkeijin have shown, ethnic 
identification is contextual, strategic in nature and therefore malleable; an 
observation which may apply to “JFCs’” ethnic identifications as well. The 
importance of social contexts in ethnic identity claims are further illustrated by 
studies on Japanese children of ‘mixed’ descent in Japan, showing how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Literally:	   New	   people	   of	   Japanese	   descent.	   The	   term	   Shin-­‐Nikkeijin	   puts	   post-­‐war	   born	  Japanese-­‐Filipinos	  in	  a	  special	  category,	  separate	  from	  Nikkeijin.	  The	  term	  is	  commonly	  used	  for	   out-­‐of-­‐wedlock	   born	   children	   of	   Filipina	   entertainers	   and	   Japanese	  men	   and	   therefore	  deemed	  demeaning	  by	  many	  NGO	  workers	  and	  Japanese-­‐Filipinos	  themselves	  (Suzuki	  2010).	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widespread perceptions of certain ethnic groups in Japan effect on the ethnic 
identification of these children (Almonte-Acosta 2009; Ishii 2013).  
‘Hafu’ in Japan: practicality and desirability of ethnic identifications 
Challenging the boundaries between Japanese and foreigners, increasing 
numbers of children were born to Japanese-foreign couples within Japan since the 
1980s. Japan’s ‘internationalization’ resulted in rising numbers of relationships, 
of marriages and of children born between Japanese and non-Japanese. The 
figures of ‘international marriages’ had starkly risen from 12,181 in 1985 to 
41,481 in 200538 . The children born from these relationships are usually referred 
to as “Hafu” (from the English word “half”), although a number of parents and 
activists have tried to popularize the term daburu (double) as an alternative term 
that would not suggest incompleteness. The term “Hafu” is most commonly 
understood to refer to offspring of Japanese and European descent although it 
actually indicates that a child has one Japanese parent and one non-Japanese 
parent. 
The expression “Hafu” emerged in the 1970s. Earlier terms denoting 
children born from relations between Japanese and foreigners - usually American 
- were Konketsuji (mixed-blood) or the more demeaning label Ainoko 
(crossbreed). The fairly recent popularity of Eurasian looks has led to a number of 
Japanese-Caucasian Hafu being featured in popular media (notably on television 
and in women’s magazines). However the existence of Hafu not fitting into these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  According	   to	  data	   from	  the	   Japanese	  Ministry	  of	  Health,	  Labour	  and	  Welfare,	  Table	  1-­‐37	  
Number	   of	   marriages	   by	   nationality	   of	   husband	   and	   wife,	   by	   year,	   available	   at	  http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/db-­‐hh/1-­‐2.html	  ,	  access	  30	  September	  2013.	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mainstream depictions has largely been ignored. “Visible Hafus are a minority of 
the minority” (Hafu- the film, 2013); the majority are the invisible ones who are 
born from the three largest groups of foreigners intermarrying with Japanese: 
Chinese, Filipinos and Koreans (ibid.). One reason why these ‘mixed’ roots 
Japanese are largely undetectable is that they are often hard to distinguish based 
merely on their looks. However a more important aspect is that many Asian 
‘mixed’ roots Japanese also prefer to conceal their foreign parentage (Ishii, 2013). 
Japan’s ‘internationalization’ has thus not simply led to a diversification of its 
social fabric but to a stratified diversification within which the various ‘mixed’ 
roots are either perceived to be of advantage or to be a liability. More than merely 
countering the myth of ethnic homogeneity still prevalent in Japanese society, the 
narratives of different Hafu reveal how racial hierarchies within Japanese society 
have produced various ways of experiencing ‘being half’. Life experiences greatly 
diverge among ‘mixed blood’ Japanese in modern Japan (Fish, 2009). Moreover, 
ethnic identifications are carefully negotiated according to their perceived 
advantage and desirability in Japanese society as Ishii (2013) and Almonte-Acosta 
(2009) have observed.   
For example, Ishii (2013) shows that ‘mixed- ethnic’  Japanese children 
negotiate their ethnic identity according to how they perceive possible 
identifications to fare in society; usually they choose the most beneficial 
identification and avoid assuming an ethnicity deemed “disadvantageous”  (Ishii, 
2013, p. 177). Ishii studied children born to Thai-Japanese couples and concluded 
that most of these children would identify as Japanese, unless they were brought 
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up by their Thai single-mothers, which would then complicate this sole 
identification. In some cases, children even feel sorry for their mothers for being 
Thai (ibid.). Internalizing the ‘race’-based hierarchies of their social environments, 
children born to a non-Caucasian parent would rather identify as Japanese while 
those born to Japanese and Caucasians tend to assume their “Western” identity, 
according to Ishii (2013, p. 178)39.  
The ‘race’-based hierarchies reflected by ‘mixed’ children’s choices of 
ethnic identification are also mirrored in societal perceptions of cross-border, 
inter-ethnic marriages. “In some dominant representations, writes Suzuki (2007, 
p.436), Japanese husbands of Filipinas have committed “bad” marriage. Their 
“badness” has been discussed in gender and racial-national terms: they have 
undermined their manhood and Japan’s global positionality.” While Suzuki 
(2007) states that marriages to women from the ‘Third World’ undermine Japan’s 
“hard-earned First World status in the postwar global order” (p 438), Mackie 
(1998, pp. 55-56) observes that marriages of Japanese men to Filipino women are 
“seen as natural if the gendered hierarchies match the racial hierarchies, but a 
relationship between a Japanese woman and a non-Japanese man from a country 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  The	   assumption	   of	   a	   “Western”	   identity	   by	   ‘mixed’	   Japanese	   children	   rather	   than	   a	  Japanese	  one	  for	  reasons	  of	  beneficence	  is	  contextual.	  Fish	  (2009)	  writes	  that	  the	  situation	  of	  
Hafu	  in	   Japan	   is	  actually	  very	  diverse;	  during	   the	  post-­‐war	  period	  most	  Hafu	  were	  born	   to	  Japanese	  women	  and	  U.S.	  American	  military	  men	  stationed	  in	  Japan	  and	  largely	  considered	  a	  social	   issue,	   not	   least	   because	   they	   often	   lived	   in	   impoverished	   conditions.	   During	   those	  times,	  writes	  Singer	  (2000,	  p.	  77)	  those	  Hafu	  “who	  could	  often	  tried	  to	  pass	  as	  full-­‐blooded	  Japanese	  and	  denied	  their	  American	  heritage.”	  However	  today,	  most	  Hafu	  born	  to	  “Western”-­‐Japanese	   couples	   are	   of	   higher	   social	   class	   and	   therefore	   do	   not	   face	   the	   same	   kind	   of	  discrimination.	  An	  exception	  to	  this	  may	  be	  Japan’s	  southern	  island	  of	  Okinawa	  were	  the	  U.S.	  continues	  to	  maintain	  a	  military	  base.	  Singer	  (2000)	  writes	  that	  because	  Caucasian-­‐Japanese	  
Hafu	  have	  increased	  in	  popularity	  as	  entertainers	  and	  are	  seen	  in	  TV	  and	  print	  commercials	  they	  are	  considered	  cool	  by	  their	  peers.	  Still,	  numerous	  children	  of	  ‘mixed’	  heritage	  continue	  to	  be	  bullied	  in	  school	  due	  to	  their	  perceptible	  or	  known	  foreign	  heritage.	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perceived as lower down the racial hierarchy is unthinkable, here.” Still, both 
authors agree that the children born from these unions “are the embodiment of 
hybridity” (Mackie 1998, p.56), “whose identities further blur the assumed line 
between the Japanese, the First World and “honorary white” and the Filipinos, the 
Third World and people of darker color. “ (Suzuki 2007, p.438) 
.  
Similarly identifying such ‘race’-based hierarchies, Almonte-Acosta 
(2009) demonstrates that Filipino-Japanese adolescents prefer to be identified as 
Japanese. Most of her respondents show very little interest in things Filipino and 
rather “...go out of their way, so as not to be identified as part of the [Filipino] 
minority group” (p.28). The knowledge of Tagalog or any other Philippine 
language is considered a source of embarrassment and therefore undesirable 
(ibid.). Almonte-Acosta concludes that Filipino-Japanese conceal their Filipino 
ancestry due to the pervasive myth of ethnic homogeneity, their desires to be part 
of the majority, as well as due to negative images associated with the Philippines 
and Filipino women in particular. ‘Race’-based discrimination in Japan therefore 
greatly impacts on how ‘mixed-blood’ Japanese negotiate their ethnic identities 
and on how ‘race’ can be an advantage or a liability. The extension of Japanese 
nationality to Japanese-Filipino children raised in Japan makes it possible for the 
latter to further conceal their non-Japanese parentage.   
An interesting point thus arises from the comparison of Japan-born and -
raised Japanese-Filipino adolescents’ assertion of a Japanese ethnic identity with 
Philippine Nikkeijin’s avowal of Japaneseness. Firstly, the comparison 
substantiates the strategic and social environment-conscious nature of ethnic 
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identification. Secondly, it shows that different discourses are employed to justify 
the same claim although by people in different locations and social contexts. Both 
groups espouse ethnic identities as Japanese, yet Japan-based Japanese-Filipinos 
justify their choice through their birth and socialization in Japan as Japanese 
(Almonte-Acosta, 2009, p. 23). Ethnic identity constructions by “mixed” Japanese 
children in Japan are contingent upon widely-held images of various ethnic and 
national groups within Japanese society.  
Philippine Nikkeijin on the other hand draw on discourses of ‘blood’, 
kinship and on ideas of a Japanese ‘essence’ (Ohno, 2007) to support claims to be 
accepted as Japanese in absence of socialization in Japan. The competing 
discourses of “nature” versus “nurture” are therefore tactically chosen to support 
claims for a particular ethnic identity over another.  Ethnic identification is thus 
also tied to matters of social status and pragmatic considerations including the 
access to privileges and rights. A similar divide arises among my respondents and 
from the texts produced by the NGOs speaking on their behalf. Although claims 
have been made on behalf of all Japanese-Filipinos, the individuals spoken for 
and spoken about are diverse in terms of familial situation, age, citizenship, and 
place of residence. An important difference exists among children and youth who 
grew up in the Philippines and those who were raised in Japan; the former were 
raised by their Filipino families, usually in absence of their Japanese parent, while 
the latter grew up as Japanese in Japan. Both groups differ culturally and 
linguistically, and one could argue that they are ethnically distinct as well due to 
their upbringing in different ethno-cultural environments. The individuals 
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interviewed for this dissertation, although based in either Japan or the Philippines 
at the time of the interview, were all raised in the Philippines at least until their 
early teens.  
To recapitulate, “JFCs’” claims towards the Japanese government are not 
the first ones of their kind; Philippine Nikkeijin had started to demand Japanese 
nationality and the recognition of Japan’s responsibility towards them about a 
decade earlier. Also, studies on the ‘return’ of Nikkeijin and of Japanese 
descendant in Manchuria have highlighted the contextual and malleable nature of 
ethnic identification. Both occasions provide useful bases of comparison with 
current processes of claims-making by Japanese-Filipino children as both involve 









Chapter 2: Conceptual approach and 
framework 
 
The symbolic and political struggle for the recognition of Japanese-
Filipinos as part of Japan’s history and of the Japanese nation-state largely 
consists of the latter’s construction as “JFC” through NGO discourses. Claims for 
Japanese nationality and citizenship made by and on behalf of Japanese-Filipinos 
challenge politics of exclusion which legally and ideologically demarcate the 
boundaries of the Japanese nation-state. Japan’s citizenship regime is an 
institutionalization of such exclusions aimed at controlling the population as well 
as fashioning it. Citizenship regimes are indeed sites of potentially conflicting 
visions over who belongs, enabling or disabling individuals’ access to rights and 
privileges. Citizenship regimes are institutionalized biopolitics. Foucault (1990; 
2003) terms “biopolitics” the management and regulatory controls of the 
population as a political problem, including the regulation and control of its 
reproduction. By setting the rules of membership and the inheritance of 
membership, the state controls the boundaries of its population and the rules of 
becoming part of it. In this chapter I expound on the concept of consanguinal 
capital as a tool to analyze the efforts made to overcome institutionalized 
exclusions, and on the necessary conditions for consanguinal capital to be 
mobilized towards gaining economic capital associated with cross-border 
migration and employment. 
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Citizenship in drawing nation-state boundaries 
As a form of membership, citizenship is internally inclusive as well as 
externally exclusive (Brubaker 1992, p.21). All modern states define their 
citizenry by formally recognizing some persons as members and all others as non-
members. This recognition ideally enables citizens to participate in civil society 
and marks a legal status entitling citizens to rights, but also demanding the 
fulfilment of obligations. Moreover, as a form of membership, citizenship entails 
“a conceptually clear, legally consequential, and ideologically charged distinction 
between citizens and foreigners” (ibid.). The state, as an organization and as an 
association of citizens, is usually thought of as the politically sovereign 
embodiment of the nation. A bounded citizenry is thus “more cohesive than a 
mere aggregate of persons who happen legally to belong to the state” (ibid.). 
Citizenship can therefore be thought of as the institutionalized, legally codified 
expression of membership in the nation.  
However, citizenship has changed in the face of globalization: “In an ever-
shifting landscape configured by mobilities and positionalities, the idea of 
citizenship tied to the terrain and imagination of the nation-state is called into 
question” (Ong 2005, p. 697). Large-scale cross-border migrations have 
contributed to the de-linking of citizenship from the nation as migrants acquire 
political and social membership in their country of residence, while maintaining 
economic, political and social tied to their country of origin. Moreover, the 
acquisition of formal citizenship and other titles of residency have in many 
instances followed pragmatic decisions, dissociating citizenship from national and 
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cultural identities as well as from emotive ties (Ong 1999; 2005). Ong (1999; 
2005) depicts how wealthy transnational Chinese business elites maintain their 
cultural identities despite often possessing numerous passports. Citizenship of 
particular states is acquired primarily for strategic purposes, to secure investments 
and grow assets, making citizenship largely instrumental. Indeed, the 
globalization of markets has subjected citizenship to economic calculations (Ong 
1999, p.112). The possession of citizenship of a country on the right “side of the 
border of security and prosperity” (Shachar 2009 b, p.1) is thus also a sought-after 
status available to those who can afford it. Consanguinal capital, I argue, can be a 
means through which citizenship becomes affordable. 
Converse to the de-linking of citizenship from the imagination of the nation-
state, processes of globalization have also brought about the redrawing of the 
national and ‘racial’ boundaries of citizenship in some contexts. An example of 
such a development could be witnessed in the Republic of Ireland in 2003. The 
Supreme Court of the Republic of Ireland concluded that non-citizen parents of 
Irish citizen children could no longer claim residency in Ireland (Luibhéid 2004). 
Before the ruling, giving birth to a child on Irish territory was a more steadfast 
way for asylum seekers to gain legal residency, than filing for asylum (ibid.). 40 In 
the discussions preceding and finally leading to the Supreme Court Ruling 
migrant women, and more specifically their bodies, gained centre stage (ibid.).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Indeed,	  between	  1999	   to	  2002,	   the	  number	  of	  people	  granted	   legal	   residence	   in	   Ireland	  based	   on	   being	   a	   parent	   of	   an	   Irish	   child	   almost	   doubled,	   climbing	   from	   1428	   persons	   in	  1999	  to	  2879	  in	  2002	  (Luibhéid	  2004,	  p.	  338).	  These	  numbers	  also	  exceeded	  the	  numbers	  of	  asylum	  seekers	  whose	  asylum	  claims	  had	  been	  granted,	  making	  childbearing	  asylum-­‐seekers	  a	  controversial	  issue	  among	  the	  public	  and	  the	  government	  (ibid.).	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Women’s bodies have come under public scrutiny because of their 
reproductive abilities. Sexuality is at the heart of biopolitical concern as it 
constitutes the intimate link between the individual and the population through its 
reproductive function (Foucault 1990, pp.147-149; 2003, pp.251-252). Women 
are held accountable for the recreation of the ‘racial’, ethnic and national 
boundaries of communities, as well as for the transmission of cultures and values 
of the community ( (Luibhéid 2004, pp. 341-342). Thus, women’s sexuality, and 
the control thereof, “remains key to establishing and maintaining- but also 
potentially contesting and reworking- racial boundaries and racialized social 
orders” (p. 342). Women’s reproductive capacities are both threats to and enablers 
of biopolitical projects. The centrality of women’s sexuality in the reproduction of 
the nation and its boundaries is therefore institutionalized in social policy and law, 
notably in the legal framework guiding the acquisition of nationality and 
citizenship. As I will discuss in chapter 4, the importance of women’s sexualities 
in state biopolitics has contributed to the discursive re-imaging of former Filipino 
hostesses in Japan by NGOs for the purpose of claims-making.  
Citizenship laws determine under what conditions women can pass down 
their nationality and citizenship, or acquire legal residency through their child. 
The legal codification of pathways to citizenship and residency thus also imply an 
understanding of which claims, conditions, and relationships are ‘legitimate’, and 
which merely serve to ‘exploit’ the system41. The Republic of Ireland amended its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Luibhéid	   describes	   how	   asylum	   seekers	   in	   Ireland	   have	   been	   portrayed	   as	   “spongers,	  wasters,	  and	  conmen”	  (member	  of	  parliament	  Noel	  O’Flynn	  in	  Luibhéid	  2004,	  p.339),	  living	  comfortably	  off	  Irish	  taxpayers	  money	  and	  engaging	  in	  childbearing	  as	  a	  means	  to	  exploit	  the	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constitution in 2004, abandoned the jus soli principle, and replaced it with a 
combined principle of jus domicili and jus sanguinis42 (Harrington 2005, p.443) 
that hinged on the acquisition of Irish citizenship of a child onto the legal status of 
the parent, and his/her length of residence in Ireland. This legal change closed off 
the possibility for asylum seekers from giving birth to Irish citizens. In Japan, the 
acquisition of Japanese nationality and citizenship has been based on the principle 
of jus sanguinis since the drafting of the first nationality law in 1899. The ‘blood’ 
principle has been maintained up to this day, yet the law has also adapted to 
changes brought about by globalization. For instance, the acquisition of Japanese 
nationality has until 1985 been patrilineal (except in the case of unmarried 
Japanese women) but was changed in preparation for the ratification of the United 
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women. Although making the acquisition of Japanese nationality bilineal, the 
1985 amendment also included new restrictions concerning dual-nationality as 
Japan’s lawmakers saw an endangerment of the “one person, one nationality” 
principle in the face of increasing migration and international marriages 
(Murazumi 2000). The law amendment indeed made it more difficult for children 
born to parents of different citizenships to acquire Japanese nationality and 
citizenship.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  system	   (p.339).	   Vukov	   (2003)	   mentions	   that	   the	   Canadian	   Immigration	   and	   Refugee	  Protection	  Act	   proposed	   in	   2001	   aimed	   at	   closing	   the	   back	   doors	   to	   avoid	   the	   “abuse	   [of]	  Canada’s	  openness	  and	  generosity.”	  (CIC,	  2001	  in	  Vukov	  2003,	  p.347)	  42	  Children	  born	  in	  the	  Republic	  of	  Ireland	  of	  non	  Irish	  parents	  could	  thus	  only	  become	  Irish	  citizens	   if	   at	   least	  one	  parent	  was	  a	   lawful	   resident	   for	  at	   least	   three	  out	  of	   the	   four	  years	  prior	   to	   the	  child’s	  birth.	  Time	  spent	   in	   Ireland	  as	  an	  asylum	  seeker	  or	  a	   student	  does	  not	  count	  (Harrington	  2005,	  p.443).	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The study of Japanese-Filipino children reveals a telling picture of the 
workings of the politics of exclusion which have made some offspring of 
Japanese-Filipina relations Japanese citizens, and others Philippine citizens. 
Japanese-Filipino children in the Philippines are born potential Japanese citizens, 
based on the principle of jus sanguinis. Japanese nationality and citizenship are 
conferred primarily based on descent, but also remain dependent on other 
variables such as the sex of the Japanese parent, on whether a child was born in or 
outside Japan, on the timing of the child’s registration with Japanese authorities if 
born overseas, and until 2008, on the marital status of the child’s parents. Thus, an 
existing biological tie between parent and child does not necessarily equate to the 
child’s right to Japanese citizenship at birth. Notably, children with Japanese 
fathers and non-Japanese mothers are subjected to exclusionary practices based on 
whether they are deemed desirable and fit for Japanese citizenship and nationality 
depending on the circumstances of their birth as will be elaborated in more detail 
below.  
These politics of exclusion have become a matter of contention for affected 
individuals and for the NGOs speaking on their behalf, not merely because, in 
principle, Japan extends citizenship based on jus sanguinis, but also because 
citizenship reflects membership of the Japanese nation and an acknowledgment as 
part of Japan’s history.   
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Immigration and citizenship regimes are institutions through which national 
communities are imagined and materially constructed (Vukov, 2003)43. The 
boundaries of the nation-state can expand and contract with changing conceptions 
of the terms of membership in the imagined community of the nation. The de-
linking of citizenship from ethnic and national identities, as well as processes of 
re-nationalizing citizenship, are contradictory trends which redraw the boundaries 
of the nation-states simultaneously. Eased access and greater rights and 
entitlements are granted to wealthy and wealth-bearing foreigners in the pursuit of 
human capital (Ong 2006, p.2), while borders are tightened for immigrants 
considered ‘undesirable’ by highly managed immigration and citizenship regimes 
(Vukov 2003). 44 
Indeed, not only individuals have learned to manoeuvre global politico-
economic changes, but as suggested above, governments too have responded to 
the challenges arising from transnationalism (Ong 1999, 6-7). States have 
adjusted their immigration and citizenship regimes utilizing the global flow of 
economic and human capital in their favour. Successive Philippine governments, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Vukov	   (2003)	   writes	   about	   immigration	   regimes.	   However	   the	   same	   can	   be	   said	   about	  citizenship	  regimes.	  	  44	  Japan’s	   ‘undesired’	  used	   to	  be	   low-­‐skilled	   foreigners	  who	  were	  considered	   to	   jeopardize	  Japan’s	  supposed	  ethnic	  homogeneity,	  thus	  prompting	  the	  preferential	  treatment	  of	  Nikkeijin	  in	  the	  1990s.	  With	  the	  economic	  tides	  turning	  and	  numerous	  Nikkeijin	  facing	  unemployment,	  Japan	  has	  recently	  adjusted	  its	   immigration	  policy	  to	  encourage	  Nikkeijin	   to	  return	  to	  their	  countries	  of	  citizenship,	  and	  has	  instead	  actively	  attracted	  the	  highly-­‐skilled	  through	  a	  point	  system	   introduced	   in	  May	  2012.	  The	  policy	  explicitly	   targets	   the	  highly	   skilled,	  as	   “foreign	  professionals	   are	   expected	   to	   contribute	   to	   economic	   growth	   and	   [the]	   creation	   of	   new	  demand	  and	  employment	  in	  Japan”	  (Ministry	  of	  Justice	  Japan	  2012).	  The	  point	  system	  caters	  to	   the	   transnational	   elite	   of	   highly	   educated	   and	   highly	   paid	  workers	   and	   thus	   reinforces	  Japan’s	  long-­‐standing	  official	  rejection	  of	  low-­‐skilled	  migrant	  labour.	  It	  also	  broadens	  the	  gap	  among	  non-­‐citizen	  residents	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  rights	  and	  privileges	  associated	  with	  the	  various	  titles	  of	  their	  visa.	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for instance, have since the 1970s encouraged its overseas population to maintain 
economic, political, social, and emotive ties with their country of birth, reaping 
the benefits of large amounts of remittances flowing back into its economy every 
year. States on the migrant-receiving end have in turn fine-tuned their 
immigration and citizenship regimes in ways to gain the most from globally 
mobile talent and investments, while shutting out the ‘undesired’. Citizenship is 
thus an important status and set of rights which remains contested and subjected 
to processes of expansion or contraction for the purpose of letting in or shutting 
out certain groups or populations.   
As numerous states have made efforts to attract highly skilled as well as 
wealth-bearing migrants, state borders have tightened for poorer economic 
migrants. To be able to cross international borders upheld by market-driven 
policies, migrants need to possess various forms of capital: economic capital, in 
the form of assets and investment, cultural capital, in the form of education, work 
experience and sought-after skills, or social capital, in the form of familial 
networks allowing them to obtain long-term visas or citizenship (as available 
through family reunification programs). For migrants unable to produce any of the 
above, another potential option remains: the mobilization of consanguinal capital.  
Consanguinal Capital in symbolic struggles 
I argue that descent can be mobilized and therefore is a form of capital, 
similarly to how Bourdieu (1986; 1989) described the working of cultural, social, 
economic and symbolic capital, “like aces in a game of cards, in the competition 
for the appropriation of scarce goods of which this social universe is the site” 
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(1989, p.17). I introduce the concept of consanguinal capital as a tool to make 
sense of the central role played by claims to consanguinity, often epitomized by 
the metaphor of ‘ Japanese blood’, in the symbolic and political struggles by 
NGOs and a number of activist Japanese-Filipinos advocating for the recognition 
of “JFC” as part of Japan’s history and thus responsibility. Consanguinal capital 
can be mobilized by individuals to take advantage of already existing structures 
allowing for the recognition of descent as legitimate ground for status or special 
treatment. Various states, for instance Japan, Korea, Germany, Italy or China, 
have initiated policies of ethnic return. But when such opportunities do not exist, 
descent first has to be established as symbolic capital. In the increasingly 
exclusivist world of global, neoliberal governance defining the ideal citizen as 
homo oeconomicus (Ong, 2005), consanguinal capital may be mobilized to 
overcome the exclusions institutionalized by immigration and citizenship regimes 
by appealing to consanguinity (as actual biological descent or as ethnicity) as a 
criterion of inclusion45. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  There	   are	   other	   cases	   in	  which	   ancestry	   has	   provided	   the	  necessary	   basis	   for	   people	   to	  migrate	   and	   search	   for	   jobs	   abroad.	   Such	   cases	   were	   documented	   in	   the	   early	   2000s,	  following	  the	  financial	  crisis	  in	  Argentina.	  Argentineans	  of	  Italian	  descent	  were	  able	  to	  take	  advantage	   of	   Italy’s	   citizenship	   policies,	   allowing	   descendants	   of	   their	   early	   emigrants	   to	  ‘return’	   and	   claim	  membership	   in	   the	   nation-­‐states.	   In	   2000	   alone,	   the	   Italian	   Embassy	   in	  Buenos	   Aires	   gave	   more	   than	   12,000	   passports	   to	   Italian-­‐origin	   Argentines	   (Hall,	   2001).	  Although	   not	   through	   appeals	   to	   descent	   but	   to	   filiation,	   Vietnamese	   Amerasians	   able	   to	  provide	  proof	  of	   their	  U.S.	  American	  parentage	  were	  allowed	   to	   enter	   the	  Unites	   States	   as	  refugees	   (Bass,	  1996).	  Claims	   to	  a	  particular	  ancestry	  can	  also	  play	  out	   in	  various	  ways	   in	  national	   contexts;	   in	   her	  most	   recent	   book,	  Hau	   (2014)	   observs	   that	   Chinese	   and	   Chinese	  
mestizos	  in	  the	  Philippines	  have	  experienced	  a	  re-­‐evaluation	  of	  their	  Chinese	  ethnic	  identity	  following	  China’s	  economic	  rise	  and	  increased	  geopolitical	  importance.	  Chinese	  mestizos	  and	  “pure	  Chinese”	  in	  the	  Philippines	  are	  now	  reclaiming	  their	  Chinese	  descent	  (which	  had	  been	  subsumed	  under	  a	  Filipino	  national	   identity)	  and	  put	   to	  work	  their	  Chineseness	  in	  order	  to	  establish	   and	   benefit	   from	   business	   alliances	   with	   mainland	   Chinese	   companies.	   TallBear	  (2013)	   shows	  how	  descent	   and	   lineage	   are	   constructed	   and	   reconstructed	   in	  politics	   over	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For the longest time, the Japanese government has maintained that the 
socio-economic and legal situation of children born to Filipino women and 
Japanese men is a private matter. But NGOs have challenged this view. To do so, 
they have engaged in a struggle over “truth”, over visions of social reality which, 
if successful, ought to provide “JFC” with entitlements and privileges they have 
thus far not been able to obtain. The symbolic struggle by and on behalf of 
Japanese-Filipinos thus aims to legitimize consanguinal capital and eventually 
transform it into other forms of capital. Among these is also Japanese citizenship 
which, as a sought after resource akin to property, largely determines life chances, 
opportunities, and security (Shachar 2007, 2009). Moreover, the attribution of 
Japanese birthright citizenship to Japanese-Filipinos who thus far had been 
excluded from acquiring it, would also mark the legitimation of consanguinal 
capital by the Japanese state, and therefore the institutionalization of a new take 
on the responsibility of the Japanese state towards these offspring.  
The mobilization of consanguinal capital is discursive and considerably 
performative. Consanguinal capital can be transformed into other forms of capital 
once it is recognized as legitimate, but in order for consanguinity, or ‘blood’ 
metaphors, to gain salience there need to be a number of conditions, values and 
dominant (and possibly institutionalized) perceptions of the social world in which 
consanguinity matters and engenders positive consequences. Before going into 
detail about these conditions, it is necessary to take a closer look at the idea of 
consanguinity as it is suggestive, not only of actual blood relationships between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  tribal	  membership	   and	   in	   processes	   of	   disenrollment	  which	   are	   often	   related	   to	   issues	   of	  access	  to	  resources	  and	  monetary	  benefits.	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two individuals, but also of kinship ties which can be extrapolated into 
imaginations of an ethnic group, a people, or a nation. In this section I will clarify 
the relationship between consanguinal capital, ethnicity, the nation, and the need 
for performance mentioned at the beginning.  
Consanguinity has been utilized to denote a kin relationship based on 
descent from a common ancestor and usually denotes a blood relation, following 
its root word sanguis (blood). But social anthropologists have found that fictive 
kinship can be just as powerful as those relationships based on biological ties 
(Marshall 1998, p. 110). Indeed, communities are formed upon the premise of a 
common descent even if claims to sharing descent are questionable (Fenton 2010, 
p.3). Consanguinal capital does account for the importance of blood relationships 
in the popular imaginary with regards to familial as well as ethnic ties; however 
these blood relationships can be real or merely assumed. At an analytical level, 
consanguinal capital needs to be understood in political-symbolic terms, not only 
as a reference to actual biological ties or features. More important than actual 
blood ties are the meanings attributed to these (real or assumed) blood 
relationships, and the effects of knowing of these relationships on the ‘sense of 
self’, and by consequence, on claims. Actual blood ties gain importance only 
where there is a need for their traceability and documentation, such as in the 
attribution of nationality and citizenship based on the principle of jus sanguinis. 
Yet, even in such cases existing blood ties may either not suffice, or blood ties 
may simply be presumed. Japan’s nationality law, for instance, provides for both 
scenarios. Although Japanese nationality and birthright citizenship are attributed 
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based on the principle of jus sanguinis, further legal provisions exclude some 
children of Japanese nationals from acquiring it. Moreover, Japan’s nationality 
law is based on its family code, stating that children born within wedlock are 
automatically presumed to be the husband’s, notwithstanding the existence or 
inexistence of an actual blood tie between father and child (Suzuki, 2010). More 
important than actual blood ties in political and symbolic struggles, is the 
performative realization of these ties following popular conflations of biological 
descent with cultural descent. In such conflations, biological relationships are 
collapsed into ethnic and/or national belonging.   
Ethnicity and ethnic identity 
Ethnicity has been defined in various ways and is indeed an elusive 
concept (Poole 1999, p.38) which makes it difficult to work with. Broadly 
speaking, ethnicity is a way to conceptualize cultural differentiation and the 
tendency of social actors to identify groups, as well as identify themselves as part 
of a group, based on the opposition of “us” versus “them”. Max Weber describes 
ethnic groups as “…those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their 
common descent because of similarities of physical type46, or of customs or both, 
or because of memories of colonization and migration” (in Cornell& Hartmann, 
p.16). What is interesting about this definition is that Weber foregrounds the 
subjective belief in common descent, whether or not such blood ties really exist. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  This	   translation	  of	  Weber’s	  work	  has	  been	   criticized.	   In	  his	   original	  German	   text	  Weber	  writes	   of	   “Habitus”	   which	   can	   be	   translated	   as	   “bearing”,	   “deportment”,	   or	   “outward	  appearance”	   (Raum	  1995,	   p.77)	   The	   difference	   between	   translating	   “Habitus”	   as	   “physical	  type”	  instead	  of	  “outward	  appearance”	  or	  “deportment”	  is	  that	  “physical	  type”	  is	  more	  likely	  to	   be	   understood	   as	   inherited	   phenotypical	   traits	   linked	   to	   biological	   relations,	   while	  “deportment”	  or	  “outward	  appearance”	  are	  more	   likely	  to	  be	  read	  as	  references	  to	   learned	  behaviour,	  mannerism,	  or	  clothing.	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Ethnicity is thus tied to how we see ourselves, rooting the basis for assumed 
common descent in physical resemblance, cultural practices, shared historical 
experience or any combination of these (p.17). Basing his conceptualization of 
ethnic groups on Weber’s definition, Richard A. Schermerhorn adds the criterion 
of self-consciousness, emphasizing that ethnic groups are populations that see 
themselves as distinct (p.19). Ethnic groups are also defined by making claims to 
kinship, to a common history, and to symbols that capture the core of the group’s 
identity. Whether they are actually culturally distinct from the larger society 
within which they form a collectivity is irrelevant (ibid.). 
The problem with this definition is that it collapses the concept of 
ethnicity with the concept of culture. Indeed, the concept of ethnicity is 
problematic because it is elusive and too easily becomes a fill-in term for either 
the concept of culture, or for ‘race’. One reason for this is the centrality of descent 
in the group’s self-understanding, and the difficulty in defining what counts as 
common descent (Poole, 1999, p.37).  Too often do understandings of a common 
descent conflate biological and cultural relations between present members and 
their predecessors (p.41).  Poole argues that ethnicity can be defined broadly as 
“constituted not by lines of physical descent, but by the sense of continuity, 
shared memory and collective destiny” (A.Smith in Poole, 1999, p.39), or 
narrowly, as family or kinship group of which we become members via birth or 
rules of entry. Yet the former definition, so Poole, bears the risk of confounding 
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ethnicity with culture and overstretching the concept47.  The latter definition is 
fraught by the risk of conflating cultural with biological descent as “[c]ultural 
conceptions of transmission often make use of concepts of ‘family’, ‘blood’, 
‘kin’, and the like, and it may not be clear- even to members of the cultural group- 
just how seriously these metaphors should be taken” (ibid.). Likewise, Efird 
(2010, p.806) points at the highly problematic use of ‘ethnicity’ both in everyday 
life and at an analytical level, as ethnicity’s ambiguity 
…also invites the very same associations with biology and behavior that 
made race so pernicious. Indeed, the confusions of cultural heritage and 
biological heritability that compose popular ideas of ethnicity often end up 
seeming all too similar to the “race” that they were meant to replace.  
 
The difficulty with accounts of ethnicity, writes Poole, is the failure to recognize 
that ethnicity is not a ‘natural’ given or an ‘objective’ fact, but a cultural construct 
which is mediated in various ways. Ethnic groups appear and disappear; 
boundaries between ethnic and non-ethnic groups are shifting (p.39).  The 
identification and construction of ethnic groups often has socio-economic and 
political dimensions, making ethnicity “not different from but a different kind of 
cultural identity” (ibid). Ethnicity of “JFC” is treated as innate, as an ‘objective’ 
fact in NGO discourses and by some of my respondents as well. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Poole	  (1999)	  argues	  that	  every	  significant	  cultural	  group	  or	  tradition	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  sense	   of	   continuity,	   a	   shared	   memory	   and	   a	   collective	   destiny,	   so	   that	   even	   the	   Catholic	  Church	  or	  the	  Boy	  Scouts	  would	  qualify	  as	  ethnic	  groups	  when	  using	  the	  former	  as	  defining	  characteristics	  (p.39).	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Constructing and mobilizing ethnicity 
The ‘instrumentalist’ perspective on ethnicity has emphasized the 
plasticity of ethnic identification (Jenkins 2008, p.46).  A main proponent of this 
perspective is Fredrik Barth who argued that ethnicity is largely defined 
situationally and is apt to change, meaning that “people (and peoples) can and do 
shift their ethnic ascriptions in the light of circumstance and environment. The 
pursuit of political advantage and/or material self-interest is the calculus which is 
typically held to inform such behaviour” (ibid.). The mobilization of 
Japaneseness by Philippine Nikkeijin, as elaborated above, provides an 
illustration of the instrumentalist perspective on ethnicity. Filipinos of Japanese 
descent had hidden their Japanese ancestry for decades after the war. Yet as Japan 
experienced its economic miracle while the Philippine economy dwindled, 
claiming Japanese lineage and ethnic identity became beneficial as means to 
qualify for entitlements (reparation, Japanese citizenship, or a Nikkeijin visa) 
extended by the Japanese state. Japanese lawmakers too have stretched the 
definition of ethnic Japanese in times of urgent need for affordable labour-force. 
Despite being socially constructed and in flux, ethnic identities are often 
perceived as ‘natural’ by most actors in society. For that reason, ethnicity all too 
often becomes conflated with ‘race’, as Poole (1999) and Efird (2010) have noted, 
resulting in an amalgamation of physical markers with behavioural and cultural 
traits, a particular geographical ‘origin’, and a common history. This 
amalgamation may at times be endorsed by individuals, who rationalize certain 
behaviours and preferences as innate, and a particular geographical location as 
well as cultural environment as ‘natural habitat’ or ‘homeland’. As I will show in 
61	  	  
this study, such tendencies have manifested in how a number of Japanese-
Filipinos talk about their being of Japanese ‘blood’. My notion of consanguinal 
capital, which refers to real or assumed blood relations with a person or a people, 
captures the tendencies to conflate ethnicity with biological relationships in 
strategies of claims making since, as I will demonstrate, the mobilization of 
consanguinal capital is both discursive and performative. 
Having highlighted that ethnicity and ethnic identity are malleable and 
instrumental aspects of one’s personal identity, it is also necessary to remember 
that ethnic identity has affective and emotional dimensions. Ethnicity is an aspect 
of the cognitive constitution of individuality, and becomes part of the perception 
of self through socialization (Jenkins 2008, p.49). What importance ethnic 
identity eventually gains for an individual differs in relation to the political, social 
and cultural context in which she/he lives. Ethnic identity can also become more 
or less significant throughout a lifetime. Ethnicity, the existence and means of 
cultural differentiation, is taught and its salience and meaning are socially and 
historically contingent. But despite ethnic groups and identities being flexible, 
individuals do not always have the possibility to ‘choose’ who they are since 
external categorizations limit their options.  
Social collectivities, writes Jenkins, “are actually shaped, to greater or 
lesser degrees, by a combination of group identification and social categorization. 
Each is simultaneously implicated in the other; social identity is produced and 
reproduced in the dialectic of internal and external definition.” (p.83)  Group 
identifications form in relation to an assumed audience and the awareness of a 
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“socially constructed cultural repertoire” (p.82). External definitions may 
acknowledge group identification as is, or impose otherwise. Such external 
categorizations as well as the perception of how important ethnicity figures in a 
person’s individual identity are subject to change: “Ethnicity, or at least an 
awareness of it, is likely to figure in different ways, with different social costs and 
benefits (consequences) attached, in each place and at each time” (p.49). 
Consequently, the meanings attached to ethnicity, and the various social 
consequences these meanings have in a particular setting, will influence how 
much ethnicity matters to the individual and to a larger group (ibid.). Thus, if the 
deployment of a particular ethnic identity engenders higher social status, access to 
resources, or cross-border mobility, then such benefits would make this particular 
ethnic identity more significant to the individuals who are able to claim it. But 
whether external categorizations make it possible for people to claim a particular 
ethnic identity, challenge widely held categorizations, or to resist the ascription of 
certain identities is a matter of politics and power, and a matter of symbolic 
struggles over perceptions of the social world. In the context of transnational, 
cross-border claims-making, the establishment of ethnic groups and the 
contestation of social categories have become more complicated because of the 
simultaneous involvement of (at least) two socio-cultural environments with 
differing definitions of ethnic categories, as well as of different audiences in 
relation to which ethnic groups and identities are produced.  
The establishment of ethnic groups and the challenge of ethnic categories 
and their boundaries is part of the symbolic and political struggle by and on behalf 
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of Japanese-Filipinos. Social classifications, according to Bourdieu (1989, p.22), 
“organize the perception of the social world and, under certain conditions, can 
really organize the world itself.” Ethnicity is a means of social classification that 
operates primarily as binary opposition of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. When engaging in 
symbolic struggles aimed at contesting the boundaries of these categories, 
consanguinal capital is mobilized by NGOs and activist Japanese-Filipinos, and 
sought to be transformed into symbolic capital. This may indeed bring about 
institutional change, create new Japanese citizens, enable migration, attribute 
status, and enable access to resources for those who thus far had been excluded.  
The symbolic struggle over divisions and classifications is a struggle over 
perceptions of the world; for this struggle over symbolic power, symbolic capital 
is the basis (Bourdieu 1989, p.23). Bourdieu’s works focus on the making of 
social classes, the establishment and perpetuation of social stratification through 
various forms of capital. But ethnicity and ethnic groups, as socially structuring 
forces, are also subject to occasionally conflicting processes of formation and 
classification. In processes of claims-making by and on behalf of Japanese-
Filipinos, and in the discursive construction of the “JFC”, consanguinal capital is 
sought to be legitimized and recognized so that new classifications and groups can 
be asserted. NGOs and Japanese-Filipinos asserting of a different way of drawing 
ethnic boundaries (targeted at the inclusion of “JFC” as ethnic Japanese and as 
Japanese nationals) marks a challenge to current state biopolitics in Japan.  
The efficacy of the symbolic struggle “…depends on the degree to which 
the vision proposed is founded in reality.” (Bourdieu 1989, p.23) As mentioned 
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earlier, consanguinal capital needs certain conditions to be mobilized and 
potentially acknowledged. The importance of blood relationships in the popular 
imaginary of familial and ethnic ties provides fertile ground for symbolic 
struggles capitalizing on blood discourses, on consanguinity. Moreover, for cross-
border claims for citizenship and residency titles to gain symbolic credit based on 
consanguinal capital, citizenship and immigration regimes need to be premised 
upon an understanding of citizenship as nationality and of nationality as ethnicity, 
as well as on an understanding of immigration of ethnic ‘others’ as threatening. 
Thus, for ‘blood’ arguments to gain salience, citizenship needs to be underpinned 
by ethno-national conceptions and acquired based on the principle of jus 
sanguinis. Consanguinal capital, in order to be mobilized, needs a legal and 
ideological environment in which citizenship, nationality, ethnicity, and 
biological descent are conflated to a great degree. Such an ideological 
environment is largely provided by Japanese nationalism. 
Ethnicity and ‘blood’ in Japanese nationalism 
There is no one Japanese nationalism, but different forms of nationalisms 
which have developed and changed over time and in response to various political 
events. Japan’s nationalism as we know it today has its roots in the Meiji period, 
war-time mobilization in the context of Japan’s imperial project, and Japan’s post-
war search for a new place and identity as a nation, and in the world following 
Japan’s defeat. One aspect of Japan’s nationalism, which McVeigh (2006) terms 
“ethnos nationalism”, can be traced back to the Meiji period (1868-1912) during 
which the concept kokutai ,which translates into “national polity”, “national 
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essence”, or “national entity”, gained ground as ideology against U.S. American 
and European influences and political power (p.43). Kokutai referred to the idea 
of a uniquely Japanese polity and implied Japan’s ‘immutable’ and ‘national 
character’ (ibid.). Moreover, discourses on kokutai came to be constituted by the 
idea of the nation as family writ large48 . Japan’s ethnos nationalism thus also 
“arose from linkages to an extended kinship at the national level with [the] 
Emperor as paterfamilias, an inherent connection to the “nation’s body” (kokutai), 
essentialist definitions of culture and race, and […] false consciousness.” (p.148) 
These essentialist definitions of culture and race, and indeed the conflation 
of the two, continued to characterized Japanese nationalisms during and after the 
war. The most popular and comprehensive nationalism of the postwar period was 
“the belief in a particular type of nation-ness that vacillates between ethnocultural 
and ethnocracial definitions of identity. [...] A theme of Japan’s postimperial 
ethnos nationalism is “homogeneity”, a myth so powerful that it informs the 
idiom of everyday discourse, media, journalism, and academic writings about 
Japan” (p.147) Despite being a myth, the unfounded associations and mistaken 
connections between ethnicity, race, culture, behaviour, or linguistic ability 
implied in ethnos nationalism, persist because most people think instinctively, 
habitually and unsystematically, leaving these links largely unquestioned (ibid.). 
One consequence of such habitual associations is, as McVeigh (2006, p.187) 
elaborates, the idea of ““exclusive ownership” based on “racially exclusive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Kazoku	   kokka,	   meaning	   the	   “Nation-­‐state	   as	   family”	   was	   a	   concept	   popularized	   by	   law	  scholar	  Hozumi	  Yatsuka	  (1860-­‐1912).	  (McVeigh	  2006,	  p.44)	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possession” of their [Japanese] culture, so that its acquisition by non-Japanese is 
considered relatively unusual and remarkable.”  
Post-war Japanese nationalism is also marked by the search for a new 
identity. One expression of popular, non-official nationalism developing from this 
search was Nihonjinron (discourses on Japanese uniqueness, or theories of 
Japanese). Despite its popular roots, Nihonjinron has become an “intellectual 
hegemony” (Befu in McVeigh 2006, p.193) and as such has accompanied and 
supported official nationalism49. Nihonjinron is insofar a continuation of wartime 
meditations on Japaneseness as it similarly relies on “primordial sentiments 
inherent in the presumed ‘ethnic essence’ of the Japanese- blood, purity of race, 
language, mystique- which are the basic ‘stuff’ of Nihonjinron, pre- and post-
war” (ibid.).  
Racialist thinking and nationalism in Japan have gone hand in hand. 
Racialism has legitimized the myth of Japan’s homogeneity, is supported by the 
belief among many Japanese that they belong to a distinct “racial group” due to 
their possession of “Japanese blood”, as well as by the denial or downplaying of 
ethnic minorities in Japan (Chinese, Koreans, Ainu) (p.211). The Japanese nation 
remains imagined by its members as kinship, symbolized by the metaphor of 
“Japanese blood”.  Indeed, the idea of race is often expressed in terms of blood, as 
McVeigh (p.210) notes. Being a “pure Japanese” is often expressed in terms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  McVeigh	   (2006,	   p.194)	   also	  writes	   that	   the	   state	   has	   appropriated	   popular,	   non-­‐official	  manifestations	   of	   nationalism	   for	   its	   own	   nationalist	   concerns	   by	   supporting	  Nihonjinron	  oriented	  research	  projects,	   financing	  the	  translation	  of	  Nihonjinron	  classics	   into	  English	  for	  an	  international	  audience,	  or	  by	  having	  corporate	  centers	  of	  power	  advocate	  principles	  from	  
Nihonjinron.	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being “pure-blooded” (junketsu), whereas those who find themselves in between 
racial categorizations are referred to as konketsuji (literally , “mixed blood child”, 
but also understood as “half-breed”, “half-blood”) (ibid.).  Moreover, the racialist 
ideology underpinning Japan’s nationalism is often “dressed up in euphemisms of 
exceptionalism and “cultural uniqueness.”” (p.211) 
The racialized and ethnicized conceptions of the nation and of nation-ness 
are reflected in Japan’s nationality law, which despite numerous post-war 
revisions has remained based on the principle of jus sanguinis, while levels of 
naturalization have remained low when compared internationally (McVeigh 2006, 
p.212). The implications of racialism, meaning the habitual cognitive equation of 
“land=people=culture=language”, as well as an “implicit genetic determinism” 
(ibid.), are ideological bases enabling the mobilization of consanguinal capital. 
Consanguinal capital makes use of such habitual cognitive equations, of official 
and non-official forms of ethnos nationalism, as well as of the legal codifications 
guiding the acquisition of nationality and citizenship. Also, these habitual 
cognitive equations and an implicit genetic determinism are often also endorsed 
by the individuals or groups mobilizing consanguinal capital. The ideological 
scaffold provided by Japan’s nationalism as well as its institutionalization in 
Japan’s nationality law thus enable descendants of Japanese nationals to mobilize 





Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
In June 2008 I started my six month long internship at the Development 
Action for Women Network (DAWN) in Manila which laid the foundation for 
this study. On a daily basis I came to the office, helped out at the research 
department and ate lunch and meryenda (afternoon snack) with my colleagues. On 
Saturdays, I participated in activities involving NGO members or entertained the 
NGO’s children clients50 while their mothers’ attended workshops. My tasks 
included teaching DAWN’s Japanese-Filipino clients how to write hiragana, 
katakana and simple Japanese words whenever the volunteer teacher, a Japanese 
lady in her 80s, was absent. Sometimes I was asked to fold origami with the 
children. During lunch, the staff would congregate around the dining table in the 
Executive Director’s office while NGO-clients who were employed by DAWN’s 
livelihood project would eat in a different part of the office. NGO staff and NGO 
clients used different cutlery because the staff did not want to share their forks 
and spoons with the organization’s clients. After lunch, some of the clients would 
wash our plates.  
I included a brief depiction of these daily lunch rituals since it was those 
moments of differentiation which raised my awareness about the potential 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50 	  NGOs	   identify	   themselves	   as	   service-­‐providers	   which	   explains	   why	   they	   refer	   to	  individuals	   seeking	   their	   help	   as	   “clients”.	   These	   services	   include	   help	   in	   locating	   the	  Japanese	  father	  of	  Japanese-­‐Filipino	  children	  as	  well	  as	  legal	  and	  para-­‐legal	  support	  in	  claims	  for	   recognition	   and/or	   alimony	   towards	   the	   father.	   These	   clients	   and	   their	   concerns	  constitute	  “cases”,	  in	  NGO	  lingo.	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discrepancies between the day-to-day interactions of staff and clients and the 
public image cultivated by the organization, and which subsequently encouraged 
me to observe NGO discourses more critically. In the course of my internship, 
seeing clients quit the organization, I also realized the gap between ideals 
espoused by NGO staff and desires fostered by clients. The experience of 
conflicting ideals and desires moreover motivated me to compare NGO discourses 
with the narratives of the people they claim to represent. In doing so, I would not 
only be able to elaborate on the discursive strategies of claims-making employed 
by NGOs, but also on the meanings attached to these claims and the motivations 
for participating in the claims-making process as asserted by NGO clients. 
Nevertheless I do understand that firstly, not all NGOs choose the same approach 
in their advocacy, in supporting their clients, and in exercising and organizing 
leadership within the organization. Secondly, NGOs themselves face constraints; 
they need to appeal to potential funders to secure the necessary means to sustain 
their advocacy as well as the services they provide for their clients.  
I initially embarked on this study because I was struck by how NGO 
workers seemed to believe that imparting knowledge about ‘Japanese culture’, 
and having their Japanese-Filipino clients practice things Japanese was nothing 
but the satisfaction of a ‘natural’ desire on the part of their clients . Most of these 
children and youths had never lived in Japan, many had never visited the country, 
and none of the children grew up with Japanese relatives. Their only connection 
to Japan was a biological relationship with a Japanese citizen. This connection to 
Japan through biological ties gained ideological weight over time, as children not 
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only learned of their parentage, but also learned to attribute meaning to it. This 
process is largely shaped by NGO workers and their own perception of what it 
means to be the child of a Japanese man and a Filipino woman in the Philippines. 
It is also shaped by societal perceptions as reflected in how Filipino mothers 
construe their children’s descent, in the children and youths interaction with 
friends and peers, as well as in how and when mass media reported about 
Japanese-Filipinos as “news”.  
Moreover, NGOs in both Japan and the Philippines have become 
important actors and middle-men through their access to transnational networks, 
offering various support services to Japanese-Filipinos and mediating between 
them, a public audience in Japan and the Philippines as well as representatives of 
the Japanese State. NGOs furthermore provide their members with access to 
“imaginative resources” (Appadurai 1996) pertaining to Japan in absence of real 
experiences. These resources are knowledge about Japan and Japanese culture, 
Japanese language classes, and encounters with Japanese volunteers and visiting 
students. As such NGOs play a central role in framing Japanese-Filipinos and 
their various situations for political action and advocacy, while also actively 
engaging in producing the imaginative and ideological resources for their 
Japanese-Filipino clients to construct their ethnic identities and their identities as 
“JFC”. 
Thus, to better understand what it means to be “JFC”, how being “JFC” 
has been constructed through and for NGO advocacy, and how these meanings 
relate to claims for recognition and Japanese nationality, I decided to analyse 
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NGO discourses relating to children born to Filipino mothers and Japanese men, 
to find out about the personal views and involvement with NGOs of the persons 
concerned, and observe the disputes around Japan’s nationality law, an institution 
which itself embodies discourses and beliefs of belonging, nation-ness, and what 
it means to be Japanese. In doing so I have focused on Japanese-Filipinos based in 
the Philippines, on NGOs based in the Philippines, and by consequence, I have 
concentrated on views, experiences, and on politics largely emanating from 
Philippine-based agents. I have chosen to do so because these claims are made 
across borders towards the Japanese government, yet on behalf of a population of 
de-facto non-citizens. My interest thus centred around the arguments through 
which belonging was expressed and justified, and through which responsibility 
and acknowledgment were demanded despite the lack of Japanese citizenship, and 
of social as well as cultural ties to Japan among most Philippine-based Japanese-
Filipino members of NGOs.  
Fieldwork and Data gathering Process 
The bulk of my fieldwork took place from June to December 2008 as well 
as from October 2010 to December 2011. In September 2009 I joined the IOM-
organized conference in Saitama, Japan which concluded their research project on 
Japanese-Filipino Children (JFC Multisectoral Networking Project, 2011). 
Between 2010 and early 2011, I conducted fieldwork in Tokyo and in Osaka for 
four months and in 2011 I travelled to the Philippines on multiple occasions for 
several weeks each time. In the Philippines, my research sites were Metro Manila 
and its vicinity.  
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I spent the first leg of my fieldwork in Japan. I was able to interview 20 
respondents in Japan: 9 NGO workers, volunteers or individuals involved with 
NGOs through cooperation and 11 Japanese-Filipinos, three of who were in Japan 
at the time of the interview to file a lawsuit. I met most of my respondents 
through snowballing, starting with NGO workers and other individuals involved 
with Japanese-Filipino children who provided me with information about ongoing 
events where I could meet potential respondents.  
During my fieldwork in the Philippines in 2011, I participated in a 
summer camp organized by Batis YOGHI which gave me the opportunity to 
spend five full days to participate in and observe the NGO’s activities as well as 
to get to know Japanese-Filipino camp participants. During my fieldwork in the 
Philippines I was also able to arrange interviews with 3 Japanese-Filipino NGO 
clients as well as 3 guardians (two mothers, one grand-mother) of Japanese-
Filipino Children at Maligaya House who were introduced to me by the head of 
the organization. In addition to NGO clients I was able to conduct interviews with 
5 NGO staff, 2 at DAWN, 2 at Maligaya House and 1 at Batis. I also repeatedly 
visited the Batis office located in Quezon City and attended their Christmas party 
in December 2011 where I engaged in numerous informal conversations with both 
staff and NGO members.  
My reliance on NGOs as gate-keepers in the Philippines has resulted in a 
limitation concerning the type of respondents I could access. Since I met my 
Philippine-based respondents through NGOs they tended to be of less privileged 
socio-economic backgrounds. Japanese-Filipinos from more affluent families do 
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exist and most probably would have very different stories to tell, yet they do not 
join NGOs and are thus harder to find.  
The Data 
Table 1 in the Appendix provides an overview of my Japanese-Filipino 
respondents and their biographical data, such as age, nationality, country based in 
and whether they were or had been members of any of the NGOs featured in this 
study.  In addition to my Japanese-Filipino respondents, I interviewed three 
mothers of Japanese-Filipinos children, one grand-mother and a total of 13 NGO 
workers, volunteers and persons who had been involved with Japanese-Filipino 
children and youth (cf. Table 2). 
The large majority of my interviewees had only Philippine passports at the 
time of the interview, which due to my focus on claims-making on behalf of 
Japanese-Filipino Children based in the Philippines is not surprising. All my 
respondents were in their late teens to mid-twenties with only one in his thirties. 
Among my Japanese-Filipino respondents 11 are female and 13 are male.  
Analyzing discourse 
Discourse is the construction of knowledge through spoken and written texts, 
wherein texts can also take shape as cultural artefacts or visual representations. 
Discourse analysis presumes that discourses construct social objects; as such it is 
a methodology based on a constructivist epistemology (Hardy, 2001, pp. 26, 28). 
Critical discourse analysis mainly deals with texts, yet I would like to factor in 
practices (such as study tours, language classes, workshops, and theatre plays) 
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which also reflect a set of beliefs and social ‘truths’. To analyse the discursive 
construction of the “JFC” as well as processes of making claims by NGOs on 
behalf of Japanese-Filipino children, I collected newsletters and books published 
by the NGOs featured in this study, papers published in journals by NGOs 
workers, online publications (on web-sites, personal blogs and on social 
networking sites), copies of speeches by NGO workers and by Japanese-Filipinos 
as well as newspaper articles and television segments. Moreover, I included court 
statements by Japanese-Filipino plaintiffs read during trial on December 22nd, 
2010, the text of the judgment by the Supreme Court of Japan of June 4th 2008 
and the appended statements by the various judges involved to examine the 
arguments and the discussion surrounding the demands for the amendment of 
Japan’s nationality law .  
The first four items are largely publications by NGOs or individuals 
involved with NGOs, while the newspaper articles and television segments are 
texts produced by mass media which I have included to help me further complete 
my analysis of NGO discourse. Interestingly, most newspaper articles derive their 
information from either one of the organizations studied and therefore perpetuate 
NGO discourse, while also affirming NGOs’ authority on issues pertaining to 
Japanese-Filipino children. Discourse is closely tied to the establishment of ‘truth’ 
which occurs when “certain forms of knowledge are rendered more valid than 
others, certain forms of knowledge are excluded from being considered as 
“true”.” (Mills, 1997, p. 19) This requires speakers who are considered 
knowledgeable and thus an authority, such as staff at Batis, Batis YOGHI, 
75	  	  
DAWN, Maligaya House and the CNJFC who remain recognized authorities on 
the issue for journalists seeking information and interviews. The “general politics 
of truth” (Foucault in Mills, 1997, p.18) are not merely about what is being said, 
written or done, but also about how it is expressed and who does the expressing, 
meaning that whether we consider a statement true or false is also dependent on 
“the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.” (ibid.). 
Thus, discourse analysis involves looking into how knowledge is produced, what 
is being posited as knowledge, and who contributes to its production.  
Discourses can never be found in their entirety but the methodological 
study of texts and practices contains evidence to particular discourses (Hardy, 
2001, p. 26). Despite involving a selection process leading to the inclusion of 
certain texts and observations while excluding others, I have made an effort to 
gather a maximum number of publications by all the NGOs. While my data 
gathering of NGO publications was partly limited by what was available to me, I 
was able to collect 42 issues of DAWN’s newsletter Sinag including numbers 
published as early as 1996, the 10 issues of the CNJFC’s newsletter Maligaya on 
hand when I visited their office, as well as a total of 6 publications, three by 
DAWN (2003; 2004; 2010) and 3 by Batis (Batis Center for Women Inc., 2009; 
Batis YOGHI, 2009; Takeda& Erpelo, 2008) in addition to a journal article 
published by DAWN’s Executive Director (see Nuqui, 2008) and a book chapter 
published by two Batis staff (see Anolin & Javier, 2011). Batis had the least 
publications.  
76	  	  
Looking at NGO publications allows me to analyze how NGOs frame 
their clients while at the same time producing themselves as discursive 
authorities, meaning as entities with expertise, knowledge, and therefore the right 
to speak. These newsletters are written by NGO staff and are sent out to their 
donors as well as subscribers located in Japan, the Philippines and other parts of 
the world. During my internship at DAWN I once assisted in getting the 
newsletters ready to be dispatched by pasting address stickers onto them. I noticed 
recipients at various United Nations offices, at Philippine government agencies as 
well as other overseas funding organizations. I furthermore screened as many 
newspaper articles as I could find written in English about Japanese-Filipino 
children since the late 1980s to gain a telling picture of when Japanese-Filipinos 
were a topic in mass-media, who was talking about Japanese-Filipinos, and what 
was being reported.  
In my search I limited the dates of publication to the years 1980-2011. I 
started with 1980, one year after “Japayuki gannen” (Japayuki year one) (Suzuki, 
2007), the year deemed the onset of Filipina migration to Japan, as this would 
have been the earliest possible date for Japanese-Filipino children born to Filipina 
migrants in Japan to become an issue attracting public attention. I realized that 
Japanese-Filipinos surfaced in media reports only when NGOs started to publicize 
their existence, 13 years after “Japayuki gannen”. The first article entitled 
“Program for Abandoned ‘Japinos’ Launched” appeared on June 29, 1992 and 
was published by Kyodo News citing Batis as its source of information. Batis had 
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announced the launch of special a program for the Japanese-Filipino children of 
their Filipina clients.  
 There are limitations to discourse analysis as a method. As mentioned 
earlier, there is always a concern over how much material can be accessed, 
collected and studied. Moreover, it is understood that “not all possible voices are 
expressed, nor are the voices that are present expressed on equal terms” (Hardy, 
2001, p. 32), especially where NGOs dominate the production of discourse. To 
overcome this limitation, I generated ethnographic data from participant 
observation, field notes and interviews. These were used to further contextualize 
the texts I was analysing, and to gain insights into the experiences and thoughts of 
NGO clients and other involved individuals (such as NGO volunteers and 
members of other support organizations) whose opinions may find little 
representation in NGO constructions of the “JFC” if they derivate too much from 
dominant tenets.  
  I chose to include the four NGOs Batis (and Batis YOGHI), 
DAWN, Maligaya House and the CNJFC in my study because they have a long-
standing history of supporting Japanese-Filipino children in the Philippines and in 
Japan. In the mid-2000s a number of newer NGOs mushroomed across the 
Philippines such as the Shin Nikkeijin Network (founded in 2006) and Maganote 
(established in 2009), equally utilizing the victimization discourse and painting 
life and work in Japan as Japanese-Filipino children’s ultimate dream. These 
organizations and foundations have no link to the above-mentioned and have been 
accused by the latter to be ‘false NGOs’ and ‘recruitment agents in disguise’, 
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earning an income from dispatching eligible Japanese-Filipinos and their mothers 
to Japan for work, and burdening them with high debts. These allegations have 
indeed been corroborated by two of my respondents, a social worker in Japan 
involved with migrants from the Philippines and a Japanese-Filipino activist 
conducting interviews with newly-arrived Filipino women and their Japanese-
Filipino children, sent by one of the two organizations. I have excluded these 
organizations from my analysis because they have not significantly contributed to 
the discursive construction of the “JFC” (the term “JFC” is not used by the latter 
two organizations) which has mainly been a political enterprise. Rather, I focus on 
those organizations which have brought the issue to public attention, liaised with 
Philippine and Japanese lawmakers, and brought their advocacy to culminate in 
litigation.  
Multi-sited ethnography 
The ethnographic component of my data collection took place in multiple 
locations: in Metro Manila and Cavite in the Philippines as well as in Tokyo and 
Osaka in Japan. Since I am dealing with transnational networks, transnational 
claims-making and with migrants as well as migration aspirants, my ethnographic 
method had to be multi-sited to grasp the various relationships linking various 
stake-holders, as well as ongoing processes marking claims across national 
borders. Multi-sited ethnography breaks with the tradition of conducting 
fieldwork in one bounded site for a relatively long period of time and instead 
acknowledges that networks, connections, communicative practices, associations, 
and relationships span across geographical locations and often across state 
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borders. With the increasing importance of online communication and new media, 
these sites can also be located within the world-wide-web. Multi-sited 
ethnography “defines as its objective the study of social phenomena that cannot 
be accounted for by focusing on a single site.” (Falzon 2009, p.1).   
For this study, I followed personal contacts, referrals and organizational 
connections linking actors in both countries to find the people and the sites where 
I would conduct interviews and observation. In addition to my experiences at 
DAWN I thus conducted fieldwork at the various sites I gained knowledge of and 
access to through my initial NGO contacts. These sites included the Batis office in 
Quezon City, the Batis YOGHI summer-camp which took place in Cavite in May 
2011, DAWN’s office in Ermita, Maligaya House’s office in Quezon City as well 
as the CNJFC’s office in Tokyo, The Tokyo High Court where three of my 
Japanese-Filipino respondents claimed their Japanese nationality, the room near 
the Court building which was rented for the subsequent press statement, various 
Christmas parties organized by the NGOs in Manila (2011) as well as one in 
Tokyo (2010), and a number of restaurants and cafes where I had informal chats 
as well as tape-recorded in-depth interviews with my respondents.   
My fieldwork had to cover multiple sites to trace and capture the networks 
and social fields of individuals located in both Japan and the Philippines, notably 
in Tokyo and Manila, who were largely connected by the common purpose of 
advocacy on behalf of Japanese-Filipino children and their Filipino mothers. 
Organizational networks intersected with the personal, familial networks of NGO 
clients who had migrated, returned, or made plans to shift location. Part of my 
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fieldwork also involved following people and interviewing them at the different 
locations they had travelled to. Following people and their connections did not 
only bring me to different geographical locations, but also enabled me to see how 
differing socio-cultural contexts impacted on how NGO advocacy was framed, 
what meanings were attached to having (only) one Japanese parent, and how the 
experience of migration and entering a new social context impacted on my 
respondent’s understanding of ‘being Japanese’. 
In analysing processes of discursive constructions, the geographical 
location of the various stake-holders participating in discursive activities was 
important. Discourses pertaining to Japanese-Filipino Children were not uniform 
but varied, partly due to the respective situatedness of those who emitted 
statements as the geographical location contributes to the historical and social 
contexts within which discourses emanate. One example is the discussion on 
Japanese-Filipinos’ ‘identities’ which has taken on different meanings depending 
on whether ‘identity’ was utilized in Japan for Japan-based NGO clients or by 
Philippine-based NGOs. Furthermore, much of my data was located online and 
therefore accessible from virtually any location. The internet provided a site 
which allowed for cross-border interaction, sharing and organizing notably among 
Japanese-Filipino children and youth, NGO staff but also researchers like myself. 
Batis YOGHI for instance maintains a Facebook group geared at easing 
communication among its geographically spread-out members.  Access to the 
group’s conversations is subject to approval by its administrators who make sure 
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only individuals who they themselves know and who meet Batis YOGHI’s 
membership criteria could join.51  
I did not conduct an online ethnography52, but instead used online social 
networking sites on which I knew my respondents would be active as well as 
blogs maintained by my respondents to further gain insights into their thoughts, 
activities, as well as networks. The people they communicated with on sites like 
Facebook were largely individuals who I had met personally, or else people I had 
heard of through casual conversations, making it easier for me to situate their 
exchanges online. Moreover, blogs and sites like Facebook provided my 
respondents an alternative form of expression where videos or pictures could be 
posted along with their comments. These could be images of Japanese popular 
culture, such as popular manga (comic book) characters, or the re-post of an 
advertising campaign using ‘mixed blood’ Filipinos as its peg53, accompanied by 
critical reactions. Online platforms also enabled me to follow day-to-day postings 
by my respondents and other Japanese-Filipinos who I had connected with online, 
which often pertained to life outside the NGO. Facebook is by no means a 
complete depiction of a person’s daily routine or personal life, but the site helped 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  To	  become	  a	  member	  of	  Batis	  YOGHI	  one	  has	  to	  be	  Japanese-­‐Filipino	  or	  a	  child	  of	  a	  current	  or	  former	  migrant	  worker.	  52	  Rotman	   et	   al.,	   (2012,	   p.	   208)	   write	   that	   “[o]nline	   ethnography	   adopts	   principles	   of	  ethnographic	   research	   formed	   in	   offline	   environments,	   and	   applies	   them	   to	   virtual	  environments,	   with	   the	   necessary	   adjustments	   (e.g.	   distant	   observation,	   extensive	   use	   of	  pre-­‐formed	   textual	   artifacts).	   The	   strength	   of	   online	   ethnographies	   lies	   in	   providing	  comprehensive	   descriptions	   of	   structures,	   interactions	   and	   content,	   beyond	   the	   obvious	  traces	  that	  users	  and	  institutions	  leave	  through	  their	  online	  interaction,	  and	  in	  giving	  a	  voice	  to	  the	  various	  users.”	  For	  further	  discussion	  regarding	  ethnography	  in	  online	  environments	  also	  see	  Garcia,	  et	  al.,	  (2009).	  	  53	  One	   of	   my	   respondents	   critiqued	   the	   advertising	   campaign	   by	   Bayo,	   a	   Filipino	   fashion	  brand,	  which	   in	  his	  opinion	  glorified	  persons	  of	   ‘mixed-­‐race’	  background	  and	   ignored	   that	  many	  children	  born	  to	  parents	  of	  different	  color	  could	  not	  live	  up	  to	  the	  image	  of	  the	  wealthy,	  well-­‐bred	  offspring	  the	  advert	  was	  portraying.	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me to keep track of developments in person’s lives and also revealed what people 
deem worth publishing.     
Repositioning myself: from former NGO volunteer to researcher 
Having volunteered for DAWN provided me with experience which I 
could use to position myself as someone who had some insight, some exposure to 
NGO work, and was familiar with the networks. However my association with 
DAWN also raised caution among some workers and clients of other NGOs. I 
noticed this when I had informal chats with women clients at Batis. Due to the 
organizational rift in the past involving DAWN, the women I talked to had 
developed scepticism as to the agenda of DAWN and its staff. One of the women 
I talked to had had the opportunity to join DAWN when it was first established, 
but had chosen to remain with Batis instead, because she felt that with DAWN’s 
Executive Director “we are always clients, never members”. My fieldwork thus 
also revealed the politics and dynamics among the different NGOs despite their 
dedication to similar issues and to Japanese-Filipino Children. I gained a sense of 
the complex relations between NGOs and witnessed ongoing tensions. Indeed, the 
NGOs studied were partners in fighting for a cause but at the same time they 
competed with each other over remaining relevant, gathering clients and over 
attracting funds.54 My having volunteered for a particular NGO thus already 
positioned me within the ongoing politics. Coming ‘from DAWN’ was suggestive 
of a particular approach to the issue of Filipino women returnees from Japan and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  At	  least	  Batis	  and	  DAWN	  would	  aim	  for	  the	  same	  sources.	  Maligaya	  House	  had	  received	  a	  one-­‐off	  funding	  by	  the	  Japanese	  government	  upon	  its	  establishment.	  Maligaya	  House	  and	  the	  CNJFC	   are	   otherwise	   largely	   funded	   by	   donations	   and	   membership	   fees	   paid	   by	   their	  supporters.	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their Japanese-Filipino children, as well as of personal relationships and of loyalty 
to the organization’s long-standing Executive Director. At the very beginning, this 
affected my access to other NGOs, an effect I could mitigate over time by making 
my own position clear. This included dissociating myself from DAWN and 
repositioning myself as NGO-independent researcher.  
Notes on Privacy and on the generation of pseudonyms 
 Because I deal with a tightly knit network of people, I recognized privacy 
to be of chief importance. Most of my respondents know each other and at times 
work with each other. Any ethnography that involves the following of networks 
and snowballing bears the risk of disclosing true identities of interviewees 
through just a few biographical details to readers who happen to be familiar with 
the networks studied. Thus, whenever I deemed it unnecessary, I refrained from 
providing too many details about my respondents. All the names of my Japanese-
Filipino respondents are pseudonyms. However, to maintain the ethnic marker of 
any given name, I used Japanese names to replace Japanese names and non-
Japanese names for all others. In doing so I could preserve a sense of how 
frequent parents (or Filipino mothers) chose or avoided Japanese names for their 
offspring. NGO workers and volunteers are referred to as [particular NGO] staff 
or volunteer and situated in either Japan or the Philippines if needed. For quotes 
from face-to-face interviews or private online chats, pseudonyms are used. When 
citing published material such as newsletters or newspaper articles, I remove the 
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name but retain the position of the person mentioned in the article, if the latter is 
indicated in the document cited.55 
 Quotes taken from publicized blogs or social networking sites are not 
linked to any of my respondents by name or pseudonym as this would jeopardize 
their privacy. Instead, they are attributed to “a respondent”. Providing the name or 
pseudonym of the author of a quote, even if it may be considered published, could 
trace him/her back to other statements and reveal his/her identity. However, any 
quote retrieved from private online chats is treated as regular interview quote. I 
have added slight corrections and punctuations to quotes taken from online chats 
without changing the meaning of the sentences so they would be more readable. 
In talking about Japanese-Filipinos in Japan, I do not mention in what city the 
interviewee was based at the time of the interview to ensure maximum privacy. 
However, all my respondents based in the Philippines are understood to be based 
in Metro Manila or in the city’s vicinity, as this is where the main part of my 
fieldwork was carried out.   
Difficulties and Limitations 
 The data I could generate has certain limitations which mainly are due to 
issues of accessibility. Firstly, I was unable to conduct interviews with clients at 
DAWN as the NGO’s Executive Director opposed my request. Finding 
interviewees through Batis YOGHI and Maligaya House proved rather 
uncomplicated. However DAWN was much more restrictive with letting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  For	  example,	  if	  I	  use	  a	  quote	  that	  had	  been	  attributed	  to	  the	  secretary	  general	  of	  the	  CNJFC	  in	  a	  newspaper	  article,	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  the	  secretary	  general	  as	  such	  but	  remove	  his/her	  name,	  in	  addition	  to	  citing	  the	  newspaper	  reference	  in	  which	  it	  had	  been	  published.	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researchers interview their clients. Although DAWN staff was the one who knew 
me best as I had spent six months with the organization, I was never allowed to 
interview their clients allegedly because they were too traumatized from their 
experiences in Japan for that sort of dialogue. Considering that some of DAWN’s 
clients had been asked to talk about their lives when the NGO had an opportunity 
to receive publicity, such as through television segments56 or at workshops and 
conferences, there may have been another reason for this decision.  
Having been disallowed from conducting interviews at DAWN, most data 
about the NGO stems interviews and NGO publications, all of which are proof-
read by the Executive Director. There was an element of control and a desire to 
monitor what was being written about the organization, about its clients, and the 
issue in general. In my interview with the Executive Director I was asked about 
my sources of funding and warned about researchers who wrote things that were 
contrary to what, in her opinion, ‘really’ happened.  I thus concluded that she was 
concerned with the representation of her clients and her organization following 
uncontrolled talks with the NGO’s clients, the people who guaranteed DAWN’s 
legitimacy and significance. Through dealing with DAWN I had realized that 
opposing my wish to conduct interviews with DAWN’s clients was both an 
expression of concern for their clients as well as a way to safeguard the NGO’s 
repute and preserving the organization’s discursive authority.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  In	   1999,	   Shin	   Yasuda	   directed	   a	   NHK	   endorsed	   documentary	   about	   Japanese-­‐Filipino	  children.	  The	  main	  protagonist	  was	  a	  boy	  named	  Michael	  Suzuki	  who	  travelled	  to	  Japan	  with	  DAWN	   staff	   to	  meet	   his	   father	   (DAWN,	   1999	   b).	   Another	   report	   featuring	   two	   of	  DAWN’s	  clients	  was	   aired	   as	   part	   of	   the	   show	   “Draw	   the	   line”	   in	   2008	   (adobo	   queenjoy	   [Youtube	  username],	  2008).	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One of the most obvious limitations of this study is the non-inclusion of 
Japanese fathers of Japanese-Filipino Children. The latter were difficult to reach 
for several reasons. Firstly, respondents are often found if there is an organized 
space that pertains to aspects of their biographies such as NGOs, religious 
meeting places or schools. However, I do not know of any organization attracting 
Japanese fathers who had left behind their Japanese-Filipino Children in the 
Philippines, thus finding Japanese fathers of Japanese-Filipino children was a 
difficult task. Japanese fathers were as elusive to me as they often are to their own 
children. Although NGOs maintained a data-base of addresses of fathers they 
were able to locate, using these for research would have been a breach of privacy 
and may have jeopardized the willingness of Japanese fathers to further cooperate 
with the NGO and thus their children. Secondly, I figured that men with strained 
relationships with their children and ex-partners would be unlikely available for 
interviews. The only Japanese father I could talk to, the man I call Mr. Tanaka, 
was a supporter of the NGOs studied and a Human Rights activist. Mr. Tanaka 
was approving of my research on Japanese-Filipino Children and willing to be 
interviewed as he himself had a stake in the issue and had committed himself to 
fend for children of Japanese men in the Philippines. 
 The inclusion of the voices of Japanese fathers of Japanese-Filipino 
Children would have provided an additional angle from which their relationships 
with their children and their children’s mothers could be considered and 
contrasted with NGO depictions. Nevertheless, since I have focused on the 
discursive construction of Japanese-Filipino Children within the context of claims 
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making towards the Japanese State, mainly involving NGO staff, their clients and 
representatives of the Japanese state and government as featured in media reports, 
the data I have collected has been sufficient to answer the queries I had set out to 












Chapter 4: From “prostitutes” to dedicated 
mothers: discursive shifts in NGO 
representations of Filipina migrants and 
returnees from Japan 
 
 Advocacy and claims-making on behalf of Japanese-Filipino children has 
gone hand in hand with advocacy on behalf of women migrant returnees from 
Japan, most of who used to be employed as ‘entertainers’. Advocacy for 
Japanese-Filipino children developed out of DAWN and Batis’ initial objective as 
women’s organizations to support women migrant returnees and lobby against 
migration policies leading to what they had identified as sexual exploitation. 
DAWN and Batis trace their roots to feminist movements in the Philippines, 
while Maligaya House and the CNJFC have been established by Japanese 
feminist journalist and activist Yayori Matsui. The CNJFC (and Maligaya House) 
focus on supporting Japanese-Filipino children and their mothers in their legal 
battles, and participate less in advocacy related to migratory practices and 
policies. However, all organizations maintain that the birth of Japanese-Filipino 
children and the problems they face cannot be considered merely a personal issue, 
but is tied to income inequalities between Japan and the Philippines as well as 
migration policies implemented by both countries. The issues at stake for 
Japanese-Filipinos are thus interlinked with their mothers’ migration histories, 
which has made it necessary for these NGOs to consider migrant returnees as 
89	  	  
mothers, not only as exploited former hostesses. While Filipina ‘entertainers’ 
could be generalized as victims of prostitution to oppose the deployment of 
OPAs, in their role as mothers of Japanese-Filipino children their depiction had to 
enable NGOs to assert their offspring’s right to paternal acknowledgment, 
financial support, and eventually to Japanese nationality. For that purpose, 
generalizations of Filipina ‘entertainers’ as prostitutes, common notably during 
the 1980s, had to be reworked into still powerful yet also advocacy-friendly 
depictions.  
Commercial sex, migration and transnational feminist activism in Japan and 
the Philippines 
Transnational cooperation and activism by women’s groups in Japan and 
the Philippines developed in response to the rise of commercial sex in East- and 
Southeast Asia, emerging in tandem with the post-war development of the tourism 
industry. This trend was also important in bringing together both feminists and 
faith-based groups as they found common ground in their aim to protect women’s 
bodies and sexualities. During the 1970s, the promotion of the Philippine islands 
as a tourist destination had attracted a foremost male crowd, the majority of which 
came from Japan (Muroi & Sasaki, 1997). Sex-tourism by Japanese men is said to 
have started with Japan’s economic boom as well as with the travel liberalization 
in 1964. Although overseas travel was costly and therefore initially reserved to 
the wealthy, the creation and promotion of package-tours marketed by Japan 
Airlines made overseas trips more affordable to lower income Japanese (ibid.). 
Additionally, a number of companies started offering their male employees so 
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called “holiday sex tours” to Southeast Asia as part of their yearly bonuses 
(Matsui 1995). In Thailand and Korea, similar trends in the tourism industry could 
be observed. For instance, the development of Chejudo-island in Korea in the 
1970s predominantly targeted male visitors, not least because of the availability of 
kisaeng (prostitution) houses (Muroi and Sasaki 1997). In just three years, the 
number of male Japanese visitors to Korea multiplied by ten, rising from 45,000 
in 1970 to over 411,000 in 1973 (ibid.).  
The increasing numbers of women engaging in sex-work in East and 
Southeast Asia had set off harsh critique among feminists in Korea, the 
Philippines, and in Japan. Among the first to organize protests against sex tourism 
was the Christian Women’s Federation of Korea. In 1972, the group drafted and 
published a declaration opposing these “holiday sex tours”. A year later, Korean 
university students organized a demonstration targeting Japanese male tourists at 
Kimpo airport. A similar demonstration was held at Haneda airport by Japanese 
women in 1974. In light of the protests, Japanese men shifted their travel 
destination from Korea to Southeast Asia.  However, Korean and Japanese groups 
coordinated with activists in Southeast Asia and protests spread. As a result of 
mobilization against Japanese sex tourism, then-Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki 
met with massive demonstrations at the airports of every of his destinations 
during his visit of ASEAN countries in 1981  (Muroi and Sasaki 1997). Protests 
in Manila were coordinated among groups in the Philippines and Japan, such as 
the Asian Women’s Association, co-founded by Yayori Matsui, and the Japan 
Women’s Christian Temperance Union (JWCTU), a transnationally connected 
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organization also known as Kyofukai, with ample experience in activism. The 
JWCTU, or Kyofukai, played a key role in opposing the karayuki57 phenomenon 
following the Meiji restoration in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as well as 
in the passage of anti-prostitution laws in Japan in the 1950s (Kaplan and Dubro 
2003).  
In response to the opposition by women’s groups, the number of tourists 
dropped in the 1980s but the migration flow also reversed. The growing economic 
divide between Japan and its Asian neighbours which had made “sex tours” so 
affordable for Japanese travellers, had also transformed Japan into an attractive 
place of employment for young women from Southeast Asia. Japan’s sex-industry 
was soon staffed with women from lower-income countries, notably from the 
Philippines, Thailand and from the 1990s onwards, with women from the ex-
Soviet Union. Their employment as hostesses on “entertainer” visas coupled with 
reports on forced prostitution had brought feminist groups to generalize and 
denounce the employment of “entertainers” in pubs and night-clubs as a form of 
human trafficking.  
However, generalizations of hostessing as prostitution and human 
trafficking often ignore that the individuals concerned may not interpret their 
migratory experiences as such. Among my respondents, Daisy, a 43-year-old 
mother of two Japanese-Filipino children, and Janice, a 40-year-old mother of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  “The	  term	  karayuki	  is	  derived	  from	  two	  words:	  kara,	  an	  archaic	  term	  referring	  generally	  to	  mainland	  China,	  and	  yuki,	  meaning	  ‘going’	  or	  ‘one	  who	  goes’.	  San	  is	  an	  honoric	  suffix	  attached	  
to	  personal	  nouns	  or	  certain	  professions.”	  (Mihalopoulos	  2001,	  185)	  The	  term	  karayuki	  refers	  to	  young	  Japanese	  women,	  usually	  from	  impoverished	  farmer	  communities,	  going	  abroad	  to	  make	  a	  living	  from	  working	  in	  brothels	  in	  colonial	  Southeast	  Asia	  from	  the	  1870s	  until	  early	  1930s	  (ibid.).	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four, had worked as “entertainers” in Japan each for over a decade. My other 
respondents had met the Japanese father of their children in the Philippines. 
Neither Daisy nor Janice had talked about their stints in Japan in negative terms, 
and had returned to Japan on several occasions. Daisy had started to work in 
Japan in 1991 and returned to the Philippines in 2005. When asked about her 
experiences in Japan, Daisy replied:”I have a lot of good memories. I enjoyed it, I 
enjoyed a lot when I was there. I enjoyed my job as an entertainer. I enjoyed 
talking to these people. I don’t have any bad experience.” Although Daisy may 
have faced challenges during her time in Japan which she prefers to leave 
unmentioned, it is telling that she made it a point not to reiterate dominant 
narratives of human trafficking and to deny having had any “bad experiences”. 
Daisy spent 14 years working as an “entertainer” in Japan.  
Janice remains based in Japan. Janice returned to Japan to work as an 
entertainer 12 times, starting at age 17. Working a second time in Japan, she got 
to know a Japanese man to whom she got married in the Philippines. According to 
Janice, he supported her financially and wanted her to live with him in Japan as 
his wife. However, Janice had a change of heart in not wanting to live with a man 
she barely knew, and decided to return to Japan by herself, again as an 
“entertainer”. After several stints, she found it difficult to find jobs since her 
salary as an experienced “entertainer” had gotten too expensive. A friend then 
convinced her to lower her salary and to remain in Japan undocumented to be able 
to continue working. That was in 1992, after she gave birth to her first son in 
Manila and subsequently returned to Japan where she then overstayed for about a 
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decade, until she got pregnant again and gave birth in Japan to a Japanese citizen. 
Janice recounted her experiences in a cheerful tone, eager to share the details 
about how she managed to hide her first pregnancy and how she bantered with her 
previous employers. She also recounted that she received support from her Mama-
san 58  when she was pregnant a second time and needed her child to be 
recognized. Janice’s narrative reveals that, although her employment was 
contractual and did not guarantee her any long-term right to abode in Japan, she 
was able to rely on a network of friends and helpful employers who enabled her to 
effectively reside and work in Japan since age 17.  
Old ideas, new packaging: new abolitionism in the name of Women’s Rights 
Japan- and Philippine-based activist groups condemning the employment 
of foreign women “entertainers” typically equate hostessing with prostitution and 
have lobbied for the abolition of both. Bernstein (2008, 2010) terms these feminist 
groups “new abolitionist” with reference to efforts by feminists in North America 
and Europe in the late 19th century to purge society of prostitution. The Women’s 
Christian Temperance Union, a prominent organization within the abolitionist 
movement, established a wing in Japan in 1886 where it remains active until this 
day. In claiming that prostitution constitutes social harm, contemporary feminists 
have become “strange bedfellows” of evangelical Christians (Bernstein 2010, 
p.47).   
The 1990s especially were marked by increasing cooperation between 
feminists and conservative groups as they found common ground in framing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Female	  manager	  or	  person	  in	  charge	  at	  hostess	  clubs.	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prostitution and pornography in terms of human rights violations. The application 
of the idea of human rights to female sexuality and women engaging in 
commercialized sex has divided feminists around the globe in essentially two 
camps: those supporting the legalization of sex-work and thus its regulation, and 
feminists opposing it in the name of women’s protection against sexual 
exploitation. Various narratives about prostitution have emerged from different 
feminist factions with liberal feminists emphasizing sex work as autonomous 
action, as opposed to radical feminists seeing prostitution as subordinated sex and 
Marxist feminists considering it as subordinated labour (Zatz 1997, p.282). 
Yayori Matsui, the co-founder of The Citizen’s Network for Japanese-Filipino 
Children (CNJFC) has unambiguously opposed the idea that prostitution could be 
justified as autonomous action. The feminist and journalist played a crucial role in 
the 1970s protests against Japanese sex-tourism and was later an advocate against 
the employment of foreign hostesses in Japan’s sex industry, a practice she 
considered tantamount to forced prostitution and sex trafficking. In an interview 
in 1996, she states her view on commercialized sex and her fear “that people will 
assume Western views on human rights are advanced, and will come to accept the 
European tendency to legalize prostitution as an advanced type of thinking.” 
(Matsui in AMPO: Japan Asia Quarterly Review , 1996, p. 46).  
Many of the women’s groups engaging in activism against the supposed 
sexual exploitation of migrant women in Japan have not only endorsed anti-
prostitution stances, but are very often organizationally linked to the original 
abolitionist movement. For instance, the women’s shelter HELP (Housing in 
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Emergency of Love and Peace) located in Tokyo has been established in 1986 by 
the JWCTU or Kyofukai. This Christian organization has a longstanding history of 
advocacy against commercial sex dating back to its establishment in Japan in the 
late 19th century. The designated goals of the Kyofukai upon its establishment 
were to advocate for monogamy, strengthen women’s position within the family 
and foremost, to control both women’s and men’s sexualities. However the 
union’s lobbying throughout the 19th century largely focused on the abolition of 
prostitution and as such, mainly targeted destitute Japanese women seeking 
employment in brothels abroad.  
Today, the Kyofukai’s website describes the union’s past and present 
activities as part of their fight “for the acknowledgment and protection of both 
women and children’s basic human rights” (Kyofukai 2013).  Yet the framing of 
the union as a warden of human rights ahead of its time is retrospectively biased 
and conveniently serves the purpose of rendering the organization’s precedent 
lobbying more relevant to contemporary social activism. The actual aim of the 
Kyofukai’s activism in the late 19th century placed great importance on the 
improvement of the moral character of the Japanese people and greatly 
contributed to the othering of poor women (Mihalopoulos 2011). Japanese 
Protestant Christians had considered themselves as bearers of the ‘worthiest 
instincts’ and had therefore lobbied to reform social and moral policies (ibid.). 
Yet, despite being driven by a philanthropic zeal, which in retrospect may seem 
akin to contemporary understandings of human rights, these policies’ “real 
function was to regulate the behaviour of the poor and to ensure the reproduction 
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of descendants by emphasizing the purity of blood and the necessity to prepare 
people for monogamous married life.” (p.80).  
To assert their moral standards, the Kyofukai had instigated a sense of 
shame which resulted in the embarrassment of all those who could not or would 
not adhere to these standards: “The humanist shame touted by the Japanese 
Christians as the future of an enlightened Japan measured others by its values, 
which held that it was better to die than to live ignobly as a prostitute.” (p.81). On 
the other hand, the endorsement of a sense of shame had contributed to the 
constitution of the Japanese upper middle-class and to the political assertion of 
their authority through their abiding to a proper and superior sexuality they had 
themselves created and established as new moral code (ibid.).  
Mihalopoulos’ argument on the role of the JWCTU, or Kyofukai, in the 
regulation of sex in Japan’s globalization is especially crucial here as the 
organization’s historical viewpoints remain relevant. The inherent class-bias of 
late 19th century efforts of surveillance and regulation of poor women’s sexuality 
is still pertinent among abolitionist feminists today, as is the idea of sex-work as a 
disgraceful and socially harmful profession. This bias becomes most obvious 
when NGOs employ a victimization discourse to reason their clients’ employment 
in the sex-industry, and in policies as implemented by one NGO observed in this 
study, cancelling its clients’ membership if they are found to be working in bars 
or night-clubs. This very same NGO also checks on and regulates its clients’ 
bodies by advising them on appropriate hair colour, dress and make-up. Such 
efforts to reintegrate former hostesses into ‘proper womanhood’ seem central for 
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all the NGOs studied. Firstly, because women choosing to work in the sex-
industry is incommensurate with these NGOs’ ideological stances, and secondly 
because claims-making for alimony and paternal recognition of their Japanese-
Filipino Children is more persuasive if childbirth is framed as a consequence of 
romantic love, not as that of a client-hostess relationship.   
Women’s activism against sex-tourism in Asia and later against the 
employment of Asian women on “entertainer” visas in Japan’s night-clubs have 
framed the latter’s engagement in sex-work as a violation of women’s rights and 
as an affront to their dignity. A victimization discourse thus has replaced the 19th 
century induction of a sense of shame. Women’s employment in the sex-industry 
is largely represented as an act of violence, as dominant ideals of womanhood and 
femininity do not allow for the possibility of women opting for sex-work on a 
voluntary basis. In Korea, where the protests against Japanese male sex-tourists 
started, women engaged in sex-work have commonly been framed as “victims of 
prostitution” (Cheng 2011). As Cheng (2011, p.495) demonstrates, the discourse 
on prostitution in Korea has been brought under the control of new abolitionist 
feminists who have popularized a paradigm of women’s human rights within 
which  
…women who demand a recognition of their right to work in prostitution 
are persona non grata who blatantly defy the victim subject endorsed by 
the women’s movement and the new laws [introduced in Korea]. 
Putatively attributing all claims of sex work by women in prostitution to 
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brothel-owners’ manipulation, Korean feminists like Cho59 eliminate the 
agency of all women to consent to sex work as well as to engage in public 
protests. 
Likewise, NGOs in Japan and in the Philippines dealing with Filipina 
hostesses and returnees from Japan have generalized their employment as 
prostitution and labelled foreign female “entertainers” as victims of human 
trafficking. For many years, these NGOs have therefore lobbied for the 
discontinuation of the employment of Filipino women in Japan’s pubs and night-
clubs. This goal had finally been achieved in 2005 when, in the name of the fight 
against human trafficking, Japan severely curbed the immigration of foreigners on 
“entertainer” visas.  
Disproving generalizations about Filipina hostesses popularized by NGOs, 
Parreñas (2011) argues that her respondents have generally migrated to Japan of 
their own volition, knowing they would engage in what she terms “illicit 
flirtation”. Parreñas makes an even stronger statement when she concludes that 
numerous Filipina hostesses in Japan saw their employment as liberating and 
empowering (2011, p.273). Earning wages abroad has given these migrant women 
decision-making-power as they have become the breadwinners in their families.  
The partaking in “illicit flirtation” has furthermore sexually liberated them and 
has allowed them to challenge patriarchal boundaries of what is deemed as 
acceptable or unacceptable female sexuality (ibid.) Concluding her study, 
Parreñas defies new abolitionist feminists’ acclaim for the restrictions on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59 	  Cheng	   is	   referring	   to	   Cho	   Young-­‐sook,	   Secretary-­‐General	   	   of	   the	   Korean	   Women’s	  
Associations	  United	  from	  2005	  to	  2009.	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employment of foreign “entertainers” in place since 2005. Instead, she writes that, 
we should “lament the setback [forced return migration of hostesses to the 
Philippines] has posed to the empowerment of migrant women.” (2011, p.273).  
Abolitionism and the Feminist Movements in the Philippines  
In the Philippines, the movement against prostitution has similarly been 
driven by new-abolitionist women’s groups, often headed by middle- and upper-
middle class women as well as clerics sensitive to women’s issues. The possibility 
that commercial sex could be a profession of choice has been unthinkable for the 
great majority of feminists in the country. The prevailing position has been that 
prostitution had to be seen as violence against women. To support this point, 
feminists have cited “the peculiar conditions of the Philippines as a developing 
country especially the acute continuing problems of poverty and unemployment, 
the historical presence of American bases, as well as the lack of social protection 
for families, as reasons for opposing the view that prostitution be legitimised as a 
profession (since in their perspective women’s choices were severely 
constrained)” (Roces 2009, p.271). These arguments also correspond to a global 
shift of the discussion of prostitution to the human-rights field, as it occurred in 
the 1990s (Bernstein, 2010). Feminists in the Philippines have therefore, in the 
name of human rights, made efforts to eradicate prostitution as well as domestic 
and cross-border human trafficking of women for sex.  
To counter negative images of Filipino women who had been involved in 
commercialized sex, DAWN and Batis have invested in a discourse of 
victimization, representing women in prostitution as innocent and without choice, 
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while simultaneously investing in a narrative of activism, which depicted women 
potential as agents of change (a transformation for which NGOs usually take the 
credit) . Roces60 (2009) argues that the victimization discourse was necessary to 
change attitudes towards women engaged in commercial sex and to pass the Anti-
Trafficking Act of 2003 which effectively decriminalized prostitutes and instead 
held buyers and agents accountable. The same discourse, however, reinforced 
patriarchal cultural images of silently suffering women or women as “martyrs” 
(ibid.). To counter this unsolicited side-effect, activist-NGOs have thus invested 
in re-imaging former victims or “survivors” into activists. Roces’ analysis, which 
includes the study of DAWN, shows how these two seemingly contradictory 
discourses have worked together well in helping NGOs achieve their goals and at 
same time gain authority as experts on the issue through the “evidence” for their 
claims provided by affected women clients. Roces however falls short of noticing 
how both the victimization discourse and that of the activist woman correlate in 
leaving unquestioned patriarchal ideals of women’s attitudes towards sex; men 
remain sexual predators and women their prey. Discursive constructions of 
Filipina entertainers by DAWN and Batis suggest that the women engage in 
sexual relations voluntarily only out of love or within marriage. This in turn poses 
a challenge when NGOs need to accommodate the phenomenon of women 
repeatedly returning to Japan as entertainers where they allegedly work as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  In	   her	   paper,	   Roces	   (2009)	   discusses	   narratives	   about	   Filipino	   women	   engaged	   in	   sex-­‐work	   as	   disseminated	   by	   DAWN,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Coalition	   Against	   Trafficking	   in	   Women	  (CATW)	   Asia	   Pacific,	   and	   the	   Third	  World	   Movement	   Against	   the	   Exploitation	   of	  Women	  (TW-­‐MAE-­‐W).	  The	  CATW-­‐Asia	  Pacific	   is	  a	  Manila-­‐based	  branch	  of	   the	   international	  CATW.	  The	  TW-­‐MAE-­‐W	  was	  founded	  in	  1980	  by	  Good	  Shepherd	  nun	  Soledad	  Perpiñan	  in	  response	  to	  rising	  prostitution	  in	  Manila.	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prostitutes. DAWN has explained this phenomenon by considering women as 
victims, even as they decide to migrate repeatedly: 
Those who decide to return to Japan have become commodified, 
equating themselves to the money they are able to earn. In the 
struggle for survival, the women also go through a process of 
depersonalization. They forget their own needs and become 
sacrificial lambs for the benefit of their families... (Montañez et al. 
2003, p.30) 
The element of choice is omitted, not simply because ‘choice’ is considered an 
invalid dimension as it is believed to be inapplicable to Filipino women engaged 
in commercial sex (or commercial flirtations), but also because discussions of 
women’s sexuality diverging too far from Christian teachings remain unthinkable 
and morally untenable in the Philippine context. The tight association of many 
women’s groups with religious groups and clerics, along with the persisting 
centrality of Catholicism in Philippine society in general, has provided a narrowed 
frame within and through which women’s issues pertaining to sexuality could be 
discussed. Women’s sexuality and reproductive capacities remain the bedrock of 
Philippine gender ideology, with the Catholic Church playing a crucial role in its 
upholding, practice and even legal coding (Austria, 2004). These deep-seated 
anxieties and moral concerns over female sexuality have come to be expressed in 
terms of human rights violations and violence against women as international 
laws and global discourses provided the vocabulary to do so. The portrayals of 
prostituted women as either shameful criminals or innocent victims are thus two 
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sides of the same coin, locating “proper” sexuality within the confinements of 
relationships deemed legitimate. This is not to say that NGOs have not achieved 
tremendously important changes for many women engaged in commercial sex, 
notably by decriminalizing women in prostitution and shifting the blame to 
consumers. Yet the victimization discourse and the eradication of the possibility 
of choice have left little space for alternative views from sex-workers, both 
domestically and in migration, and have therefore failed to convincingly account 
for women repeatedly opting for employment as hostesses in Japan or for the 
protests of several thousand women in 1991 against the government ban 
restraining the overseas deployment of female entertainers (Roces 2009). 
Daisy and Janice have returned to Japan repeatedly. In order to make sure 
she could continue working in Japan, Janice overstayed her visa upon re-entering 
Japan in 1992. Janice thus actively sought a way to carry on her employment as a 
hostess in Japan. Daisy had actively sought out placements as an “entertainer” in 
Japan several times between 1991 and 2005. In our conversation she emphasized 
her fond memories of Japan and that she had earned a lot of money. Yuzuki, one 
of my Japanese-Filipino respondents and a Japanese national since birth, had 
chosen to work as a hostess over her part-time job in a translation agency as it 
would provide her with a higher income. Janice, Daisy, and Yuzuki’s choices thus 
contradict NGO’s essentializing of women “entertainers” as mere victims. 
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Deploying the ideal or the ‘normal family’ in representations of Filipina 
migrant returnees 
NGOs have framed Japanese-Filipino children and their mothers as 
“broken families”, abandoned by or separated from the Japanese father. Efforts 
undertaken to reunite the children with the fathers as well as the efforts to bring 
together Filipino women with their ex-partners (as undertaken in the early days of 
NGO support) reflect the idea that the mother, father and child form an entity 
which should not be disrupted. As an illustration in DAWN’s newsletter Sinag 
(cf. plate 1) shows, the “normal” family is a central point of reference and an ideal 
to which women’s relationships with Japanese men are gauged and made to fit in 
retrospect. The women’s narratives need to show that there has been a family set 
up deemed “normal” in the past or a desire for such a set up in the future. If none 
of the former applies, then Filipino women are usually framed as victims of 
broken promises, but never is any doubt cast over the propriety of their sexual 
behaviour. 
 
Plate 1, “The family is the basic unit of a community” in (DAWN 1998 f, p.4) 
suggests how a family should look like: a father, a mother, and their children. 
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Early demands by NGOs61 were therefore made towards truant Japanese 
men as fathers in need to live up to their responsibility of caring for their families. 
However, the idea of the nuclear family frequently proved inapplicable in these 
appeals due to a variety of reasons. A significant number of fathers were already 
married and had families in Japan. Others were not aware of the existence of their 
offspring as they had believed their Filipina ex-partners had aborted their 
pregnancy as requested62. In some cases, the Japanese fathers of Japanese-Filipino 
children had already passed away. But the family remained an important topic in 
NGO advocacy. Indeed, feminists in the Philippines have for a long time avoided 
criticism of the ideal of the ‘normal’ family despite its central importance in the 
perpetuation of patriarchy. The Filipino family is “[h]eld sacrosanct by 
revolutionaries and the popular mind, the family, perceived as the repository of all 
that is value in the Philippine life, has been exempted from critical scrutiny and 
interrogation” (Aguilar 1988, p.20). In doing so, feminists have also refrained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  NGOs	  frequently	  demanded,	  and	  still	  demand,	  the	  paternal	  acknowledgment	  of	  Japanese-­‐Filipino	  children	  by	  their	  Japanese	  fathers,	  and	  their	  financial	  support.	  The	  arrangement	  of	  meetings	  between	  father	  and	  child	  has	  also	  become	  part	  of	  NGO’s	  endeavours.	  In	  the	  article	  entitled	   “a	   fruitful	   year”	   (DAWN,	   1997	   b)	   DAWN	   celebrates	   their	   achievement	   of	   having	  enabled	   the	  reunion	  of	  one	  of	   their	   clients,	  Cherry	  Aquino,	  with	   the	   Japanese	   father	  of	  her	  youngest	  daughter.	  The	  article	  further	  states	  that	  DAWN	  has	  helped	  nine	  other	  women	  and	  children	  to	  return	  to	  the	  Philippines	  or	  to	  go	  back	  to	  Japan	  to	  be	  reunited	  with	  their	  families.	  
Sinag	  also	  reports	  of	  a	  study	  tour	  to	  Japan,	  organized	  by	  DAWN	  in	  1998	  in	  order	  for	  some	  of	  their	   clients	   to	   meet	   with	   their	   Japanese	   “husbands/partners/relatives	   to	   discuss	   the	  recognition	   and	   support	   of	   their	   Japanese-­‐Filipino	   children.”	   (DAWN,	   1998	   e)	   One	   of	   the	  motivations	  behind	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  JFC	  Lawyer’s	  Association	  and	  the	  CNJFC	  was	  to	  get	  Japanese	   men	   to	   acknowledge	   their	   children	   with	   Filipino	   women	   and/or	   to	   get	   them	   to	  support	  their	  children	  financially.	  62	  In	   Japan,	   abortion	   is	   largely	   considered	   morally	   permissible	   and	   often	   chosen	   over	  birthing	   a	   child	   out	   of	   wedlock.	   In	   the	   strongly	   Catholic	   society	   of	   the	   Philippines	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	  abortion	   is	  both	   legally	  and	  normatively	  out	  of	  bounds.	   I	  have	  often	  witnessed	  Filipino	  NGO	  workers	   and	   clients	   expressing	   shock	   and	   anger	   about	   Japanese	  men	   asking	  their	  Filipina	  partners	  to	  get	  an	  abortion	  upon	  learning	  of	  their	  pregnancy.	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from openly challenging its main proponent, the Catholic Church. Rather, 
feminists have sought ways to strengthen women within the morally accepted 
boundaries, largely set by Christian teachings. The religious roots of women’s 
oppression in Philippine society have mainly been criticised in terms of women’s 
subjugation to men in private and public life, the defining power men had over 
women’s lives and the patriarchal constructions of femininity glorifying women’s 
martyrdom (Roces 2009). Nonetheless the supremacy of the “normal” family as 
ideal and patriarchal notions valuing women’s chastity and sexual passivity, have 
remained largely unchallenged.  
In early 2001, DAWN’s newsletter Sinag featured a short article entitled 
Women reclaim feminist principle which reported on the organization’s 
participation in the International Women’s Month that year (DAWN 2001 b). The 
feminist gathering was organized by the Association of Major Religious Superiors 
of the Philippines and other religious groups. The get-together was held at St. 
Joseph’s College, featuring activities like the Holy Mass and an Ecumenical 
Solidarity celebration. The report on the event was illustrative of the tight 
interlacing of feminists with religious groups.  
Clerical staff and other religiously trained persons are very much involved 
in the NGOs observed in this study as consultants and board members, or through 
their support in advocacy or in the design and implementation of trainings and 
workshops. The close association of these women’s groups with church groups or 
staff as well as the complex relationship of Philippine feminism with strongly 
engrained Christian beliefs in Philippine society have made ideals of the “normal” 
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family pivotal in claims towards fathers. Indeed, the ideal of the Filipino family, 
through its belief in patrilineal descent and the nuclear family, enforces the 
dependence on Japanese fatherhood as the determinant of the place of belonging 
of children.The negligent father is held responsible for women’s sufferings due to 
separation and children’s emotional struggles as a result from growing up with a 
single parent. With ideals of the nuclear family remaining largely unchallenged, 
many Japanese-Filipinos unable to live up to this ideal are being taught how to 
cope with their situation through workshops and sharing sessions, rather than to 
deconstruct “the family” and to welcome alternatives as just as normal. This 
sometimes reinforces the negative feelings associated with growing up in an 
“incomplete” or “broken” family, two expressions which have also been used by 
some of my Japanese-Filipino respondents. 
DAWN’s Japanese-Filipino clients’ yearning for a ‘complete family’ is 
published in the NGO’s newsletter, highlighting how much their Japanese-
Filipino wish to meet their Japanese fathers, and how important it is for them to 
have “normal” families: 
Yuri dreams of going back to Japan to be with her father again. And she 
hopes that her father would visit the Philippines. She wants her family to 
be reunited. Since the trip, Yuri has changed for the better. (DAWN 1998, 
p.8)  
All the children who managed to meet their Japanese fathers expressed joy 
at seeing their dream come true. One girl said that she became a whole 
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person when she met her father. Another has mixed feelings because of 
the complicated situation of her family. (DAWN 2000 a, p.7) 
This fifth grader [a Japanese-Filipino client of DAWN] loves to act and is 
thrilled at the possibility of seeing her Japanese father. (DAWN 2000 b, p. 
5) 
I am looking forward to seeing my father. I want to talk to him about what 
happened to his relationship with my mother. (Aissa Hatori in DAWN 
2003 b, p.6) 
The situation of Japanese-Filipino children yearning to meet their father is 
juxtaposed to that of those who have managed to do so, and who are featured as 
success-stories in the newsletter, so to confirm the importance of knowing one’s 
father. The NGO highlights the important change it has brought about in a child’s 
life, establishing the importance of Japanese fathers for their children, as well as 
validating the existence of the NGO itself as an enabler of the meeting between 
father and child and of the tremendous change that followed.  
But the experience of growing up without one’s father was not always as 
distressing as suggested in DAWN’s newsletter. Hayate and Alina, both Japanese-
Filipino young adults based in Japan, stated that they had no issues with not 
knowing their biological father. Alina also expressed her unhappiness with NGOs 
dwelling on the issue of the missing father:  
“This is the funny thing. I never thought about it until I met them [NGO 
workers]. As a JFC I should have known, but I never thought about it until 
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I met them. […] I never thought about how bad it is for me that I don’t 
have my dad… my real dad.” (Alina) 
Felix, one of my Japanese-Filipino respondents, told me that he was curious to 
meet his father and mother once he got the opportunity to travel to Japan. But 
otherwise he never felt lonely despite being without his biological parents: 
 “Anyways when I was young since all the people who took care 
of... even if my real parents were not there it felt that I have mothers 
everywhere, fathers everywhere, brothers and sisters so...it’s not that hard 
for me to accept that I’m alone. But of course I want to see my real parents 
and know what’s the feeling of having your mother in front of you, 
scolding you, teaching you stuff.” (Felix) 
Thus, while some of my respondents have expressed their unhappiness for not 
having been able to grow up in a nuclear family, others such as Hayate, Alina and 
Felix contested the idea that growing up in a nuclear family and knowing one’s 
biological father were essential to their lives. On the contrary, Alina challenged 
NGOs’ assumption on the importance of knowing one’s biological father and 
expressed discontent with NGOs creating particular situations as problems in the 
first place. Coincidentally, those among my respondents who expressed the least 
grief about growing up without their biological fathers also had not been involved 
with NGOs to any substantial extent. Those who did often joined their respective 
organizations at an early age.  
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The family is central in DAWN’s concerns pertaining to their young 
clients in both rhetoric and practice. Events like the yearly “Family Day” 
celebrate the importance of the family, workshops organized for Japanese-Filipino 
children tackle the issue of family, the missing father, and identity (cf. DAWN 
2007 c), and activities organized for women have included parenting workshops. 
In September 2008, a workshop focussing on “Understanding the Dynamics of the 
Filipino Family vis-à-vis Single Parenthood” (DAWN 2008 b) was organized by 
DAWN, including a sharing session about women’s feelings and experiences of 
not being able to live up to the nuclear family ideal. In setting up the session as 
such, single parenthood was already marked nonstandard and potentially 
problematic. 
An NGO worker at Batis confirms: “Family in the Philippines is very 
important, that is why JFC often suffer from the missing father”. “My only dream 
is to see Japanese-Filipino children reunited with their fathers so that their 
families will be whole again”, declares Aira, one of DAWN’s clients (DAWN 
1999 d, p.3). Similar desires for a “complete family” are expressed by some of 
DAWN’s women clients (cf. DAWN, 2007 a, p. 4). An episode of the television 
segment "Draw the Line" (cf. adobo queenjoy [Youtube username] 2008) aired on 
the popular Philippine television channel GMA Network in 2008, reiterated the 
importance of the father and the risk posed by single-parenthood to Japanese-
Filipinos' development. The episode explored the issues faced by Japanese-
Filipino children in the Philippines and featured DAWN’s Executive Director and 
three of DAWN’s clients including Takeru, a Japanese-Filipino boy. Takeru’s 
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narrative was supplemented with a commentary by psychologist Prof. Michael de 
Vera:  
Narrator: Takeru cannot help but feel resentment against his father. 
Because of him, Takeru does not really know who he is. 
Takeru: Of course, as a son, it’s like…you feel empty. Because there is 
something lacking in your life, because you haven’t seen your father yet. I 
say to myself, I hope I see my father. Because, as I said, it’s very 
painful… 
Narrator: In spite of the many years they have not seen each other, 
Takeru still strongly believes that he has rights to fight for. 
Takeru: Like those…whatever can be done or whatever you can do that is 
beneficial, that you should have because it’s your right…it’s the right of 
the child to be supported by the father, but, since he is not here, I have 
come to accept that I cannot cling on any support… 
Narrator: The problem is that the mother does not have any idea about 
the whereabouts of Takeru’s father. They are somewhat “suspended in the 
air”, and they are certain if they can still count on any support. The 
situation of Japanese-Filipino children and their mothers was the reason to 
establish the Development Action for Women Network, or DAWN. 
 [...] 
Narrator: In the 13 years that DAWN has been providing help, they have 
helped more than 800 JFC’s and 500 mothers. According to Prof. Michael 
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de Vera, a psychologist, abandonment can have immense effect on the 
child. 
Prof. de Vera: No one will set the goals in the house…number 2, the 
child’s foundation is weak, because let’s say that the mother is “soft” as 
compared to the father, who is the “tenacious” one. Number 3, if the child 
grows up with the mother, there is likelihood of mother-dependency, so 
the child may become effeminate, or what we call sex-role conflict…so 
basically he harbors a hatred toward the father, because in the first place, 
does he know why they were abandoned, where the father is? If the father 
is not around and only the mother takes care of the child, there is 
likelihood that the child becomes a brat… 
[…] 
The development of a ‘distorted’ gender identity, becoming a ‘brat’, and 
resentment may be the consequences of growing up with a single mother 
according to the psychologist. The absence of a nuclear family is thus depicted as 
highly problematic for a child growing up.  
Messages about the family are additionally delivered through advocacy; 
“SANA...Isang Kuwento ng Pangarap”, DAWN’s first theatre play staged by 
Teatro Akebono in 1998 tells the tale of Yuki, a young Japanese-Filipino girl who 
dreams of meeting her Japanese father. “Everyday [sic], she waits for the postman 
to ask if there is a letter from him. But each day always ends in disappointment.” 
(DAWN 1998 c, p.4). Yuki is being discriminated against because of her absent 
father and the resulting allegations that she may be the product of her mother’s 
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sexual ‘indiscretions’. Both Yuki and her mother thus resort to hopes of living in 
Japan and reuniting with the girl’s Japanese father. “The play ends with a note of 
hope that Japanese fathers would finally realize their responsibilities to their 
Filipino families” (ibid.). 
The ideal of the ‘normal’ family and the idea of a possible reunion of its 
nucleus -mother, father and child- were most notably deployed in the 1990s, to 
mitigate suspicions of promiscuity popularly associated with former entertainers 
in Japan, or “Japayuki”63. The father was thought of as important to rectify 
“wrong impressions” and to redress the honour of both the child and his or her 
mother. The discourse on the family is thus not only central in depicting the 
situation of Japanese-Filipino children, but inevitably also a means for NGOs to 
consider women clients’ relationships with their partners and ex-partners. The 
nuclear family remains the norm; whoever fails to live up to it- and most clients 
are unable to- needs to learn how to cope with the ensuing ‘incompleteness’. 
Meanwhile, NGOs’ Japanese and Filipino audiences must be persuaded that these 
women did try their best; support groups thus cast the relationships entertained by 
Filipino women with Japanese men as ‘love relationships’ followed by 
disappointment. In 1997, Cherry Aquino, a mother of three, adorned the 
newsletter Sinag’s front page; the headline reported that Cherry is reunited with 
Mr. Shimizu, the father of her youngest daughter (DAWN, 1997 b, p. 1). Cherry 
and her children were deported from Japan after they had been caught 
overstaying. A photograph of the family taken in Japan, together with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Literally	  means	   “Japan	   bound”.	   However	  mass	  media	   in	   the	   Philippines	   and	   in	   Japan	   as	  well	   as	   NGOs	   have	   often	   (wrongly)	   associated	   Japayuki	   with	   prostitution.	   (Suzuki	   2004,	  p.483)	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DAWN’s Executive Director and a Japanese NGO volunteer, accompanied the 
news.  
Although Japanese fathers are taken to task by NGOs and urged to live up 
to their responsibilities, they are simultaneously endowed with significant power. 
The Japanese father is the person upon who depends not only his child’s legal 
status, but also the child’s identity and the child’s wealth and well-being. Given 
that they grow up without paternal recognition, NGOs maintain that Japanese-
Filipino children develop an “identity crisis”.  To mend this presumed crisis, and 
also to obtain financial support from the Japanese fathers for their clients, 
organizations have made efforts to arrange ‘reunions’ of children with their male 
parent. The yearly theatre tour of Teatro Akebono in Japan is an opportunity for 
children to meet their biological fathers. DAWN used to also organize theatre and 
study tours for its women clients in the early 1990s, but after an incident 
involving two of their clients splitting from the group to remain in Japan 
undocumented, DAWN has ceased bringing its women clients to Japan.  
 The centrality of these meetings to both children and NGO work is 
illustrated by their coverage in newsletters. The July-September 1998 issue of 
Sinag, preceding Teatro Akebono’s very first theatre tour to Japan, provides a list 
of names of children scheduled to meet their fathers, as well as the cities where 
the meetings are planned to take place (cf. DAWN, 1998e). The get-together of 
father and child is further dramatized after each theatre tour by articles reporting 
on one particular meet-up and narrating it at length with thickly laid on emotions.  
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For Yuri, her prayers were not for a new dress or an expensive toy, but 
only for her to finally meet the father she had always dreamed of hugging 
(DAWN, 1998b, p.1)  
 
Lani had always dreamed of meeting and knowing her father. […] Upon 
introduction to her father, Lani did not hesitate. She embraced and kissed 
her father with all the pent up love that she has been keeping in her heart 
for eleven years. (DAWN, 1999b, p. 9) 
 
Tsuyoshi’s eyes kept darting around until they found his father seated in 
the third row with his grandparents. Imai and Tsuyoshi couldn’t take their 
eyes off each other. Similarly, Tsuyoshi’s grandfather couldn’t stop taking 
pictures of his grandson during the performance. (DAWN 1999 b, p.5) 
The above excerpts depict Japanese-Filipino children’s feelings and experiences 
from the NGO’s staff writer’s point of view. However, as mentioned above, not 
all Japanese-Filipinos find it important to know their biological fathers.  
In a review of their own tour, a staff writer declares: “All the children who 
managed to meet their Japanese fathers expressed joy at seeing their dream come 
true. One girl said that she became a whole person when she met her father.” 
(DAWN 2000 a, p.7). The arrangement of a meeting with the father is principal in 
determining the NGO’s “success” since the ideal of the ‘normal’ family takes 
such centrality in NGO discourses. The figure of the father is symbolically laden. 
The father stands for financial stability, the provision of private education, hopes 
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for a better, possibly even a transnational life and most importantly, recognition 
through formal paternal acknowledgment. The meeting of father and child is 
depicted as a happy event, marking an important juncture in the young person’s 
life both deemed to resolve financial difficulties as well as the question of “who 
am I?”. Yet, despite these meetings being celebrated as reunions, they are at times 
short-lived; the contact between children and fathers is not always sustained and 
sometimes finds an abrupt end when fathers change address or phone numbers 
without bothering to communicate the change to their children or the NGO (cf. 
DAWN 2002e, p.11). Nevertheless, a staff member at DAWN asserts that even a 
single meeting between father and child engenders an important transformation in 
the child which even manifests physically and mentally: 
“Of course we’ve found a number of fathers. But some of them after 
meeting them [their children] once they communicate then they disappear 
again. But we can see the impact on the children. Like the children 
develop more confidence. They develop more and they grow faster, 
physically, mentally, emotionally. These are observations on the children 
who had a chance to meet their fathers. And then they try to study harder. 
Because they always say they want their fathers to be proud of them.” 
(DAWN staff) 
Although DAWN is not always able to facilitate sustained contact between fathers 
and children, let alone the rekindling of the parents’ relationship, this DAWN 
staff-member insists on the important positive change provoked in the children by 
their first- and often only- meeting with their biological fathers.  
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However, a Japan-based DAWN volunteer having dealt with a number of 
Japanese fathers notes that they may not always be the long-awaited resolution of 
‘identity’ questions and financial struggles. Sometimes Japanese fathers decline 
meeting with their children as they already have a family and some fathers 
struggle with financial problems themselves. As the DAWN volunteer stated:  
“…some fathers think that supporting the children financially is their 
responsibility as a parent and if they cannot help the children financially 
they feel ashamed to meet the children, I guess. They cannot meet their 
responsibility maybe.” (DAWN volunteer)  
She also doubted whether meeting the fathers was always a good idea. According 
to her, many of the Japanese fathers are in a difficult situation and are sometimes 
mentally ill. The Japanese-Filipino children and youth might eagerly look forward 
to the first meeting as a turning point in their lives, but often that one meeting 
would remain just that one meeting. 
The importance of blood-ties in discourses on the “normal” family 
Men in Japan have since the 1990s come under public scrutiny for not 
spending enough time with their families and being largely absent- physically and 
emotionally- from their offspring’s upbringing (Nakatani 2006). Knowing 
Japanese men’s absence from family life in Japan despite shared living space as 
well as the realities of growing numbers of de facto single-parent families in the 
Philippines, the question arising here is about the nature of the advocated-for 
family ties that seem to be of such primacy in NGO discourses and endeavours.  
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Indeed, the primary concern materializes around blood-ties, the biological 
link between father and child rather than experienced parenthood: the father is 
reified as the provider of lineage and thus familial identity, as the authority of 
acknowledging a child as his, and thereby as part of the family. By investing their 
energies in securing paternal recognition and financial support, support-NGOs are 
reinforcing absentee fathers as bearers of these two masculine domains within the 
traditional family make-up.  
The importance of blood-ties as a defining aspect of the ‘normal’ family is 
also inculcated into the children though practice; despite the absence of their 
biological fathers, numerous children have step-fathers and half-siblings who 
nevertheless remain excluded from most NGO organized activities and are largely 
absent from family-day celebrations which are only attended by NGO clients, 
staff and supporters (members of the board and volunteers for instance). The 
insistence on the ‘need’  for Japanese-Filipino children to meet their biological 
father is thus another manifestation of patriarchal ideas of family and kinship; the 
children can only know ‘who they are’ if they know the male lineage from which 
they descend. 
The discourse on the ideal of the “normal family” serves as a blueprint 
against which Japanese-Filipino children are made to stand out. The use of the 
discourse on the family accentuates the importance of blood ties. Links are drawn 
between the biological relationship of father and child and the offspring’s sense of 
self.  The ideal of the ‘normal family’, held dearly among Filipinos in a country in 
which legal divorce is non-existent, serves as a lynchpin of moral panics 
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whenever political and economic circumstances incite social change as will be 
shown in more detail below. It is thus not surprising that ‘family’ remains a 
pivotal matter in NGO discourses, and certainly an emotionally laden one. The 
importance of the ideal of the ‘normal family’ and of biological parent-child 
relationships translating into social ties furthermore serve to underpin the 
mobilization of consanguinal capital by adding a normative dimension to claims 
for recognition and belonging. 
“Doing family” outside the boundaries of the “normal” is encountered 
with suspicion; NGO staff at DAWN monitor their clients’ private lives and 
relationships for fear the Japanese-Filipino children may suffer. An NGO worker 
of DAWN related to me the story of one of DAWN’s Filipina clients, G.: 
“She married [a Filipino man] when she was very young and then they 
separated and she went to Japan. Now the daughter is 20 plus… maybe 22. 
And then her JFCs K. and N. and then now she has also another boy. But 
the two take care of the young. And the older one is working and she 
supports the two. But on the part of G. [Filipina client] we’re quite 
disappointed because she doesn’t take care of the other children, only this 
boy. [...] So the problem we’re identifying is with the mother and then of 
course the step-father. It’s like the step father wants the mother’s time and 
attention more. So it’s like he doesn’t care about the children, the other 
children. We were like thinking if the mother will get another partner she 
should make sure the partner would consider the other children.  Then of 
course since the two JFCs are girls, K. will be fourth year high school and 
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N. will be in grade six. Of course there are times when we are worried 
about their safety. Because in the Philippines...their home is very small… 
then they’re in separate room but there are no locks. And if they have the 
stepfather there…it’s like… and then there are other relatives inside the 
house. So there are times when we, we feel worried about the safety in 
their own house. Because in the Philippines there are a lot of cases of 
abuses of children. Sometimes by the step father, by the relatives, by the 
grand-father…”   
 
The patchwork family is considered potentially dangerous especially to 
young girls, as there is no blood-relationship with the step-father and other family 
members who would be prepared to protect ‘their own’. Although the risks of 
abuse may be real, harassment does occur among blood-relatives as well. One 
such case had been handled by DAWN itself; in the early 1990s, the NGO had a 
Filipina client who suffered from a mental illness. Subsequently, DAWN 
convinced her ex-partner to take care of their teenage daughter and have her live 
with him in Japan. After some time, the father started to sexually harass his child. 
The girl found a way out by marrying an American soldier stationed in Japan at 
the time.64 This case shocked the organization and shored up the potential risks 
involved in sending children to live with their fathers in Japan, fathers who often 
had little emotional bonds with their children. I learned of a similar case of sexual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  This	  story	  was	  related	  to	  me	  by	  a	  DAWN	  volunteer	  based	  in	  Japan.	  
120	  	  
harassment during my fieldwork.65 Haru, a young woman who had grown up with 
her mother in the Philippines was able to live with her father in Japan and 
subsequently gained Japanese citizenship. Her father also financed her tertiary 
education in the country. However, during an overseas trip they undertook 
together, he sexually harassed her. According to Haru, her father also suffered 
from a mental illness which made him very difficult to live with. The young 
woman sought help from fellow Filipinos upon her return to Japan, gaining 
support from a local NGO and eventually finding shelter with an American-
Filipino expatriate couple living near the American military bases. There, she 
worked in a restaurant and met her American husband-to-be. After the American-
Filipino couple had returned to the U.S., the young woman was forced to move in 
again with her father. The last time I met her, she was secretly planning her 
escape from Japan, asking her friends and acquaintances to store some of her 
belongings in their homes until she had managed to move everything out of the 
house before sending it to her former hosts in the U.S. She also had a flight ticket 
booked and, with her Japanese passport, she could travel without worrying about 
the time-consuming process of applying for a U.S. visa.  
Another of my respondents, Alina, recalled that as a young girl she had 
been physically abused by her own relatives. She grew up in the absence of both 
her parents. Her mother was working in Japan, sending remittances to support her 
two daughters and the rest of her family.  However, according to my respondent, 
her relatives “hurt her” and she had no one but her older sister who would stand 
up for her. Upon knowing of the abuse her daughter had suffered from her own 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  The	  young	  woman	  in	  this	  account	  was	  not	  a	  member	  of	  any	  of	  the	  five	  NGOs	  in	  question.	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kin, her mother banned her extended family from their home and cut them off her 
support, leaving her eldest daughter as well as house-helpers in charge of 
managing the household and taking care of her youngest.   
Accounts like these put into question the assumption that the social 
practice of ‘doing family’ is most favourable if supported by actual biological 
relationships among family members. The above mentioned examples and other 
cases of Japanese fathers being mentally and/or financially unfit to take care of 
their Japanese-Filipino children contravene this idea.66 
Nevertheless, the ideal of the “normal” family continues to be deployed by 
NGOs to sustain their claims and to reframe Filipina women’s involvement with 
Japanese men. NGOs portray the presence of the biological father to be vital in a 
child’s life. This insistence on the biological father’s presence and partaking in his 
child’s life is not only motivated by beliefs of what is morally “right” and in the 
child’s interest, but also necessary to direct political claims towards the Japanese 
government. Firstly, Japan is urged to acknowledge its accountability in having 
made possible the birth and abandonment of numerous Japanese-Filipino children. 
Secondly the government is blamed for having deprived many of these children of 
Japanese nationality. Thirdly the need of meeting one’s biological father and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Another	  DAWN	  volunteer	  based	  in	  Japan	  mentioned	  that	  Japanese	  fathers	  sometimes	  have	  psychological	   problems	   or	   are	   suffering	   from	   poverty.	   Yet	   NGO	   staff	   from	   the	   Philippines	  tends	  to	  believe	  that	  life	  in	  Japan	  remains	  the	  better	  option	  for	  Japanese-­‐Filipino	  children	  as	  Japan	  and	  the	  Japanese	  are	  deemed	  to	  generally	  be	  wealthy.	  This	  impression	  may	  be	  brought	  about	  by	  Japan’s	  self-­‐depiction	  as	  socially	  homogenous,	  middle-­‐class	  society.	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getting to know one’s “other homeland” is mentioned as a reason why Japanese-
Filipinos should be given Japanese nationality67. 
In its earlier days, DAWN believed in the reunion of “the family”: the 
Filipina mother, the Japanese father and their child(ren). In anticipation of more 
such ‘success’ stories as the one of Cherry and Mr. Shimizu mentioned earlier, 
theatre and study tours to Japan were also organized for women clients of the 
organization during its first years of existence. In 1998, three such tours were 
arranged, each time bringing a handful of clients to Japan in the hopes for them to 
meet with Japanese ex-partners and in-laws in Tokyo and to “discuss the 
recognition and support of their Japanese-Filipino children. “ (DAWN 1998 d, 
p.3)  Another tour took place in 2000 (DAWN 2000 a). As briefly mentioned 
above, two women clients failed to show up at the airport when it was time to 
return to the Philippines after one of these tours. Instead, they remained in Japan 
undocumented. Realizing the lure of the yen, the NGO has since stopped bringing 
their women clients on trips overseas.   
The news about this incident spread among other support groups, 
cautioning them against bringing adult women clients with them to Japan. Talking 
to one of the staff of Maligaya House, I was informed that they had decided to 
bring only one Filipino mother to accompany them to Tokyo during one of their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  	  “Our	  support	  for	  JFCs	  and	  their	  issues	  and	  concerns	  dared	  to	  chip	  away	  at	  the	  prevailing	  notion	   that	   the	   issue	   of	   Japanese	   –	   Filipino	   children	   is	   a	   personal	   issue	   between	   Filipina	  mothers	  and	  Japanese	  fathers.	  	  We	  lobbied	  both	  the	  Japanese	  and	  Philippine	  governments	  to	  enact	   equitable	  policies	   that	  will	   recognize,	   respect	   and	  promote	   the	   rights	   and	  welfare	  of	  Japanese	   –	   Filipino	   children	   and	   helped	   raise	   awareness	   on	   the	   issue	  with	   the	   peoples	   of	  both	  countries	  as	  well.	  [...]	  Amendments	  to	  the	  Nationality	  Law	  needs	  [sic!]	  to	  be	  taken	  steps	  further	   in	  order	   to	  remove	   legal	   impediments	   to	   the	  exercise	  of	   JFCs	  of	   their	   right	   to	   their	  cultural	   heritage,	   including	   their	   father's	   nationality	   or	   freedom	   of	   movement	   in	   their	  father's	  birthplace.”	  	  (The	  Batis	  Center	  for	  Women	  et	  al.	  2008)	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trips where “the rest are children as some women might stay in Japan and go 
TNT.68 This happened to DAWN before.” The incident went unmentioned in 
DAWN’s newsletter and one-sided depictions of women migrant returnees as 
victims of exploitation were sustained. 
Depicting Filipina mothers 
The victimization discourse used to frame Filipina “entertainers’” 
experiences in Japan and the deployment of the ideal of the ‘normal’ family has 
enabled NGOs to do two things. First, Filipina migrant returnees are depicted in 
ways that dissociate them from sex-work, from the image of the “cunning” 
prostitute (Suzuki 2008), and thus from notions of ‘immorality’; second, to draw a 
generalized picture of their Japanese-Filipino children as born, if not from 
marriage, then at least from love to legitimize their claims.  
I met my Japanese partner in the club where I was working in during my 
last contract in Japan. […] He courted me after a few days. He was 
responsible and kind. He was pursuing me relentlessly until I also fell for 
him. I accepted him as my boyfriend on March 2, 1991. I got pregnant. He 
took care of me. He even introduced me to his parents. He would often 
call me in the club. He promised to marry me in the Philippines. […] June 
30, 1991, it was my boyfriend’s birthday, he called up to ask how much 
we need to spend for our wedding. After that call, we already lost 
communication. (Cora in DAWN 2004 a, pp.170-171) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Tago	  ng	  tago,	  to	  go	  into	  hiding,	  which	  also	  means	  to	  become	  an	  undocumented	  migrant.	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I met the father of my child in the club where I was working in. he was a 
regular customer there. He courted me and I didn’t have any second 
thought of accepting him because of the kindness he showed me. I was 
able to prove once how much he really loved me. I told him that I would 
go home to the Philippines after my contract. Nothing changed when I 
came back. He treated me like the way he used to. Until something 
unexpected happened. Before I was able to finish my contract, I got 
pregnant after going out on dohan with him for several times. (Rose in 
DAWN 2004 a, pp.188-189) 
Although readers of DAWN’s newsletter Sinag, or of Batis’ publication 
“Behind the Drama of Filipino Entertainers in Japan” (Takeda and Erpelo 2008) 
are reminded of instances of forced prostitution and other forms of sexual 
violence, the simultaneous depiction of Filipino women as loving and caring 
mothers reinforces the juxtaposition of the victimized, sexually deviant 
“entertainer” and the transformed “survivor”69. 
The representations of Filipino mothers as victims yet survivors and as 
caring mothers, is central to claims on behalf of their children.70 Filipino women’s 
relationships need to first be shown to have been “legitimate” to validate claims 
on behalf of their children with Japanese men. The process of legitimizing entails 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  The	   narratives	   selected	   for	   Batis’	   publication	   depict	   more	   violent	   scenarios,	   including	  forced	  prostitution,	  rape,	  and	  domestic	  violence,	  than	  those	  featured	  in	  DAWN’s	  book.	  	  70	  The	  depiction	  of	   former	  entertainers	  as	  victims	  and	  caring	  mothers	   is	   less	   important	   for	  individual	  cases	  than	  it	  is	  for	  the	  NGOs’	  cause	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  June	  2008	  decision	  to	  amend	  Japan’s	  nationality	  law	  following	  the	  CNJFC-­‐supported	  lawsuit	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  recognition	  of	  Japanese-­‐Filipino	   children	   being	   born	   into	   families,	   rather	   than	   from	   short-­‐lived	  relationships.	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the establishment of Filipinas’ relations with Japanese men as emotionally driven 
(or in some cases as a result of despair) and not motivated by ulterior motives 
such as a visa or a guarantee for financial support. When queried as to their 
relationship, Filipinas married to Japanese men would mention “love” to have 
been the reason for their legal union, as “love” cancels out the possibility of 
having married, as it is widely assumed, for purely instrumental motivations 
(Parreñas 2011, p.182). However, “making love for a visa” and other benefits 
corrupts the ideal of sexual relations taking place purely out of love (ibid.), and 
preferably within wedlock.  
Suspicions of childbirth having resulted from the engagement in sexual 
relations for ulterior motives therefore need to be dissuaded; instead, accounts by 
Filipino women published in NGO newsletters and books read like tales of 
martyrdom, betrayed vows of love and broken promises of marriage. With 
childbirth established as the consequence of “love”, not as part of a plan for 
material gains, claims for paternal recognition, Japanese nationality and alimony 
are also deemed legitimate. The depiction of mother, father and child(ren) to have 
been a family in the past or desiring to be a family in the future,  concludes and 
reifies the idea of a failed love-relationship while highlighting the importance of 
the Japanese father to live up to his responsibilities. Japanese-Filipino children are 
roped into this project of nullification of motives contrary to love by performing 
the role of the ever-loving child; DAWN occasionally publishes tender messages 
by its child clients addressed to their biological fathers, highlighting their 
affective bond with a man they often have never met. 
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Dear Papa, How are you? I am well here. Papa, we are going to come to 
Japan on October 16, 1998. Papa, I would like you to watch me and mama 
in Saitama on October 17, 1998. Papa, Hitomi and Nozomi miss you. Papa 
ai tai [I want to meet you] and I love you. Your loving daughter, Yuri71 
(DAWN 1998 a, p.9) 
 
To my Dearest Daddy, Daddy how are you? I hope you are always fine. 
Dad I miss you so much. Dad, I am already in Grade IV, and I am already 
10 years old. I wish we’re a complete family, and I always pray that every 
night. I have watched on television that some places in japan are flooded 
and Ihope you are not affected in that flood. Dad, please call me up on our 
cellular phone number 0918-281-0335. May God bless you always! I love 
you very much! And please take care of yourself! Sayonara otoosan 
[Good bye, father]! Your loving son, Hirofumi S. Kataoka No.218 
Military Cut-off, corner Hillside, Baguio City, PHILIPPINES. (ibid.) 
 
Victimization discourses have for a long time been deployed by NGOs for 
political purposes, such as the passing of anti-Human Trafficking laws72, as well 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Tagalog	  original	  as	  printed	  in	  the	  newsletter:	  Dear	  Papa,	  Kumusta	  ka	  na?	  Mabuti	  naman	  po	  ako	   dito.	   Papa	   pupunta	   po	   kami	   ng	   Japan	   sa	   October	   16,	   1998.	   Papa,	   gusto	   ko	   pong	  panooring	  mo	   po	   kami	   ng	  Mama	   sa	   Saitama	   sa	   October	   17,	   1998.	   Papa,	   name-­‐miss	   nap	   o	  kayo	  nina	  Hitomi	  at	  Nozomi.	  Papa	  ai	  tai	  and	  I	  love	  you.	  Your	  loving	  daughter,	  Yuri	  [note:	  Yuri	  uses	  honorific	  speech	  when	  she	  addresses	  her	  father.]	  	  72	  The	   Republic	   Act	   No.9208	  was	   signed	   in	  May	   2003	   by	   then-­‐Philippine-­‐President	   Gloria	  Macapagal-­‐Arroyo.	  DAWN	   (2003,	   p.4)	   claims	   part	   of	   the	   success	   in	   getting	   the	   law	   signed	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as to reframe former Filipina “entertainers” in Japan as ‘proper’ women. Filipino 
women’s prominence in Japan’s night clubs has left migrants and returnees 
burdened with a set of negative stereotypes: cunning, materialistic and 
promiscuous. Throughout the 1980s, the Japayuki has emerged as ‘immoral’ 
Other in Japanese mass media, with migrant women being depicted “as hostesses 
and whores choosing to work at night in order to achieve their own ends, with 
some even depicted as deceiving their clients and intentionally becoming pregnant 
to bear “Japanese” children” (Suzuki 2008, p.68). In the Philippines, on the other 
hand, “Filipinas’ flights to Japan are also portrayed as tantamount to a betrayal of 
their natal state and its gender ideology73” (p. 76). These negative images are 
detrimental to gaining sympathy for the plight of many returnees in distress. 
Migrant women's decisions to leave the country, the nature of their employment 
and their relationships with Japanese men are thus vindicated differently by 
support groups; the women’s involvement with Japanese men are often cast as 
love relationships while their labour in the sex industry is attributed to a lack of 
choice. Filipino women are symbolically distanced from the sexualized image of 
the Japayuki through portrayals as either devout lovers or as passive, even 
reluctant participants in the sexual act. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  in:“DAWN	  was	  one	  of	  the	  active	  supporters	  for	  the	  passage	  of	  this	  measure	  along	  with	  fellow	  advocates	   from	   the	  National	  Commission	  on	   the	  Role	  of	  Filipino	  Women	  and	   the	  Coalition	  Against	  Trafficking	  in	  Women-­‐Asia	  Pacific	  (CATW-­‐AP).”	  	  73	  An	  unpublished	  study	  by	  Carolyn	  Medel	  Añonuevo	  (1990)	   found	  that	  dominant	   ideals	  of	  femininity	   in	   the	   Philippines	   are	   largely	   derived	   from	   Catholic	   teaching.	   These	   ideals	  established	   two	   types	  of	  women:	   “the	  virginal	  martyr	   and	  mother	   role	  of	  Mary	  or	   the	   evil	  women	  that	  the	  seductress	  Magdalene	  was	  portrayed	  to	  be”	  (Añonuevo,	  1990	  in	  Roces	  2009,	  p.272).	   	   Ideal	   femininity	   also	   entailed	   virginity	   until	   married	   and	   fertility	   when	   married	  (ibid.).	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Her lack of a proper working visa pushed Teresita to a live-in arrangement 
with Mr. Shimizu. On June 15, 1993, Teresita gave birth to Anna. 
(DAWN 2001) 
This above excerpt taken from Sinag leaves out any mentioning of a love 
relationship or of sexual involvement; Anna is born out of a live-in arrangement 
her mother was pushed into. The ensuing pregnancy is portrayed as a result of Mr. 
Shimizu having taken advantage of her mother’s forlorn situation.  
Yayori Matsui (1999) tells about the stories of Japanese-Filipino children 
and their Filipino mothers that she had collected when visiting Luzon in January 
1994. Recounting the narratives of the Filipino mothers she had met, she writes: 
 He hired her as a maid and then made her pregnant. 
(p. 52 emphasis added)  
In many cases, the mothers met the Japanese men who had made them 
pregnant while they were working in Japan. (p.54 emphasis added)  
There, as part of a business relationship, they serve customers who show 
an interest in them. In doing so, the women become unable to distinguish 
between love and showing hospitality. (p.58 emphasis added)  
 
In Matsui’s depictions, Filipino women have fallen prey to Japanese men 
as well as to their alleged incapability of differentiating between love and their 
job. By using the passive voice in narrating occurrences of sexual relations and 
pregnancies, Filipino women are portrayed as disempowered victims of overly 
potent Japanese men. The depiction of Japanese men as lustful and exploitative is 
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in tension with the importance attributed to them within discourses on the “normal 
family”.  Moreover, contrary to these depictions Parreñas (2011) has shown that 
Filipina hostesses’ decision to engage in emotional and sexual relations usually 
was carefully thought through and not merely passively accepted.  
Janice, one of my respondents, has two Japanese-Filipino sons; each boy 
was born from a relationship that started at the club where she worked as an 
‘entertainer’. In her narrative, Janice portrayed herself as an adventurous as well 
as calculating person; she actively choose the father of her first child and used wit 
to hide her pregnancy from her employers.  
Interviewer: How did you meet [your first son’s] father? 
Janice: He’s my tenchō [branch manager, here the manager of the pub]. 
He’s the tenchō of the pub. Then that time I was really (laughs), I heard 
that in 2000-something the world was going to blow up like that, [I 
thought] oh my gosh, I don’t even know what’s the face of my [future] 
child… whatever happens I have to see my own baby even if it doesn’t 
have a father or what, but I just want my own baby. Then, that time he was 
engaged with someone, somebody, another talent. But that time I didn’t 
know he was going to marry someone. So I flirted with him: “Hey, you 
want me?” (laughs) That time I was still a virgin, but he won’t believe me 
that I’m still a virgin because I’m like that. [Janice mimics the 
conversation] “You want me?” “What?” “You want me?” “What are you 
talking about?” “I would like you to be the father of my child.” “What? 
Are you nuts?” “No I’m not” “Why I must be the one, or what?” “If you 
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don’t want it’s okay I‘ll find someone. I’ll find someone, you’re not the 
only guy. Don’t worry, forget it, I told him, don’t worry forget it.” […]  
Eventually Janice’s tenchō decided to date her, but they kept their relationship 
secret. Soon however, her co-workers at the pub started gossiping which attracted 
the attention of their superiors.   
When I was still there [at the pub] the buchō [manager, superior to tenchō] 
and the sachō [manager, superior to buchō] noticed the tsismis [gossip], 
the tsismis blew up. [They said] “Oh we heard that you’re pregnant and 
you still have a relation with the tenchō do you know he’s married 
already?” [I replied] “Yeah I know, and he’s not my boyfriend we do not 
have a relationship, do you have proof? You are an official man, guy, so 
you don’t have to believe in the tsismis, ‘cause you’re a top guy who 
doesn’t believe in tsismis unless you saw it with your own eyes.” [They 
replied] “Okay for the best, let’s go to the doctor and have a check-up.” 
They want me to have some [pregnancy] check. But I won’t allow them to 
bring me for a check. So I told them, I will go there, but you have to sign 
the papers here you, my promoter, buchō and sachō gojuman [fifty 
thousand], gojuman, gojuman, that’s 150 000 [yen]. [Janice continues to 
mimic the conversation] “You have to sign it that you’re going to pay me 
if you find out I am not pregnant.” “Why? It’s too takai [expensive], it’s 
too much, too expensive for just checking.” “Just checking? They’re 
gonna you know, they’re gonna do like that and then…for you guys it’s 
okay, but for me.” “Okay okay okay, no way.” “So if you want me to go 
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there but you first sign. If you want me to go okay, but I’m not pregnant. 
Why won’t you guys believe me I’m not pregnant. Okay we can go there, 
but sign that.” Until 6 months… but that time I was slim, so that time they 
really did not recognize it. […] After that at the airport when I finished my 
visa, my contract, then at Narita they gave me my 6-months’ salary. I 
waited there. After the promoter came to me: “Okay here is your salary, 
okay you go there”, etcetera, etcetera. [Janice mimics the conversation] 
“Wait, wait, wait!” “What?” “You know what? I’m pregnant!” (laughs) 
“I’m six months pregnant!” Ah no it’s 4 months… “You’re a naughty girl! 
You fooled us!” (laughs). 
 
Despite understating the more difficult situations she may have faced 
during her time as a hostess in Japan, Janice did not once depict herself as a 
victim. But a story like Janice’s which deviates from ideals of female chastity and 
links child-birth to calculations would hardly garner support. 
The deployment of the ideal of the “normal” family, to reiterate the theme 
of this section, is a discursive strategy by which NGOs hope to enable women to 
find their way back into accepted femininity. By highlighting the family and by 
emphasizing motherhood, women are discursively removed from the bar and 
placed back into a primarily domestic sphere as providers of care for their 
children. The role of women migrant returnees as mothers is played up in 
DAWN’s family day celebrations which are usually coupled with Mother’s Day: 
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 Capping the celebration was a short program that was especially meant 
for DAWN women who have been fulfilling their important roles as 
mothers to their JFCs. In time for the May 12 celebration of Mother’s 
Day, women were given the chance to share their sentiments, thoughts and 
feelings to their children and to the DAWN family, making everyone 
teary-eyed that fine afternoon. (DAWN 2002 c, 2)  
Single-motherhood74, rendering these women into both providers and 
carers, sculpts another popular female trait: that of the sacrificing mother. The 
“DAWN family” (cf. DAWN, 1999a; DAWN, 2002a; DAWN, 2002b; DAWN, 
2002c) on the other hand provides material and financial support, guidance, 
knowledge and at times disciplines its members: “Simple tokens of love and 
appreciation were given to all the mothers present even to staff and volunteers 
including [the] Executive Director […] who was described as the ‘Mother of the 
DAWN family.’” (DAWN 2002d, p.2, emphasis added) The organization jumps in 
to fulfil duties deemed masculine, filling in the gaps left by absentee fathers by 
being a source of financial support, providing guidance and exercising discipline. 
Simultaneously, the filling in for missing fathers reifies the organization’s 
authority, both in its clients’ lives but also discursively, as an important and 
legitimate source of knowledge on Filipina migrant returnees and their Japanese-
Filipino Children, buttressed by their expertise in dealing with and supporting the 
latter and by acting as their mouthpiece.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Not	  all	  women	  members	  of	  support	  NGOS	  are	  de	  facto	  without	  a	  partner.	  “Single”	  seems	  to	  denote	  women	  who	  are	  separated	  from	  the	  Japanese	  father	  of	  their	  Japanese-­‐Filipino	  child.	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Concluding remarks 
The insistence on the nuclear, ‘normal’ family is not surprising 
considering the strength and deep-rootedness of Christian values in Philippine 
society and by consequence within cause-oriented groups. Yet it is peculiar for 
organizations dealing with former migrant women to place emphasis on the 
missing father within a socio-economic context that has seen rising numbers of 
single-parent families due to persistent labour export; Japanese-Filipino children 
are not the only children growing up with one sole parent. This is not to say that 
the rise of de facto single-parent families, if one does not take into account 
members of the extended family providing support in child-rearing, has not led to 
concerns about the ‘Filipino family’. Notably the increasing numbers of women 
crossing borders over extended periods of time often leaving their children in the 
care of relatives has sparked “[p]owerful moral discourses saturated with 
normative ideas about gender and generation bewail[ing] the breakup of the 
nuclear family in labour-exporting regimes such as that of the Philippines” 
(Horton, 2008, p. 926). The targeting of women, rather than men, in moralistic 
discourses on the family illustrates how the responsibility for the quality of a 
child’s life is manifestly gendered. Women remain responsible for children’s 
emotional well-being while men need to provide the family with income and their 
children with status and identity.  
Patrilineal inheritance of descent, name, status and property needs an 
assurance of paternity. Women are therefore subjected to greater surveillance; 
their sexual behaviour is controlled in order to guarantee the biological relation 
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between a child and the putative father. Women are expected to remain sexually 
inexperienced until marriage and chaste within marriage, being sexually available 
only to their husbands75. Indeed, women’s reputation and ‘respectability’ is tied to 
their sexualities76. Sexuality thus becomes the locus of control that men77 hold 
over women, tying women’s status, sexual reputation, and moral identity to 
whether they conform to ideals of female sexuality (Chang and Groves 2000, 
p.74). Women’s credibility and their entitlements to claim rights thus seem to be 
conditioned upon their compliance to gendered norms of sexual behavior. 
 Former Filipina hostesses have transgressed Philippine gender ideals, and 
have commonly been perceived as the “immoral other and as the antithesis of the 
Japanese “good wife, wise mother”” (Suzuki 2004, p.483). Yet, the conforming of 
Filipina NGO clients to dominant ideals of femininity is crucial in legitimizing 
their claims. Widespread negative media representations of Filipina entertainers in 
Japan as “gold digging hookers”  (Suzuki 2000 , p.183) and the conflation of 
hostessing with prostitution make it difficult to persuade an audience of the 
legitimacy of rights-claims involving former ‘entertainers’. The demands for 
paternal recognition and financial support for Japanese-Filipino children largely 
born from hostess-client relationships may be contested by assumptions about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  In	  many	  European	  countries	  as	  well	  as	  in	  Japan	  a	  child	  born	  within	  wedlock	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	   the	   husband’s,	   notwithstanding	   the	   existence	   of	   an	   actual	   biological	   relationship	   (cf.	  Machado	   2008;	   Suzuki	   2010).	   This	   illustrates	   the	   legal	   codification	   of	   assumptions	   about	  gendered	  sexuality	  and	  women’s	  chastity	  within	  marriage	  in	  particular.	  76	  As	  well	  as	  to	  their	  bodies,	  supposedly	  revealing	  indications	  of	  their	  sexual	  behaviour	  and	  availability	  which	  is	  one	  reason	  why	  DAWN	  staff	  advises	  its	  women	  clients	  how	  to	  dress,	  not	  to	  dye	  their	  hair,	  and	  not	  to	  wear	  excessive	  make-­‐up.	  77	  It	  should	  not	  be	  forgotten	  that	  women	  perpetuate	  patriarchy	  as	  well	  by	  policing	  each	  other.	  Also,	  middle	  class	  women	  often	  hold	  women	  of	  the	  lower	  social	  classes	  against	  their	  middle-­‐class	  ideals	  of	  femininity.	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their mother’s sexual activities and the subsequent reliability of paternity claims. 
The re-imaging of former Filipina entertainers in Japan as victims, heart-broken 
lovers, and caring, dedicated mothers is thus an important step, not only to lobby 
against the Philippine labour export and the ‘entertainer’ visa, but also in 
establishing the legitimacy of NGO claims for paternal recognition and financial 
support on behalf of their Japanese-Filipino children.  
While the effectiveness of this strategy on individual cases is difficult to 
measure, the decision to amend Japan’s nationality law taken in June 2008 was 
partly based on the rationale that children born into families other than traditional 
nuclear families should be given equal rights as long as their fathers 
acknowledged them. Underlying this decision is thus the recognition of Japanese-
Filipinos’ parents’ relationships as familial and therefore legitimate, as opposed to 
casual or fleeting and therefore illegitimate. Moreover, the recognition of 
vicitmization discourses is revealed by the funding received through various 
donor organizations and agencies considering NGO’s projects to be valid and 







Chapter 5: Japanese-Filipino 
Children in NGO discourse 
 
A private Philippine organization helping women migrant workers 
launched a program Tuesday to help what are called “Japinos”—
abandoned children of broken marriages between Japanese and Filipinas. 
[The] director of the Batis Center for Women, said the program will help 
children of Filipinas who have separated from their Japanese husbands or 
what she called “one-night babies” born of bar girls and Japanese visitors 
who have gone back to Japan.  
(Kyodo News Int. 1992) 
 They are the products of summer flings and mostly out of wedlock 
relations between Japanese men and Filipino women entertainers. Slit-
eyed and fair-skinned, these children or “Japinos” (a contraction of 
Japanese and Filipino) have been leading difficult lives just like the 
“Amerasians”, or “souvenir babies”, sired by American servicemen out of 
Filipino bar girls in areas surrounding the US military facilities 
here.“They’re the products of what has been referred to as ‘flower drain’”, 
says [the] executive director of Batis Center for Women, a non-
governmental organizations (sic) (NGOs) assisting Filipino overseas’ 
contract workers (OCWs), who have become victims of abuses abroad. 
“Flower drain” refers to the present-day phenomenon of Filipino women 
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entertainers going to Japan or other parts of the world to earn foreign 
exchange. Filipino sociologists have coined this phrase in the absence of 
appropriate words to describe this migratory practice, where innocent-




The above excerpts of two articles which appeared in the newspapers 
Kyodo News on June 29th, 1992 and Manila Standard on October 18th, 1992  
respectively are an introduction to the emerging ‘problem’ of Japanese-Filipino 
children. What is notable about these reports is that they describe Japanese-
Filipino children as the consequences of brief, uncommitted sexual encounters, as 
products of Filipino women’s engagement in the sex-industry, or as abandoned 
children of broken marriages. In the early 1990s, when the birth of Japanese-
Filipino children first began to be considered an issue, “one night babies” was the 
phrase used by the then executive director of Batis, […], to denote Japanese-
Filipino children of former Filipina “entertainers” (Kyodo News Int., 1992). Then, 
the aims of a dawning political struggle were not yet set. Batis, the first NGO to 
have been established to cater to Filipina migrant returnees from Japan, had only 
started to recognize child-birth as a significant consequence of Filipina 
employment in Japanese red-light establishments and Japanese presence in the 
Philippines. As the term “one night babies” suggests, many of these offspring 
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were first thought to have hailed from Filipina’s sexual escapades with Japanese 
men.  
But the discursive construction of Japanese-Filipino children has shifted 
since 1992, as Batis and the organization’s supporters noticed increasing numbers 
of Filipina mothers of Japanese-Filipino children seeking support in locating their 
children’s fathers. NGOs in support of Japanese-Filipinos have, since the mid-
1990s coined the acronym “JFC”, the short form for ‘Japanese-Filipino Child’ and 
have invested in its definition and establishment as the correct term to designate 
the said population. “Japinos” have thus become “JFC” and are, two decades 
later, defending their Rights of the Child78, claiming Japanese nationality, and 
claiming their right to acquire their Japanese fathers’ culture. They are no longer 
depicted as the accidental babies of Filipino women who went abroad “to lose 
their virginity to earn”. Rather, they are portrayed as offspring who now assert the 
rights and privileges they had been deprived of when their fathers abandoned their 
families, and as offspring of Japanese men who defy the (legal) boundaries that 
exclude them from being accepted as part of Japan.   
The subject of this chapter is the discursive construction of Japanese-
Filipinos as “the JFC” in the process of claims-making and advocacy by NGOs. 
Common knowledge about “the JFC” did not emerge in a vacuum but, like any 
object, was constructed within its particular historical context and from a mesh of 
available discourses (Mills (1997) 2004, p.10). These established discourses are 
resources used to make sense of this particular social phenomenon and to frame it 
in a way that its representation resonates with popular images such as that of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Based	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  of	  the	  Rights	  of	  the	  Child.	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innocent, helpless child and widely sanctioned ideas of universal rights and 
children’s welfare, attracting support in NGO-led politics of recognition and 
rights assertion. NGOs have utilized various discursive resources to craft 
particular representations of their Japanese-Filipino constituents. In addition to 
NGO workers, a handful of Japanese-Filipino young adults have since the 2000s 
engaged with significant fervour in politicizing “the JFC” as an issue worthy of 
public concern and, as such, have actively participated in the shaping of projects 
and the drafting of statements and opinions in the name of Japanese-Filipinos, 
whether they effectively hold a leading position within a group or not.  The 
political and symbolic struggle by and on behalf of Japanese-Filipinos began with 
NGOs establishing Japanese-Filipino children as a population, as a group 
deserving special attention. Japanese-Filipino children’s births were perceived to 
be a consequence of the structural inequalities which brought together their 
parents and from which they too would suffer.  
The use of particular discourses and the foregrounding of certain 
depictions over others have gone hand in hand with technological advancement 
(such as DNA testing), the popularization of global rights discourses by larger 
funding organizations, and with legal changes in Japan. Moreover, the discursive 
construction of Japanese-Filipinos has also resulted in the establishment of “the 
JFC” as a category, as an identity (Ogaya 2011, 2013). The “JFC” category has 
been institutionalized through NGOs’ discursive practices but remains contextual 
in its significance for Japanese-Filipino children’s identities, meaning that “being 
JFC” is not necessarily salient under all circumstances and in all interactions. 
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Discursive representations have not only taken shape in spoken or written form 
but have materialized as practices put into action by NGO workers, often 
involving the management and policing of their own clients. The performance of 
ascribed identities, which is central to the support organizations’ credibility and 
discursive authority, reproduces particular narratives sanctioned by the NGO 
while understating alternative experiences and views. Particular “truths” about 
Japanese-Filipino children become institutionalized through the organization and 
reified through NGO activities and workshops promoting a particular “JFC” 
identity for the purpose of advocacy.  
The establishment of Batis’ program for Japanese-Filipino children 
marked the acknowledgment of childbirth from Japanese-Filipina relations as not 
merely a private matter, but also as a social issue expected to gain importance. 
Although in 1992 it sounded as if the blame for having out-of-wedlock children 
was primarily attributed to Filipino women’s casual sexual involvement with 
Japanese men, understandings of the children’s situation by activists and NGO 
workers rapidly changed in the subsequent years. In 1993, the issue of Japanese-
Filipinos in the Philippines was broached at a public forum at the University of 
the Philippines and taken up by human rights lawyer Kenshi Nishida who branded 
the situation as a “gross human rights violation” (Kyodo News International, Inc., 
1993). No longer presented as accidental “one night babies”, Japanese-Filipinos 
were understood as victims of human rights abuses by Japanese fathers who 
neglected their parental responsibilities (ibid.), and by the Philippine government, 
showing a lack of concern for its citizens by participating in the sending of 
141	  	  
Filipino women into precarious employment in Japan’s sex-industry (Kyodo 
News Int., 1994 b). In 1994 however, with growing support from civil society 
groups and lawmakers in Japan79, claims were also directed towards the Japanese 
government (Kyodo News Int. 1994 c; 1994 d). Japanese lawmakers Masako 
Owaki and Kimiko Kurihara agreed to pursue economic aid from Japan through 
its overseas development assistance as part of a plan of action to alleviate the 
situation of Japanese-Filipinos in the Philippines. Meanwhile, Batis also asked the 
Japanese Embassy to provide educational and financial assistance to abandoned 
Japanese-Filipino children (Kyodo News International, Inc., 1994 d).  
In the same year, the Philippine Ambassador to Japan pointed out that the 
number of children born to Japanese-Filipina couples was increasing, and that 
most of these children were born out of wedlock. Between 1991 and 1993 the 
embassy had recorded the births of 605 Japanese-Filipino children, 60% of which 
were “illegitimate” (Kyodo News Int. 1994 a). In November 1994, then-President 
of the Philippines Fidel Ramos asked for Japan’s cooperation in helping settle the 
issue of Japanese-Filipino children abandoned by their fathers, which would 
include the determining and legalization of their status in Japan (Kyodo News Int. 
1994 e). The request for cooperation emerged at around the same time as the case 
of “Baby Andrew”, an abandoned new-born child in Japan who was stateless at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  The	  1990s	  were	  marked	  by	  discussions	  about	  children’s	  rights	  and	  welfare,	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  international	  signing	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Covenant	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  the	  Child.	  A	  number	  of	  children’s	  rights	  organizations	  had	  sprung	  up	  in	  Japan,	  and	  the	  discourse	  about	  nurturing	  fathers	  gained	  ground.	   	   Japanese	  men	  were	  criticized	   for	  not	  spending	  sufficient	   time	  with	  their	   families,	   especially	   their	   children	   (Nakatani,	   2006).	   	   The	   role	   of	   fathers	   and	   their	  responsibility	   towards	   their	   children	   thus	   garnered	   wider	   interest.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  1990s	  were	  marked	  by	   Japan’s	  war-­‐time	   legacies	  surfacing:	   claims	  by	  comfort	  women,	   the	  ‘homecoming’	  of	  orphans	  left	  behind	  in	  Manchuria,	  as	  well	  as	  claims	  for	  Japanese	  nationality	  by	  Philippine	  Nikkeijin.	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birth since his parents’ identities could not be determined (but whose mother was 
assumed to be Filipina). The issue of the legal status of babies born out of 
wedlock to foreign women and Japanese men became increasingly pressing. 
Coincidentally, Japan ratified the UN Convention in the Rights of the Child in 
1994, making the problems of out-of-wedlock births, children’s precarious legal 
status in Japan, and abandonment by Japanese fathers even more relevant. 
Throughout the 1990s, the children’s situation was increasingly framed as rights 
infringement and concerns about the respect of their human rights were raised 
more frequently.  
Utilizing Discourses on Childhood  
In the 1990s, when Japanese-Filipino children first surfaced in NGO 
newsletters and in mass media reports, most children were minors. When Batis 
first initiated its special program for children of women migrant returnees from 
Japan, the eldest children were in their mid-teens. As of today, many Japanese-
Filipinos are in their late teens or adults, some having families of their own. The 
terms ‘child’ or ‘children’ denote both young people at a developmental stage 
widely understood as “childhood” as well as a more age-neutral status of 
“offspring”. By talking about Japanese-Filipino offspring as ‘children’, NGOs 
obscure the large age-gaps separating various cohorts and benefit from the 
symbolic and emotional capital associated with representing a population deemed 
in need of protection.  
With numerous babies born from Japanese-Filipina relations over the past 
three decades, the age-range of Japanese-Filipino NGO clients has increased as 
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compared to 1992. In 2011, DAWN’s youngest member was five years old, while 
their oldest was in his thirties. The research project on Japanese-Filipinos 
conducted by the IOM (2009) revealed that most respondents located in the 
Philippines were in their teens at the time of the survey. Japanese-Filipino 
members of Batis YOGHI today are in their mid-teens to mid- twenties. Japanese-
Filipinos’ coming of age has been encountered with the institution of Batis 
YOGHI in 2000 and more recently with the establishment of DAWN JFC for 
Change, acknowledging their ability to organize and speak for themselves. 
Reaching adulthood, Japanese-Filipino offspring needed less catering to their 
needs, but could be co-opted as advocates instead.  
DAWN’s theatre plays, for instance, have been part of the NGO’s 
advocacy to inform their audiences about the children’s human rights (DAWN 
1998 b, p.3). In 2000, DAWN first reported about organizing a workshop to 
inform their clients of the Rights of the Child, enabling Japanese-Filipinos “to 
realize the concept of being human and having human dignity, and to get 
acquainted with basic the definition and understanding of human rights, 
particularly the Rights of the Child.” (DAWN 2000 d, p.5). In 2004, the Human 
Rights workshop is said to also help Japanese-Filipinos develop “self-confidence 
and their knowledge and skills as potential advocates of children’s rights”. 
(DAWN 2004 b, p.9) From merely being recipients of information, Japanese-
Filipinos are depicted as potential future advocates in DAWN’s publications. This 
shift seems to have been accompanied by a discursive change, from emphasizing 
children’s rights to “an intact family and stable financial support” (DAWN 1999 
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e, p.11) as well as “these children’s right to a nurturing home, good education and 
the right to develop their utmost potential” (ibid.) to an emphasis on children’s 
rights to Japanese nationality (DAWN 2008 c).80 This indicates a change of focus 
from demanding acknowledgment and support as it could be provided by their 
Japanese fathers, to recognition by the Japanese state, reinforcing the idea that the 
issue of numerous Japanese-Filipinos abandoned by their fathers was not merely a 
private one.  
Despite their great disparity in age, NGO representations of Japanese-
Filipino children draw on the widespread image of the child as innocent and in 
need of help and care. A flyer distributed by the Tokyo-based Citizen’s Network 
for Japanese-Filipino Children (CNJFC) gives the impression that most of their 
clients are small children. The flyer displays five photographs of toddlers, printed 
in shades of red and white, Japan’s national colours (cf. plate 2). The children in 
the photographs have troubled expressions which suggest that something is 
preventing them from being ‘happy’, as if the latter is a given condition of 
childhood. A short statement accompanies each photographed face, presumably 
uttered by the person in the picture that provides us with an explanation for the 
children’s bothered looks; “It is my dream to meet my father”, “When I grow up I 
want to become a pilot and go see my father”. One statement reads: “Papa said:  
“This is not my child””, suggesting cases of rejection and illustrating the battled 
injustice with statements suggesting strong emotions.   





Plate 2, Flyer distributed by the CNJFC  
In a video produced for Maligaya House (pinoyhub, 2008) and uploaded 
on the online video-sharing platform Youtube, the NGO introduces some of the 
children it supports in the Philippines. The video features small children and a girl 
in her teens expressing their desires to meet their biological father as well as their 
dreams for the future. All statements are subtitled in English and dubbed in 
Japanese by a female voice.  
“Papa, I am JB, I like to see you. I hope my dream to become a pilot or a 
doctor will come true.”  
“Papa, hello… I hope you can come here in the Philippines so we can 
meet. I miss you…” 
The use of the word “Papa” suggests familiarity. The video then cuts to a scene of 
people standing in a hall or church, one with a guitar and five others singing for 
their audience seated across several rows of benches: 
“Hey dad look at me/ Think back and talk to me/ Did I grow up according 
to plan?/ And do you think I'm wasting my time doing things I wanna do?/ 
But it hurts when you disapprove all along/ And now I try hard to make it/ 
I just/ want to make you proud/ I'm never gonna be good enough for you/ I 
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can't pretend that/ I'm alright/ And you can't change me/ 'Cuz we lost it all/ 
Nothing lasts forever/ I'm sorry/ I can't be perfect/ Now it's just too late 
and /We can't go back/ I'm sorry / I can't be perfect”81  
While the rendition of the song continues, the audio track is laid over with 
medium close-ups and extreme close-ups of child-members of the NGO.  
The message of the video is one of children’s needs for their biological 
father and the desire to know him. It is also one of absolution; the absence of the 
father is justified by his child(ren) not living up to his standard. By implying 
blame on Japanese fathers for having abandoned their Filipino children, the 
apologetic tone of the song nevertheless also signifies submission to the father as 
a powerful patriarch, to the extent that participating Japanese-Filipinos would 
seek reasons for the father’s wrong-doings in themselves. This submission to the 
patriarch is couched in ideals of the traditional nuclear family, while the self-
abasing tone of the chosen song feeds into ideals of suffering. In our most recent 
conversation, Mifune, a Japanese-Filipino man in his 30s who had been very 
involved with NGOs for the past seven years, observed: “Well it's like this; since 
we [JFC] don't have any other capital, some of us think that suffering is some sort 
of capital, it's probably a catholic thing.” The depiction of “JFCs’” submission to 
the father and their willingness to suffer is used to illustrate the children’s 
virtuous character. But at the same time, the submissive tone reflects the unequal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  The	  song	  entitled	  “Perfect”,	  popularized	  by	  the	  Canadian	  band	  Simple	  Plan,	  was	  written	  by	  the	  band’s	  drummer	  Chuck	  Comeau	  and	   lead	  singer	  Pierre	  Bouvier.	  Comeau’s	  parents	  had	  been	  unsupportive	   of	   his	   plans	   to	   give	   up	   college	   and	   form	   a	   band	   instead.	   The	   lyrics	   are	  written	  from	  a	  son’s	  perspective.	  The	  son	  addresses	  his	  father	  after	  he	  had	  rebelled	  against	  parental	  expectations.	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power relations in place which leave NGOs and Japanese-Filipinos with restricted 
capacities to enforce their demands.  
The innocence, good-will and forgiving character of the children is 
reiterated in publications by DAWN. In earlier issues of Sinag, a section entitled 
“children’s corner” provided space for comments and letters by Japanese-Filipino 
Children. The “Editor’s Note” reads:  
What would the children say to their fathers? Below are some of the 
children’s thoughts, wishes and feelings for their fathers. (DAWN 1998 a, 
p.9).  
Most of these messages are filled with sentiments of gratitude towards the 
organization and with well-wishes for their fathers. 
“To my dearest Daddy, How are you? I hope that you are fine. Daddy, if 
you will ask me, I am fine too. […] Daddy, I have a request, please come 
back to the Philippines […]”  (DAWN 1998 a, p.9) 
 
“To my Dearest Daddy, Daddy, how are you? I hope you are always fine. 
Dad I miss you so much. […]. May God bless you always! I love you very 
much! […]” (ibid.) 
Japanese-Filipino children are generally depicted in a positive light, 
usually in line with adult expectations of filial piety, obedience, gratitude, 
childlike innocence, a zest for life and a hunger for knowledge. The reports on 
workshops and activities organized for Japanese-Filipino NGO clients provide a 
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platform to depict the children favourably. A staff writer describing the latest 
workshop comments in 2006: “They [JFC] were therefore very excited and eager 
to learn and participate in the activities. […] the JFC workshop participants were 
trained how to be responsible children. They were assigned cleaning duties and 
nobody complained [...] They all expressed appreciation for helping enhance their 
talents.” (DAWN 2006, pp.6,8). Commenting on the plot of a new theatre play, 
the "JFC” depicted in the play appear resilient and optimistic: “Just like the other 
JFCs in the Philippines, they have their problems. But young as they are, they are 
strong and full of ambition.” (DAWN 2007 b, p. 7). Descriptions of the young 
cast-members of Teatro Akebono are another instance of the portrayal of the 
‘good child’, the childlike child. All the participating children are introduced one 
by one, sometimes with their portrait and always with their full names, age and a 
summary of their candid likes.  
“Eight year old Jemina is an only child. She is in Grade II at a public 
school. Her favourite subjects are Mathematics and English. Just like other 
children her age, she likes to play a lot. She likes to play computer games. 
Her favorite colors are red and pink. Jemina wants to become a nurse 
someday.” (DAWN, 2008, p. 7) 
 
“Takeru is eleven years old. He just graduated from elementary school this 
March and will enrol in high school. Takeru is a very active boy. He loves 
music and sports. He is [sic] taekwondo player. When he grows up, 
Takeru says he wants to become a scientist.” (ibid.) 
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Their depiction in DAWN’s newsletters shows no trace of school-drop 
outs, youth involved in illegal activities, gang violence or teenage parenthood, 
which have occurred among clients of all four support groups82.  The Japanese-
Filipino Child has to be innocent and ‘childlike’ to gain empathy but also to 
remain non-threatening in his/her potential to cross borders to Japan. Therefore, 
through their portrayal as ‘pure’ innocent children, Japanese-Filipinos are more 
likely to be considered deserving support: from their fathers, from the Japanese 
government, from funding organizations, as well as from private donors. 
Moreover, Japanese-Filipino children may be regarded ‘non-malicious’ recipients 
of help (who after all did not chose the be born into their specific circumstances), 
as opposed to their mothers, whose long-standing stereotyping as “gold digging 
hookers”  (Suzuki 2000,  p.183) may still cast doubts over their motives for 
having had children with Japanese men in the first place.  
The image of an innocent, virtuous, well-behaved and knowledge-hungry 
“JFC” is constructed against the negative image of the “Japino”, a child whose 
existence  is a reminder of his/her mother’s failed attempts to secure a ‘better life’ 
with or through a Japanese man. In doing so, NGOs discursively disconnect the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  The	   newsletter	  Maligaya	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   provides	   rather	   detailed	   “case	   reports”	   in	  which	  school	  drop-­‐outs	  and	  teenage	  pregnancies	  are	  mentioned	  (although	  usually	   justified	  by	   the	   child’s	   or	   the	   teenager’s	   familial	   circumstances).	   These	   reports	   are	   written	   in	  Japanese	   for	   the	  CNJFC’s	   Japanese-­‐speaking	   supporters	   in	   order	   to	   inform	   them	  about	   the	  various	   cases	   their	   legal	   team	   is	   handling.	   Many	   of	   the	   CNJFC’s	   supporters	   are	   lawyers	  themselves,	  which	  may	  explain	  why	  so	  much	  attention	  is	  devoted	  to	  discussing	  the	  financial	  and	  educational	  situation	  of	  the	  child	  in	  question,	  his/her	  relationships	  with	  family	  members,	  and	  providing	  details	   about	   the	   communication	  of	   the	  NGO	  with	   the	  parties	   involved.	   It	   is	  noteworthy	  that	  the	  “JFC”	  remains	  the	  innocent	  party	  in	  these	  “case	  reports”	  (as	  opposed	  to	  his/her	  parents	  or	  other	  relatives).	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children from the cunning, sexually ‘deviant’ Japayuki and generate a new pair: 
the woman victim-survivor and her “JFC”. 
“JFC’s needs” in the politics of recognition 
The  recognition of the notion of ‘the child’ and ‘childhood’ as being 
discursively produced can be analyzed vis-à-vis Philippe Ariès’ ground-breaking 
work Centuries of Childhood (1962), in which he challenges childhood as a 
natural given and establishes how, not only ideas on childhood, but the concept 
itself has historically emerged. His famous assertion: “[I]n medieval society the 
idea of childhood did not exist” (p.125) epitomizes the gist of social 
constructionist approaches to the concept of childhood. Childhood as a state of 
immaturity can be agreed upon as a biological fact of life, “but the ways in which 
this immaturity is understood and made meaningful is a fact of culture” (Prout 
and James 1990, p.7). Similarly, what we consider to be children’s ‘needs’ varies 
across social and historical contexts (James and James 2004, p.18). In this light, 
what NGOs promote as the ‘needs’ of Japanese-Filipino children can be 
deconstructed and analysed with regards to dominant canons on childhood as well 
as with regards to NGOs’ goals. As Woodhead (1997) points out, the latent 
assumptions and judgments about children underlying the concept of ‘needs’ are 
telling about the cultural location and personal values of the user of the concept 
(p.63). Contrary to the depiction of ‘needs’ as natural, the stating of and attending 
to the ‘needs’ of “JFC” thus has a political dimension; here it provides the basis 
for making claims. 
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 Based on this ‘need’ to know one’s father, Japanese-Filipino children are 
said to face a series of deficiencies following its non-fulfilment: lacking self-
confidence, shyness and an apparent identity crisis. Contributing to these 
identified ‘deficiencies’ are bullying and discrimination, said to arise from 
prejudices associated with these children being “bi-racial” or “bi-cultural” and to 
be an experience widely shared by Japanese-Filipinos. Such examinations of 
attitudes displayed by children reaffirm the centrality of the ‘normal’ family ideal 
in NGO discourses. These depictions also serve, if not as a critique of a seemingly 
intolerant society, as means to gain empathy for their children clients. In an issue 
of Sinag published in 2007, the work performed by support groups is said to help 
their child members become ‘normal adults’: “These organizations [Home 
Lawyers, CNJFC and DAWN] hope that through their work, more JFCs would be 
given the necessary interventions that they need to grow and develop normally.” 
(DAWN 2007 a) 
The mere fact that Japanese-Filipino children have ‘needs’ suggests them 
to be helpless and passive, which resonates with the victimization discourse 
popularly deployed by supporters to depict Japanese-Filipinos as well as their 
mothers. It is, of course, the very same discourse that simultaneously justifies the 
mere existence of support organizations as well as their discursive authority as 
their clients’ mouthpieces.  Interestingly, the framing of both women and children 
as victims places them in a positive light for claims while simultaneously putting 
the children’s mothers in a weak position to satisfy these ‘needs’ thus leaving the 
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‘real’ power and the actual responsibility of catering to them with those addressed 
in NGO claims: the Japanese fathers and the Japanese government.  
The deployment of ‘needs’ as language for claims has another important 
function for NGO advocacy and claims-making; ‘needs’ statements are not 
merely descriptive but “convey considerable emotive force, inducing a sense of 
responsibility, and even feelings of guilt if they are not heeded […] This 
combination of descriptive and imperative authority provides a persuasive basis 
for defining policy.”83 (Woodhead 1997, p.66). Grounding demands in Japanese-
Filipino children’s ‘needs’ is a political means to instigate relevant change 
through normative claims. The deployment of discourses on the child and on the 
‘ideal childhood’ thus not only informs the framing and discursive production of 
the “JFC”, but also enables NGOs to work with the emotive currency given to 
children, as well as to further their own subject positions as ‘custodians’ of the 
children’s welfare, as ‘experts’ and therefore as discursive authorities (cf. Hahn 
and Holzscheiter 2013, on NGOs and the use of victimization discourses).  
Furthermore, having presented themselves as ‘experts’, the professional 
assessment of Japanese-Filipino children’s needs by NGOs serves to divert 
attention from the fact that the assessment is made by adults from an adult value-
position (cf. Woodhead 1997, p.74). “Projected onto children themselves, writes 
Woodhead, they [professional judgements in terms of ‘children’s needs’] acquire 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  In	  his	  paper,	  Woodhead	  (1997)	  analyzed	  the	  concept	  of	  children’s	  needs	  and	  contends	  that	  it	   “conceals	   in	   practice	   a	   complex	   of	   latent	   assumptions	   and	   judgments	   about	   children”	  (p.63).	  Expressing	  ideas	  and	  opinions	  of	  what	  children	  ought	  to	  have	  or	  ought	  to	  experience	  in	   terms	   of	   “needs”	   makes	   the	   latter	   seem	   timeless	   and	   universal,	   and	   by	   consequence	  attributes	  statements	  about	  children’s	  “needs”	  with	  significant	  authority.	  However,	  what	  we	  identify	   and	   frame	   as	   “needs”	   are	   socio-­‐culturally	   located	   beliefs	   about	   childhood,	   norms,	  and	  values.	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spurious objectivity. In this way, cultural prescriptions for childhood are 
presented as if they were intrinsic qualities of children’s own psychological make-
up. “ (ibid.) Supporter’s biases, as well as the fundamental role of these biases in 
the formulation of “JFC”’s needs are concealed as the latter are packaged as if 
they were the children’s property, ‘naturally’ arising from their situation.  
“Needs” become “rights” 
“JFC’s needs” are also the basis for rights claims. In making claims by and 
on behalf of Japanese-Filipino children, supporters heavily rely on the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) to buttress their 
assertions. As an international agreement on the protection of children, the 
UNCRC carries significant symbolic weight. NGOs benefit from this symbolic 
credence and its widespread, international claim to truth which has contributed to 
changes in the discursive construction of childhood around the world (James and 
James 2004).  
The UNCRC sets normative standards on a supra-national level to which 
NGOs can refer when challenging national policies, such as Japan’s nationality 
law. Within court rooms, the utility of references to the UNCRC is relatively 
limited since the legal changes deemed necessary are usually made upon 
ratification of such conventions. However, calling to mind the Rights of the Child 
has great symbolic salience both within and outside court rooms. For NGOs 
located in the Philippines, such as Batis and DAWN, the Rights of the Child have 
thus become an important discursive tool especially in making cross-border 
claims towards a foreign government in the name of (mostly) non-citizens. The 
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UNCRC is evoked as normative standard to demand ‘adequate’ treatment of 
“JFC” by the Japanese state, notwithstanding “JFC’s” citizenship. Moreover, the 
bringing into play of the UNCRC has positioned the NGOs as safeguards of 
Children’s Rights. 
The “rights” of children as stated in the Covenant are largely ‘needs’ 
based and as such “particularly susceptible to being defined, or at least moderated, 
by political and cultural considerations” (p.84). The UNCRC is thus a political 
tool, not only by its symbolic salience and its formulation as a statement of rights, 
but also by its contents and their specific utilization in claims making. The 
UNCRC itself is an outcome of the political processes and decisions. “The 
family” for instance is defined in no other way but through the heterosexual 
nucleus of mother and father caring for their own progeny (James & James, 
2004).  
In the 1990s there was a demand for the children’s “right to meet one’s 
fathers” (Kyodo News Int., 1994 c) as well as efforts to make Japanese men “owe 
up” to their fatherhood and to ensure “good fathering” (Kageyama, 1999) - ideas 
which coincided with the rising discourse on fathers’ involvement in family life as 
well as with the availability of paternity tests via DNA. In 1994, with the on-
going case of “Baby Andrew”, the Osaka based International Center for the 
Rights of the Child demanded the creation of a special visa for Japanese-Filipino 
children to be able to travel to Japan, look for their fathers and live as part of a 
family (Kyodo News Int., 1994 c). Undocumented children born in Japan should 
also be given protection, according to the Center.  
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On the verge of the new millennium however, voices demanding the 
recognition of Japanese-Filipino children as Japanese citizens became more 
audible. The calls for father’s involvement in child-rearing remained, yet 
complaints about institutional discrimination surfaced as well. In an interview 
published in 1999, a staff member of the Citizen’s Network for Japanese Filipino 
Children demanded for children born to foreign mothers out of wedlock to be 
treated equally to children born to married parents (Global Information Network, 
1999). By the early 2000s, activist NGOs in support of Japanese-Filipino children 
wanted the issue of differential treatment to be resolved; the birth of Japanese-
fathered children without access to citizenship was a considered social problem 
caused by the MOJ’s own policies. “At the very least”, the activist is quoted, “it 
was the Justice Ministry that had issued the visas to the women who eventually 
became the lovers of Japanese men, and then the mothers of their children” 
(ibid.).  
The UNCRC has been particularly useful for activists, following the filing 
of a lawsuit against the Japanese government in 200584 by 10 Japanese-Filipino 
children and their mothers, supported by the CNJFC and the JFC Lawyers 
Association. Articles 7 and 8 of the UNCRC stipulating children’s right to a 
nationality as well as the role and responsibility of the State in safeguarding 
children’s nationality and identity have entered the spotlight ever since the 2005 
case. In efforts to push for legal changes, the above mentioned provisions have 
been given central attention by a handful of adult Japanese-Filipino activists 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  This	  is	  the	  case	  which,	  after	  going	  through	  several	  instances,	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  change	  in	  Japan’s	  Nationality	  Law	  in	  2008.	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speaking on behalf of all “JFC”. Pushing for additional legal changes, demands 
for Japanese nationality have been linked to the ‘need’ for Japanese-Filipinos to 
consolidate their identity and their rights to “cultural heritage” (cf. United 
Japanese Filipino Children, 2009; Batis YOGHI, 2012).  
Politicising “identity” 
NGOs and leading figures among Japanese-Filipino youth have used 
“identity” as an important argumentative tool; Identity is essential and “identity” 
is linked to other ideas such as culture, descent, nationality, citizenship, and 
knowing one’s biological father85. Furthermore, children’s identities have been 
codified as “rights” by the UNCRC86 . Considering “JFC” identities to be 
endangered by the existing socio-legal conditions, activists have established the 
need for action. Interestingly, “identity” as an important key-concept, has entered 
NGO discourse in 2005, simultaneously with the filing of the CNJFC-backed 
lawsuit against the Japanese government. Since then, the children’s “identity 
problems” have also been covered and reiterated by the mass media (cf. The 
Manila Bulletin 2008; The Manila Times 2008 a; Yasumoto 2008 b). 
“”The revision [of the Japanese Nationality Law] will mean a lot to the 
children, because (nationality) is part of their identity and will secure them 
a more stable status and future,'' said [the] secretary general of the Tokyo-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  Donovan	  (2006)	  argues	  that	  the	  human	  genome	  project	  and	  the	  commercial	  availability	  of	  DNA	  testing	  	  since	  the	  1990s	  contributed	  to	  a	  discourse	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  knowing	  one's	  biological	   parents.	   The	   knowledge	   of	   one's	   biological	   parents	   was	   initially	   linked	   to	   the	  purpose	   of	   checking	   one’s	   proneness	   to	   inheritable	   illnesses,	   yet	   the	   discourse	   on	   the	  importance	   of	   knowing	   ones	   biological	   heritage	   developed	   to	   include	   ontological	   security,	  meaning	  a	  sense	  of	  identity	  and	  self-­‐confidence	  derived	  from	  the	  knowledge	  of	  one’s	  place,	  expressed	  in	  biological	  relationships,	  within	  society	  and	  history.	  	  86	  Cf.	  Article	  8	  and	  Article	  29	  (c)	  pertaining	  to	  cultural	  identity	  in	  education	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based Citizens Network for Japanese-Filipino Children, which supports 
Filipino women and children in Japan who often live under permanent 
resident status.” (The Japan Times 2008) 
The identity problems mentioned by CNJFC’s secretary general pertain to 
the need to reconcile citizenship with national identification to help Japanese-
Filipino children who were born and raised in Japan to become full-fledged 
members of society. Concerns over “identity” have also been raised by NGOs 
based in the Philippines to advocate for their clients’ rights to Japanese 
nationality. Manila-based DAWN had sporadically made use of the term 
“identity” in relation to their Japanese-Filipino members’ ‘mixed’ heritage earlier 
(i.e. DAWN 2000 a p.7), yet the concept increasingly gained ground in claims for 
Japanese nationality, notably so after the change in Japan’s nationality law in 
2008 which will be considered in more detail below. In statements made by 
Philippine-based groups, “identity” suggests ethnic identity. 
In 2005, coincidentally the same year in which the lawsuit against the 
Japanese government was filed, Teatro Akebono87 premiered its play The Magic 
Ring, portraying “JFC who grow up trying to search for their identities” (DAWN 
2010, p. 113). Previous plays88 had highlighted issues of discrimination against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Teatro	  Akebono	   is	  DAWN’s	  children’s	  theatre	  group.	  The	  group	  stages	  plays	   in	  Japan	  and	  the	  Philippines.	  88	  DAWN	   has	   organized	   theatre	   tours	   to	   Japan	   since	   1998	   (DAWN	   2004-­‐2011).	   The	   plays	  were	   conceived	   as	   part	   of	   the	   NGOs	   advocacy	   but	   also	   enabled	   DAWN	   and	   some	   of	   their	  Japanese-­‐Filipino	   clients	   to	   travel	   to	   Japan.	   This	  made	   it	   possible	   for	   the	  NGO	   to	   organize	  reunions	   between	   Japanese	   fathers	   and	   some	   of	   the	   children.	   At	   such	   occasions,	   the	   NGO	  may	  also	  be	  able	  to	  secure	  the	  fathers’	  promise	  to	  support	  their	  child	  financially,	  or	  receive	  cash	  allowances	   from	   Japanese	   fathers	   to	  hand	  over	   to	   their	  child	   in	   the	  Philippines.	   In	  an	  interview,	  DAWN’s	  Executive	  Director	  stated	  that the	  creation	  of	  a	  theatrical	  group	  “became	  necessary	  because	   the	  children	  could	  not	  obtain	   tourist	  visas	  without	   financial	  certificates.	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Japanese-Filipino children at school and by their neighbours, children coping with 
the absence of their biological father, as well as their dreams of living with both 
their parents (cf. DAWN 2010, pp.109-112). Since the staging of The Magic Ring, 
the children’s link with Japan has increasingly taken centre stage in the plays; in 
The Gift, a parcel sent from Japan and received by the protagonist stands for the 
expectations and hopes associated with Japan by Japanese-Filipino children in the 
Philippines. JFC World sets “the JFC” apart from Filipino and Japanese children; 
they inhabit a world of their own and are endowed with super-powers. The latest 
play, entitled The Cranedog, makes a definite link between ‘race’, cross-border 
travel and identity. The play was shown at various locations in Japan in 2009 and 
2010 following the news of Japan amending its Nationality law. The various plays 
are part of DAWNs advocacy and have served as vehicles to convey messages 
about the situation and plight of Japanese-Filipinos.  
Discourses about “JFC”’s identities initially emerged during the litigation 
process that started in 2005. NGOs in the Philippines supporting clients who were 
“100% Filipino linguistically and culturally” (Yuusuke 2009) had to emphasize 
their clients’ Japaneseness and the significance of obtaining Japanese nationality 
to Japanese-Filipinos’ identities.  
“We express our opposition to a law that justifies, through legal mandate, 
the failure of the State to protect and uphold the identity of interracial 
children who trace their roots to Japan.” (Batis YOGHI 2012).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Therefore,	   their	   only	   option	  was	   to	   enter	   Japan	   on	   professional	   entertainer's	   visas.”	   (The	  Daily	  Yomiuri	  2004).	  Moreover,	   the	  yearly	   theatre	   tours	  are	  a	  means	   for	  DAWN	  to	  sell	   the	  products	  manufactured	  through	  its	  livelihood	  program	  Sikhay.	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 “JFC get here [to Japan] through various means [...] A few find 
contentment in never settling the Japanese identity question at all and look 
forward to living out their lives in the Philippines.” (United Japanese 
Filipino Children 2009) 
The usage and definition of “identity” within the context of rights 
assertion has been arbitrated by efforts of recognition. The UNCRC mentions 
“identity” as a right of the child and thus provides convenient grounds upon 
which demands may be formulated, imbuing suitable meanings into this fuzzy and 
malleable concept. 
“Identity” has been mobilized to give meaning to claims for Japanese 
nationality and cross-border mobility. The symbolic salience of “identity” lies in 
its personal importance and universal appeal; everyone has an identity and yet 
each identity is deeply personal and therefore defining of an individual. As such, 
depriving someone of the means to protect, uphold or settle one’s identity 
(identity in identity politics is often assumed to be fixed) becomes an 
infringement of one’s personhood. Being prohibited from obtaining Japanese 
nationality and from migrating to Japan are thus framed as encroachments on 
Japanese-Filipinos personhoods, human rights, their very being.  
 
The ideal of the “normal” family has served to establish ongoing 
conditions as abnormal and unfair, while the discourse on the child has benefitted 
NGOs through the emotional currency associated with children thus confirming 
NGOs’ important role in taking care and advocating on behalf of Japanese-
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Filipinos. Furthermore, the employment of the UN Covenant on the Rights of the 
Child in processes of rights assertion contributes to the construction of Japanese-
Filipinos as children (in terms of age), whereas many individuals –notably 
politicized Japanese-Filipinos who actively engage in the production and 
maintenance of meaning for their constituents and possible supporters- are already 
past their childhood.  The employment of the UNCRC also reveals a conflation of 
the two definitions of “child”, one denoting “offspring”, with the other defined by 
age as set out in the Covenant89. The “Rights of the Child” in claims-making thus 
seem to denote the “Right of the Offspring” or birthright; demands do not merely 
target legal change benefitting Filipino-Japanese minors and generations to come, 
but strongly imply requests towards the Japanese State and society to recognize 
the consequences of Japanese immigration policies and in doing so, to owe up to 
‘their children’90, even if the latter are already adults. The idea that Japanese-
Filipino children are “children of Japan” has been repeatedly mentioned by one of 
my respondents, Mifune, in our early interviews and in statements he conveyed 
through the online networking site Facebook.  
“Well I always thought that the Japanese are a set of people who accept others, 
humble, polite, orderly, that they’re not going to discriminate against us because 
we are their children”, Mifune reflected on his first visit to Japan. His sentiments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  “Article	  1	  :	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  present	  Convention,	  a	  child	  means	  every	  human	  being	  below	   the	   age	   of	   eighteen	   years	   unless	   under	   the	   law	   applicable	   to	   the	   child,	   majority	   is	  attained	   earlier.”	   Online	   at:	   http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm	   (access:	  24.October	  2012)	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of disappointment grew and in one of our online conversations91 he stated that 
Japan treated “JFCs” as bastards and never cared. A similar thought is affirmed in 
the title of DAWN’s (2010) publication We are your Children, Too. Creative 
Journeys of DAWN's Japanese-Filipino Children members. 
 
The construction of the “JFC” identity 
In processes of claim-making on behalf of Japanese-Filipinos, the latter’s 
“needs” and desires have inevitably been generalized. This generalization has 
rendered “the JFC” into a category-like identity, ready for Japanese-Filipino 
clients to espouse. At NGO premises and through NGO activities, Japanese-
Filipinos are taught to identify as “JFC” and to produce narratives in line with 
dominant representations of Japanese-Filipinos by NGOs. Yet the acronym “JFC” 
is a term which needs to be problematized. Established as the ‘correct’ expression 
to designate children born to Japanese-Filipina couples by advocacy NGOs, “JFC” 
has been understood to refer to all Japanese-Filipino offspring born since the late 
1970s.  But the term has also come to imply that these Japanese-Filipinos hail 
from problem-ridden relationships, were often born out of wedlock, and were 
later abandoned. With the absence of the Japanese father come financial 
difficulties; the designation “JFC” thus also entails lowered socio-economic status. 
Thus, while the acronym seems to merely refer to children of ‘mixed’ –ethnic/-
national/-racial relationships, it also contains generalizations pertaining to their 
familial and financial situation.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  (17th	  May	  2010)	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As elaborated on above, NGO discourses tend to occlude differences 
among Japanese-Filipinos in  terms of variables such as age, socio-economic 
status, legal residency as well as citizenship and familial situation by focussing on 
‘problem-cases’. The generalizing manner in which Japanese-Filipinos are 
subsumed into “the JFC” has concealed this diversity in favour of highlighting 
commonality based on ‘mixed’ Japanese-Filipino heritage as well as assumed 
‘common issues’. The “JFC” is usually portrayed to meet the standards of the 
innocent, lively child, yet having some ‘typical’ handicaps associated with his or 
her situation as a “JFC”: presumed identity issues, an absentee father, the desire to 
meet one’s father and the desire to experience Japan.  
Ogaya (2011) demonstrates how Japanese-Filipino children become “JFC” 
upon joining an NGO92; it is through NGO membership and participation in their 
activities that they are familiarized with the expression and learn to use it to refer 
to themselves. Prior to joining the organization, children usually just know that 
they are “children of Japanese” and get acquainted with the term only through 
their NGO membership (p.6). Indeed, Ogaya’s interviewees declare that “’JFC’ is 
only for and at DAWN’s office” and “I don’t have this feeling at school. I’m just 
‘half-Filipino, half-Japanese’ there. I don’t feel that I’m JFC when I’m at school.” 
(p.7). Another respondent states “I’m ‘normal’ at school. There is an aura in the 
office that makes me feel that I’m a ‘JFC’” (ibid.). Being “JFC” is thus highly 
contextual and usually confined to an identity within the NGO, which implies that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Ogaya	  writes	  about	  her	  experiences	  with	  DAWN	  in	  particular.	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the “JFC” identity may be more important for NGOs than for Japanese-Filipinos 
who slip in and out of their roles as “JFC”.  
Discourses on the “JFC” largely emanate from the relationships between 
Japanese-Filipinos and their mothers with NGOs, from the relationships of NGOs 
with potential funders, as well as of NGOs and Japanese-Filipinos with 
lawmakers in Japan. Drawing on Foucault’s conception of power as a productive 
force, I contend that NGOs’ engagement in symbolic and political struggles have 
produced the “JFC” and have influenced how Japanese-Filipinos are being 
thought and talked about, to the extent of creating identities espoused (and at 
times resisted) by their Japanese-Filipino clients. The “JFC” is constructed at the 
NGO; children are not only being taught the term, but the expression is given 
meaning through definition and practice. For instance, during a summer-camp 
organized by Batis YOGHI in May 2011, the NGO had planned a workshop 
aimed at tackling the meaning of ‘being a JFC’ through a problem-tree drawing 
session. All Japanese-Filipino participants were asked to split up into groups of 
five. Seated on the floor with a big, blank paper poster, markers and a manga93 
published by Batis YOGHI, the group members were tasked to draw a problem 
tree to map out the root causes and current issues faced by “JFC”. The manga 
featuring three narratives deemed to be “typically” experienced by JFC, was 
handed to the participants as an inspirational guide while filling out the problem 
tree.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  YOGHI	  Manga	  (2009),	  Quezon	  City:	  Batis	  Center	  for	  Women	  Inc.	  and	  Batis	  YOGHI	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The group I had been assigned to initially did not know what to write into 
the blanks of the problem-tree in front of them. They discussed the manga story 
they had been assigned to and looked for the “right” answers. The most vocal 
participant, a girl in her early 20’s who led most of the discussion, eventually 
asked me if what they had written was correct and whether I had any more ideas. I 
replied that they should draw from their own experiences as Japanese-Filipinos to 
complete the activity. After further discussion, discrimination was mentioned 
several times as a typical “JFC” problem. When I asked the discussion-leading 
girl whether she had experienced discrimination before, she answered no. She had 
never had any bad experiences related to her being Japanese-Filipina.   
The activity had prompted Japanese-Filipino participants to reiterate and 
reproduce common representations of the “JFC” notwithstanding whether these 
may actually be applicable to themselves. Activities like the one mentioned above 
reify the “JFC” as a category and seek to establish a shared identity defined by a 
set of ‘typical’ experiences, issues and desires. Ogaya (2013) points out that the 
length of one’s NGO involvement largely determines how much being a “JFC” is 
endorsed as an identity. Two of her interviewees who declared they were “proud” 
to be “JFC” had spent a significant part of their childhoods with NGO workers 
and joining NGO activities. These findings correlate with data I collected during 
my fieldwork. I interviewed several Japanese-Filipino youth in the Philippines 
during the Batis YOGHI summer camp and found that those who had been with 
the NGO for the longest time also had the most positive things to say about their 
membership and their being “JFC”.  
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I think that because we’re all JFC’s we have the same experiences in our 
lives. And I think that what unites us are our experiences, you know. Like 
here we have different personalities but we still, but we are still united 
because we have the same experiences, the same thoughts in our minds, 
like that. (Sachiko, NGO member since age six) 
Before I thought that I was alone. But when I participated in the activities 
of Batis YOGHI we shared experiences and stories of our lives. They 
made us a more tighter, tightened the relationship. [...] it’s like a family in 
Batis YOGHI. And we just treat each other as brothers and sisters, like 
that. (Yoko, NGO member since age seven) 
Before I thought I am the only one like this. But since I joined Batis and 
joined YOGHI and attend the summer camp I see many, many like this. 
That’s why I understand I’m not alone. I told myself I’m not alone. 
(Atsushi, NGO member since age six) 
Their membership with Batis and Batis YOGHI had provided them with a social 
network and acquainted them with other children growing up with single-mothers. 
Being “JFC” had become a means for them to make sense of their situation as 
children of absent Japanese fathers, and taught to consider themselves as part of a 
larger group of people which has been viewed as a positive experience by my 
respondents above. 
However, not all Japanese-Filipinos agreed that “JFC” were united by 
their experiences. Japanese-Filipinos are indeed more diverse than the acronym 
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“JFC” suggests. Japanese-Filipino children grow up in various family forms, 
including nuclear families, patchwork families, extended families, single-mother 
families, or transnational families in absence of both biological parents. 
Throughout Japanese-Filipinos’ childhood and youth, these family forms may 
change. For instance, Japanese-Filipinos may leave or join a relative or a family 
nucleus upon migration. They grow up in either Japan, or the Philippines, and in 
some cases, in a third country. They may shift residence with both or one of their 
parents from Japan to the Philippines and vice-versa, or be sent to be taken care of 
by relatives in the Philippines when their parents find themselves unable or 
unwilling to raise them in Japan. 
Japanese-Filipino children also grow up in various socio-economic 
situations. Fifteen year old Toshiro and his siblings were raised in Manila by their 
Japanese expatriate father and their Filipina mother, a homemaker. All frequent 
the private Manila-based Japanese International School, are fluent in Japanese, 
and have visited their relatives in Japan on a regular basis. Alina, a Japanese-
Filipina in her early twenties, frequented a private school in Manila as well before 
joining her step-father in Japan where she later enrolled in a private university. In 
the meanwhile, her mother, a former ‘entertainer’ turned business woman has 
relocated to Manila leaving Alina in the care of her Japanese step-father. The 
variety of “JFC” experiences shows that although Japanese-Filipino’s parents’ 
relationships are couched in similar structural inequalities, the diversity of these 
relationships goes beyond the dichotomy of the Filipina victim and the Japanese 
predator. Moreover, the heterogeneous familial configurations mentioned above 
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illustrate that the “JFC” is not uniform and that NGO advocacy has focused on a 
particular ‘type’ of Japanese-Filipino.  
Within the context of NGO activism and claims making, the development 
of a “JFC” identity has a political purpose. For many NGO members, such as 
Sachiko, Yoko, and Atsushi, this shared narrative has taken on the form of a 
collective memory, “the active past that forms our identities” (Olick in Rocha, 
2010, p. 80). Yet this collective memory underlying the “JFC” narrative is not 
shared by everyone. Toshiro, who joined an NGO upon his father’s suggestion, 
clearly stated that he did not share any of the experiences of other NGO members. 
Alina too has difficulties feeling adequately portrayed by NGO-endorsed 
representations of Japanese-Filipinos. In our interview she makes it a point to let 
me know of her privileged upbringing: 
Alina: they don’t have maids? These moms? 
Interviewer: These moms are not well-off moms  
Alina: Oh they are living in the Philippines? Most of the half-Japanese in 
the area where I live in Manila are pretty ok- they don’t have problems 
with money. [My district is an] area quite good to live. 
Interviewer: How come there is this enclave?  
Alina: There are a few places for you to choose from if you are better off- 
this is one of the places. Others are parts of Las Piñas, Alabang, some 
parts of Parañaque… there are a lot of international schools. If there is a 
concentration of education, you will find a lot of Koreans, Japanese half… 
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but not pure Japanese. […]: I know a lot of people in Japan who are like 
me- people who are well-off back in the Philippines.  Actually we have a 
totally different situation than the other ones.  
 
Alina feels uncomfortable being associated with the lower social classes both in 
the Philippines and in Japan. To emphasize her distinct situation she mentions the 
friendships she fostered with Japanese returnees from the United States: “So I 
have these friends that are international, like from the States… they’re Japanese. I 
have people I can talk to, compared to these other JFCs.”  
The representation of Japanese-Filipinos as a troubled population has 
served NGOs to justify their existence and the implementation of funded projects. 
Yet this has implicitly created an exclusive imagination and representation of the 
“JFC” with which only children and youth in particular circumstances are able to 
identify with. Others are led to distance themselves from both NGOs and activism 
pertaining to Japanese-Filipinos. Alina, who is involved in a Japan-based youth-
group, makes it a point to dissociate herself from other ‘troubled’ youths who she 
is providing support for, mentioning two supposed experts who could vouch for 
her class difference: “If you are going to ask [a social worker] or [a Japanese 
Professor], they would say that I have a different situation than the others. 
Because I live in a totally different community back home.”  
The problem with the category “JFC” is thus not that NGOs point out 
issues and difficulties faced by a great number of Japanese-Filipino children and 
youths, but that being Japanese-Filipino has come to be conflated with these 
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problems. The ascription of a “JFC” identity to Japanese-Filipinos by NGOs, 
based on generalizations of Japanese-Filipinos as abandoned and/or born out of 
wedlock facing financial and emotional difficulties, largely stems from two 
factors. First, the way “JFC” have come to be understood and framed by NGOs is 
largely based on the situation and experiences of individuals seeking the help of 
support groups. As DAWN’s and Batis’ publications show, numerous Filipina 
women and their Japanese-Filipino children have faced challenging situations94. 
Second, the depiction of “JFC” as vulnerable, problem-ridden, and deserving of 
support is crucial to establishing Japanese-Filipinos’ existence as an issue and to 
politicizing it. Moreover, if “JFC” are considered to be in need of assistance, and 
NGOs situate themselves as supporters, then NGOs gain the legitimacy to apply 
for funding to finance their enterprise.  
Thus, instead of being written off as “one night babies” or the accidental 
children of prostitutes as in the early 1990s, “JFC” have come to be depicted as 
victims in need of attention or even psychological treatment. DAWN’s newsletter 
Sinag mentions that some of the NGOs clients have been sent for psychological 
counselling and testing (DAWN, 2000 e; 2008 d). Moreover, articles featured in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  Though,	  it	  should	  not	  be	  forgotten	  that	  such	  narratives	  are	  always	  selected	  and	  framed	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  advocacy.	  As	  Ogaya	  (2013)	  has	  shown	  in	  her	  paper,	  some	  of	  DAWN’s	  clients	  resist	  the	  negative	  depictions	  of	  what	  it	  entails	  to	  be	  a	  hostess	  in	  Japan,	  as	  well	  as	  dominant	  interpretations	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  the	  child	  of	  a	  former	  ‘entertainer’.	  Disagreements	  over	  such	   depictions	   have	   sometimes	   led	   to	   clients	   leaving	   the	   NGO,	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Anna	  depicted	  in	  Ogaya’s	  paper.	  My	  fieldwork	  too	  has	  revealed	  that	  clients	  leave	  their	  NGOs	  when	  they	   feel	   NGO	  membership	   no	   longer	   serves	   a	   purpose,	   or	  when	   they	   find	  more	   lucrative	  alternatives.	  Two	  families	  who	  had	  been	  with	  DAWN	  when	  I	  first	  joined	  the	  NGO	  in	  2008	  had	  left	  the	  organization	  in	  the	  following	  years	  to	  join	  a	  different	  group.	  According	  to	  one	  DAWN	  staff	   they	   had	   hoped	   to	   be	   able	   to	   secure	   employment	   in	   Japan	   by	   joining	   that	   other	  organization.	  One	  family	  of	  four	  had	  indeed	  managed	  to	  secure	  Japanese	  citizenship	  for	  two	  of	   its	  members.	   The	   other	   family,	   a	  mother	   and	  her	   Japanese-­‐Filipino	   son,	   still	   remains	   in	  Manila	  as	  they	  have	  been	  unable	  to	  locate	  the	  son’s	  Japanese	  father.	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Sinag (e.g. Hara A.M., 1998; DAWN, 1996 a; DAWN, 1999 c; 2002 a; 2004) and 
DAWN’s web-site (DAWN, 2004-2011) have repeatedly highlighted DAWN’s 
activities as “therapeutic”, as a means to “heal”, and a way to get in touch with 
oneself, effectively pathologizing the NGO’s clients. Batis had taken a different 
approach by initiating Batis YOGHI and encouraging its Japanese-Filipino 
members to take matters into their own hands. Batis YOGHI promotes optimism 
and individual responsibility, but does not avoid endorsing the over-generalized 
“JFC” category, as well as considering “JFC” a priori troubled youths who the 
group seeks to empower.   
The symbolic struggles engaged in by NGOs have given rise to the “JFC” 
as an alternative term to Japino, and as an identity defined by a dominant 
narrative which is reified through practice and repetition. Some Japanese-
Filipinos themselves have endorsed being “JFC” as a political and an ethnic 
identity. The identification as “JFC” is a process, as Ogaya (2011) shows, and the 
significance of being “JFC” is contextual. Jenkins (2008, p.82) points out that 
“[s]ometimes ethnicity may take its place alongside the primary identities of 
humanness, gender and individual selfhood; in other local contexts it will matter 
less.” It seems that for many Japanese-Filipinos, being “JFC” matters most in 
relations to their involvement with their NGOs, including processes of claims-
making towards the Japanese government. 
Japanese-Filipino members of NGOs undergo a process of ethnicization via the 
ascription of a “JFC” identity, largely denoting Japanese-Filipino parentage, a 
common history, and a presumably shared set of ‘issues’. The “JFC”-identity is 
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constructed via the repetition of the ‘typical’ story depicting the supposed ‘origin’ 
of Japanese-Filipino children, via the provision of resources enabling Japanese-
Filipinos to imagine Japan and get in touch with things Japanese, and via instilling 
a sense of difference separating ‘us, JFC’ from ‘them, regular Filipinos’. This 
process of ethnicization, of drawing ethnic boundaries, is part of the symbolic 
struggle on behalf of Japanese-Filipinos to gain recognition of “JFC” as Japanese 
and as part of Japan’s history, from the Japanese government.   
 ‘Blood’, descent, ‘race’ and ‘culture’: mobilizing consanguinal capital  
The construction of the “JFC” as distinct from ‘regular’ Filipinos by 
NGOs in the Philippines occurs by highlighting Japanese-Filipino’s Japaneseness 
and by labelling them ‘children of Japan’. Japan becomes a substitute for the 
absent Japanese father by likening filiation to national ties. The deployment of 
discourses on the child and the ‘normal’ family have highlighted the importance 
of paternal recognition and as such established the father as provider of “identity”, 
presuming he would be the answer to the unsettling question “who am I?”. The 
father within the “normal”, patriarchal family setting is the source of status, name 
and lineage. “I really want to study the culture of Japan, because that is the root of 
my life”, says Atsushi about his interest in things Japanese, thereby reconfirming 
his father as source of identity and Japan as an extrapolation of that unknown 
Japanese man who, at least biologically, made Atsushi ‘who he is’. In this analogy 
Japan is conceived as the greater father of all Japanese-Filipinos and becomes a 
provider of identity. The importance of exploring Japan and ‘Japanese culture’ as 
a way of knowing one’s Japanese father by proxy is reiterated by Mifune: 
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“I mean it’s always tied to the whole Japanese, the whole Japan 
relationship thing is always tied to the way a child, or a JFC tried to 
resolve the father question. I think I agree with [my Japanese-Filipino 
friend]…[she] mentioned that she can’t know her father, so what she 
chose to do is study the whole culture of Japan, the whole breadth if it, 
experience it, experience the people, the people that the father belongs to 
so ultimately once you embrace the country it’s like embracing your own 
father. That’s the stance I also take. [...]So I’ve established a kind of 
dialogue with the whole culture, the whole country.”  
 
 Individual Japanese fathers are abstracted into the image of the Japan. 
Japan turns into the potential provider of both, Japanese citizenship and ‘cultural 
heritage’, notably for children and youth having grown up in the Philippines.  
Indeed, one becomes a member of a nation similarly to how one becomes part of a 
family: by birth (Delaney, 1995). In claims made by Japanese-Filipinos, this 
“birthright” does not merely include nationality and citizenship but also the right 
“to learn firsthand the ways of our fathers” (United Japanese Filipino Children 
2009).  
Beneath demands for national membership lays the generalization of 
kinship ties into an imagined community (Anderson 2006 (1983)) which also 
forms the core of the assumptions on having a “cultural heritage” to claim; the 
‘blood’ metaphor is conflated with culture and reveals the essentializing 
suppositions implied in the argumentation. Indeed, its gist resonates with classic 
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views on ‘one nation, one culture, one language, one state, one citizenship’ (Grillo 
2007, p.993), which have largely been contested by intensified human cross-
border mobility and transnationalism. It is therefore even more interesting to see 
NGOs invested in the support of rights assertion by children born from the very 
human mobility that challenged classic views of the nation, yet reviving it for 
their own purposes of claims-making, advocacy and inclusion of Japanese-
Filipinos as Japanese nationals. The concepts of ‘race’, culture, citizenship, 
nationality and ‘blood’ have been deployed notably by Philippine-based NGOs 
without clear distinction and as such seem to reverberate with the cultural 
essentialism and the effective equation of state, nation and ethnicity purported by 
popular nationalist discourses including Nihonjinron 95  (cf. Lie, 2003 on 
Nihonjinron or McVeigh, 2006 on Nationalisms in Japan).  
Culture and ‘race’ are two terms commonly used interchangeably in texts 
produced by support NGOs of Japanese-Filipinos. “The JFC” is often described to 
either hail from “inter-racial” unions or from “inter-cultural” ones. In describing 
the play The Ugly Duckling96 performed by Teatro Akebono in 2001, the story is 
said to easily be one “of every Japanese-Filipino child, who soon finds that being 
born of two cultures means never fitting in any of them” (DAWN 2001 a, p.4). 
The statement assumes culture to be transmitted by birth, an assumption that 
becomes even clearer upon considering that the majority of Japanese-Filipinos 
spoken for by the NGO have never had significant contact with any of their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  A	  popular	  body	  of	  writings	  asserting	   Japan’s	  ethnic	  homogeneity	  as	  well	  as	   the	   Japanese	  people’s	  distinctiveness,	  produced	  notably	  after	  WWII	  and	  during	  Japan’s	  economic	  miracle.	  96	  The	   play	   is	   based	   on	   the	   classic	   by	   Hans-­‐Christian	   Andersen	   (DAWN,	   2001	   a),	   but	   the	  author	  of	  the	  play	  remains	  unmentioned.	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Japanese relatives, nor any lived experience of Japan. Another statement reiterates 
the conflation of ‘culture’ with ‘race’:  “[t]he children [...] have become more 
confident in expressing their identities as Japanese-Filipino children and now 
accept they belong to two different cultures.” (DAWN 2000 a, p.7).  Japanese-
Filipino members of DAWN restate the conflation: 
“I think it is great to be a JFC because aside from being a product of two 
cultures, many people say that JFC are beautiful and talented.” (Mayumi, 
in DAWN, 2010, p.71) 
 
“Inside us [JFC] there exists an empire with a monolithic culture and a 
colony with a boiling pot of influences.” (Philippine-based Japanese-
Filipino Facebook user) 
 
While Japanese-Filipinos are indeed offspring of parents born and raised 
in distinct societies, the latter’s socio-cultural knowledge does not naturally 
transfer onto the children simply by birth, rendering them bi-cultural as statements 
in NGO publications suggest. Most Japanese-Filipino children spoken for by 
Philippine-based NGOs are born and raised in the Philippines and learn about 
Japan mainly through mass-media, through the narratives of their mothers or 
NGO sponsored workshops and projects. Therefore, calling these individuals “bi-
cultural” means equating descent with culture. Usually, it is support groups that 
provide Japanese-Filipinos with access to things Japanese and encourage their 
learning and practice. In short, NGOs acquaint the children with what is 
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considered ‘Japanese culture’. In doing so however, support groups contradict 
themselves by promoting bi-culturalism as an innate quality on the one hand, and 
a faculty in need of development on the other: 
 
“Their [“JFC”’s] cultural exchange with the Japanese people and their 
sight-seeing activities are also expected to develop their pride and 
appreciation of their paternal roots.” (DAWN 2002 b, p.12) 
  
“DAWN recognizes the JFCs rights to discover and understand their 
paternal roots. Part of which is learning basic Nihonggo words and writing 
especially for those going to Japan for the theatre tour.” (DAWN 2003 a, 
p.6) 
 
“The activity is held annually to foster and promote better understanding 
and appreciation of other cultures, esp. Japanese culture considering that 
the JFCs are half-Japanese [...] The JFC participants performed in the 
musical play, had dialogues and interactions with local communities, 
schools and organizations in Japan, attended workshops and talks on 
Japanese culture, and experienced Japanese hospitality through homestay 
with Japanese families.” (DAWN 2009, p.6) 
 
Batis-YOGHI, an organization of children of Filipino women migrant 
workers in/from Japan, is committed to [...] raise their [Japanese-Filipino 
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children’s] awareness on Japanese and Filipino culture. (Batis Center for 
Women 2009, p.20) 
 
NGOs have invested time and resources to inculcate Japaneseness into 
their Japanese-Filipino members. The children and youth are given the 
opportunity to learn basic Japanese by participating in language classes organized 
by the NGOs (Batis YOGHI, DAWN and Maligaya House have provided 
Japanese language classes for Japanese-Filipinos). At DAWN, Japanese-Filipino 
members are involved in activities that expose them to things Japanese; origami 
folding, onigiri (rice-ball) making, the singing of Japanese children’s songs and 
even the performance of one of their theatre plays in Japanese.  
The ‘culture’ argument is employed strategically to justify both the 
necessity for Filipino-Japanese children born and raised in Japan to remain in the 
country where they grew up, as well as the need for Japanese-Filipinos to migrate 
out of the Philippines to Japan.  "We mothers don't need Japanese nationality. We 
want to go back to the Philippines when we become old, [...] But I can't bring my 
daughter to my country. She only speaks Japanese and only knows life in Japan. 
She'd have such a difficult time in the Philippines. She wants to live in Japan" 
(The Daily Yomiuri, 2005), declares Charlette, a Filipino mother of a Filipino-
Japanese girl born and raised in Japan. Here, gaining Japanese nationality is 
deemed crucial to enable a Japanese-Filipino girl to remain in the country she 
learned to understand as her home, of which she speaks the language and where 
she is accustomed to daily life.  In contrast to this statement are demands on 
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behalf of Philippine-based children and youth to take legal steps to 
further“...remove legal impediments to the exercise of JFCs of their right to their 
cultural heritage, including their father’s nationality or freedom of movement in 
their father’s birthplace.” (The Batis Center for Women, et al. 2008) The ‘culture’ 
argument is malleable and depends on who speaks; at times it is linked to ‘blood’ 
and descent, while at other times ‘culture’ is highlighted as a matter of 
socialization. In the case of NGO advocacy on behalf of Japanese-Filipinos based 
in the Philippines, biological descent becomes deployed as a reason to acquire 
certain cultural knowledge and experience, and thus migrate to Japan, while in 
claims on behalf of Japan-based Japanese-Filipinos, an already acquired cultural 
knowledge and habits become the primary reasons why they are deemed unable to 
live in the Philippines.  The employment of different and indeed contradictory 
discourses shows that the mobilization of descent is strategic in claims on behalf 
of Philippine-based Japanese-Filipinos.  
The CraneDog- scripting ‘race’ into staged stories 
In 2009, Teatro Akebono’s The CraneDog was first staged. The play, 
written by a former Japanese-Filipina member of DAWN notably for audiences in 
Japan, picks up on issues of identity, culture and ‘race’. The CraneDog is the 
story of a baby born to a crane and a dog, a crossbreed of both animals. 
Wondering about his different looks and thus his identity, CraneDog learns that 
he had been fathered by a Crane. In search of his real father, CraneDog thus 
leaves his home to travel to Craneland. There, he manages to find his father and, 
with his help, learns the ways of the Cranes. However, CraneDog eventually 
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returns to his natal land and would visit his father from time to time (DAWN 
2010, pp.115-116)97.  
The play was initially written to raise awareness of Japanese-Filipino 
children’s identity struggles98. The play’s Japanese-Filipina author, a former 
client of DAWN herself, related to me through e-mail: “Crane dog started with an 
idea about a half-half person who's confused about his identity.” According to its 
author, the intended message of the play was to highlight the importance of 
knowing where one is from and to understand oneself. This message is in line 
with the recurring query of ‘identity’ and the question of “who am I?” in NGO 
discourses. The theatre play also conveys a number of implicit ‘truths’ endorsed 
by the author.  For instance, by drawing parallels between Japanese-Filipinos and 
an animal made up of two different species, she suggests that the amalgamation of 
the two nationalities is inherently abnormal. Japanese-Filipino children, 
represented by a crossbreed born from the liaison of a crane with a dog, are 
depicted as an abnormality. The capacity to adapt to Craneland – symbolized by 
CraneDog’s ability to fly- is possible though his wings, a biologically inherited 
asset. Last but not least, the animals chosen to represent the Japanese and Filipino 
people convey an unequal power relation, possibly this was an unintended 
slippage. Cranes are often found in Japanese paintings and on textiles, 
symbolizing long life and good fortune. Dogs- chosen to represent the Filipinos - 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  This	   reflects	   DAWN’s	   opposition	   to	   labour	   migration.	   DAWN	   however	   encourages	   its	  clients	  to	  travel	  to	  Japan	  and	  acquaint	  themselves	  with	  ‘Japanese	  culture’.	  	  98	  The	   actual	   impact	   of	   the	   theatre	   tours	   as	   tools	   of	   advocacy	   is	   difficult	   to	   assess.	   In	   a	  conversation	  with	  one	  of	  DAWN’s	  staff	   in	  May	  2011,	  she	  complained	   that	  discussions	  with	  Japanese	   audiences	   are	   usually	   tame.	  The	   typical	   questions	  would	  be	   “do	   you	   like	   Japan?”	  and	  the	  like	  as	  Japanese	  audiences	  would	  not	  breach	  any	  contentious	  issues.	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are usually associated with loyalty, but also with submissiveness. The author of 
the play mentioned that the dog was not her first choice; to represent the 
Philippines she would have selected an eagle or a carabao, but the dog costumes 
would make the children look “cute” (E-mail from the play’s author, on 
08.02.2012).  
The purpose of the play was also to make Japanese-Filipino children seem more 
familiar to the Japanese audience through kabuki-inspired visuals. Ultimately, the 
author hoped to engage the audience “so that subconsciously they will know that 
these kids are not different from them but are actually one of them.” (ibid.) The 
idea of difference is reinforced when Japanese-Filipino children are contrasted 
with other ‘regular’ Filipinos while at the same time efforts are made to make 
them appear more similar to Japanese.  By doing so, the stage-performers and the 
characters played are made culturally relevant to their Japanese audience. The use 
of things Japanese develops into a crucial act through which cultural proximity as 
well as familiarity is displayed. Plays like the CraneDog are part of DAWN’s 
activities aimed at producing Japaneseness, notably by highlighting ‘racial’ 
belonging to Japanese society as well as a ‘natural’ interest and inclination for 
things Japanese, and at convincing an audience of the rightful claim to certain 
rights by virtue of descent. The play was staged several times in different cities in 
Japan and in Manila. I happened to visit DAWN in early May 2011 as one 
Japanese-Filipino boy and one Filipina mother were rehearsing a scene from The 
Cranedog under the direction of one of DAWN’s staff members. DAWN had 
scheduled a performance to welcome the new Japanese Ambassador and his 
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friends to be held on May 26th. DAWN staff decided it would be better to perform 
the play in Japanese and so the two actors struggled to recite their lines in a 
language they barely spoke.  
 The implied message of the play has not been appreciated by all parties 
involved. A DAWN volunteer based in Japan has raised her doubts about the 
content of “the Cranedog” and about DAWN’s identity ascription in general: 
I questioned if it is really good for children and how the organization’s 
staff is thinking. […] What did I think about Cranedog? At first I didn’t 
like the idea of a dog and a crane because it looks like we have two 
defined races, you know? […] I think identity is not something that 
someone decides, it’s not decided by someone else. But when I see 
DAWN’s activities it seems like sometimes DAWN staff sort of make 
their children’s identity to advocate their status maybe. I guess that’s 
inevitable as long as you’re an NGO and wanna say something in that 
field to public people, JFCs, Japanese-Filipino children. But if you do too 
much, I guess some children sort of internalize that identity and I wonder 
what will happen to these children once they grow up. As long as you 
belong to DAWN as a group, as a family I’m sure children get lots of 
influence from the other staff. So I just wonder how the staff thinks about 
their influence on the children in the process of making their identity. 
(DAWN volunteer) 
One is not born bi-cultural or a “JFC”, as often suggested in NGO publications, 
but one becomes a “JFC” through NGO membership and participation in NGO 
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activities. The “JFC” identity is based on generalizations largely made for the 
purpose of advocacy. It is contextual as well as instrumental. This is not to say 
that the acronym and the meanings invested in it by NGOs have not provided 
Japanese-Filipino individuals with the means to make sense of their situation and 
their knowledge of having parents hailing from two different nation-states. But it 
would be wrong to assume that all Japanese-Filipinos, simply based on the fact 
that their parents come from the Philippines and from Japan, attribute the same 
importance and meaning to their parentage. 
The problem with the ascription of a “JFC” identity to all individuals of 
Japanese and Filipino parents born since the late 1970s is thus primarily one of an 
over-generalization of “JFCs’” experiences and their assumed affectedness by 
their situation. Secondly, the ascription of the “JFC” identity may actually 
identify problems where they weren’t any in the first place, as Alina pointed out.  
Lastly, in establishing “JFC” as an identity and in stressing Japanese-Filipinos’ 
Japaneseness, NGOs feed into the idea that “JFC” are distinct from other Filipino 
children (even their own half-siblings) because of their Japanese ancestry, despite 
many other children and youth in the Philippines growing up with one or both 
parents working overseas, and facing similar challenges as “JFC” due to their 
socio-economic circumstances.    
Concluding remarks 
The concept of the “JFC” thus emerges amidst dominant discourses on the 
“normal” family, childhood, the universal rights of the child as well as ideas on 
‘race’ and culture. Discourses on the “normal” family and childhood were 
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significant in the 1990s and the early 2000s. ‘Culture’ and ‘identity’ (as ethnic or 
mixed-racial identity) have surfaced only with more recent activist and litigation 
efforts employed to demand Japanese nationality. All the relevant discourses are 
interconnected and mutually reinforcing each other, notably through the metaphor 
of family-ties; blood relationships among individuals are transposed onto the 
symbolic level, depicting and reinforcing the nation as ‘family’ and establishing 
the State (notably that of Japan) as the ‘parent’, and therefore as bearer of 
responsibility, through claims of belonging by ‘blood’. “The JFC” has emerged 
through NGO and public discourses, but Japanese-Filipinos have started to speak 
on their own. Japanese-Filipinos identifying with the acronym “JFC” and making 
statements in its name very often use similar categories and vocabulary as do the 
NGOs they still are or were involved with.  Nationalist discourses from Japan 
which potentially exclude Japanese-Filipinos from the Japanese nation are turned 
around and deployed in ways beneficial to Japanese-Filipinos’ and NGOs’ own 
political struggle by utilizing primordial ideas of Japaneseness and highlighting 
Japanese’ blood’ as a binding element.  
Discourses are indeed  “tactical elements or blocks operating in the field 
of force relations; there can exist different and even contradictory discourses 
within the same strategy; they can, on the contrary, circulate without changing 
their form from one strategy to another, opposing strategy.” (Foucault 1990, 
pp.101-102). Japanese descent has been utilized to support claims for Japanese 
nationality, the “right to cultural heritage”, the need to explore one’s father’s land, 
and one’s own roots in the name of ‘identity’ (United Japanese Filipino Children 
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2009), as well as the importance of becoming acquainted with Japanese culture. 
These ideas have led to the implementation of projects teaching Japanese-Filipino 
children what they are imagined to know ‘naturally’: how to be Japanese. 
But conflicts over the objectives and forms of support have surfaced 
among Japanese-Filipinos and the different NGOs. The assumed unity of 
Japanese-Filipinos, based on Japanese-Filipina parentage, has proven untenable. 
Japanese-Filipinos are too diverse to be lumped into one category and bestowed 
with one political identity. While numerous Japanese-Filipinos have expressed joy 
over the advantages gained through NGO membership, depictions of the “JFC” as 
poor and needy have also prompted a number of Japanese-Filipinos aware of 
ongoing NGO advocacy to distance themselves from such portrayals. 
Simultaneously, a large number of Japanese-Filipinos remain unaware of activism 
in their name. Among these are well-heeled offspring of ‘successful’ marriages 
between Japanese men and Filipino women in the Philippines, such as Toshiro 
and his siblings, and Filipino-Japanese in Japan who largely identify as Japanese 







Chapter 6: The Change of Japan’s 
Nationality Law and new 
opportunities for Japanese-Filipinos 
 
On June 4, 2008 the Japanese Supreme Court decided that there was a 
need for an amendment in the Japanese Nationality Law. A clause that 
distinguished between children born within wedlock and children born to 
unmarried parents in granting Japanese nationality was deemed to be in conflict 
with Article 14 Paragraph 1 of the Japanese Constitution, stating “all of the people 
are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic 
or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.” (The 
Supreme Court of Japan 2008a). After three years of trial against the Japanese 
government starting in April 2005, the final ruling was celebrated as a ‘landmark 
decision’ by the plaintiffs and their defendants (Kyodo News Int., 2008). For 
NGOs in support of Japanese-Filipino Children this ruling not only meant 
significant legal change, but it marked a symbolic breakthrough in NGO advocacy 
and activism. The individuals who have brought forward their legal complaint 
were nine Japanese-Filipino children and their mothers (JFC Network 2005, p.15) 
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who were represented by lawyers from the JFC Lawyers Association99 and 
supported by CNJFC staff.  
Japanese citizenship and nationality have always been exclusive, 
discriminating along parental marital status, sex, and ethnicity. Until 1950, 
Japanese women had to give up their Japanese nationality upon marrying a 
foreign man. Before 1985, Japanese women married to foreign men were unable 
to pass down their nationality to their children. Korean and Taiwanese immigrants 
and their descendants were unilaterally stripped off their Japanese nationality at 
the end World War Two. Naturalization remained a difficult process and was long 
time conditioned upon assimilation, including the changing of one’s name into a 
Japanese name. This requirement has been cancelled in 1987, when the use of 
non-official characters was allowed when naturalizing and registering one’s name.  
Yet Japanese authorities continued to push many applicants to change their 
names, a practice which subsided only over the years (Weiner and Chapman 
1997). Lastly, until 2008 Japanese men needed to be married to the foreign 
mothers of their children, or acknowledge their offspring before birth, in order for 
their children to acquire Japanese nationality at birth. 
Many of these exclusions are based on the understanding of what makes a 
person ‘Japanese’. In Japan, nationality remains premised upon biological descent 
via the principle of jus sanguinis, as well as upon cultural descent, as expressed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  This	  group	  is	  sometimes	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘Lawyers	  Association	  for	  JFC’.	  The	  group	  was	  formed	   in	   1993	   to	   provide	   an	   avenue	   of	   legal	   support	   for	   Filipino	   mothers	   of	   Japanese-­‐Filipino	   children.	   However,	   the	   great	   number	   of	   cases	  made	   it	   difficult	   for	   the	   lawyers	   to	  handle	   them	   all,	   so	   a	   year	   later,	   in	   1994,	   the	   CNJFC	   was	   set-­‐up	   as	   an	   NGO	   to	   provide	  administrative	  and	  para-­‐legal	  support.	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through popular discourses on Japan’s ostensible ethnic homogeneity and implied, 
although less evidently, in Japan’s nationality law as I will illustrate in this 
chapter. Moreover, the right to Japanese nationality at birth remains tied to birth 
from relationships deemed ‘legitimate’, meaning from relationships considered to 
form a ‘family’ and able to produce and raise ‘proper’ Japanese nationals and 
citizens. By consequence, children born from relationships deemed ‘illegitimate’ 
remained barred from acquiring Japanese nationality at birth. However, the idea 
of what makes a family is not a natural given, but discursively produced and 
sanctioned or contested on political grounds. A broadening of the understanding 
of what makes a ‘family’ as the unit producing ‘legitimate’ Japanese thus means 
an inclusion of children of Japanese nationals who thus far had been unable to 
acquire Japanese nationality because they had been born from ‘illegitimate’ 
relationships.  
The aim of this chapter is to examine in more detail the lawsuit against the 
Japanese government which had effected in the cancellation of the requirement of 
legitimation in the acquisition of Japanese nationality by children born to 
Japanese fathers and foreign mothers. The text of the final judgment and the 
judges’ individual opinions delivered in the conclusion of the trial are of 
particular interest as they reveal how changes in society with regards to what 
constitutes a family -and therefore what kind of family structure it takes to enable 
a child to develop a ‘tie’ to Japan- are perceived by the judges who handled the 
case. The opinions also include a discussion of the circumstances necessary to 
become a Japanese national, on top of descending from a Japanese parent.  
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Moreover, I will shed light on NGO reactions to the legal amendment and 
their handling of increasing cases of immigration to Japan and of rights-claims for 
those Japanese-Filipinos who were unable to benefit from the amended law due to 
various reasons. These reasons usually are age100, non-registration with the 
Japanese authorities within the cut-off period of three months after birth if born 
abroad, and too little information on the Japanese father. Staff at the CNJFC has 
also criticized the many bureaucratic obstacles encountered by Japanese-Filipinos 
trying to obtain Japanese nationality after the legal amendment (JFC Network, 
2010).   
Litigation for social change 
The issue of nationality for children born to foreign women surfaced in the 
Japanese media in the 1990s. Stateless “Baby Andrew” was not the only child 
confronted with institutional hurdles to obtain Japanese nationality. In the mid-
1990s a Korean woman appealed for her child with a Japanese man to obtain 
Japanese nationality. Her case was complicated by the fact that she was still 
married to her previous Japanese husband when she gave birth to the child of 
another Japanese man. Two months after the child was born, she divorced her first 
husband. The now ex-husband confirmed the absence of any biological 
relationship with the child and subsequently, the child’s biological father 
recognized his offspring. Nationality was however denied as per law a child 
should acquire nationality at birth through its parent-child relationship at the time. 
After confirming the absence of filiation between the baby and the supposed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  Applications	   to	   recover	  one’s	   Japanese	  nationality	   following	   the	  amendment	  need	   to	  be	  made	  before	  one’s	  20th	  birthday	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father, the law determined that the child had no father at the time of birth. This 
problematic situation resulted from the Civil Code, stating that children born 
within wedlock are presumed to be the husband’s biological offspring. The 
Korean woman appealed in court and in 1997 the Supreme Court ruled in her 
favour. The final judgment was accompanied by individual judges’ opinions, one 
of them stating that the “time of birth” with regards to pre- or postnatal 
recognition should not be understood in strictly physiological terms (Suzuki 
2010).  
A similar case was brought before the Supreme Court in 2003. The court 
ruled in favour of the non-Japanese mother and her child with reference to the 
precedent ruling of 1997. The most decisive lawsuit foregoing the one initiated by 
the CNJFC was filed in 2002. The child of a Filipino mother and a Japanese father 
was denied Japanese nationality which prompted the parents to sue the Japanese 
government for discriminatory treatment over the differentiation made between 
children with foetal recognition versus those recognized after birth. The point of 
contention was the clause establishing a distinction according to the timing of 
paternal recognition. The appeal was rejected, but the judges offered their 
opinions in addition to the official verdict. They suggested that the distinctions 
created by the requirement of legitimacy, notably applying to children born to 
Japanese fathers and non-Japanese mothers, were problematic (ibid.). After 
scrutinizing the judges’ opinions on the latter case, the main argument of the 
lawsuit organized by the CNJFC in 2005 shifted from problematizing the 
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definition of “at the time of birth” to the requirement of parental marriage, a shift 
which eventually resulted in their victory in court. 
Prior to the Supreme Court ruling of June 2008, the Japanese government 
had for the longest time maintained that issues pertaining to children born from 
Japanese-Filipina unions including the legal status of the children and their 
mothers in Japan were private matters. Filipino women in the Philippines seeking 
help from the Japanese embassy with matters regarding the Japanese fathers of 
their children have been directed by embassy staff to seek help from NGOs like 
Batis, Maligaya House or DAWN. While the government avoided recognizing the 
phenomenon of numerous Japanese-Filipino children being legally 
unacknowledged and financially neglected by their fathers as a socio-political 
issue, it did financially contribute to the establishment of Maligaya House and 
also financed the implementation of various projects by DAWN and Batis. In 
2007, DAWN started the nation-wide registration of Japanese-Filipino children in 
the Philippines with the aim of drafting a basic socio-economic profile of these 
children and to gain a better sense of how many there might be. Kenji Endo, the 
then first secretary and chief consul of the Japanese Embassy in the Philippines 
expressed the Japanese government’s support of the registration for humanitarian 
reasons (Manila Standard 2007).  He stated that the Japanese and Philippine 
governments had already discussed the issue and had “agreed to continue the 
program and find out what kind of assistance both governments can extend to 
these children” (ibid.). However he also added that an intervention from the 
Japanese government was not yet needed at that point in time, reinforcing the idea 
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that the problems faced by numerous Japanese-Filipino children remained 
considered private and not a matter needing government intervention. 
 Despite NGO’s attempts to render “JFC issues” a public concern, the 
stories of abandoned women and children were considered private misfortunes. In 
the 1990s, when the issue of children born to “entertainers” entered public 
discourse in Japan, journalists showed interest in the newly set-up Lawyer’s 
Association for JFC and in the creation of the CNJFC. However, as a staff 
member of the CNJFC stated, the problem was considered an individual problem 
not a social problem and a lot of people did not understand the necessity for 
NGOs. Despite the heightened publicity of the issue, the frequency of Japanese-
Filipino children born to Filipino women and abandoned by their Japanese fathers 
was not recognized as a consequence of the Japanese governments’ complicity in 
funnelling young foreign women into the sex-industry.    
While avoiding legal and social change, the Japanese government kept 
financing NGOs which would handle issues of paternal acknowledgment and 
payment of alimony on a case-by-case basis. In doing so, the government kept 
under control the pace and development of claims. The financial concessions 
made by the government could thus be considered “preemtive-concessions 
strategies” (Pharr in Chung, 2010) used by Japanese officials to remain in control 
over the potentially destabilizing effects of claims by civil-society groups. Thus, 
achieving legal change which by consequence would also mark social and 
political change was an important step in the overall goal of advocacy and 
activism on behalf of Japanese-Filipinos.  
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For a long time, the CNJFC and the Lawyer’s Association for JFC have 
concentrated on solving individual cases and have consequently struggled with 
substantial workload. If the CNJFC would have kept solving complaints case-by-
case without targeting a vital stakeholder in the issue, the Japanese government, it 
probably would have “ran itself into the sands of litigation”, just as the Japanese 
environmental movement eventually did (Upham 1987, p.121). Indeed, 
movements like the environmental movement have been slowed down by having 
turned their political struggles into legal ones, dictated by the pace of the courts 
(ibid.). Yet, if used strategically and with a political purpose, litigation has shown 
to be an effective tool for significant change. Therefore, when stressing that 
problems related to Japanese-Filipina couples and their offspring were private 
issues, the Japanese government was making an effort to keep political action out 
of the courts and social change at slow pace. Yet, once the CNJFC recognized the 
opportunity to achieve legal and social change, the decision to challenge their 
greater opponent, the Japanese government, was taken.  
Japan’s nationality law has been conceptualized to warrant ‘legitimate’ 
paternity by imposing parental marriage, or else foetal acknowledgment, as 
condition for offspring of Japanese men and foreign women to acquire Japanese 
nationality at birth. The requirement for legitimacy has also been understood to 
guarantee the development of significant affective and cultural ties to the 
Japanese parent and subsequently to Japanese society. However it could also be 
argued that the requirement for ‘legitimation’ in force until 2008 was a way to 
implement exclusionary practices in anticipation of potential claims to Japanese 
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nationality by children born from the relations between Japanese men and foreign 
women. Japan’s nationality law alongside the Japanese governments’ 
longstanding reluctance to take an active role in confronting and dealing with 
rising numbers of Japanese-Filipino babies lacking legal status in Japan, has 
sustained the exclusion of potential Japanese nationals born under circumstances 
deemed unsuitable to produce ‘proper’ Japanese.   
The legal victory indeed challenged the power of the State in determining 
who ought to be a Japanese citizen. However, this would not have been possible 
without the judges’ acknowledgment of increased variety in family lifestyles and 
of the independence of those family lifestyles from whether a child develops a 
‘tie’ to Japan or not. Media coverage of the problems related to children born to 
unmarried foreign women, the precedent legal cases, and the plaintiffs 
demonstrating a Japanese upbringing have certainly influenced the important 
decisions concerning the contemporary ‘sense of society’101 and whether these 
children had developed ‘ties’ to Japanese society, despite being brought up by 
their Filipino mothers. The decision over whether Japan’s nationality law needed 
to be amended therefore lay in the hands of judges who, besides manoeuvring 
legal texts and interpretations, also brought their own subjective perception of 
society and social norms with them into the trial.  
Whether the discursive construction of Japanese-Filipino children by 
NGOs directly influenced the judges’ decision is difficult to assess. What can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  The	  expression	   ‘sense	  of	   society’	   is	  often	   referred	   to	  by	   judges	   in	   Japan	   to	  anchor	   their	  decisions	  in	  what	  they	  identify	  to	  be	  contemporary	  social	  trends	  and	  realities	  (West	  2011).	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said is that the understanding of Japanese-Filipinos as children born from familial 
relationships (as opposed to casual ones), and the plaintiffs’ fluency in things 
Japanese has helped pave the way for the legal amendment by demonstrating that 
despite their unmarried parents, they too could develop a ‘tie’ to Japan. 
Analysis of the June 4th Supreme Court judgment102 
The idea of filing a lawsuit against the Japanese state first materialized 
after a Filipino mother and her child submitted a notification for acquisition of 
Japanese nationality to the Ministry of Justice in 2003. The Japanese-Filipino 
child had been legally acknowledged by his/her103 Japanese father after birth but 
was denied Japanese nationality as his/her parents were not married. Encouraged 
by their efforts to claim nationality, the CNJFC decided to follow suit and 
contacted its clients, nine of whom were willing to join the proceedings (Suzuki 
2010).  
In order to obtain Japanese nationality at birth, several criteria need to be 
fulfilled. Japan operates according to the principle of jus sanguinis, meaning that 
nationality is conferred ‘by blood’. A child therefore needs to be the direct 
offspring of at least one Japanese national to obtain Japanese nationality. If the 
child is born to a Japanese woman, filiation is easily established and the child may 
obtain Japanese nationality, similarly to children born to Japanese couples, upon 
registration with the authorities. The conferment of Japanese nationality by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  For	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  final	  judgement,	  I	  rely	  on	  the	  English	  text	  of	  the	  judgement	  which	  is	  a	   translated	   version	   provided	   online	   by	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   (The	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   Japan,	  2008a).	  	  103	  The	   judgment	   issued	   by	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   does	   not	   state	   whether	   the	   appellant	   was	  male	  or	  female.	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women has been possible since the revision of the Japanese Nationality law in 
1985 as part of Japan’s ratification of the Convention on Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women. 
However, before the implementation of the amended law in 2009, if a 
child was born to a Japanese father, the parents needed to be married for paternity 
to be determined104. If born out of wedlock, the Japanese Nationality Law 
required foetal acknowledgement, which means that the father had to submit a 
formal acknowledgment before the birth of his child. Yet if acknowledged after 
birth, children born to unmarried foreign women could only obtain Japanese 
nationality by undergoing the process of naturalization, which means that 
Japanese nationality was not their birthright but needed to be granted by the 
Minister of Justice upon assessing their case. This regulation established a 
differentiation between those who have the right to Japanese nationality, and 
those who may or may not have the privilege of becoming Japanese nationals at 
the discretion of the Minister of Justice.   
The crux of the issue thus centred on the requirement of parental marriage 
in order to obtain Japanese nationality and on how this requirement, codified in 
Article 3 paragraph 1 of the Nationality Law, was a form of discrimination against 
children born out of wedlock to foreign women and Japanese men. On April 12, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Article	  772	  of	  the	  Civil	  Code	  maintains	  that	  children	  born	  within	  wedlock	  are	  presumed	  to	  have	  been	  fathered	  by	  the	  husband	  under	  assumption	  of	  the	  wife’s	  chastity.	  According	  to	  the	  Civil	  Code,	  “a	  child	  conceived	  by	  a	  wife	  during	  marriage	  shall	  be	  presumed	  to	  be	  the	  child	  of	  her	  husband”.	  Furthermore,	  “a	  child	  born	  after	  200	  days	  from	  the	  formation	  of	  marriage	  or	  within	  300	  days	  of	  the	  day	  of	  the	  dissolution	  or	  rescission	  of	  marriage	  shall	  be	  presumed	  to	   have	   been	   conceived	   during	   marriage.”	   Marriage	   thus	   established	   the	   biological	  relationship,	  notwithstanding	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  child	  being	  another	  man’s	  offspring.	  (see	  Suzuki,	  2010)	  .	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2005 the nation’s first ever class-action lawsuit105 over the issue was filed at the 
Tokyo District Court (The Daily Yomiuri 2005).  The Tokyo District Court ruled 
in favour of the plaintiffs, yet the Japanese government appealed and the case was 
moved to the Tokyo High Court. The previous ruling was then overturned, but the 
plaintiffs appealed and their cases were brought before the Supreme Court of 
Japan where in June 2008 Article 3 paragraph 1 was ruled unconstitutional.  
The final judgement delivered on June 4, 2008 as well as the individual 
judges’ opinions are interesting to look at in greater detail because, as West 
(2011) argues, the grounds for court decisions are never purely legal but always 
also contain nonfactual elements that divulge how the judges assess contemporary 
social trends, social reality, and based on that, take their decisions. The written 
opinions at the end of each trial reveal  how “[c]onsciously or otherwise, subtly or 
otherwise, judges choose, eliminate, emphasize, and downplay facts to justify 
their decisions or perhaps to tell a dramatic, convincing, or familiar story filled 
with socially salient elements.” (p.11). The text of the final judgment by the 
Supreme Court exhibits the subjective perceptions of the judges of the trial about 
what makes a person Japanese, what family forms are acceptable and which 
family forms best guaranteed a child’s ties to Japan.  
West (ibid.)106 points out how a particular perception of society always 
finds its way into legal judgements.  He argues that society is “[o]ne of the 
particularly complicated players in this legal conversation [...] Sometimes judges 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  A	   class-­‐action	   lawsuit	   is	   a	   lawsuit	   wherein	   a	   large	   number	   of	   people	   with	   a	   common	  interest	  in	  a	  matter	  sue	  another	  party,	  or	  get	  sued.	  106	  West	   (2011)	  analyzed	  several	   legal	  cases	   in	   Japan	   to	   find	  out	  how	  the	   idea	  of	   ‘love’	  has	  been	  featured	  in,	  deployed,	  understood,	  and	  dealt	  with	  by	  judges	  in	  criminal	  cases.	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must interpret laws that they know were deeply contested at their passage or are 
the subject of shifting contemporary debate” (p.24) and at other times judges have 
to look at social trends to find answers to difficult questions often concerning the 
most private issues. In deciding on verdicts and in justifying opinions, judges 
have therefore reverted to the “sense of society”, a standard invented by courts 
and applied in many areas of Japanese law107 (ibid.). The “sense of society”108 is 
“among the most frequently used phrases in Japanese judicial opinions. In 
judgment after judgment, Japanese judges invoke the ‘sense of society’ as a 
controlling source of value and standard for their decisions.” (Haley 1998, p.157)  
The ‘sense of society’ is indeed mentioned twice, as shakai tsuunen 
(which can be translated as ‘conventional wisdom’ or as ‘social norms’), in the 
Japanese version of the final judgment drafted by the Supreme Court (see The 
Supreme Court Japan, 2008b, p. 6). In the English text provided online by the 
Supreme Court, shakai tsuunen is translated as “socially accepted views” (The 
Supreme Court of Japan 2008a). In addition to mentioning socially accepted 
views, both English and Japanese texts refer to “social circumstances” (shakai teki 
jyoukyou) to refer to the ‘sense of society’. The agreement upon a particular 
‘sense of society’ has played an important role in the final decision of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  These	   include	   cases	  of	  divorce	  and	  marital	  disputes,	   religious	   freedom,	  property	   rights,	  and	  employee	  dismissal	  (West,	  2011).	  In	  the	  judgement	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  	  in	  June	  2008	  and	  in	  the	  opinions	  provided	  by	  the	  judges	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  “sense	  of	  society”	  was	  mainly	  used	  to	  assess	  what	  constituted	  a	  family	  and	  whether	  there	  had	  been	  substantial	  changes	  in	  how	  people	   practiced	   family	   to	   consider	   the	   parental	   marriage	   requirement	   of	   the	   Nationality	  Law	  out-­‐dated.	  108	  West	   (2011)	   mentions	   shakai	   kannen	   (ideas	   about	   society,	   concept	   of	   society)	   shakai	  
gainen	   (concept	   of	   society)	   or	   shakai	   tsuunen	   (conventional	   wisdom	   or	   social	   norms)	   as	  terms	  popularly	  employed	  by	  Japanese	  judges.	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Supreme Court, especially with regards to the acknowledgment of greater variety 
of family lifestyles going beyond traditional marriage.   
In the final statement and in their individual opinions, the judges discuss 
the three principles that determine Japanese nationality: jus sanguinis, the legal 
relationship between the Japanese parent and his/her child through 
acknowledgment, and the “tie to Japan”. The tie to Japan denotes an individual’s 
‘significant’ attachment to Japanese society presumably formed through familial 
and social ties with Japanese family members. Interestingly, this tie is not defined 
in any more detail than by statements about how it is formed: through contact 
with the Japanese family or through residency in Japan, as proposed by one of the 
judges as a possible alternative to parental marriage. In the final texts, the close 
connection to Japan is never translated into “Japanese culture” or “heritage” per 
se, but rather suggested through the description of the conditions under which one 
grows up to be Japanese. The statements issued together with the judgment 
contain discussions of how to measure this “tie” to the national community and 
how such a measurement could be legally codified. Here, the judges’ opinions 
diverge, notably concerning the importance of parental marriage for a child born 
to a non-Japanese woman. The contested Article 3 paragraph 1 of Japan’s 
Nationality Law requiring parental marriage was considered a means to guarantee 
the development of a connection with Japanese society. The text of the final 
judgment states  
“The primary reason that this provision was included in the Act can be 
construed as that in the case of a child acknowledged by a Japanese father 
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after birth, when the child has acquired the status of a child born in 
wedlock as a result of marriage of the parents, the child’s life is united 
with the life of the Japanese father and the child obtains a close tie with 
Japanese society though his/her family life, and therefore it is appropriate 
to grant Japanese nationality to such a child.” (The Supreme Court of 
Japan, 2008a) 
The understanding of the clause of legitimacy as a means to guarantee a child’s 
connection with Japanese society assumes firstly, that marriage assures the child 
will be in touch with his/her Japanese father and secondly, that the Japanese father 
will take an active part in raising the child.  Indeed, one of the judges in favour of 
the maintenance of the requirement of legitimation defended his position by 
stating that “when legitimation has occurred, the legal relationship between the 
father and the child becomes firm because the father obtains the parental authority 
over the child and is also given the rights and obligations to take custody of and 
take care of the child” (statement made together by Justices Yokoo, Tsuno and 
Furuta in The Supreme Court of Japan, 2008a, p. 37). The Japanese parent is thus 
mentioned as a key person to enable his offspring’s primary socialization into 
Japanese society. Based on this assumption, children of Japanese men born to 
married parents by consequence earn their right to be part of the Japanese nation. 
 In NGO discourses the father’s role is central too, but his role is not one of 
facilitating his child’s socialization into Japanese society as most fathers NGOs 
deal with have abdicated that role towards their children. For the CNJFC, 
Japanese fathers are primarily needed for the legal procedures of paternal 
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recognition, the filing for Japanese nationality where applicable, and negotiations 
pertaining to child support. However, the figure of the Japanese father is also 
depicted as an important person in children’s lives, although often displaying 
negative traits (womanizer, bigamist, fails to financially support child, violent, 
rejects child) and thus failing to play the role a father would be expected to play. 
In texts published by the CNJFC is it mostly the father’s wrongdoings 
(unwillingness to acknowledge the child, non-reporting of marriage and childbirth 
to Japanese authorities, missing of registration deadline of births abroad), in 
combination with the exclusions codified in Japan’s Nationality Law, which lead 
to some Japanese-Filipinos gaining Japanese citizenship, and others not. The law 
endows Japanese fathers with much decision power, having created possibilities 
for leaving their offspring unacknowledged, especially if the latter were born 
overseas. Removing the legitimation requirement was thus a means to lessen the 
fathers’ and the state’s power to exclude “unwanted” offspring.  
The judges opposing the cancellation of the legitimation requirement 
however argue that this change would lead to foreigners without ties to Japan 
making claims for Japanese nationality. Two of the judges opposing the 
amendment of the nationality law state that the amendment would 
“...lead to the consequence that even a person who has been living in a 
foreign state as a foreign national over many years without having any 
relations with Japanese society can acquire Japanese nationality just by 
making a notification if the person is a minor and has obtained 
acknowledgment, or in other words, acquisition of Japanese nationality 
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would be allowed even in cases where no close tie can be found between 
children and Japanese society.” (Justices Kanaika and Horigome in The 
Supreme Court of Japan, 2008a, p. 39)  
However, the assumption that parental marriage would be a valid measure 
for a child’s tie to Japan proves problematic for a number of reasons. First, 
numerous children of Filipino women and Japanese men were born out of 
wedlock and yet were raised in Japan as Japanese, arguably establishing a tie with 
Japanese society. Simultaneously, many other Japanese-Filipinos were born 
within wedlock but did not develop significant connections to Japan as they had 
grown up in the Philippines, largely in the absence of their fathers. The parents’ 
marriage is indeed not only an unreliable indication of a child’s ties to Japan but 
rather an additional hurdle for offspring of Japanese men to acquire Japanese 
nationality (The Supreme Court of Japan 2008a). Thus, the judgment by the 
Supreme Court recognized the requirement as going “far beyond the bounds 
where reasonable relevance with such legislative purpose can be found... and as a 
result [the] said provision should be deemed to cause unreasonable 
discrimination.” (p.10).  
Underlying the discussion about the requirement of parental marriage is 
the question of whether it was still “reasonable” with regards to the intention of 
the law of ensuring a child’s connection to Japan, or whether it may be outdated. 
Therefore, the idea of what constitutes a family and how family life was practiced 
becomes central to the argument against the provision. The idea is that alternative 
forms of family could also provide a child with a ‘tie’ to Japan. Indeed “the 
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family” is a discursive construct without ‘true’ form and is subject to change. The 
plaintiffs chosen to participate in the class-action suit supported by the CNJFC 
had all grown up with their Filipino mothers in Japan. They went to Japanese 
schools and spoke Japanese, despite their out-of wedlock births.  
Masami, one of the Japanese-Filipino plaintiffs, is introduced as someone 
who has lived in Japan all her life and who speaks only Japanese (cf. The Manila 
Bulletin, 2008; Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2008; Yasumoto, 2008 b). ''I feel like I 
am Japanese just like other friends, but I'm not, am I, mom?,'' Masami is quoted 
(Yasumoto, 2008 b). Her mother Rossana explains: ''Every time we go to an 
immigration office to renew Masami's visa, we are reminded that she is not 
Japanese'' (ibid.) implying that otherwise, Masami perfectly blends into Japanese 
society and is indeed part of it. During one of the hearings of the trial at the Tokyo 
District Court in 2005, the Japanese-Filipino plaintiffs were asked to give their 
testimonies. One of them was 11-year old Julie-Ann Chittum who also identified 
herself as Jurian Arashiro, which was her Japanese name 
"My name in Japanese is Jurian Arashiro, but my passport bears Julie-
Anne Chittum as my name," she said. "I made my name [in kanji] myself." 
She explained the three kanji that she picked to phonetically match her 
Japanese-pronounced first name, Ju-ri-an. (The Daily Yomiuri, 2005)  
In an interview with a reporter after the hearing, Jurian’s mother stated: 
“She only speaks Japanese and only knows life in Japan.” (ibid.)  The children 
giving their testimonies spoke fluently Japanese; some of them have been 
described by their mothers as speaking no other language but Japanese. The 
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Japanese-Filipino plaintiffs’ ability to perform Japaneseness played an important 
role in convincing the judges of the unfairness of the legitimation requirement, 
and more importantly, of the flawed connection between parental marriage and 
Japaneseness, upon which the requirement is based.  
Here, the interpretation of social trends and of what could be considered 
“normal” had a major bearing on the outcome of the lawsuit. In the view of the 
majority of the judges involved,  
“the changes in social and economic circumstances in Japan, including the 
desirable way of living together for husband and wife, as well as those 
regarding parent-child relationships have also varied, and today, the 
realities of family life and parent-child relationships have changed and 
become diverse, as seen by the fact that the percentage of children born 
out of wedlock in the total number of newborn children has been 
increasing.” (The Supreme Court of Japan 2008a, 8).  
The changes in family life were therefore acknowledged by the judges as 
socially accepted alternatives to marriage. This acknowledgment resonates with 
discourses on the family ‘in transition’, ‘in crisis’, or simply on the changing 
family in Japan, manifesting since the 1990s (Rebick and Takenaka 2006). The 
lawsuit could thus also be considered as one institutional change, following the 
various significant changes undergone by the Japanese family in the context of 
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economic slowdown and demographic shifts109 (ibid.). The nuclear family is thus 
no longer the only form of legitimate cohabitation and site of childbirth.  
To some extent, this contradicts the primacy of the nuclear family in NGO 
discourses. However, as illustrated above, the nuclear family had been a hard to 
achieve model, used to emphasize the victimization of Filipino women and their 
children by comparing their situation to the ‘ideal’. Moreover, NGOs have made 
efforts to depict scenarios in which affective and sexual relationships that deviate 
from the ideal are nonetheless deemed justifiable. In such scenarios women 
usually turn out to be the victims of broken promises of love and marriage, or of 
abandonment. NGOs’ women clients were discursively taken out of the 
stigmatized night business and placed into ‘proper’ relationships. In doing so, 
NGOs have created ‘legitimate’ circumstances of childbirth, in spite of non-
marriage while holding malingering Japanese men accountable for the inability of 
NGO clients to live a “normal” family life. Having established that Japanese-
Filipinos were not the outcome of brief affairs, and that the missing parental 
marriage was not the child’s fault, the CNJFC could claim that the exclusion of 
these children from acquiring Japanese citizenship at birth was discriminatory. 
Prevalent discourses on the transformation of the Japanese family, including the 
increased frequency of children born from cross-border, international couples, 
aided their case. Indeed, the judges recognized changes in Japan’s social fabric as 
a result of increased diversity following immigration and rising numbers of inter-
national couples. As a result the situation of  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  Rebick	   and	   Takenaka	   (2006,	   p.3)	  mention	   falling	  marriage	   rates,	   later	  marriage,	   rising	  divorce	  rates,	  changing	  patterns	  of	  cohabitation	  of	  members	  of	  the	  family,	  and	  rapid	  ageing.	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“...children whose parents are couples of Japanese citizens and foreign 
citizens, the realities of their family lifestyles (e.g. whether or not the child 
lives with a Japanese parent) as well as the views regarding legal marriage 
and the ideal form of parent-child relationship based thereon are more 
complicated and diverse than in the case of children whose parents are 
both Japanese citizens, and in the former case, it is impossible to measure 
the degree of closeness of the tie between children and Japan just by 
examining whether or not their parents are legally married.” (ibid.)  
The judgment also proposed an international outlook and a comparison with the 
situation in other countries, notably with Western Europe, to buttress the change 
in norms concerning family life. As new forms of ‘doing’ family were accepted, 
the requirement of legitimacy to obtain Japanese nationality was considered 
discriminatory and therefore in conflict with Japan’s Constitution. Thus, the 
requirement had to be removed from the Nationality Act. Recognizing the 
timeliness of the lawsuit, a staff member of CNJFC comments:  
“We also did not know if we could win. Because against the Japanese 
government, it is so difficult to change the Japanese law. But I feel, even 
though there is a small percentage of illegitimate children in Japan, I feel 
the Japanese people are changing. Changing, little by little. So some of 
them can accept illegitimate children, so they also know there is 
discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children. Because, for 
instance, they cannot get Japanese nationality if their parents did not get 
married. That is why I think even the judges gave this decision. If the case 
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was… It was 2008, but if it was 1980s or 1990s or 2000, I think we could 
not win the case. So it was a good time to bring the case to the court, 
because it shows that people are also changing.“ (CNJFC staff, interview 
with author) 
 
Although the CNJFC was not certain of the extent to which their argument about 
greater variety in family lifestyles would be recognized, the group knew of prior 
lawsuits upon which they could build their argumentative strategy. Precedent 
legal cases had functioned as points of references in the preparations for this 
recent lawsuit concluded in June 2008. These previous legal cases have 
furthermore attracted public attention in Japan to the issue of Japanese nationality 
for children born to non-Japanese mothers.  
The legal change and the intensification of discourses on identity and descent  
Following the legal victory in 2008, NGOs as well as activist Japanese-
Filipinos have issued statements commenting on the outcomes of the court case. It 
is noticeable that in these reactions, the “tie to Japan” mentioned in the verdict has 
been understood as cultural ties and cultural competence. NGOs have thus 
highlighted the need for “JFC” to access and explore Japan so they could recover 
their “cultural heritage” and exercise their right “to [a] preservation of identity” 
(Batis YOGHI 2012). Indeed, even after the amendment in the nationality law in 
2008, the numbers of applicants for nationality remained relatively low as 
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numerous children did not qualify110 or could not afford to remain in Japan for six 
months to fulfil the residency requirement. Since the ruling in June 2008, only 
about 130 children have submitted applications for citizenship ahead of the 
passage of the bill (Reuters News 2008). As of March 2009, merely a dozen 
children had been granted visas by the Japanese Embassy in the Philippines to 
enter Japan and initiate the procedures to obtain Japanese nationality (Suzuki 
2010). With numerous Japanese-Filipinos still being excluded from the benefits of 
Japanese nationality, notably Philippine-based NGOs have utilized arguments 
based on Japanese lineage to emphasize Japan’s responsibility as ‘other 
homeland’ to provide its left-out children with their ‘proper’ identities (United 
Japanese Filipino Children, 2009; Batis YOGHI, 2012).  
The idea of identity emerged in NGO discourses in 2005, as the CNJFC 
filed its first class-action lawsuit against the Japanese government. “Identity” has 
become a recurring theme throughout the duration of the suit as well as after the 
change in Japan’s Nationality law. CNJFC’s secretary general has been quoted 
saying that “the revision will mean a lot to the children, because (nationality) is 
part of their identity and will secure them a more stable status and future” (The 
Japan Times 2008) and that without Japanese nationality, the children in question 
would face an “identity crisis” come adulthood (Yasumoto, 2008 b; The Manila 
Bulletin, 2008; The Manila Times, 2008 a).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  Some	  “JFC”	  have	  already	  passed	  the	  cut-­‐off	  age	  of	  20	  by	  which	  children	  born	  to	  unmarried	  parents	  could	  claim	  their	  Japanese	  nationality	  since	  the	  amendment	  of	  the	  nationality	  law	  in	  2008.	  Others	  cannot	  locate	  their	  Japanese	  fathers.	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Although the idea of mending potential identity issues by securing 
nationality for children who grew up in Japan arose from the specific situation of 
the plaintiffs involved in the proceedings, NGOs in the Philippines supporting 
children who have never been to Japan followed suit and picked up on a similar 
discourse. “Identity” issues were now also at stake for “JFC” in the Philippines 
with regards to their right to acquire Japanese nationality. Philippine-based NGOs 
regarded these ‘identity’ issues as consequences of Japanese-Filipinos growing up 
without knowledge of the Japanese father and without having experienced Japan. 
Thus, while identity issues of “JFC” in Japan as identified by the CNJFC mainly 
concerned the securing of children’s legal status and the harmonization of their 
ethnic identity with nationality and by consequence citizenship, ‘identity issues’ 
ascribed to and/or experienced by “JFC” in the Philippines stemmed from having 
‘Japanese blood’ but remaining excluded from the Japanese nation. Issues 
pertaining to the ‘identity’ of “JFC” raised and based in the Philippines are said to 
largely stem from having a Japanese parent but lacking first-hand experience in 
Japan. "We have two faces”, Ken is quoted, “If we only know the Filipino face, 
you don't feel you're complete. There is small enlightenment in knowing who you 
are" (The Mainichi Newspaper 2009).   
In December 2010111, the CNJFC and its team of lawyers thus supported a 
group of 27 Japanese-Filipino plaintiffs in another lawsuit against the Japanese 
government. This lawsuit was meant to enable offspring of Japanese-men to 
obtain Japanese citizenship if their parents were married when they were born, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  The	   lawsuit	  was	   filed	  on	  21st	   July,	   2010.	  December	  22nd,	   2010	  was	   the	  date	  of	   the	   first	  hearing.	  
208	  	  
had failed to register their births with the Japanese authorities on time. The 
lawsuit addressed Article 12 of the nationality law which states that a “Japanese 
national who was born in a foreign country and has acquired a foreign nationality 
by birth shall lose Japanese nationality retroactively as from the time of birth, 
unless the Japanese national clearly indicates his or her volition to reserve 
Japanese nationality according to the provisions of the Family Registration Law” 
(The Ministry of Justice n.d.). This clear indication of volition to reserve Japanese 
nationality has to be done by registering the newborn child with the Japanese 
embassy within three months after their birth. Otherwise the child foregoes his/her 
right to acquire Japanese nationality. The clause was added in 1985 as part of the 
amendment of the Nationality Act. It was introduced to “prevent individuals from 
holding dual nationality without a legitimate reason to claim Japanese nationality” 
(Judge Makoto Jozuka in Asahi Shimbun, 2012).  
During the first hearing at the Tokyo District Court in December 2010, the 
plaintiffs took the witness stand one after the other to read out their statements. 
An interpreter translated their statements into Japanese as all of them, except one 
delivered by the Japanese father of a young girl, were either in English or 
Tagalog. As opposed to the plaintiffs winning the lawsuit in 2008, most plaintiffs 
who took the stand in 2011 had not grown up in Japan and the large majority did 
not express themselves in Japanese. While I sat in the court room listening to the 
testimonies, my seat-neighbour, a Post-Doctoral fellow at Tokyo University who 
had been following the CNJFC’s activities and their advocacy for ‘mixed’ 
children, turned to me and whispered: “I don’t think they will win this time. They 
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do not convince as Japanese.” Although merely an interpretation of the 
development of the case, he recognized that the lack of performance of 
Japaneseness may be a crucial factor influencing the final decision. Indeed, the 
claim was dismissed and Judge Jozuka who presided over the case, declared that 
“granting Japanese nationality to people whose links with Japan are thin would 
lead to a standstill in the execution of rights and in the performance of their duties 
as Japanese nationals.” (Judge Makoto Jozuka cited in Batis YOGHI, 2012). 
Since then, steps have been taken to bring this case before the High Court.  
 This recent court-case is not only of interest as the judges dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ claims based on a lack of “links with Japan”, but because of the content 
of the plaintiffs’ statements that indicated their understanding of what makes a 
person ‘Japanese’. Three of the claimants- Natsumi, Mike and Yukari112- wrote 
the following (Statements delivered at the Tokyo District Court 2010):113 
“It’s like I’m standing in between two countries and do not really know 
which is my nationality- that which defines my true identity. I know that 
society dictates that I am Filipino since I was born and brought up in the 
Philippines. However, personally, I do feel there’s something missing- that 
feeling of going back to my roots, to that Japanese blood that’s running 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  All	  names	  have	  been	  changed	   into	  pseudonyms.	  All	   statements	  have	  been	  read	   in	  court	  and	  received	  in	  written	  form	  by	  the	  author.	  	  113 	  According	   to	   Natsumi	   their	   statements	   have	   been	   composed	   based	   on	   their	   own	  experiences,	   yet	   they	  were	   guided	  by	   their	   attorneys	  who	  provided	   information	   regarding	  the	  nationality	  law.	  The	  testimonies	  were	  also	  edited	  by	  their	  attorneys	  to	  make	  them	  more	  poignant	   as	   each	   claimant	   was	   given	   only	   one	   minute	   to	   read	   his/her	   statement	  (correspondence	  via	  Facebook,	  March	  29th,	  2013)	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through my veins [....] please give us a chance to prove ourselves that we 
belong in your country- our country, which is Japan.”  (Natsumi) 
“...I’m a Filipino citizen because my Japanese nationality is gone without 
my consent....When i [sic] was young I lose [sic] a lot of my opportunity 
to learn their tradition, Culture, Language. “ (Mike) 
“I also have that Japanese blood running through my veins. Being a 
daughter of a Japanese national it is my right to acquire his nationality...” 
(Yukari) 
In their testimonies, the Japanese-Filipino claimants emphasized their Japanese 
descent as the primary reason for them to become Japanese citizens. Their 
understanding of what makes them 'Japanese' is primarily based on the 'Japanese 
blood' running through their veins (Natsumi, Yukari), which turns Japan into part 
of their roots (Natsumi), to a country  to which they too belong by birthright 
(Natsumi). The quotes illustrate how the apparent disjuncture of ethnic identity 
and citizenship is challenged by mobilizing 'blood' and the idea of birthright. The 
outcome of the lawsuit however has demonstrated that being part of the Japanese 
nation-state requires more than blood-ties.  
Nationality and the “tie” to Japan 
 The ‘tie’ to Japan binding offspring born to foreign women and Japanese 
fathers to Japan is given significant weight in the assessment of whether these 
children deserve to be Japanese nationals and by consequence, citizens. Also, in 
the name of warranting this “tie” and verifying the biological relationship 
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between parent and child, a number of regulations complicating the (re-
)acquisition of Japanese nationality have been presented by lawmakers. For 
instance, a six months residency requirement in Japan was introduced. 
Furthermore, applicants need to produce an original copy of their father’s family 
registry containing the record of their births, and they could be asked to produce 
supplementary documents to verify the father-child relationship, such as the 
mother’s or father’s travel histories (Suzuki 2010). These requirements have made 
it difficult for many Japanese-Filipinos to submit an application, especially if they 
had lost contact with their father.  
The “tie” to Japanese society can be interpreted as social, cultural or 
emotive connection. In the final verdict of 2008 and in the additional opinions 
delivered by the judges, this “tie” is not clearly defined except for it being 
understood as forming through significant contact with Japanese family members. 
Activists have interpreted the “tie” to Japan as cultural and as emotive. Japan is 
often referred to as Japanese-Filipino’s “other homeland” or as their “father’s 
land”, suggesting belonging and nostalgia while theatre plays like the CraneDog 
and the learning of things Japanese is utilized to demonstrate Philippine-based 
Japanese-Filipinos’ connection with Japan. 
 Lawmakers’ discussions following the verdict of 2008 have focused more 
on the authenticity of blood-relations and have revealed fears over false 
recognition. Right-winged lawmaker Takeo Hiranuma is quoted to have said:  "If 
a law like this is misused, what will happen to the Japanese identity?" (Reuters 
News 2008). Momochi Akira, Law Professor at Nihon University reacted to the 
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verdict by commenting: "There are many Asian people who want to sneak into 
Japan. I can easily imagine they want to defraud the Japanese authorities (by 
using the revision)" (The Japan Times 2008). Statements like these are revealing 
of fears over the dilution of the ‘genuine Japanese’ notably by applicants without 
Japanese lineage who bypass, through fraud, Japan’s sovereignty in according 
nationality.  
To guarantee the existence of father-child filiation, a number of 
lawmakers therefore suggested DNA tests to be made mandatory. These scientific 
tests however are not only costly but also problematic for a number of other 
reasons. First, DNA tests had so far been used only to force recognitions when the 
father was unwilling to acknowledge paternity. Thus, if DNA testing would be 
made mandatory to establish the blood relationship between children born to 
unwed foreign mothers and their Japanese fathers, the same should be done for 
children born within wedlock. Marriage, under the Civil Code, only presumes 
filiation but it does not prove it (Suzuki 2010). Second, adoption has traditionally 
been used by Japanese families to gain a male heir if needed; as such social 
filiation is not always linked to biological ties (ibid.).  The relaxation of the rules 
governing the accordance of nationality to children with one foreign parent have 
thus sparked political panic over lineage and national identity, or as one journalist 
put it “[…] the issue of granting Japanese nationality is deeply embedded in 
protecting Japanese bloodlines and is the root issue of accepting children with 
foreign parents.” (Inter Press Service 2005) 
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The biopolitical importance of the nationality law has also transpired in 
some of the judges’ individual opinions presented in addition to the Supreme 
Court verdict. Heralding lawmakers’ stances, some judges have expressed 
concern over falsified paternity claims as well as proposed alternative measures to 
be introduced by Japanese lawmakers in order to guarantee a child’s “tie to 
Japan” (i.e. through residency requirements). Also of interest is that the 
amendment of the Nationality Law is feared to hinder the purpose of controlled 
exclusion performed through immigration control. In their statement, judges 
Kainaka and Horigome (The Supreme Court of Japan 2008a) asserted:  
“[t]he procedure for granting nationality has a significant impact in 
various aspects with regard to immigration control and management of 
foreign nationals residing in Japan, and it should be noted that it is an 
issue that needs to be examined from a policy perspective by taking these 
matters into consideration.” (p.40) 
The judges’ comment implies that the extension of full-fledged citizenship 
to offspring of single foreign women reduces the State’s power in defining the 
boundaries of its population. Considering Japan’s current move towards attracting 
the highly skilled through a point system and rewarding Nikkeijin for giving up 
their long-term visas and returning to their countries of citizenship, the judges’ 
comment can be interpreted as fearing the influx of nouveau-Japanese that do not 
match the presently sought-after sets of skills.  
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Lawmakers perceive the change in the nationality law as endangering 
Japan’s sovereignty in managing its population, notably its immigrant population. 
By becoming Japanese nationals, the state would not be able to exclude these 
nouveau-Japanese from its polity, no matter whether they are considered 
‘desirable’ or ‘undesirable’ additions to Japan’s population. With the amendment, 
more offspring of Japanese men would gain rights in Japan notwithstanding their 
de facto foreignness through an upbringing in a foreign country and environment. 
Judges Kainaka and Horigome also stated that “the arrangement as suggested by 
the majority opinion is in effect the same as recognizing the child’s close tie with 
Japan just by reason of the child’s intention to seek Japanese nationality” (ibid.), 
anticipating the amendment to trigger nationality claims by the numerous 
offspring of Japanese men born and raised in foreign countries presumably 
without cultural, social and emotive relations to Japan.  
Citizenship and the population 
Citizenship is a means for the state to manage its population by 
establishing criteria of inclusion and exclusion. The control of who crosses 
Japan’s borders, who ought to obtain social or political rights in Japan, and on 
what terms, form part of the Japanese state’s responses to social issues, including 
perceived ‘threats’ to its population. Through its descent-based citizenship, 
Japanese nationality is linked to ethno-cultural identity (as discussions about the 
necessity of a “tie” to Japan have also demonstrated) and since “citizenship 
policies are […] based on deeply rooted understandings of nationhood, they 
reflect shared understandings of what the “nation” should look like, who is 
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worthy of membership, and who should be granted rights and privileges 
administered by the state.” (Chung 2010, 18) 
Sexuality in general and women’s bodies in particular (Luibhéid 2004), 
have been central concerns to the nation-state. Women biologically reproduce the 
population. In doing so they are responsible for recreating boundaries of ethnic, 
racial, or national collectives. Moreover, women are usually being tasked with 
rearing the next generation and are therefore in charge of transmitting cultures, 
language, and values (p. 341).  Thus, the control of women’s sexualities is of 
central importance in maintaining (or changing) racial, ethnic, or national 
boundaries (p.342). In mid-nineteenth century Japan, intermarriage and sexual 
relationships with (‘white’) Western women was considered a way to improve the 
Japanese ‘race’, and for a while the Japanese State indeed encouraged upper-class 
men to marry Western women for the purpose of producing “eugenically 
“superior” Japanese children”  (Suzuki 2007, p.437). Intermarriage was part of the 
strategies to elevate the national status of Japan from that of a “barbaric” country 
to a “civilized” one (ibid.).   
However in contemporary Japan where ethnic endogamy is favoured, 
foreign women (especially “Third World” women) may pose a ‘threat’ to the 
nation-state by blurring national, ethnic or racial boundaries when birthing the 
child of a Japanese national.  
In supposedly ethnically homogeneous contemporary Japan, marital 
citizenship today favors ethnic endogamy, and sexual relationships with 
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women from the Third World are viewed as undermining Japan’s hard-
earned First World status in the postwar global order. […] Their marriages 
are then seen as engendering national-class downward mobility to rejoin 
“backward” Asia, aggravating continuing Japanese continuing identity 
insecurity of being “not-white, not-quite”. (Suzuki 2007, p. 438 ) 
Filipino women are thus a potential ‘threat’ not merely because they are foreign, 
but because their ‘kind’ of foreignness is considered to disrupt Japan’s “First 
World” status114. Filipino women have also been associated with sex-work and 
prostitution thus violating the heteropatriarchal imperative required to control 
women’s childbearing (Luibhéid 2004, p.342). All these have made Filipino 
migrant working as ‘entertainers’ in bars and pubs, potential ‘threats’ to the 
Japanese nation.  
In claims on behalf of Japanese-Filipino children, NGOs have sought to 
reframe Filipina migrants and returnees in ways as to make them less 
‘threatening’. As discussed in Chapter 4, Filipino women have been depicted as 
women who sought a stable, ‘legitimate’ relationship, as caring mothers, and as 
women who had children out of ‘love’ thus distancing these former ‘entertainers’ 
from the stigmatized night business. As shown throughout this chapter, the 
‘legitimacy’ of relationships is crucial. Even in redefinitions of the family as not 
necessarily nuclear, the relationship between the parents is understood to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  Suzuki	   (2007)	   argues	   that	   Japanese	   men	   having	   married	   Filipino	   women	   have	   been	  “caricatured	  negatively,	  if	  not	  symbolically	  expelled	  from	  the	  national	  borders.	  Cross-­‐ethnic,	  cross-­‐national	  marriages	  especially	  with	  women	  from	  the	  South	  have	  served	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  differences	  between	  men	  and	  between	  Japanese	  nationals,	  and	  Japanese	  men	  married	  to	  Filipinas	  have	  been	  portrayed	  as	  either	  hyper-­‐	  or	  de-­‐masculinized	  men,	  being	  removed	  from	  the	  center	  of	  Japanese	  manhood	  and	  nationhood”	  (p.448)	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‘legitimate’, meaning as genuine, sincere, heterosexual, and monogamous. By 
investing in the discursive construction of former ‘entertainers’ as victims, as well 
as abandoned wives and lovers, NGOs make the women’s relationships with 
Japanese men and the children born from these socially more acceptable. 
Highlighting that their women clients wanted to get married and often were 
promised marriage (which in many cases however never materialized) reinserts 
them into the heteropatriarchal system and makes them victims, or losers, but not 
violators of the latter. Utilizing discourses on gender and sexuality, NGOs make 
their Filipino women clients fit for claims and less ‘threatening’ to Japan’s 
biopolitical project.  
Having eliminated the legitimation requirement, the acquisition of 
Japanese nationality remains conditioned upon biological descent and ethnicity. 
The process leading to the amendment of Japan’s Nationality Law in 2008 as well 
as to the rejection of the latest class-action suit supported by the CNJFC, has 
indeed shown how various discourses on Japanese ‘blood’ and Japaneseness have 
played out. The importance of ‘Japanese blood’ remains codified in the jus 
sanguinis principle, but having a Japanese parent is not sufficient. As the 
discussions about the ‘tie’ to Japan have revealed, offspring of Japanese also need 
to display an ethnic habitus (cf. Bourdieu 1984; 1986; 1989) to qualify as 
Japanese nationals. The habitus is “that which we have hitherto known without 
knowing about […] the embodied and unreflexive everyday practical mastery of 
culture: unsystematic, the empire of habit, neither conscious nor unconscious. 
Nothing could be more basic and nothing more inextricably implicated in 
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ethnicity.” (Jenkins 2008, p.79) An individual’s ‘tie’ to Japan is performed 
through ethnic habitus, the unreflexive display of mannerisms deemed typically 
Japanese, of language proficiency and means of expression. Being Japanese in 
supposedly homogenous Japan is both premised upon biological descent and 
cultural performance, ensuring that the racial and ethnic boundaries of the nation 
are maintained.  
The concepts of culture and blood-lineage have been used by Japanese 
lawmakers and NGOs to simultaneously buttress and challenge Japan’s 
biopolitics with regards to immigration control and the extension of nationality. 
Philippine-based NGOs, aware of the absence of substantial social and cultural 
ties binding their clients to Japan, have relied on arguments of blood-lineage to 
challenge the definition of the boundaries of the Japanese nation. Essentialist 
discourses linking Japanese ‘blood’ to identity issues, an affective longing for the 
other homeland, and to a desire of exploring one’s “cultural heritage” have 
intensified after the legal amendment in 2008. Conversely, Japanese lawmakers 
have made use of arguments relating to the same two concepts to justify 
exclusionist practices, as demands for DNA tests and fears of heightened 
immigration have shown. One staff member of the CNJFC explains politicians’ 
fears of false paternal recognition:  
“This problem is not particular to JFCs. So they are in a way trying to 
protect Japan from these elements, the fake people. So the politicians in a 
way are trying to protect not to abuse the system. Being recognized means 
Japanese nationality so there will be a lot of cases like this.” 
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Her colleague added:  
“Many Japanese politicians they don’t like too many foreigners to come to 
Japan. So they want to control who can enter Japan. So they want good 
citizens.”  
Both express their awareness of the State’s interests to remain in control of 
Japan’s population, and over cross-border mobility towards Japan. Within the 
context of globalization, the regulation of migration is part of biopolitics and as 
Mackie (2010, p.72) notes, “biopower is also a matter which crosses national 
boundaries. ...While workers attempt to maximize their income through crossing 
national borders, nation states attempt to regulate these flows though border 
control.” The two lawsuits supported by the CNJFC aimed at eliminating 
exclusions preventing numerous Japanese-Filipinos from becoming Japanese 
citizens, thus enabling their legal stay in Japan. With the amendment of Japan’s 
nationality law and the rejection of the second class-action lawsuit, demands for 
Japanese nationality for all Japanese-Filipinos have become increasingly tied to 
issues of identity, destiny, Japan as another homeland, cultural heritage, and racial 
belonging, drawing upon symbolically salient discourses on Japaneseness to push 
for Japanese-Filipinos’ right to access their father’s land. Japanese ‘blood’ and its 
conflation with cultural and national identity has become a central argument in 
demanding Japanese nationality by and on behalf of Japanese-Filipinos.  
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I have considered the recent conclusion of the CNJFC-
supported lawsuit against the Japanese government with regards to content of the 
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final judgement and the opinions of the judges presiding over the case. Given the 
conservative grip the Japanese government has maintained over social change, the 
legal victory of 2008 indeed was a landmark decision. Yet the reactions by 
Japanese lawmakers have also shown that definitions of who ought to be Japanese 
remain ethno-cultural and that claims merely based on Japanese ‘blood’ had little 
bearing on the notions of who ought to be Japanese. As a comparison between the 
two lawsuits fought by the CNJFC indicates, Japaneseness has to be performative 
as well. In rights-claims for Japanese nationality, the mobilization of consanguinal 
capital thus needs to go with the exhibition of an ethnic habitus; the biological 
relationship with a Japanese national alone does not suffice.  
With Japanese citizenship remaining tied to a particular conception of 
‘Japanese culture’ and Japanesness, have NGOs won their symbolic struggles? 
Have they challenged Japan’s biopolitics and broadened the definitions of who 
ought to be Japanese? Certainly, the riddance of one exclusive clause has brought 
about greater inclusion and enabled numerous offspring of Japanese to become 
Japanese nationals and citizens. However, the decision to remove the legitimation 
requirement was justified by parental marriage having no bearing on a person’s 
‘tie’ to Japan. This means that who ought to be Japanese continues to be defined 
in ethno-cultural terms.  
Moreover, the change in Japan’s nationality law has contributed to an 
intensification of discourses on ‘blood’ and descent with regards to “JFCs’” 
identities and their right to Japan, Japanese nationality, and citizenship.  The 
change in the law has been welcomed as a step into the right direction by NGOs 
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and Japanese-Filipino activists, but with the legal framework still barring a great 
number of Japanese-Filipinos to become Japanese citizens, the legal change has 
also provided impetus for the discussion of consanguinity within the identity 
construction of the “JFC”. 
 Reactions to the amendment of Japan’s nationality law have shown that 
politicians are aware of the desire of many foreigners of Japanese descent to gain 
the right to live and work in Japan. Indeed, the claims for Japanese nationality 
have not been made by the relatively privileged Japanese offspring of North-
American or Western-European parents, but instead by the underprivileged, by 
those threatened by deportation from Japan and those based in the “Global 
South”. There has therefore been a sense of urgency underlying the claims for 
Japanese nationality securing legal status in Japan that is related to more than 
issues of identity or matters of asserting rights. Desires to discover one’s “cultural 
heritage” or one’s “other homeland” are only part of the motivations behind 
nationality claims.  
Yet, economic motives in claims for nationality (and citizenship) are in 
tension with notions of loyalty and identification with the nation implied in being 
or becoming a national of a particular country. Aware of this tension, NGOs have 
thus made efforts to remind their clients of the “proper” reasons for claiming 
Japanese nationality and have warned them from making rushed decisions based 
on desires to earn higher wages in Japan (The Japan Times 2008). 
Simultaneously, NGOs have chosen to foreground the emotive aspects and 
matters of justice involved in these claims when addressing their supporters and 
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audiences in Japan and the Philippines. Certainly, issues of identity (whether 
based on actual biological relationships with individual Japanese men or on 
imagined kinship ties to Japanese society as a whole epitomized using the ‘blood’ 
metaphor) are a consequence of the disjuncture of ethnic identification and 
citizenship. Yet, at the same time it remains understated how the positive image 
of Japan as a modern, technologically advanced, “First World” country also 
propels the appropriation of a Japanese ethnic identity in the first place, as will be 











Chapter 7: Mobilizing 
Consanguinity as a form of Capital  
 
Symbolic struggles, writes Bourdieu (1989, p.20), entail labour to 
establish a group, its size and cohesiveness,  entail “strategies of presentation of 
self” which are “designed to manipulate one’s self-image and […] the image of 
one’s position in social space”, and lastly, the struggle over words, over 
“schemata of classification […] which construct social reality”. In previous 
chapters I have shown how NGOs have ascertained Japanese-Filipinos born since 
the late 1970s as a population, as a group of significant size, and as an issue 
worthy of public attention. NGOs have also established the ‘correct’ term to refer 
to the population. I have shown that NGOs, through their activities and their 
publications, have made efforts to highlight “JFCs’” Japaneseness, their link to 
Japan, and therefore their rightful claim to Japanese nationality. In this chapter, I 
observe how Japanese-Filipinos’ social environment, meanings attached to being 
Japanese in the Philippines, and the historical context of Filipina migration to 
Japan, feed into their ‘sense of self’, and by consequence, on views pertaining to 
their entitlement to particular rights and privileges which are associated with 
being Japanese.  
As Jenkins (2008) shows, ethnic identity forms through socialization and 
becomes an integral part of people’s identities. This chapter therefore investigates 
the role of Japanese-Filipino’s mothers as well as of their involvement with NGOs 
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in influencing how having a Japanese father is made sense of by my Japanese-
Filipino respondents, and how Japanese ethnicity becomes part of Japanese-
Filipinos’ identities. Ethnic identity is no ‘objective’ fact, but is constructed and is 
a process. Ethnic identity is thus malleable and may be instrumental.  
Jenkins notes that the significance of ethnicity in a person’s identity 
depends on social and historical contexts. This chapter thus contextualizes the 
endorsement of a Japanese ethnic identity and the capitalizing on ideas of 
‘Japanese blood’ considering the income differentials between Japan and the 
Philippines as well as the largely positive image of Japan in the Philippines. As 
will be shown in greater detail, the metaphor of ‘Japanese blood’ has been largely 
understood to denote a ‘Japanese race’ which has led some of my respondents to 
identify Japaneseness in some of their supposedly innate qualities and behaviours 
which they thought set them apart from ‘regular’ Filipinos. 
  I contend that the choice made by some of my Japanese-Filipino 
respondents to identify as Japanese is closely tied to issues of social status as well 
as processes of capital accumulation, on top of being interlaced with the desire to 
connect with one’s father based on ideals of the “normal family” and the 
understanding of identity as patrilineal. Capital is, as Bourdieu (1986, p.241) 
writes, “what makes the game of society”. It is not a game of chance where 
people are endowed with equal opportunities but rather an intricate process of 
accumulation and transformation of assets that also come in forms other than 
money and material possessions. As it has been pointed out by Anthias (2012), 
individuals’ positions within social hierarchies, as well as their social identities, 
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are determined not merely by social class- the social, cultural, and economic 
capital they hold- but also by ethnicity and/or ‘race’. Consanguinal capital can 
thus be mobilized to gain social status in the Philippines via documental proof of 
belonging to the “First World” via Japanese citizenship, or to gain cross-border 
mobility and access to Japan’s labour market. 
I begin by exploring the role that Japanese-Filipino’s immediate family 
members, especially their mothers, have played in encouraging their children to 
assert a particular ethnic identity over another. I then consider the role played by 
the broader context of income inequalities making Japan an attractive place to 
seek paid employment, the significance of having a claim to “foreignness” in the 
Philippines, and the opportunity to obtain a Japanese passport or a long-term visa 
in how Japanese-Filipino youths and young adults make sense of who they are 
and where they belong. I argue that the various expected gains associated with 
Japanese nationality and citizenship contribute to the readiness of Japanese-
Filipinos in the Philippines to embrace and accentuate their Japaneseness. These 
economic considerations are however in tension with NGO discourses which have 
largely highlighted emotive and moral reasons for nationality claims, as well as 
the ‘naturalness’ of Japanese-Filipinos’ interest in things Japanese. Finally, I 
explore the unintended consequences of capitalizing on Japanese ‘blood’, such as 
the creation of a new migrant working-class in Japan or the disappointments 
arising from not being recognized as Japanese once migrating to “the other 
homeland”. Japanese-Filipinos’ experiences upon migration to Japan show that 
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ethnic categories valid in one socio-cultural setting are not necessarily valid in 
another, demonstrating the contextual character of ethnic boundaries.  
Instilling Japaneseness 
“The funny thing is when we were all growing up our mothers would 
always say you will go to Japan some day, because that’s where you 
belong. There is that whole building of expectations so that suddenly 
you’re romanticizing it. It’s also some sort of like Shangri-la, or you know, 
some sort of mythological place…that expectation I think mythologizes 
Japan in such a way that it becomes some sort of paradise for JFC.” 
(Mifune) 
 
Unlike many others, Mifune’s mother had not worked in Japan but had 
travelled there and gathered knowledge about Japan from her Japanese 
acquaintances which she recounted to her son. Mifune’s parents met in Manila 
when his mother was working in a restaurant where his father noticed her. He 
courted her and eventually they got married in the Philippines. Mifune’s parents 
lived as a couple in Manila. Mifune’s mother recounts that his father’s hobbies 
were playing golf, going out for drinks, and trying his luck at casinos. His father 
ran a business in the Philippines and frequently travelled to Japan. Mifune’s 
mother had the opportunity to travel to Japan with her husband. She showed me a 
picture of her trip in the late 1970s- a tall woman in a white sheer blouse posing in 
front of a restaurant in Ueno, Tokyo. “In this picture I was pregnant, did you see 
my stomach? It is big. I think I was five months pregnant”, she says. When 
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Mifune was three years old his parents separated. After that, Mifune and his father 
met only once, in Manila, when Mifune was in his teens. Mifune would however 
try to reconstruct his impression of his father from his mother’s stories, from 
things Japanese he found in the city (shops, restaurants) as well as by 
familiarizing himself with Japanese history, literature, and popular culture.  
Mothers of Japanese-Filipino children play a crucial role in nurturing their 
offspring’s self-perception as children of Japanese fathers by calling attention to 
their lineage and establishing favourable associations with being Japanese. A 
number of interviewees shared that their mothers had introduced them to Japanese 
food, informed them about Japanese customs and had told them positive stories 
about their stay in Japan.  
I don’t know if what my mother told me [is true] but Japanese give dolls 
to babies as gifts hoping to imbibe the characteristics of the doll in the 
child (Mifune) 
 
[I got interested in things Japanese] by just watching Japanese channels. 
From my mother, she offered me, takes me to Japanese restaurants, things 
like that. [...] But before going there [to Japan] I’ll be studying …I want to 
enrol in a Japanese [class] before moving there, cause my mom told me 
that if you don’t know how to speak their language and you go there it will 
be very hard for you to live and socialize. Because Japanese are not that 
good in English that’s why you can’t just talk in English. (Kenta) 
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One mother of two Japanese-Filipino children who had lived in Japan for 14 years 
prior to returning to the Philippines also mentioned why she wanted her children 
to know about Japan. 
I wish they (her children) could go there (to Japan)… In the future maybe. 
Just hoping… Yes they are [curious], they are. They’re always asking me 
about Japan, the culture, what kind of people… So how’s the food? 
What’s the climate? Because I told them about the experience that I have, 
that I get there… Then they are always asking, they ask about their father, 
what happened…Yes of course [it is important to know about Japan], they 
have to know more about Japan. Yeah, I don’t know…Right now I’m 
hoping one of these days or in the future maybe when they grew up, when 
they are in the right age to go there, so that they have some knowledge 
about Japan, what’s Japan, what’s in there, what kind of people are living 
there.” (Daisy, mother of two Japanese-Filipino Children) 
 
Those among my Japanese-Filipino respondents who grew up in absence of both 
their parents often gained positive images of Japan through the comfortable life 
they were able to live via their mother’s remittances. Hayate and Amal, both in 
their early twenties at the time of the interview, have grown up in the Philippines 
while their Japan-based mothers supported them financially. Before relocating 
abroad, both had imagined Japan to be the high-tech place it is usually depicted in 
popular television programs, and a place where money could be easily earned. 
The impression that money was easily made in Japan very likely stems from 
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having had their comfortable lifestyles financed by their mothers. Neither Amal 
nor Hayate needed to work whilst living in the Philippines, but benefitted from 
steady financial support. Upon arriving in Japan, however, their initial impression 
of the country was altered.  
I thought at first it’s easy to earn money. But when I realized, I 
experienced to work here oh it’s so hard. That’s the life. In the Philippines 
my mother gave me money. Now I realized that money is too hard to get. 
(Amal) 
 
Oh I expected tall buildings. Yeah...to be honest I was expecting tall 
buildings but when I came here...damn...there were not buildings in our 
place! I thought all was high-tech, tall buildings, lights, but it’s boring. 
Like at 8 or 9 pm everything is dark, quiet. (Hayate) 
 
 In most cases115, Japanese-Filipino children’s mothers are the first ones to 
let their children know about their Japanese lineage, and they are the first ones to 
create images of Japan for their children. These have also considerably 
contributed to Japanese-Filipinos’ identification as half-Japanese. Many of my 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  Some	   of	  my	   respondents	   did	   not	   learn	   of	   their	   Japanese	   father	   through	   their	  mothers.	  Felix’s	   mother	   for	   instance	   was	   not	   present	   during	   his	   childhood	   so	   he	   learned	   of	   his	  Japanese	  father	  through	  his	  relatives.	  Felix	  did	  not	  highlight	  any	  particular	  moment	  in	  his	  life	  in	  which	  his	  Japanese	  parentage	  was	  revealed	  to	  him,	  but	  stated	  that	  his	  relatives	  had	  freely	  talked	  about	  it	  so	  he	  grew	  up	  knowing	  about	  his	  Japanese	  father.	  In	  Sachiko’s	  case,	  her	  father	  was	   around	   during	   her	   childhood	   and	   visited	   her	   in	   the	   Philippines	   on	   a	   regular	   basis.	  Toshiro	  grew	  up	  with	  both	  his	  parents.	  Yuzuki	  was	  born	  in	  Japan	  and	  lived	  there	  for	  the	  first	  five	  years	  of	  her	  life	  until	  her	  father	  passed	  away	  and	  her	  mother	  sent	  her	  to	  be	  taken	  care	  of	  by	  her	  grand-­‐mother	  in	  the	  Philippines.	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respondents who had their mothers with them whilst growing up mentioned that 
their mothers would make them aware of their Japaneseness, whether by 
commenting on their looks or interpreting their behaviour.   
For me it’s quite confusing because I was born and raised in the 
Philippines and even though I’m- I haven’t been to Japan when I was 
young, I still feel a bit Japanese like um, their- um, it’s just like what my 
mom always says that I am like a Japanese even though I have- I’m not 
with all these people and um, some of my interests are more Japanese than 
Filipino so um, it’s sort confusing, it’s a, a little bit of both Japanese and 
Filipino. (Yukari) 
 
Natsumi and Fumiko who grew up in the Philippines shared that friends and 
acquaintances have also contributed to their self-perception as Japanese. For both 
young women, being identified as Japanese were positive experiences. Fumiko 
reports that she had received special treatment while Natsumi has embraced being 
identified as Japanese to the extent of considering herself a part of Japan. 
[I see myself ] as a Japanese. Because most of people I was in the 
Philippines, they always said that I look like a Japanese even though they 
didn’t hear my name, like just in my face. They, they always said, “are 




Because it [being half Japanese] gives you a little privilege. Because when 
you are half Japanese some people… some person will treat you different. 
And others will treat you special. [...]Because being a Japanese you will 
have small eyes. People will notice you because of your eyes. Many 
people I met would…the first time we meet they would ask me the basic 
question “are you a Japanese?” like that. “ah that’s why”. When I say half 
Japanese…they would say “ah that’s why it’s your eyes…” (Fumiko) 
 
By learning to associate their Japanese descent with particular behaviour and 
preferences, Japanese-Filipinos also internalize the essentialism underlying these 
conceptions of Japaneseness and Japanese ethnic identity. Japanese-Filipinos’ 
mothers and acquaintances are central in their self-perception as half-Japanese or 
Japanese. The mothers of Japanese-Filipino Children greatly contribute to the 
construction of their children’s ethnic identification through positive depictions of 
Japan but also through their presumed competence in identifying Japaneseness. 
One striking trend among Japanese-Filipino children is that the large majority has 
been given Japanese first names (but not all carry their father’s last names), 
presumably by their mothers who registered them with the Philippine authorities. 
A name is a crucial aspect of a person’s identity, suggesting familial as well as 
ethnic origin and belonging. 
Because others usually name us, the act of naming has the potential to 
implicate infants in relations through which they become inserted into and, 
ultimately will act upon, a social matrix. Individual lives thus become 
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entangled– through the name – in the life histories of others. [...] The 
power of the name itself, which varies cross-culturally, often thus plays a 
critical role in social life. [...] names carry with them the capacity, not only 
to delineate the boundaries of social status, but also to bridge them. Names 
may reveal crucial information about gender, kinship, geographical origin, 
or religion. At the same time, they may also provide the vehicle for 
crossing boundaries between those very same categories [...] The potential 
for the name to become identical with the person creates the simultaneous 
potential to fix them as individuals and as members of recognized social 
groups. It is their detachability that renders names a powerful political tool 
for establishing or erasing formal identity, and gives them commodity-like 
value. (Bodenhorn and Vom Bruck 2006, 3-4) 
Names as indicators of belonging to social groups have symbolic value. As ethnic 
markers, Japanese-Filipinos’ names symbolically establish their link to Japan. 
Indeed, Japanese-Filipinos’ Japanese names, and in some cases their physical 
appearance, have led the majority of my respondents to be identified as Japanese 
by their friends and classmates. These markers of Japanese ethnicity are 
complemented by NGOs who further contribute to the development of a Japanese 
ethnic identity by providing resources (Japanese language classes, visits by 
Japanese volunteers and guests, study tours and theatre tours to Japan, home-stays 
and school visits in Japan, presentations about Japan, origami folding, rice-ball 
making, the learning of Japanese songs, calligraphy) to substantiate the link to 
Japan and make it meaningful. Having learned that they were Japanese, Japanese-
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Filipinos raised outside of Japan have to interpret this piece of information with 
the means available to them, such as stories told by their mothers and available 
global cultural products. By providing cultural resources to Japanese-Filipinos, 
NGOs not only reinforce the production of the “JFC” as an ethnic group, but also 
to the link drawn between culture and biological lineage.  
Accessing socio-economic resource through Japanese-Filipino Children 
My interview data has shown that Filipino mothers of Japanese-Filipinos 
do not merely contribute to their children’s ethnic identification as half-Japanese, 
but have also nurtured desires to live and work in Japan from early on. Mifune 
corroborates this with his own observations: 
That’s how important Japan is to JFCs; it’s a fulfilment when you get 
there. [...] But really the valuation is passed down through the mothers. 
[...] I haven’t told you this but I hate some of what the mothers do to their 
children. The children are pushed to Japan because they become economic 
safeguards; they become OFWs [Overseas Filipino Workers] themselves 
sending yen home. It’s the Filipino colonial mentality. I’m not sure how 
many kids can differentiate from their own desires over the desires of their 
mothers. I believe that fathers do not want to relate to their kids believing 
they have been compromised by their mother’s materialistic mindset. 
(Mifune)   
Mifune’s opinion contrasts with NGO depictions of Filipino women as caring 
mothers who engage in claims for paternal recognition and financial support 
because they believe to act in the best interest of their children. In Mifune’s 
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opinion, some Filipino mothers make Japan look attractive in the hopes of 
achieving upward social mobility by leveraging on their offspring. Moreover, he 
believes that numerous Japanese-Filipinos’ interest in migrating to Japan to find 
employment had actually been manufactured by their mothers. Here, Japanese-
Filipinos are manipulated and victimized by their mothers at the expense of their 
relationship with their fathers. This perspective is also in tension with NGO 
depictions of Filipino mothers as victims and Japanese fathers as plainly uncaring. 
A staff member at Maligaya House expresses a similar view when asked why 
Maligaya House, which offers legal assistance, attracted more new clients than 
other NGOs. 
[Filipino mothers are looking for legal assistance] like the child support, 
support from the father. They still want to depend on the father. That’s 
some problem actually. But the mothers are still hoping for the support of 
the father […] They don’t work. They don’t want to work. That is why 
they are looking for support from the father. (Maligaya House staff) 
NGO staff is indeed aware of numerous Philippine-based mothers of 
Japanese-Filipino Children fostering desires to return to Japan through their 
children (see DAWN, 2008 b; The Japan Times 2008).  Dharma, a Japanese-
Filipino long-time member of Batis YOGHI, observes that Japan remains a 
popular destination “because for the mothers there is an attachment to the country 
so it’s still a romantic idea to go back to Japan.”116 However their ability to 
legally live and work in Japan is premised upon their marriage to a resident of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  This	  interestingly	  contradicts	  NGOs’	  generalizations	  of	  labor	  migration	  to	  Japan	  as	  fraught	  by	  abuses	  and	  traumatizing	  experiences.	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Japan117 or upon obtaining a visa as legal custodian of a Japanese citizen. 
Japanese-Filipinos’ legal status as citizens of Japan is therefore crucial in order 
for their mothers to be able to live and work in the country. Felix, who was able to 
obtain his Japanese nationality as a result of the 2008 amendment of Japan’s 
nationality law, has been actively involved in his mother’s struggles to secure her 
residency in Japan.  
Yeah, hahahaha, I’ll sponsor her as for her visa, it will not be a long term 
visa, but "mother of a Japanese citizen" the duration and length of stay 
might be the same but the credibility is better since she now have a 
connection with a Japanese citizen. Well the problem is I’m so in a heat to 
go back the Philippines, I wonder will it (her desires to remain in Japan) 
hinder me [to go back]?  (Felix, via online chat) 
 
Felix finds himself in a bind as he knows of his importance to his mother’s legal 
status in Japan. Felix has spent three years in Japan and managed to obtain his 
nationality. He also worked there at a laundry service and in a fast-food chain to 
earn an income, but decided that he prefers living in the Philippines. His mother’s 
desire to remain in Japan and his ability as a Japanese citizen to provide her with a 
visa make it difficult for him to do as he pleases. The ability to claim Japanese 
citizenship has thus also come with changes in family dynamics linked to 
Japanese-Filipinos’ ability to migrate, earn a higher income than in the 
Philippines, and to sponsor their legal guardian’s visa. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  To	  a	  Japanese	  citizen	  or	  a	  permanent	  resident.	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As noted above, Mifune’s earlier comment contains a reflection on 
Filipino mothers’ role in souring relationships between father and child. Mifune’s 
distrust is based on both his own experience and on accounts of other Japanese-
Filipinos he has encountered through his involvement with one NGO. Throughout 
our interviews, Mifune has repeatedly mentioned his awareness of being an 
important resource for his own mother in accessing financial support from his 
father. In his opinion, the children of Japanese-Filipina couples have too often 
become tokens in their mothers’ endeavours to live financially secure, prosperous 
lives.  Their connection with Japan and with a Japanese citizen has thus also 
implied expectations of ‘a better life’ which have become attainable with the 
change of Japan’s nationality law. Numerous women have sought Japanese 
nationality for their children and have subsequently relocated to Japan (Agnote 
2008; Kyodo News 2008 a; The Manila Times 2008a, 2008b). 
Most respondents did not provide details on why they had lost touch with 
their fathers, as often they would not know. One of my respondents mentioned 
that her communication with her Japanese father had stopped because of 
“misunderstandings” between her parents. In some cases, the breakdown of 
communication was accompanied by a cessation of financial support. Fumiko 
narrates how her father stopped providing the family after her Filipino grand-
father laid eyes on the financial support and badmouthed Fumiko’s mother: 
Then it (the support) stopped because of my grandfather because he 
wanted that the support will be given to him, not to my mother. But it’s 
like he was saying some bad words, some bad words then to my mother. 
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Then he sent a letter to my father. So my father stopped because maybe he 
was confused. Maybe he was confused because who to believe. Because 
we also sent letters, and my grand-father also sent letters. He was confused. 
That’s why we lost contact with him. (Fumiko) 
 
In some cases, Filipino women themselves are sometimes struggling with 
extended kin over their access to financial flows.  
 
...Very close relatives. It happened but many of the relatives just cheated 
on my mom with money and everything. [My mother] didn’t just lose 
confidence but they left us. And, I don’t know, yeah they did, when I was 
younger. Yeah. They left us but they stayed and then yeah they cheated 
my mom for years and years...my sister put them away. She told them to 
get out when she had the confidence to tell them. From then on my sister 
has to do all the budgeting.  (Alina) 
 
Narratives of such conflicts are corroborated by accounts found in the case reports 
published in Maligaya (cf. JFC Network, 2002) and by the story narrated by Rose, 
a client of DAWN (DAWN 2004 a, p.190). Therefore, Japanese-Filipinos are not 
the only people seeking to benefit from claims-making, but so do their mothers 
and sometimes their extended families. Gaining Japanese citizenship and/or 
financial support for Japanese-Filipino children can indeed become a family 
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concern which also reflects in familial relationships. The children’s Japanese 
parentage thus becomes a form of capital, not only for Japanese-Filipinos, but also 
for their mothers and their extended families, which may benefit from migration-
generated remittances, or by accessing the financial support from Japanese fathers.  
During my fieldwork in Japan I met Tanaka, the Japanese father of a 
Japanese-Filipino girl in her late teens. Tanaka also had to deal with demands for 
payments from his ex in-laws. His daughter, Tomoko, was born in Japan from his 
marriage to a Filipino woman. But around the time his child turned three years old, 
her mother developed psychological problems according to Tanaka. This led to 
daily quarrels and eventually his wife left and, without his knowledge, took the 
child with her and the passbook to Tanaka’s bank account. At first, Tanaka did 
not know where they had gone, but later found out that his ex-wife had relocated 
from Osaka to Tokyo. However, before moving to Tokyo, she had brought 
Tomoko to the Philippines to be raised by her family. Tanaka tried to visit his 
daughter in the Philippines, but she was hidden from him by her family.  
 Almost 11 years I was separated from my daughter who lived either in 
Tokyo together with her mother or in Manila together with her mother’s 
relatives. Then I was able to meet her five times only. But every time, of 
course, if I wanted to meet her I had to bring a lot of money. That’s the 
condition. In the very beginning even if I brought the money they would 
say “okay you gave the money only but you are not allowed to meet”. And 
then I was extremely angry. But eventually I could meet her. But 
unfortunately because both my daughter’s mother and my relatives talk 
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about me very badly, my daughter believed that I was a very bad man. So 
my daughter was really cold to me and not friendly. So I was very much 
depressed. But even though I was depressed I tried to meet her over and 
over again. Five times only. (Tanaka) 
 
According to Tanaka, his ex-wife had abducted their child and subsequently used 
her to extort money from him. Tomoko had thus become an important resource 
for both his ex-wife and her family. Eventually, Tanaka’s daughter was not longer 
a resource but a liability to her mother.  
You know...now, I live with my daughter. For the past six months. What 
happened is, after a few years we divorced. That was 11 years ago. My ex-
wife remarried another Japanese in Tokyo. Then one of the reasons why 
my daughter was sent to the Philippines was that she had remarried. So my 
daughter became a kind of burden for them. But the problem is [...] after 
the year 2008 it turned out that all the nearest relatives of my daughter, 
including her uncle and aunt and grand-father migrated to other countries. 
They moved to New Zealand. Because one of the brothers of my ex-wife 
got the New Zealand nationality, so it turned out no one could take care of 
my daughter in the Philippines. So she was sent back to Japan again when 
she became a second year junior high-school [student]. But the mother 
delivered two babies in just a few years. So they have to raise three 
children and my daughter has become very rebellious. So they had 
problems. One [problem] is financial and one is her rebelliousness. And of 
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course the step-father is not happy to live with my daughter because he 
has to shoulder the economic burden. So they decided to send my daughter 
back to me by force. (Tanaka) 
 
According to Tanaka, his ex-wife and her new husband had changed Tomoko’s 
official address record118 and transferred her to another school despite her protests. 
Tomoko was thus left without choice but to move in with Tanaka. After having 
spent many years of her life being sent back and forth between the Philippines and 
Japan, Tanaka’s daughter was eventually ‘returned’ to her father when her mother 
deemed her to be a liability. 
Although Tanaka’s story is rather exceptional insofar as he seemed more 
concerned about his daughter’s welfare than her mother, his experiences illustrate 
how Japanese-Filipino children and youth can find themselves confronted with 
their mothers’ desires for a “better life” and their central role in fulfilling this 
desire or getting in the way of it. Akira too was deserted by his mother when she 
settled in Japan. Akira was born in the Philippines in the 1980s. His parents were 
never married. Until he was two years old, he says, his father was around. But 
when his father ceased to be involved with Akira’s mother, she went to work in 
Japan and he was left in the care of his maternal grandmother. Today, he hardly 
communicates with his mother who seems reluctant to help him process the 
necessary paperwork to go to Japan. Akira suspects that her own documents may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  In	   Japan,	   the	  municipal	  office	  keeps	   track	  of	  people’s	   change	  of	   address.	  Once	   someone	  moves,	  their	  address	  needs	  to	  be	  updated	  and	  the	  records	  are	  transferred	  to	  the	  respective	  municipal	  office	  in	  charge.	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not be in order and that her Japanese husband may not know of his existence. 
These narrative contrast with NGO depictions of Filipino women as dedicated 
mothers, foregrounding the ‘best interest’ of their children. In reflecting about his 
own role in his mother’s relationship with his father, Ken contemplates: 
“Sometimes I feel that maybe I was also [my mother’s] breadbasket in a 
way. I really hated that set-up that you need to have children in order to 
ensure your future with a Japanese husband. I really... It’s an ugly side of 
the whole thing but I think it does exist. It’s also bad on our side, on the 
Filipino side to think of the Jap... of the foreigners as keys for security you 
know. We have to do it for ourselves not just marry into convenience.” 
(Ken in Yasuo. A Geography of Memory, 2012) 
The awareness of being a source of income confronts children born to 
parents of economically disparate backgrounds with their instrumental role in 
securing livelihood. Individuals like Ken, who were born from these relationships, 
suspect not only their existence but their subsequent role to be nested in their 
mother’s aspirations for ‘a better life’. The latter challenges the ideal of the 
woman martyr, the self-sacrificing mother, markedly cherished in Philippine 
society (Roces 2009) and endorsed by NGOs. Just as a ‘marriage of convenience’ 
has been depicted as the opposite of ‘romantic love’, being one’s mother’s 
“breadbasket” seems to be in conflict with the ideal of a mother’s selfless love 
and care. But, just as love and pragmatism are not necessarily opposites (Bulloch 
& Fabinyi, 2009; Parreñas 2011), the relationships between Japanese-Filipinos 
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and their mothers are often too intricate to be labelled either ‘of convenience’119 
or ‘truly heartfelt’. As Ken states: “I think in my relationship with my mother 
there is a level of dysfunction and a level of grace” (in Yasuo. A Geography of 
Memory, 2012). He was able to understand his mother’s motivations and her 
concern for him, but at the same time felt that her dependency on her Japanese 
partner made him play an uncomfortably pivotal role in assuring the quality of 
their lifestyle.  
It is also that dependence on the Japanese male, this largely felt absence, 
or the presence of absence of that Japanese male, the person...the person 
who brings the bounty home. When I was young I’ve been subjected to 
that sort of conversation almost on a daily basis. I mean, “if your father 
was here...” or “if your father loved you...” or “if your father was close to 
you...” or “if you only hugged your father when you met him he would 
love you” , something like that. All that conditional statement. So I think 
that’s also kind of the JFC...I think...I don’t know I don’t wanna make 
labels. But I think there’s a malaise, a JFC malaise. That feeling of not 
knowing what to do with one’s life or ...because of lowered expectations, 
of the fear of disappointment or the heartbreak of it all. Disappointment.  
(ibid.) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  An	   article	   published	   in	   the	   newsletter	   Sinag	   (DAWN,	   2008	   a,	   p.	   2)	   mentions	   that	  observers	   have	   argued	   Japanese-­‐Filipino	   children	  were	   “anchor	   babies”	   for	   their	  mothers,	  enabling	  them	  to	  live	  in	  or	  return	  to	  Japan.	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Ken realizes that his parents’ relationship is embedded in structural 
inequalities creating dependencies and power inequalities which his mother 
navigated through him. Her relationship with a “First World” Japanese man was 
one among the few options available to consolidate the discrepancies between the 
life she desired and the lifestyle she would be able to otherwise achieve without 
“the person who brings the bounty home”. Japanese-Filipino children learn not 
only of their Japanese lineage, but also of their essential role as financial 
safeguards or, as in Felix’s case, of their importance in supporting their guardian’s 
residence permit in Japan. Also, with Filipino mothers’ hopes “to ensure [their] 
future with a Japanese husband” (Ken) pinned on their Japanese-Filipino children, 
having a Japanese father gains another layer of meaning. Japanese descent comes 
to signify access to a “better life” or even the right to a “better life”. Yet when the 
Japanese father vanishes and with him the “better life”, the loss of these privileges 
confronts children of Japanese men with the dissonance between their actual 
social status and class, and the positionality expected based on their ethnic 
identification as Japanese. It is at this point, when the Japanese partner vanishes 
and the support stops, that Filipino mothers of Japanese-Filipino children usually 
join NGOs hoping to be able to reinstate their source of livelihood.  
Japanese-Filipinos’ Japanese parentage however can also become a 
liability as I will show in the following section. Not only can the potential benefit 
derived from mobilizing consanguinal capital also cause tensions in familial 
relationships between Japanese-Filipinos, their mothers, their fathers, and their 
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extended families, but being of Japanese descent can under some circumstances 
also become a burden.   
Legal status, social status and the symbolic Japanese passport 
Japanese-Filipino children and youths raised in the Philippines derive 
meaning from having a Japanese father through beliefs and values prevalent in 
Philippine society. Such dominant perceptions are habituated by a range of 
popular discourses supporting particular meanings ascribed to ethnicity, ‘race’ 
and lineage, and sustaining dominant ideas of the family or ideals of childhood. 
Having a Japanese parent is commonly perceived to indicate affluence, given the 
wide-spread conflation of ethnicity with social class in the Philippines (Bulloch & 
Fabinyi, 2009). Moreover, many Japanese-Filipinos had been confronted with 
expectations of cultural and linguistic proficiency in Japanese based on 
widespread essentialist associations of ‘blood’ with cultural practices. Not having 
been able to live up to such expectations has left a number of my respondents 
with sentiments of inadequacy.  
You know, of course when I was younger I’m a very conscious child. [...] 
it’s not that I was getting bullied but the other children were always 
acknowledging the fact that I have mixed blood. Okay. They sometimes, 
they even say that, they tease me because I’m Japanese. But Filipinos like 
humour so they like to find something funny and something different. So I 
think it was normal. But you know at some point they always insist on the 
foreignness. I never met anybody in my entire life for the first time who 
hasn’t asked me the question “do you speak Japanese?” It is always the 
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assumption that you must speak because you look Japanese. So there is 
that imposition already. And that made me very self-conscious at a very 
young age. (Mifune) 
 
Mifune failed to live up to his acquaintances’ expectations of Japaneseness, but 
Sachiko was even challenged by one of her classmates who asked her to prove 
that she was Japanese by passing a test he had set. 
Yes before, when I was in third year High School, I have…. This is just a 
simple thing but it affected me so much. My classmate told me if I were 
Japanese, what is my favourite Japanese band. And I told him “Arashi” 
like that. And then he told me that, who are the members of it. And then I 
only like know, I memorize one boy it’s Jun Matsumoto. And the four 
other boys which I forgot. Because that time I’m not really like, I’m 
studying and then he asked me that. And then he told me that, if you’re 
Japanese why do you only know one member. You should study, like that. 
He’s so mean in school, and also I’m hurt because it’s not really my fault 
if I don’t know any, a lot of things about it. (Sachiko) 
Sachiko’s Japaneseness was assessed according to her classmate’s standards. The 
experience affected her a lot and she still remembers it. This shows how central 
the identification as (half-) Japanese is to her. Sachiko still feels bad about not 
having been able to perform accordingly when her classmate questioned her 
Japaneseness.  
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Growing up, I experienced a lot of awkward and embarrassing situations 
whenever my classmates would ask me why I am a Filipino citizen and 
not Japanese. They asked me where my father is and why I am not in 
Japan. They asked me why we don’t observe Japanese practices at home. I 
was looked down upon and discriminated because being a Filipino, they 
thought I was an illegitimate child. Although it is true that my father left 
me and my mother, it happened for a reason different from what other 
people think. My mother tried to protect me from all the discrimination so 
she worked hard to show everyone that we all are well-provided for. She 
was so busy that I lost a lot of time to be with her and she now is sick from 
being overworked. (Yukari)120.  
 
While Mifune and Sachiko have mainly experienced being challenged with 
regards to their knowledge of Japan and insufficient performance of Japaneseness, 
Yukari has been subjected to the upsetting assumptions that she must have been 
an unwanted child born from an ‘illegitimate’ relationship or possibly from her 
mother’s engagement in sex-work. These assumptions were largely based on her 
lack of wealth, of Japanese nationality, her limited knowledge and performance of 
‘Japanese culture’, and on the general knowledge of Filipino women’s 
deployment as “entertainers” to Japan. The latter has been commonly understood 
to add up to prostitution, an idea which for many years has been fed by anti-
human trafficking NGOs. Moreover, being raised by a single mother still remains 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  Excerpt	  of	  Yukari’s	  statement	  presented	  at	  the	  Tokyo	  District	  Court	  in	  2011	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a social stigma in a society where women with children ought to be married and 
“[w]omen with a ‘past’ or with children of an earlier marriage are sometimes 
viewed essentially as ‘damaged goods’ in the strict Catholic society of the 
Philippines” (Bulloch and Fabinyi 2009, p.136).  
Yukari is not alone in having been scrutinized for not living up to common 
perceptions which associate foreign, “First World” lineage with living affluent 
lives. Atsushi, who grew up with his mother in a Philippine province was often 
questioned by his classmates about his absent father and why he was so poor, 
despite his father being Japanese. The lack of prosperity combined with single 
motherhood and foreign parentage result in speculations about the nature of the 
relationship from which Japanese-Filipinos, like Atsushi and Yukari, were born. 
Thus for numerous Japanese-Filipinos their father’s presence, physical or 
symbolic through financial support and/or a Japanese passport, becomes crucial. 
Obtaining a Japanese passport would legitimize Japanese-Filipinos as being part 
of Japan and as children of Japanese which is why obtaining the document has 
been repeatedly mentioned to be of importance by Japanese-Filipinos like Yukari.  
Yukari has participated in one of the class action suits co-organized by the 
CNJFC. She describes her own desire for obtaining Japanese nationality as 
follows: 
I wanted to have my nationality because, I want to somehow erase the 
prejudice that I, that was placed upon me when I was little (Yukari) 
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One NGO worker actively supporting the latest law-suit aimed at easing the 
acquisition of birthright citizenship for Japanese-Filipinos explains that for many 
claimants obtaining a Japanese passport was a means to establish Japaneseness.   
Basically the children are confused, something lacking from themselves? 
Because mothers always tell them “your father is a Japanese, you have 
that blood of Japanese”, So, but they never saw the father, they never go to 
Japan, they never talk the Japanese language. But people are telling “they 
are Japanese”. But in reality, they are Filipino. So maybe they are 
confused. So the children, the nationality project, they believe that if they 
got a Japanese nationality, they could [recover] that lack. [...] Maybe they 
want to have something to show, to see or, they can’t see that they are 
Japanese and they are Filipino [because] now, they are just Filipino. They 
have the documents of the Filipino. They have the, there’s a mother, the 
Filipino mother. It’s very clear they are Filipino nationals but the, the 
Japan side, of the Japan side they don’t have any records in Japan. In the 
family registry of the father, their name is not registered. (NGO worker) 
Gaining Japanese nationality can thus both be a matter of fulfilling other 
people’s expectations of cross-border mobility and social status associated with 
‘being Japanese’, as well as of obtaining tangible documentation of ones link to 
Japan. The espousal of a Japanese ethnic identity makes obtaining proof of being 
officially recognized as Japanese all the more important, especially where general 
knowledge of Filipinas’ prominence in Japan’s sex-industry would otherwise 
suggest unfavourable family backgrounds.  Moreover, being able to obtain 
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Japanese nationality is a status symbol, especially in the Philippines wherein 
cross-border mobility is seen as an achievement in itself (Kelly 2007, p.22). 
Bearing a Japanese passport affords legal status in Japan as well as social status in 
the Philippines. The geographical mobility associated with a Japanese passport 
and in particular the access to Japan’s labour market, provides its bearers with the 
documental proof of relative privilege that often is assumed once they are 
identified, or identify themselves, as Japanese.  
As seen from the discussion thus far, Japanese parentage and descent can 
be beneficial, but also burdening. As Yukari and Atsushi’s stories have shown, 
the intersection of ethnicity with a lack of wealth, of mobility, and of cultural 
knowledge can also trigger upsetting assumptions about their family life and the 
circumstances of their birth. Japanese-Filipinos may thus gain advantages linked 
to their association with Japan under some circumstances, but simultaneously also 
suffer from it under others. In both cases, ‘being Japanese’ signifies difference.   
Having ‘Japanese blood’ is at times considered an edge by Japanese-
Filipinos; a few of my respondents positively emphasized their difference from 
other ‘regular’ Filipinos, a phenomenon also frequently found in narratives by 
Japanese-Filipinos reprinted in NGO publications.  
Yukari: I think that being- that having Japanese blood is- has its um, 
advantages and having Filipino blood has its own advantages for having 
them both is like, um, having two good eggs at the same time.   
Interviewer: Mmh, what advantages are- 
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Natsumi: We’re different, different to, to others. 
Yukari: Yeah. We, we look different. 
Natsumi: Yeah. 
Yukari: And um. 
Natsumi: The Filip... 
Yukari: Yeah. And things like that. 
Interviewer: Mmh. 
Natsumi: And I think I the Japanese blood is more heavier (slightly 
laughed) in me than Filipino.  
 
I think it’s cool to be a JFC. I feel different from other kids. But I am 
happy because other people accept me for who I am. (Heidi in DAWN, 
2010, p. 56) 
 
I think highly of myself because I am a JFC. I am different from other kids 
because I am a product of two cultures. When I was younger, some people 
used to tease me because of my Japanese blood. But now, people even ask 
me to teach them how to read and write Japanese. I feel that in my school, 
I am special. (JM in DAWN, 2010, p.58) 
 
What is it to be a JFC? Before, I did not know what a JFC was. I just know 
that my father is Japanese and my mother is a Filipino. But when we 
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joined DAWN, I understood what it is to be a JFC. I am not alone. There 
are other children like me. (Kay Celine in DAWN, 2010, p.61) 
 
I am proud to be a Japanese-Filipino child (JFC). A JFC is different from 
other children because a JFC has Japanese blood. Some JFC have 
Japanese names or have Japanese features. For me JFC are different from 
other children because they have the chance to find work in Japan when 
they grow up. (Jenny in DAWN, 2010, p.66) 
 
Having ‘Japanese blood’ is considered a benefit because it enables its 
bearers to find employment in Japan, as Jenny mentions, and because it entails 
distinction. Here distinction is primarily based on the notion of ‘Japanese blood’ 
and thus defines boundaries separating “us” from “them” in ‘racial’ terms by 
exaggerating lineage. This essentialism has also led to an understanding of 
identity as something fixed, something mandated by Japanese descent and in need 
to be unearthed. 
The notion of carrying a ‘hidden’ Japanese side inside oneself by way of 
ancestry is illustrated in the following statement by Mifune: 
It’s probably something that called through it, you know. I don’t know if 
you believe that there is something like genetic psychology or what, it’s 
probably a fallacious thing, but sometimes I just feel like I might have 
some, some behaviours that people might think it’s Japanese, or I might 
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think it’s Japanese. It’s something that I can’t explain myself. Something 
that I struggle with, this unknown factor, this unknown variable. And so, 
yes, it’s something that others have called to by acknowledging the 
physical thing (his looks). But it’s none of the less present. Something that 
I tried to thresh up and discover. (Mifune) 
Mifune’s statement illustrates how ethnic identities are formed in relation to 
ethnic categories and ascription. Yet Mifune interprets this ascription as the first 
step in the discovery of his ‘inborn’ Japanese side, rendering a constructed 
category into a ‘natural’ one. He describes the process of discovering his Japanese 
side as a process requiring a supposed hidden Japaneseness to be “threshed up”. 
He attempts to make sense of his Japanese parentage by entertaining the thought 
that his ‘Japanese genes’ may cause unintentional behaviours that originate from a 
‘Japanese subconscience’. Mifune is not alone with the thought that Japaneseness 
bears symptoms which articulate as behaviour, or preferences. Yukari has 
mentioned that despite not having lived in Japan she does “still feel a bit Japanese 
[...] I am like a Japanese even though I have- I’m not with all these people” 
(Yukari). Natsumi also considers herself belonging to Japan since she finds that 
“Japanese blood is heavier in me than Filipino.”  
Despite Japaneseness being described to surface ‘naturally’ by some of 
my respondents, the experiencing of ‘Japanese culture’ is recurrently mentioned 
to help an alleged ‘dormant Japanese side’ to materialize. Indeed, many of my 
respondents have brought up their interest in things Japanese, such as movies and 
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dramas, manga, anime, cosplay121, fashion, music and food. Most of the Japanese 
cultural products consumed by Japanese-Filipino youths can be categorized as 
popular culture rather than as the officially promoted ‘Japanese culture’. 
‘Japanese culture’ is largely understood as ‘traditional’ Japanese arts and crafts 
(Goldstein-Gidoni 2005), such as ikebana (flower arrangement), calligraphy, tea 
ceremony, Japanese genres of theatre and poetry or martial arts. When NGOs 
offer workshops on ‘Japanese culture’ they usually do so with reference to 
representations of Japan as a place of tradition, familiarizing their members with 
simple calligraphy, origami folding, onigiri (rice-ball) making or the singing of 
Japanese children’s songs122.  However, both popular culture and Japanese 
‘traditional’ culture have in common that they are thought of as uniquely Japanese. 
Both have also been promoted as global products, available and consumed within 
and beyond Japan’s borders (cf. Goldstein-Gidoni, 2005; Otmazgin, 2008).  
Using Appadurai’s (1996) concept of the imaginary as social practice I 
argue that Japanese-Filipinos are able to make sense of and give substance to their 
Japanese ancestry through the consumption of ‘Japanese culture’ , a global 
cultural product and export, despite the lack of substantial social experiences in 
Japan. The availability of global cultural products makes it possible to imagine 
life in Japan and life as Japanese. The consumption and knowledge of things 
Japanese have also become means to perform Japaneseness in the Philippines 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Cosplay	   is	   short	   for	   "costume	   play"	   and	   denotes	   the	   wearing	   of	   costumes	   imitating	  popular	  manga	   or	   anime	   characters.	   Cosplay	   started	   in	   Japan	   in	   the	   1990s	   and	   has	   since	  spread	  throughout	  the	  world. Manga	  and	  anime	  are	   Japanese	  graphic	  novels	  and	  animated	  movies	  respectively.	  122 	  For	   instance	   at	   DAWN,	   Japanese-­‐Filipino	   children	   were	   taught	   the	   song	   Furusato	  (homeland),	  a	  nursery	  rhyme	  pre-­‐dating	  World	  War	  Two.	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which makes it possible for Japanese-Filipinos to construct their identities as 
Japanese. The imagination as Japanese and as part of Japan further underpins 
claims-making for recognition and Japanese nationality.  
 Ken, the central character in the documentary Yasuo. A Geography of 
memory (2012), constructs his Japaneseness through sites he finds in his 
hometown Manila: 
Part of my process as a JFC is I wander around and I look for something 
Japanese in the city, you know. I mean, my father... I mean, I don’t know 
about how to be a Japanese, what they feel like what they look like...how 
it is to be Japanese basically. So I take small trips, walks and I happened 
to discover this place [Little Tokyo]123. [...] See I really think this place is 
a refuge in a way. Also it’s kind of...it’s also a refuge and somewhat 
alienating at times because you see these Japanese products and stuff but 
you can’t afford them and you don’t know what they are. I think its’ pretty 
much like us I guess, you know, a piece of Japan in the Philippines and 
vice-versa. If we were in Japan we would also look for a little Philippines 
or a little Manila if there is such a thing and we would find solace in that 
too, if were in the country. [...] What I love about this place is you can go 
to a piece of Japan but it’s not so far away so you could not hear Tagalog. 
[...] Manga and anime role play a large ...In my opinion...play a large role 
in the socialization of JFC to Japanese culture. This one in particular, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  Little	  Tokyo	  is	  a	  complex	  of	  Japanese	  restaurants	  and	  grocery	  stores	  in	  Makati,	  Manila.	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Naruto124. A lot of JFC love Naruto. Because that is also a route. It is one 
of the ways that we deal with... one of our (JFCs) main points of 
interaction [with Japanese culture] happens through anime.  
 
Kenta and Atsushi have stated their interest in things Japanese similarly by 
relating it to their Japanese parentage. Both learned that they had Japanese fathers 
from their mothers. Kenta’s mother would tell him about Japan and about his 
father. Kenta mentions that, according to his mother, his father was a decent man 
who had fed him when he was a baby. Atsushi on the other hand has little 
information about his father. He knows his name, but not his age, he does not 
know where he lives, nor does he have any pictures of him. His mother was 
reluctant to elaborate about Atsushi’s father who she met at the bar in Japan 
where she used to work at as a singer. Kenta’s mother freely talked about Japan 
and Kenta’s father while Atsushi’s mother avoided the topic. Nevertheless both 
grew interested in Japan, relating the country to their personal identity.  
I just want to explore the other part of me. And I want to explore their 
culture, their life-style. […]My Japanese part. (Kenta) 
 
Given the chance yes [I would like to go to Japan]. Because I really want 
to study the culture of Japan, because that is the root of my life. (Atsushi) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  124	  Naruto	  is	  the	  main	  character	  and	  title	  of	  a	  popular	  Japanese	  manga	  and	  anime	  series.	  The	  story	  tells	  about	  Naruto,	  a	  young	  fighter,	  whose	  father	  had	  defeated	  a	  dangerous	  demon	  who	  had	   attacked	   their	   village.	   However,	   the	   demon	   could	   only	   be	   defeated	   by	   sealing	   it	   into	  Naruto’s	  body.	  After	  doing	  so,	  his	  father	  died.	  In	  fear	  of	  the	  demon,	  the	  village’s	  inhabitants	  avoided	  Naruto	  who	  thus	  grew	  up	  in	  loneliness.	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Sachiko has made it her duty to accumulate knowledge on Japan, an endeavour 
for which her NGO membership was very helpful. Sachiko became an NGO 
member when she was a young child, together with her mother and older sister. 
Sachiko’s mother used to work in Japan as an entertainer where she met her father. 
According to Sachiko, her mother joined the NGO out of interest. Her father had 
lived with them in the Philippines for three years after Sachiko’s birth and later 
visited on a regular basis until he passed away when Sachiko was in her early 
teens. However Sachiko’s knowledge on Japan largely comes from books, not 
from knowledge imparted by her father during his short visits.  
Yes… It started when I was eight years old. Because like in school, my 
classmates are asking questions about me, about Japan. […]They are 
really interested because before Japan is really popular here in the 
Philippines. And then if I say that I’m Japanese-Filipino my classmates 
would ask a lot of questions about Japan and… because it’s really hard to 
answer them because I did not live there [in Japan]. I’m interested, since 
eight years old I read books about Japan. And after that, Batis sponsored a 
lot of seminars about Japan. So I was really happy about that. And then 
when I was in high-school if my classmates asked questions about me, I 
can answer them. Unlike before I don’t know anything about it. [...]Even 
though I’m here in the Philippines I do still have Japanese blood. So I 




All these statements underpin a primordial understanding of ancestry which 
renders children of Japanese fathers a “piece of Japan” despite never having lived 
in the country.  The primordial conception of Japanese ‘blood’ is deemed so 
central by Atsushi that it becomes the “root” of his life. Similarly, being the son 
of a Japanese national is considered to have implanted a “Japanese part” in Kenta 
which he now wants to explore. Sachiko was able to synchronize her ‘Japanese 
blood’ with expectations of cultural proficiency through the help of Batis. ‘Blood’ 
is a metaphor that seeks to make belonging to an imagined (national or/and racial) 
community more tangible. However the understanding of ‘blood’ also becomes 
linked to culture. 
The consumption of global products of Japanese cultures (both popular 
culture and the more ‘traditional’ handicrafts) not only helps Japanese-Filipinos 
give substance to their imagined Japaneseness, but is also closely related to issues 
of social status. As discussed above, Japanese-Filipinos can also find themselves 
confronted with stigma and prejudice if they fail to live up to expectations of 
wealth, privilege, and fluency in things Japanese. At the same time, the positive 
image that Japan is enjoying in the Philippines, especially since its “economic 
miracle” in the 1970s and 1980s, has provided Japanese-Filipinos with the 
opportunity to be associated with certain cultural prestige by embracing a 
Japanese ethnic identity. Tsuda (2001, p.59) has observed similar patterns with 
regards to ethnic identification among Japanese-Brazilians in Brazil where  
“being “Japanese” involves a positive contrast not only between First 
World Japan and Third World Brazil but also between Japanese and 
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Brazilian cultures. The prestige of being associated with Japan has 
encouraged the Japanese-Brazilians to embrace a transnational “Japanese” 
identity based on an ethnic identification with the Japanese nation while 
de-emphasizing their national consciousness as Brazilians.”  
 
By constructing a “JFC identity” based on ‘Japanese culture’ as ‘traditional 
culture’ as well as on the trendiness of Japanese popular culture admired by 
young people, Japanese-Filipinos attempt to align themselves with a cultural 
identity deemed commendable. Kenta mentions in our interview that he likes what 
he identifies as Japanese nationalist pride in the practice of ‘Japanese culture’. 
 
Kenta: They’re more nationalistic people.  
Interviewer: Nationalistic people? 
Kenta: Unlike Filipinos, we tend to, you know, observe the culture of 
other countries like the US. 
Interviewer: You think Japanese don’t do that? 
Kenta: Ahm, I think they are more on their own. 
Interviewer: And you admire that? 
Kenta: Yeah…that’s it. 
 Interesting about Kenta’s admiration for ‘Japanese culture’ which he largely 
knows from television programs is that the identification as Japanese provides a 
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desirable alternative to the identity as Filipino which he associates with excessive 
Americanization and a lack of national pride. His embrace of a transnational 
Japanese identity is thus underpinned by the positive image he has of the Japanese 
people, as well as by his desire to resist ‘Americanization’.   
Pragmatism in Nationality Claims 
Japanese-Filipinos in the Philippines often cannot live up to widely held 
expectations of affluence, yet ethnicity, class, and wealth remain intertwined with 
their pursuit of Japanese nationality. Although the motives for pursuing claims for 
Japanese nationality as well as subsequent migration are complex and include 
desires for self-actualization, family reintegration and sentiments of ‘homeland’ 
nostalgia  (Hara 2013, p.11), economic motivations behind obtaining a Japanese 
passport have been mentioned by the majority of my respondents.  
After finishing my studies I will go to Japan and work there. But it’s not 
final. I’m still thinking about it. […] I still want to work here in the 
Philippines to apply my course. I just want to explore the other part of me. 
And I want to explore their culture, their life-style.  (Kenta) 
 
Because as his daughter, my father is Japanese, so I think I have the right 
to have his nationality as a Japanese. Then, ahm, for easy access to Japan. 




 I am hoping to have an opportunity in Japan. I am hoping I could have a 
job there when I finish my college.[…]I’m interested in jobs. Jobs. And 
then I want to see the place. Because it’s my second home to the 
Philippines because my father is from there. And I want to meet my father.  
(Fumiko) 
 
Life in the Philippines is hard, jobs, there is a lot of unemployed people, 
that’s why, I think my citizen[ship] helped me to get here for work. Then I 
work then I send them money back. Because in the Philippines it’s hard to 
look for work and it’s hard to earn money because of a low salary and they, 
they need to, they need to have a college graduate, the qualification to 
work. (Yuzuki) 
 
Because I really want to go to Japan. […]Because I want to work, even if 
not in Japan, even if other country that giving me a chance to work. 
Because in the Philippines I didn’t find a very good work. (Atsushi) 
 
Moreover, working in Japan is frequently linked to the idea of asserting 
one’s birthright when Japanese-Filipinos state that having a Japanese father gave 
them the right to a Japanese passport and consequently to work in Japan. In that 
sense, earning higher incomes coalesces with the concept of “rights” which is also 
closely tied to concerns over social status in the Philippines. Japanese-Filipinos’ 
pragmatic motivations for obtaining Japanese nationality have remained 
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disproportionally understated in NGO publications as they do not make for ‘noble’ 
reasons to express interest for membership in a nation-state.  
The claim for Japanese nationality has largely been framed by NGOs and 
Philippine-based, politically active Japanese-Filipinos as an assertion of one’s 
birthright to explore Japanese culture, an opportunity to meet one’s father and 
generally as ethnic return. While these themes have also surfaced in my 
conversations, most of the respondents for this study sought Japanese nationality 
primarily for the purpose of employment in Japan. Also, a small number of 
respondents, such as Atsushi, considered Japan only one among many other 
possible migration destinations. As will be elaborated later, Japan sometimes is 
not the final stop but a stepping stone despite its alleged importance as “second 
home”. A Japanese passport may thus merely be a stepping stone in Japanese-
Filipinos’’ migration endeavours.  
Politically active Japanese-Filipinos such as Dharma and Mifune as well 
as NGO workers have demanded the recognition of all Japanese-Filipinos as 
Japanese nationals both by deploying the “rights” discourse and by underscoring 
emotive grounds for nationality claims, such as the desire to be acknowledged by 
Japan as well as to experience life in Japan. These arguments are crucial for 
demanding the Japanese State to acknowledge all Filipinos with Japanese fathers 
as equals to other offspring having received Japanese nationality at birth. Yet at 
the same time, the foregrounding of non-economic motives to claim Japanese 
nationality conveniently diverts attention from the problematic link between 
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citizenship and money, considering that the supposed “true” value of citizenship 
hinges on political rights, not on economic considerations (Hau, 2000, p. 138)125.  
In my interviews, economic motives and practicality have been mentioned 
alongside emotive reasons for acquiring Japanese citizenship. Yet, the former two 
have remained marginalized in NGO publications. Official statements by NGOs 
and activist Japanese-Filipinos have highlighted the ideal reasons for seeking 
Japanese citizenship and nationality: “identification with the country, its people, 
history, culture, and way of life” (The Batis Center for Women et al., 2008), 
Japanese-Filipinos’ aspirations to “contribute to the wealth of [Japan] through 
sheer hard work exemplified by the pure Japanese”, as well as to claim their 
“birthright: to learn firsthand the ways of our fathers” (United Japanese Filipino 
Children, 2009). The demand for Japanese nationality is also made on the premise 
that living in Japan would help Japanese-Filipinos “to find themselves [...] 
Though the modern age gives easy access to information, nothing quite matches 
witnessing firsthand the wonders of Japanese culture. The major hindrance for the 
full realization of a JFC’s identity is the issue of Nationality.” (ibid.)  To play 
down economic pragmatism, NGOs and activist Japanese-Filipinos resort to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  Hau	   (2000,	   p.138)	   writes	   about	   the	   Chinese	   in	   the	   Philippines	   who	   were	   construed	  mainly	   as	   “...	   objects	   of	   distrust	   and	   censure	   because	   they	   supposedly	   pervert	   the	   “true”	  value	  of	  citizenship	  by	  hitching	  their	  desire	  to	  acquire	  citizenship	  to	  their	  desire	  to	  protect	  or	  enhance	   their	   business	   interests,	   thereby	   contaminating	   political	   rights	   with	   economic	  considerations.”	   Dominant	   discourses	   still	   tie	   citizenship	   and	   nationality	   to	   exigencies	   of	  loyalty	   to	   the	   Nation-­‐State	   as	   concerns	   over	   the	   allegiance	   of	   transnational	   migrants	   and	  dual	   citizens	   have	   shown.	   Thus,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Japanese-­‐Filipinos,	   claims	   made	   for	   mere	  economic	   reasons	   are	   considered	   as	   running	   counter	   to	   the	   fundamental	   meaning	   of	  citizenship	  and	  nationality.	  Although	  citizenship	  has	  been	  sought	  after	  as	  well	  as	  extended	  for	  strategic	  reasons	  (Ong,	  1999),	  these	  ideals	  remain	  symbolically	  salient	  and	  can	  therefore	  not	  be	  blatantly	  linked	  to	  money.	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popular conflations of culture and ‘blood’, framing the claim for Japanese 
nationality as ethnic return and homeland nostalgia.  
While arguing that Japanese nationality and access to Japan are part of 
Japanese-Filipinos’ rights, NGOs also urge their clients to carefully consider their 
decision with regards to migration (see DAWN, 2008 c; The Batis Center for 
Women et al., 2008). The YOGHI Manga (Batis YOGHI 2009), a Japanese style 
graphic novel published by Batis YOGHI, serves as a reminder of how precarious 
employment in Japan can be. This reflects NGOs’ discomfort with their clients’ 
rush to claim Japanese passports in efforts to find jobs in Japan. According to a 
Japan-based NGO volunteer, the change in Japan’s nationality law, eliminating 
the legitimation requirement for children born to foreign mothers, had created the 
impression that all Japanese-Filipino Children had to claim their right, without 
giving much thought to whether it made sense for them to be carrying a Japanese 
passport: 
Maybe it’s the children’s right but before that, you know, even if you have 
a right to get Japanese nationality, that doesn’t mean you should get 
Japanese nationality. If you want to exercise your right, it’s okay but not, 
not all the people have to exercise the right to get Japanese nationality. So 
it seems like the children have to get Japanese nationality if you have a 
right. But I don’t agree with that. (NGO volunteer) 
The NGO volunteer points out that the opportunity to acquire Japanese 
citizenship has come to be understood as a requirement despite the option of 
foregoing a Japanese passport and remaining a Filipino citizen. However, 
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considering that “securing membership status in a given state or region-with its 
specific level of wealth, degree of stability, and human rights record-is, even in 
the current age of increased globalization and privatization, a crucial factor in the 
determination of life chances” (Shachar and Hirschl 2007 , p.254), not to acquire 
Japanese citizenship would mean to knowingly let pass opportunities and life 
chances associated with being a member of the Japanese state. 
With rising numbers of Japanese-Filipinos qualifying for Japanese 
nationality after 2008, NGOs celebrated the change as a political victory, but at 
the same time had to recognize that obtaining a Japanese passport was often 
motivated by desires to seek employment in Japan. Migration has been sharply 
criticized and at times opposed by Philippine-based NGOs since their beginnings. 
Labour migration in particular has been criticized for playing a major role in the 
break-up of families and for exposing workers to exploitation and abuse abroad. 
Ironically, by promoting Japanese-Filipinos’ ethnic identification as Japanese or 
half-Japanese, by having nourished their desires to see Japan, as well as through 
their lobbying and active legal and para-legal support, NGOs have inadvertently 
made possible the overseas employment of another generation of OFWs.  
Japan as stepping-stone 
The leveraging on consanguinal capital, has allowed many Japanese-
Filipinos to gain formal recognition as Japanese. But Japanese-Filipinos have 
benefitted from their Japanese nationality in ways other than by merely finding 
employment in Japan.  
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Jun, in his early twenties at the time of our interview, came to Japan at age 
17 together with his mother. Jun grew up in a middle class, business owning 
family with several employees and had never joined any NGO prior to getting 
involved with the CNJFC who helped him to process his application for Japanese 
nationality in Japan. When his mother first broached the idea of applying for his 
Japanese nationality, Jun replied that he already had a Filipino passport. Jun also 
indicated that he had no desire to migrate, nor had he been interested in Japan 
prior to resettling to the country. However, his mother saw an opportunity in 
obtaining a Japanese passport for her son and so they went ahead with the process. 
Upon obtaining his Japanese passport, Jun worked several jobs in Japan. He 
started as cleaning staff in a hotel and saved his income to then return to the 
Philippines to enrol in a culinary arts course. After graduation, he sought another 
job in Japan and started cooking in a restaurant while still working as a part-time 
cleaner in a hotel. His earnings went into buying a condominium in Metro Manila, 
several DSLR cameras and travels to the United States, to Korea, Singapore and 
Australia. Eventually Jun relocated to Australia, where he found life to be more 
laid back. He made use of his Japanese nationality to gain a “working holiday” 
visa which is initially valid for up to one year which can be extended126. By 
securing a job through his “working holiday” visa, Jun had the chance to find 
potential employers to sponsor a long term working visa. For Jun, having a 
Japanese father had little importance except for economic gains and the 
opportunity to gain eased access to a third country.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126 	  For	   details	   concerning	   the	   Australian	   “working	   holiday”	   visa	   please	   see	  http://www.immi.gov.au	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Similarly regarding Japan as a stepping stone, Haru first moved to Tokyo 
to join her father. As I have discussed the case of Haru earlier, she had maintained 
contact with her father throughout her childhood and youth and thus had no issues 
with acquiring Japanese nationality. Possessing Japanese nationality eventually 
proved very useful when she made plans to leave Tokyo for the United States to 
join her U.S. American boyfriend, but more importantly to escape from her father 
who had sexually harassed her. Her Japanese passport made it possible for her to 
leave Japan for the U.S. in a relatively short time-span. Should Haru have applied 
for a U.S. visa using her Filipino passport, she would have waited for a very long 
time.  
Still in Metro Manila but having recently obtained his Japanese passport, 
Kenta envisages resettling to Japan, “then after Japan, Canada. Because my mom 
plans to go there.  My mom told me that if you have your Japanese citizenship 
you don’t need a visa to go to other countries. Just a ticket and a passport” 
(Kenta).  
Indeed, a Japanese passport increases mobility and migrants as well as 
would-be migrants are highly aware of it. In her anthropological study of Filipino 
women married to Japanese men in rural Japan, Lieba Faier (2009) confirms this 
‘passport consciousness’. A frequent topic of conversation between her 
respondents and her were the colours of their passports and on what visa they 
were staying in Japan. When compared with Faier’s (2009, p.95) U.S. citizenship, 
Philippine passports “evoked immigration gates tightly shut; they were barriers to 
an outward world and obstacles standing in the way of where these women 
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wanted to go.” Wanting to gain Japanese nationality is thus not necessarily 
contingent with wanting to settle in Japan despite activist Japanese-Filipinos 
framing migration to Japan as a return to one’s “other homeland”. Rather, a 
Japanese passport denotes heightened cross-border mobility, whether one’s route 
leads to Japan or elsewhere: Jun decided to live in Australia, Haru moved to the 
United States, and Kenta contends moving to Canada someday.  
Apart from mobility per se, Japanese citizenship also establishes a 
symbolic connection to a “First World”, technologically advanced country widely 
admired for its supposedly unique culture127. Japanese-Filipinos thus gain the 
privilege of cross-border mobility numerous Filipinos in the Philippines seek, 
while at the same time obtaining documental evidence for  Japaneseness which 
individuals like Sachiko, Natsumi, Yukari and Mifune ‘feel’ and try to perform. 
The distinction achieved through the mobilization of consanguinal capital, or 
what De Dios (2012, p.30) refers to as the manipulation of ethnicity for economic 
advantage, plays a part in Japanese-Filipinos’ development of a sense of self. As 
De Dios (2012, p.31) has pointed out 
 Being the child of Filipino and Japanese parents confirms in their 
(Japanese-Filipino youths’) minds their belongingness to the Philippines 
and Japan. Although their primary socialisation took place in the former 
which resulted in having a greater connection to that country and culture, 
their sense of connection to the latter would tend to surface when they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  As	   mentioned	   above,	   Japan	   markets	   its	   cultural	   exports-­‐	   both	   ‘traditional’	   Japanese	  culture	  and	  popular	   culture-­‐	  as	   ‘uniquely’	   Japanese.	  This	  premise	  has	  not	  been	  questioned	  neither	  by	  NGOs	  nor	  by	  my	  Japanese-­‐Filipino	  respondents.	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differentiated themselves from their Filipino peers in terms of ancestry and 
nationality. This was particularly evident when they stressed that those 
who have Japanese ancestry and nationality can easily come to Japan and 
find work.  
Cross-border mobility as a form of access to resources is resonant of ‘racial’ and 
class privilege  (Faier 2009, p.98), a privilege implicitly demanded by NGOs and 
activist Japanese-Filipinos through the amalgamation of essentialist discourses 
with the insistence on their constituents’ “birthright” to Japanese nationality.  
Faier (2009, p.99) writes, migration is “at once a metaphor for, and a route 
to, privilege, choice, and self-actualization- not only a form of mobility, but also 
an end in itself.” By going to Japan, Japanese-Filipino Children not only 
transform their consanguinal capital into material gain but also accumulate 
‘worldliness’ frequently displayed on Facebook through pictures of branded 
clothes and electronic gadgets, symbols of global consumption and modernity. 
This ‘worldliness’ moreover entails the experience of a different environment and 
the acquisition of some degree of sophistication through the accumulation of 
knowledge in a place deemed ‘advanced’. Bulloch & Fabinyi (2009) have argued 
that the accumulation of ‘worldliness’ through migration abroad involves the 
achievement of high status identity. Gaining Japanese citizenship thus entails 
higher status identity through the privileges the legal status provides, and through 
the symbolic associations it suggests.  
Even without crossing the border to Japan, a passport as formal 
confirmation of Japaneseness provides Japanese-Filipinos with a marker of 
269	  	  
distinction. As Bulloch & Fabinyi (2009, p.138) argue, one does not need to 
migrate to attain the “high status identity of the balikbayan”, the migrant returnee. 
The authors refer to successful transnational marriages of Filipino women as a 
way of gaining prestige notably “due to their connections abroad and the fact that 
they have the option of living overseas” (ibid.). Likewise, obtaining a Japanese 
passport provides not only the opportunity to migrate but also a formalized 
association with modern, cosmopolitan Japan. In a country in which migration is 
considered a marker of middle-class success (Faier, 2009) yet which is contained 
by the limitations imposed by carrying a Philippine passport, a “First World” 
travel document offers privilege and status. The Japanese passport is thus a 
mobility enabling document, but also a symbolic association with cosmopolitan 
Japan.  
Foreigners in “the other homeland” 
Upon arrival in Japan, Felix, Hayate, Jun and Dharma realized that they 
were not considered Japanese but foreigners. Dharma had had the chance to travel 
to Japan on a few occasions before taking up employment in one of its urban 
centres. After one of her initial trips she commented that she felt like a foreigner 
among the hustle and bustle of Japanese day-to-day life. That feeling only grew 
upon staying in Japan for an extended period of time, having been warned to 
closely stick to the etiquettes of politeness and having repeatedly experienced 
being singled out as non-Japanese.  
270	  	  
Jun narrates his experience of being treated unfairly at work by his 
employer who, according to Jun, thought she could take advantage of her foreign 
staff whom she presumed to be ill-informed about Japanese labour laws.  
Jun: She’s not giving the full amount for our salary every month. Like… 
the first month is okay but the second month is… Then after second month, 
give everything, give the full amount. The third month is another, is 
another month not giving the full amount of salary. And after that I quit. 
[...] All the staffs are foreigners, different nationalities. From Thailand, 
Europe [...]except me. I’m the only Japanese 
Interviewer: So you think she did that because you were foreigners? 
Jun: Yes she thinks I’m Filipino. She doesn’t think I’m Japanese. 
Interviewer: So that’s why she paid less and tried to get away with it? So 
what did you do? 
Jun: I threatened her. I will call the labour union, I will do this and do 
that… 
Interviewer: And then? 
Jun: And then she gave me my salary. The full amount. Then I quit…. “I 
will report you to the labour that you’re doing this... I will report 
everything”. She was afraid. But the restaurant is really nice. The foods 
are expensive, so expensive. 
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Felix and Hayate also stated that they were treated as foreigners. Hayate 
recounts that he would not only be identified as foreigner, but he would also be 
treated differently. 
So we order like burger and drinks. But there is not straw. Where is the 
straw? Then the second time you go there no straw again. But the others 
have straws. It’s because you’re a gaijin128. Sometimes the orders are 
wrong. You order a cheeseburger but he gives you an ordinary burger. 
Why is that? Then sometimes you go to a store, but they entertain 
Japanese customers first. But you came there first! Why entertain the 
Japanese guy who came later than you... than I? Why is that? Because I 
look like a gaijin? (Hayate) 
 
Amal notes that the feeling of being discriminated against is one of the reasons 
why migrant youth from the Philippines form gangs: “That’s how the gangsterism 
starts. Filipinos make a group. Some Japanese harass us. ‘Hey you Filipinos look 
like fools!’ Who looks like a fool right now? We’re going to bang them right?”  
Mifune’s travels to Japan had great impact on how he thought about the 
place of Japanese-Filipinos within Japanese society. Making use of imagery 
reminiscent of Japan, Mifune states his first trip to the land of the rising sun: 
It should have been an experience that pleased me or made me very happy 
or enlightened me, it did enlighten me but it did so by removing those rose 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  Gaijin	   is	   a	   short	   form	   of	   gaikokujin	   (foreigner),	   and	   in	   its	   short	   form	   often	   used	   as	   a	  derogatory	  word	  for	  ‘foreigner’.	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covered petals or sakura or petals from my eyes. [...] Well I always 
thought that the Japanese are a set of people who accept others, humble, 
polite, orderly, that they’re not going to discriminate against us because 
we are their children. But no, that’s not the case. They always put a stick. 
They always touch us with a stick. There is always a measure of distance. 
Those Japanese-Filipinos who had constructed an ethnic identification as 
half-Japanese whilst growing up in the Philippines were confronted with altered 
criteria of what makes a person ‘Japanese’ upon travelling to Japan. Mifune 
certainly had to reconcile his initially imagined Japaneseness with experiences 
that led him to put into question his belief in acceptance based on being one of 
Japan’s “children”. Defying the discrimination he experienced, Mifune continues: 
Ah I think being a mixed, being mixed blooded is also an improvement on 
their race129. I mean I’m an improvement, I don’t care if they think I 
am…I am what, almost Japanese. I don’t care about that. But looking at 
the bigger picture I don’t think the Japanese are really prepared to accept 
the JFCs, or the Nikkeijins. (Mifune) 
 
As Hara (2013) notes, numerous Japanese-Filipinos relocating to Japan 
experience an “unstable identity” (p.22), a dissonance between the ethnic identity 
as half-Japanese or as “JFC” they had formed whilst in the Philippines and the 
foreignness ascribed to them in Japan. Similar processes of ethnic identity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	  Mifune	   expresses	   his	   disappointment	   with	   having	   not	   been	  welcomed	   as	   Japanese	   but	  treated	   with	   distrust	   and	   some	   level	   of	   contempt	   by	   the	   Japanese	   organizers	   of	   his	   trip.	  Mifune	  believes	  these	  were	  related	  to	  racism,	  his	  being	  half-­‐Filipino	  and	  a	  Filipino	  national.	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reconfiguration upon migration to Japan have been identified among Philippine 
Nikkeijin (Ohno 2007) and Brazilian Nikkeijin (Tsuda, 2001; 2008). Ethnicity is 
malleable, flexible, and contextual as noted earlier. Ethnic categories and ethnic 
groups thus also differ in various socio-cultural contexts, not only over time, but 
also geographically. Individuals who identify and are identified as Japanese in the 
Philippines are not necessarily accepted as such in Japan. Ethnicity, the tendency 
of social actors to identify groups and to identify themselves as part of a group 
based on the opposition of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ draws its boundaries along 
perceived sameness and difference. Japanese-Filipinos in the Philippines 
identifying as Japanese (or half-Japanese) compare themselves to other ‘regular’ 
Filipinos by asserting difference with reference to their Japanese ancestry or in 
terms of the privileges afforded by their Japanese nationality. But once in Japan, 
migrant Japanese-Filipinos’ differing ethnic habitus often bars them from being 
considered Japanese, or ‘truly’ Japanese. Thus ethnic identifications constructed 
in the Philippines are not entirely translatable into the context of Japan leading to 
disappointed migratory experiences in one’s “father’s homeland”.  
Contributing to the creation of a new migrant generation 
Increased opportunities to migrate to Japan have not only put into question 
Japanese-Filipinos’ identifications as half-Japanese, but also contributed to the 
creation of a new generation of low-paid workers in dead-end jobs. Prior to the 
change in Japan’s nationality law, Japanese-Filipinos and Filipino youth have 
relocated to Japan upon being petitioned by their Japan-based mothers. Migration 
to Japan has affected Japanese-Filipinos in various ways, at times working to their 
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benefit, at times impairing their education and career choices, and increasingly 
leading to employment under exploitative circumstances (see Hara 2013)130. 
Among my 24 Japanese-Filipino respondents, 7 individuals expressed bitter-sweet 
feelings about their relationship with their mothers as a result of conflictual 
experiences related to strategies of upward social mobility and capital 
accumulation. In most cases, stories of tensions revolve around Philippine-based 
Japanese-Filipinos being pressured by their migrant mothers to join them in Japan. 
Numerous Japanese-Filipinos grow up, not only in the absence of their fathers but 
also in absence of their mothers who have sought employment overseas (usually 
returning to Japan). As their children grow older, Japan-based Filipina mothers 
capable of petitioning their offspring to Japan often do so.  They are usually 
motivated by wanting to offer their children the opportunity to make a living in 
Japan, to cease supporting them in the Philippines through remittances, or to have 
them contribute to the family income. Being petitioned to Japan has often been 
accompanied by sentiments of a lack of choice and of being at one’s mother’s will. 
Alina for instance grew up in the Philippines whilst her mother and Japanese step-
father worked in Japan. Throughout her childhood, Alina remembers how she had 
yearned to live with her parents, but they refused. Growing older, she had no 
more longing to join them yet was forced to relocate to Japan after graduating 
from high-school. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  A	  number	  of	   Japanese-­‐Filipinos	  and	  their	  mothers	  have	  been	  deployed	  as	  care-­‐givers	  to	  homes	   for	   the	   elderly	   in	   Japan.	  According	   to	   activists,	   these	  migrant	  workers	   are	  paid	   the	  legal	   minimum	   wage,	   but	   are	   saddled	   with	   high	   debts	   payable	   to	   the	   Philippine-­‐based	  organization	  that	  sent	  them	  to	  Japan,	  and	  forced	  to	  work	  16	  hours	  straight	  with	  only	  short	  breaks.	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It was my 16th birthday, it was so dramatic okay.  [...] And, I had a 
boyfriend back home, and we were going out for a long time and so that 
actually brought me to shits and so I didn’t really want to come here since 
my life in the Philippines was perfect. And on the other hand my life here 
[in Japan] was…just nothing. I started back to zero. [...]So I was actually 
torturing myself when I came here. Emo (laughs). Yes, I didn’t eat for four 
days, yes and I fainted. Because…it was a hunger strike I just did not want 
to stay here. I was doing all these excuses for them to bring me back to the 
Philippines and it never worked. Because my parents are really strong-
hearted. Honestly I am not sure about their reasons. They want to control 
me, next is, well...they wanna look after me, after all these years… 
(laughs) and then they decided to look after me and they want me to learn 
Japanese. And they want me… I don’t know. Maybe they wanted me to 
stay here, maybe that’s the whole point. (Alina) 
 
Hayate and Amal were both petitioned131 to Japan by their mothers whilst in their 
teens. Both had grown up with their maternal grand-mothers before joining their 
mothers. Both described their lives in the Philippines as easy-going and stress-free, 
stating that they had no desires to migrate to Japan.  
Interviewer: How was your life in the Philippines before? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  131	  This	   is	   a	   process	  whereby	   their	  mothers	   or	   their	  mothers’	   husbands	   in	   Japan	   sponsor	  their	  long-­‐term	  visas.	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Hayate: Happy go lucky. Everything fine. Hey mom, I want money! 
Never think about... 
Amal: A privileged life 
Hayate: Never think about money is hard to earn here. Never think about 
that. Hey I need to pay this bill, hey mom I need some load for my prepaid, 
hey mom I need some clothes...I need a new cell-phone...I need this, I 
need that. 
Amal: Hey I need a CP [cell-phone]... 
Hayate: Go studying, go home and it’s either you sleep or go to your 
friends and drink some beer. Or go hang out outside and go to the club. 
That’s our life back in the Philippines! Here... 
Amal: work 
[...] 
Interviewer: Did you want to come to Japan? 
Amal: No. I had to because my mother said come here.  No choice.  
Hayate: Some of the kids here want to come here.  But in my opinion, in 
100 kids Filipino or half Japanese-Filipinos, I think in 100 of them it’s like 
80 or 75 of those kids don’t want to come here. They want to stay in the 
Philippines. 
 
People like Hayate and Amal, as well as Alina, did enjoy a financially 
comfortable upbringing and therefore experienced migration as an undesirable 
277	  	  
change. The desire or need to mobilize consanguinal capital may thus also depend 
on one’s wealth in other forms of capital. Alina, Amal and Hayate were content 
with their lifestyles in the Philippines because they were well taken care of 
financially. Most of my Philippine-based respondents however associate cross-
border mobility with a ‘better life’ and thus thought of migration favourably. 
Moreover, since Hayate and Amal’s mothers- and in Alina’s case her step-father- 
lived in Japan, all three had the social capital necessary to enable their migration.  
Hayate makes an interesting point when he states that not all Filipinos and 
Japanese-Filipinos petitioned by their mothers actually desire to migrate. 
Numerous migrant youths face difficulties when moving in with their mothers and 
their mothers’ new partners, both of whom they frequently are unfamiliar with. 
Another difficulty migrant youths from the Philippines find themselves 
confronted with in Japan are academic challenges. Tanaka describes that his 
daughter faced severe difficulties in school due to her shuttling between two 
countries following her parents’ separation and her mother’s remarriage. Nathan, 
a Filipino social worker in Tokyo, has witnessed numerous migrants youths from 
the Philippines failing in school or being prevented from furthering their 
education in favour of seeking employment132.  
Nathan: They usually come here at the age of 12, between ages 12 and 16. 
Interviewer: And they go to a Japanese school? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	  This	   trend	   is	   exacerbated	   by	   the	   lack	   of	   an	   adequate	   support	   system	   for	   primary	   and	  secondary-­‐school	  students	  with	  poor	  Japanese	  language	  skills.	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Nathan: Yes that’s the biggest problem. They were uprooted in the school 
in the Philippines and they are here to study in Japanese schools so their 
personal growth is almost kind of stopped. [...] There are so many stories 
actually. So if you hear how their hearts cry. They want to study but their 
mothers want them to work because they cannot live. That’s one sad story 
of them. So there are those who have opportunities to study but they aren’t 
interested. And there are those who are really wishing to study but they 
don’t have the opportunity. Education is something kind of, not taken so 
seriously by the mothers and the children. If you will look at the 
demographics of the mothers, only 20% of them were able to go to college. 
So there is a big number of elementary and high-school graduates that, 
they don’t have so much appreciation for education.  (Nathan, missionary 
and social worker) 
 
Concurring with Nathan’s observations, none of my respondents petitioned to 
Japan by their mothers were able to complete college education. Hayate 
interrupted college to join his mother in Japan. So did Yuzuki, in her early 
twenties at the time of the interview, who now works as a hostess in a night-club, 
the job her mother used to do when she first came to Japan. Felix and Amal were 
petitioned to Japan before they were able to start college. Amal had not yet 
graduated from high-school. Alina’s situation is exceptional in comparison with 
that of most of my other respondents. Alina had the privilege of attending a 
private university in Japan yet still had put her studies on hold for unknown 
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reasons at the time of our interview. Also, with the change in Japan’s nationality 
law, numerous Filipino mothers have sought to return to Japan as custodians of 
their underage children notwithstanding the interruption caused to their children’s 
studies. According to one of my respondents, a group of three Japanese-Filipino 
children in their early teens had recently relocated to Japan together with their 
mothers. While their mothers are at work, the children attend public school. Yet 
due to their lacking proficiency in Japanese, they face severe academic challenges. 
The interruption of Japanese-Filipinos’ academic careers due to migration 
coupled with linguistic difficulties contributes to their funnelling into low-skill, 
dead-end jobs. Japanese-Filipino migrant youth in Japan thus become part of a 
working class133.  
Many Filipina mothers who have nurtured their Japanese-Filipino 
children’s identification as Japanese as well as their desires to live in Japan have 
done so with the thought of returning to Japan or having their children seek 
employment there. Their children with Japanese men often are keys to return to 
Japan, or potential future migrant workers who may find it easier to access the 
country and find employment due to their Japanese ancestry. Certainly not all 
Philippine-based mothers of Japanese-Filipino Children make migration seem an 
attractive option to their offspring. However, none of my interviewees had 
mentioned their mothers opposing their desires to migrate. On the contrary, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  Alina	  is	  one	  exception;	  she	  managed	  to	  find	  an	  office	  job	  at	  a	  telecommunication	  company	  despite	   stopping	   her	   college	   education.	   Also,	   Jun’s	   case	   is	   an	   exception.	   Jun,	  who	   came	   to	  Japan	  with	  his	  mother	  to	  acquire	  Japanese	  citizenship,	  made	  use	  of	  his	  access	  to	  the	  Japanese	  labour	   market	   to	   save	   for	   his	   education.	   He	   returned	   to	   the	   Philippines	   for	   his	   studies,	  foregoing	   a	   potential	   income,	   to	   then	   seek	   higher	   paying	   jobs	   in	   Japan	   with	   his	   recently	  earned	  degree	  in	  culinary	  arts.	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number of interviewees whose mothers were already based in Japan have been 
pushed to relocate against their will, underestimating or notwithstanding the 
academic challenges their children would face.   
Filipino mothers who would like to see their children live and work in 
Japan usually justify their plans for their children through their concern for them 
and their wish to provide them with an opportunity to live a ‘good life’. Daisy and 
Linda, both mothers of Japanese-Filipino Children describe their motivations for 
applying for their children’s Japanese nationalities: 
Right now I’m hoping one of these days or in the future maybe when they 
( my children) grow up, when they are in the right age to go there [to 
Japan], so that they can have some knowledge about Japan, what’s Japan, 
what’s in there, what kind of people are living there. For me I want them 
to go there to stay there for good. That’s my plan. Because it’s different 
when they stay here, than stay there. It’s different. And it’s very hard to 
raise children here in the Philippines. Because I’m not a rich kind of 
person. I’m not...we don’t come from a rich family. So I cannot support, I 
cannot give the full support they need. [...] I want them in the future, if 
they have their passports, they can go there without any hindrances. [...] If 
in the future my children want to go to Japan and stay there for good it’s 
okay for me. As long as they have a good life there, they finish their 




Because I was hoping that nationality, applying for my daughter’s 
nationality. Maybe for the future someday [...]Then, she wants to go to 
Japan someday, or maybe she wants to meet any relatives of her father. 
(Linda, mother of one Japanese-Filipino child) 
 
Janice, the mother of two Japanese-Filipino children, one of them born and raised 
in the Philippines, explains why she petitioned her son to live with her and her 
new partner in Japan: 
Because for now I have a new family, so I think he’s old enough to 
manage it himself so I called him to get there [to Japan] for his own future. 
And I notice my son so maybe I think there is something he looks like me, 
like something tsuyoi (strong), adventurous: “I want to do that for 
experience, I can manage that...” I think he gets that from me. (Janice, 
mother of two Japanese-Filipino children) 
 
In our interview, Daisy highlights that she does not have much money. 
Daisy, who had worked in Japan for over 14 years and then found employment as 
a call-center agent in Manila is not part of the poorest of the poor, but rather of the 
lower middle-classes who opted for Japan not “to make money but to make more 
money, not for their daily bread but for the finer things in life.”  (Ventura 1992, 
p.125, emphasis in original), she hopes for her children to have a “good life there”, 
not because the family is stricken by poverty but because life as imagined through 
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global images of ‘ideal childhood’ (Horton 2008) as well as the globalized 
imaginary of middle class lifestyles seem unattainable through employment in the 
Philippines.  
When Daisy mentioned that life in the Philippines was hard and that she 
was not from a rich family, she also alluded to the grave income divides between 
rich and poor as well as to virtual class immobility, to which only emigration 
could provide a way out.  Indeed, when Filipino women first sought employment 
overseas, one of their motivations was to be able to afford a ‘better life’ for them 
and their family. In one of the first studies conducted on Filipina entertainers in 
Japan Ballescas finds (1992, p.24):  
The desire to improve the daily lives of their families- husbands, children, 
parents, brothers and sisters- is a recurring theme echoed by almost every 
Filipino entertainer we interviewed and surveyed for this report. [...]They 
wish for their young children a more stable today and a more secure 
tomorrow: regular meals and stable financial support to the see them 
through school, through college, if possible.134 
 
Although numerous Filipina settlers in Japan have managed to provide 
financial support to their families in the Philippines, my data has shown that this 
support, though frequently used to finance primary and secondary education in 
private schools, has usually not been translated into investments in college 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  These	   sentiments	   are	   of	   course	   not	   unique	   to	   Filipino	  migrant	   women,	   but	   commonly	  shared	  among	  labour	  migrants.	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education. The initial goal of achieving a ‘better life’ by enabling their children to 
go to college has often been supplanted by quicker methods of capital generation; 
rather than transforming economic capital into college degrees and the 
opportunity of securing a white collar job in the Philippines, numerous Japan-
based Filipino mothers have petitioned their children to Japan to work. Ultimately 
this tendency to prioritize employment over tertiary education often negatively 
affects chances for upward social mobility in the longer term. This trend however 
also needs to be understood in relation to the constraints and demands imposed on 
migrant women and their migrant children by obligations to support familial 
networks in the Philippines 
  Today, Japanese-Filipino youth and adults as well as non-Japanese 
Filipinos petitioned by their Japan-based mothers are channelled into factory work, 
care-giving, maintenance work or follow their mothers’ footsteps by taking up 
employment as hosts and hostesses. Janice’s son initially found part-time 
employment in the kitchen of a fast-food restaurant, and then worked in a factory 
producing sponges. According to Nathan, many of the Filipina migrants who 
entered Japan since the 1980s had to forego tertiary, sometimes even secondary 
education. Although investing in education may have been a goal in their early 
days as migrant workers when their return to the Philippines was still part of a 
foreseeable future, their ideas of a “better life” have over time translated into 
earning wages and not earning a degree. As Nathan adds “...what they are telling 
to their children once the children say they want to study in college, is 'guess what 
it’s the same, you will earn, especially here in Japan.'”  This way, migrant youths 
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and young adults often become part of a migrant working class in Japan.  
Nonetheless, incomes earned from such occupations remain comparably higher 
than incomes earned from similar or even some white-collar jobs in the 
Philippines. 
Filipino migrant women as well as their working offspring may be located 
at the lower ends of the social, occupational and income ladder in Japan, yet their 
wages permit them to afford upper middle-class lifestyles in the Philippines. Thus, 
while Filipino migrant youths in Japan are frequently found in the lower echelons 
of social and occupational classes, Filipino migrants often inhabit two different 
class positions simultaneously (Kelly 2007). Writing about Filipino 
transnationalism, Kelly (2007, p.28) points out that “the frame of reference for 
class positioning is shifted through transnational linkages and comparisons”. As 
Kelly further observes, “[w]hile occupational markers of class may indicate a 
downward movement, the consumption markers of class provide something of a 
compensating countermovement.” (p.22)  
Money not invested in the purchase or refurbishing of homes, in small 
businesses or vehicles in the Philippines does not remain invisible; the online 
networking site Facebook has provided a new stage for class performance 
reaching audiences globally and most importantly, ‘back home’. Part of that class 
performance is achieved through the participation in global capitalism, through 
the consumption of goods of recognizable symbolic value. A perusal of migrant 
Japanese-Filipinos’ Facebook profiles reveals a conspicuous display of branded 
clothes, collections of baseball caps, and branded sneakers. These are interspersed 
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with self-portraits, usually shot against a mirror reflecting the indispensable 
Iphone.  The more distinguished Facebook-users take mirror-shots with their 
DSLR cameras. Photographs of meat dishes eaten at restaurants, yakiniku, 
sizzling steak or shabu-shabu, become evidence for outings and leisure. 
Photographic memories of snowboarding trips, pictures of coloured, spiky hair 
typically among Japanese youth, and uploads of purikura135 remind viewers of the 
overseas location of their Facebook-friend.  
Social networking sites have supplemented Sunday mass where, back in 
the 1990s, Ventura (1992, p.80) observed Filipino migrants displaying their “gold 
chains, bracelets, rings, leather jackets, signature clothes both real and fake”. 
Although the site of class performance may have experienced a shift into the 
virtual world, the “enthusiastic embrace of the dreams and desires generated by 
the global capitalist imaginary and projected through global mass media, 
entertainment and consumer industries” (Hau 2004, p.248) remains unchanged. 
Interestingly, status symbols and consumed goods are frequently American. 
Fashion brands recurrently found in Facebook pictures include Fubu, Converse, 
the Iphone, sneakers of various American brands in addition to photographs taken 
of baseball caps, Starbucks paper coffee cups, or taken in front of a McDonalds 
outlet.  
In their symbolic and political struggles, NGOs have managed to mobilize 
their Japanese-Filipino plaintiffs’ consanguinal capital to challenge an exclusivist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135purikura	   (プリクラ)	   are	   photo-­‐sticker	   booths	   popular	   among	   youngsters	   in	   Japan.	   The	  booth	  can	  be	  used	  by	  several	  people	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  who	  would	  then	  pose	  for	  a	  set	  number	  of	  exposures.	  The	  desired	  pictures	  can	  be	  selected	  and	  customized	  using	  a	  touch	  screen	  or	  a	  pen-­‐sensitive	  screen. 	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clause in Japan’s nationality law, and have thereby enabled many more Japanese-
Filipinos to gain Japanese citizenship. However, one of the unintended 
consequences of these struggles was the expansion of opportunities for an already 
existing population of migrant youth from the Philippines to enter Japan in order 
to take up lowly paid work. The change in the law has thus inadvertently led to a 
new generation of labour migrants. Activist Japanese-Filipinos, like Dharma and 
Mifune, have grappled with these developments and made efforts to organize 
migrant Japanese-Filipinos in Japan as well as to politicize their marginality. 
Mifune regards their consumption as a way to cope with marginalization in Japan 
and Dharma is said to be upset about Japanese-Filipino migrant youths’ 
unquestioned participation in the capitalist system that funnelled them into low-
paid work in the first place. Most migrant Japanese-Filipinos however show little 
interest in partaking in such advocacy efforts and rather focus on earning and 
income.  
You have to understand JFY136 and JFC have very different concerns. You 
probably know that already. Very different life-styles also. I mean, I have 
seen that the JFY, they’re… they use…I don’t know, one of their coping 
mechanisms is to apply the Japanese commercialist attitude. Like you 
know, when they get there what do they do? Buy the gadgets, dye their 
hair, you know those physical adjustments. But at some point their still 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  136	  The	  acronym	  JFY	  is	  commonly	  used	  among	  NGO	  workers	  and	  Japanese-­‐Filipino	  members	  of	  NGOs	  to	  refer	  to	  Japanese-­‐Filipino	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐Japanese	  Filipino	  migrant	  youth	  in	  Japan.	  While	   the	   acronym	   “JFC”	   largely	   grew	   out	   of	   NGOs	   in	   the	   Philippines,	   the	   term	   “JFY”	  developed	  within	  the	  context	  of	  Nathan’s	  faith-­‐based	  fellowship	  for	  migrant	  youth	  in	  Japan.	  Both	   terms	   stuck	  with	   the	   different	   groups	   and	   have	   become	   indicators	   for	   their	   bearers’	  geographical	   location.	   Unlike	   “JFC”,	   whose	   ages	   greatly	   vary,	   “JFY”	   tends	   to	   be	   used	   for	  migrants	  in	  their	  teens	  and	  twenties.	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not…ah… adjusting well enough to the society because they don’t have, 
they don’t have that level of Nihongo [Japanese language] needed to 
actually, to part the veil, right? So I don’t know, I think, I don’t wanna say 
it’s, I don’t know it’s, at worst I see some sort of defence mechanism. This 
materialism I am seeing in the JFCs abroad. (Mifune) 
 
That’s what [Dharma] is so frustrated about: their [JFCs in Japan] 
materialism. They are centered with their situation without questioning the 
broader situation.” (NGO worker) 
 
Mifune and Dharma both have university degrees. They are also the only 
two among my respondents who have entered Japan on an academic fellowship 
and as an office worker respectively. Equipped with cultural capital unavailable to 
the large majority of migrant Japanese-Filipinos, Mifune and Dharma are 
confronted with the discrepancies between their own class-biased visions for the 
‘imagined community’ (in Benedict Anderson’s terms) of Japanese-Filipinos and 
the reality of little political engagement as well as of consumption as class 
performance which, as Mifune puts it, is a way for migrant Japanese-Filipinos to 
cope with their disadvantaged situation in Japan.  
Migration remains an important means to achieve upward social mobility 
for the lower middle classes in the Philippines. Japanese-Filipinos with Japanese 
passports or with the necessary social networks to relocate to Japan do not need to 
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accumulate cultural capital in the form of degrees to qualify for overseas 
employment. Education for the purpose of finding overseas employment thus 
becomes redundant if migration is achieved without it. Furthermore, education 
does not guarantee upward social mobility. As Kelly (2007) points out “In the 
Philippines, there is [a] strong sense of immobility - a stickiness in the class 
structure, such that those in lower class positions can never aspire to exceed their 
particular strata in Philippine society, even if educational achievements would 
imply otherwise.” (p.18) 
The predominance of migrant youth from the Philippines137  in low-pay, 
low-skill employment in Japan is not solely a consequence of lacking cultural 
capital, but also an outcome of the social networks they rely upon. If not funnelled 
into low-paid work through an agency, migrant youths from the Philippines are 
dependent on their social contacts to secure a job upon arrival in Japan. Hayate, 
for instance worked for his step-father in their family-run recycling business. 
Felix found a job at a fast-food chain with the help of his mother. Yuzuki found 
her first job in Japan at the same factory where her mother used to work. The type 
of employment secured is often determined by the knowledge of the Japanese job-
market available to the individuals approached for help. The latter often tend to be 
employed low-paid jobs themselves. Thus, by resorting to their mothers or to 
Filipino friends for assistance in finding work, the marginality of migrant youth in 
the labour market is perpetuated (cf. Kelly 2007, p.16). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  These	   include	   petitioned	   Japanese-­‐Filipinos	   and	   Filipinos	   as	   well	   as	  migrant	   Japanese-­‐Filipinos	  with	  Japanese	  passports.	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Conflicting visions and ambitions  
Throughout the period of data collection, I observed a rise of 
disagreements over the ‘appropriate’ measures to support Japanese-Filipinos both 
in the Philippines and Japan. The change in Japan’s nationality law which had 
created new possible mobilities for Japanese-Filipinos and their mothers had also 
intensified divides among NGO staff, actively involved Japanese-Filipinos, and 
NGO members in general. Moreover, the legal change was ensued by a project 
initiated by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which foresaw a 
significant inflow of new, young migrants from the Philippines. Through this 
project, Japanese-Filipino NGO members based in the Philippines and organized 
Japanese-Filipino migrant youths from Japan, who previously had not been 
significantly in touch with each other, met and worked together for the first time. 
The meeting between the two groups was momentous as both parties realized that, 
despite having imagined themselves as a community of “JFC”, their problems, 
needs and desires diverged greatly. Mifune and Dharma were surprised at Japan-
based Japanese-Filipino’s preference of consumption over political engagement. 
On the other hand, Alina considered the politicizing of claims for Japanese 
nationality as pretence to gain access to Japan’s labour market: 
Because they’re not having a good life in the Philippines…I don’t know 
why…Some have a good life. They actually, well they pretend to have a 
good life, like these JFCs I’ve met in Saitama. These kids like they said 
that they did not want to come to Japan and live here, but they said that 
they want to have that Japanese nationality because it’s their right. And I 
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know –I didn’t tell them of course, I did not want to be rude and say “of 
course not- that’s not what you’re thinking” but I know what they’re 
thinking is that someday they might want it, since even if you’re a nurse , 
even if you’re working in the Philippines they are planning to work abroad 
anyway, it’s not gonna be enough for the rest for their lives. And I know 
they want it since they wanted it since they were kids and they have 
experienced hardship…I know…the way they say it, it’s 
something…Cause I met many JFCs. (Alina) 
 
 Despite these divides, members of both groups seemed to have found 
agreement over one issue: the aspiration to form a support group for Japanese-
Filipinos independent from existing NGOs.  Indeed, following a conference in 
Saitama, Japan in 2009 initiated by the IOM, a handful of individuals decided to 
form the United Japanese-Filipino Children (UJFC), a primarily online-based 
group connecting Japanese-Filipinos from Japan and the Philippines.  
Alina: But the point of making the United JFC is that we just want to, 
instead of NGOs doing stuff for us, it would be better if we would do stuff 
for ourselves. Activities and, you know. It would be better.  
Interviewer: And was NGO staff present when you decided that? 
Alina: Yes, and they weren’t happy. I was really strong about how I said 
it. [...]I almost said: ”so we don’t have to ask for the help of the NGOs”. 
Honestly I do not like so many NGOs, you know, controlling. Because 
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they are making money out of us. I almost said it- I was really, really close. 
And I know that they know that I said that. They were: “oh yes, and that’s 
true” and everything. [...] 
Yeah, we were talking when we were drinking in Saitama and we were 
talking about we should get out of these NGOs and we would have this 
hidden agenda (laughs). It’s just that we… we cannot do it by just 
ourselves, you know. These kids have already loved NGOs and stuff 
probably. And some are...it’s Filipino, Filipino culture that when you are 
trying to actually fix something and somebody wouldn’t like it, it would 
tatatatata go to these bigger people and then we’re all like “okay”…then 
they know it. So it’s really difficult.  
 
However the UJFC did not take off. This was partly due to the busy schedules of 
the group’s initiators and members, and due to diverging visions of what the 
group should provide.   
Interviewer: And on Facebook before you formed this group UJFC…is 
that alive? 
Mifune: No, not anymore. Sadly the distance and the schedules of the 
people involved… And some disagreements we had with some other 
projects kind of, kind of split, split us actually. You have to understand 
JFY and JFC have very different concerns.  
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Yet the idea of a fresh organization led by Japanese-Filipinos for 
Japanese-Filipinos still remains. Akira, who had participated in activities and 
projects by two different groups, Batis YOGHI and the UJFC, had approached me 
for advice in setting up his own group as he had gotten frustrated over politics in 
NGO leadership.   
 I think I already mentioned to you this, well to be honest I hate politics 
[...]. so here's the thing I observed how the NGOs controls the other 
groups and how the members worked to each other and I hate it so much 
in a way I observed they are too competitive each other and everything 
and so on... (Akira) 
 
Alina too has developed a particular distaste for Philippine-based NGOs which 
she blames for both creating problems artificially and perpetuating them. 
 
It’s weird…I just hate them [NGO workers] talking about so much about 
this stuff that you cannot really do something about. You’re just gonna tire 
yourself thinking about it plus you gonna get depressed. Because that’s 
what the NGOs taught them [JFC] to do: think about it. [...] You know 
what. This is the funny thing. I never thought about it until I met them 
[NGO workers]. As a JFC I should have known, but I never thought about 
it until I met them. I would have never thought that: “hey, what if I have 
Japanese Nationality”. No I never thought about it and I never thought 
about how bad it is for me that I don’t have my dad… my real dad. And I 
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never thought about how bad it is for me not to know the Japanese culture 
and way of living before. Maybe they [Japanese-Filipino NGO members] 
would not have felt that without them [NGOs]. ‘Cause they would just 
move on. But because they give them false hope, they still fight for it… 
It’s too bad. That’s what is maybe my opinion you know. But, some have 
hope but they cannot say it straight to those who don’t have hope 
anymore. They just keep them hanging. (Alina) 
 
Such divergences and conflicts illustrate that not all Japanese-Filipinos claimed to 
be represented by DAWN, Batis YOGHI, Maligaya House or the CNJFC actually 
feel spoken for. While a number of respondents expressed positive feelings about 
their involvement in NGOs, Mifune complains about differing visions and the 
abundance of egos involved in activism for and by Japanese-Filipinos while Akira 
and Alina doubt the effectiveness of NGO support. Alina has developed a very 
critical stance towards stereotypical depictions of “JFCs” by NGOs. Moreover, 
her awareness of the importance of Japanese-Filipino Children to NGOs’ survival 
has made her suspicious of whether the various groups were truly interested in 
solving “JFC issues”. Alina's distrust of NGOs raises the point that keeping "JFC 
issues" ongoing is also a way for NGOs to utilize consanguinal capital at an 
institutional level in order to continue financing their operations by keeping their 
services relevant and thus attracting funding138.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	  Funds	  have	  come	  from	  various	  sources:	  the	  CNJFC	  has	  received	  a	  one-­‐off	  donation	  by	  the	  Japanese	  government	  sponsoring	  its	  Manila	  office	  and	  office	  equipment.	  Moreover,	  the	  NGO	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Conflicting discourses on “JFC” demonstrate that ascribed identities as 
well as proposed remedies for assumed issues also encounter opposition. Long-
time members of Philippine-based NGOs tend to endorse dominant discourses on 
“JFC” as well as a “JFC” identity, however newer members such as Toshiro, or 
individuals like Felix and Jun who were only briefly involved with the CNJFC 
(which handled their acquisition of Japanese nationality) and who have otherwise 
not joined any “JFC” youth-groups, tend to neither identify as “JFC” nor to 
endorse discourses on Japaneseness as propagated by NGOs. Nevertheless, Felix 
and Jun still mobilize consanguinal capital through individual practices of 
ethnicity. For example, Felix's endeavour to seek a career in entertainment is 
largely built upon playing up his Japanese descent by using his Japanese name 
and communicating with his fans in Japanese on social media sites. Jun's Japanese 
passport allowed him to work in Japan and save up for an education in culinary 
arts and later advance his career as a chef in Australia. 
The change in Japan’s nationality law and the subsequent increase of 
opportunities to migrate to Japan have also shown more clearly the discrepancy 
between members’ desires and NGOs opposing migration. DAWN has recently 
witnessed a decline in new members as one of its staff members explains: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  finances	   itself	   through	   its	   (largely	   Japanese)	  members	   and	   their	   contributions,	   as	   well	   as	  through	   donations.	   DAWN	   has	   received	   funds	   through	   Japanese	   Official	   Development	   Aid	  (ODA),	  from	  the	  Japan	  Foundation,	  and	  from	  Jichiro	  –	  the	  all-­‐Japan	  Prefectural	  and	  Municipal	  Workers	   Union	   (online	   conversation	   with	   DAWN	   staff,	   October	   1st	   2013).	   Batis	   has	   also	  received	  funds	  through	  Japanese	  ODA.	  The	  Batis	  YOGHI	  summer-­‐camp	  2011	  was	  generously	  sponsored	  by	  a	   Japanese	  expatriate	   living	   in	  Manila,	  and	   in	  2012	  the	  camp	  was	  allowed	  to	  take	  place	  at	  the	  dormitories	  and	  training	  center	  of	  Komatsu	  (a	  Japanese	  company)	  located	  South	  of	  Metro	  Manila.	  
295	  	  
Currently I think, current members we’re handling...ah... 70 plus women I 
think or 90 plus. But they are not all new. Since after 2005139, you know, 
the number of women [migrating to Japan] has diminished, it has 
significantly dropped. And somehow we’re already feeling it. Because in 
the past, even 2 years ago we were still getting 20, 20+ calls or referrals to 
DAWN but this time around in a month we get about 5, 6 calls unlike 
before. And we think that a lot of them maybe they don’t...perhaps a lot of 
them would rather go back to Japan and work. (DAWN staff) 
 
The number of DAWN members also dwindled because some of its old 
members left the organization to join another group, Maganote, instead. 
Maganote was set up in 2009 as an organization which specializes in handling the 
necessary paperwork to then deploy their Japanese-Filipino applicants as workers 
to Japan. The organization, which also makes use of the “rights” language to 
frame its work140 , has sent several former DAWN members to Japan over the last 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  2005	  was	  the	  year	  when	  Japan	  amended	  its	  Immigration	  Control	  Act	  and	  implemented	  tighter	  identity	  checks	  on	  applicants	  for	  “entertainer	  visas”.	  The	  total	  number	  of	  “entertainer”	  visas	  issued	  by	  Japanese	  authorities	  subsequently	  dropped	  from	  100	  633	  in	  2005	  to	  	  49	  631	  in	  2006	  (source:	  http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/i_crime/people/pamphlet.pdf	  ,	  access	  1st	  July,	  2013)	  140	  As	  of	  2009,	  Magaonte	  was	  located	  along	  Leon	  Guinto	  Street	  in	  Malate,	  Manila.	  Maganote	  has	  no	  other	  web-­‐presence	  except	  its	  Facebook	  profile	  page.	  Here	  the	  organization	  describes	  itself	  as	  follows:	  	  “About	  An	  NGO	  that	  supports	  the	  abandoned	  Japanese	  -­‐	  Filipino	  Children	  in	  retrieving	  their	  Japanese	  Citizenship.	  Simple	  Japanese	  Lessons	  will	  be	  posted	  regularly	  for	  those	  who	  want	  to	  learn	  Japanese.	  [...]	  Mission	  1.	  To	  provide	  Japanese	  –	  Filipino	  Children	  opportunities	  to	  exercise	  their	  rights	  as	  Japanese	  Citizens,	  acquire	  language	  skills,	  education	  and	  jobs	  in	  Japan.	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three years. The clients who left DAWN in favour of Maganote did so to find 
employment in Japan. This development is significant as it shows that NGO 
clients are not necessarily persuaded by NGOs’ ideological stances, such as 
DAWN’s disapproval of migration and its emphasis on training as well as the 
need for psychological interventions, despite long-time membership.   
Yet, not all NGOs have experienced a decrease in clients. Staff at 
Maligaya House, focussing on solving legal issues with the help of Japan-based 
lawyers, reported that phone enquiries and accepted cases increased after the 
change in Japan’s nationality law in 2008. Only the recent decreases in inquiries 
were largely due to the March 2011 earthquake that hit Japan since, as one staff 
member mentioned, many Filipino mothers must have given up on the hopes of 
going to Japan believing the Japanese father of their children had died and that the 
economic situation was bad. Before the earthquake however, inquiries were 
abundant. 
Prior to the change in Japan's nationality law, DAWN, Batis, the CNJFC 
and Maligaya House were among the few avenues available for Filipino mothers 
and their Japanese-Filipino children to locate and negotiate with their Japanese 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.	  To	  help	  restore,	  build	  and	  empower	  the	  Japanese	  –	  Filipino	  Children	  to	  become	  productive	  and	  responsible,	  with	  new	  perspective	  and	  meaning	  in	  life.	  	  Company	  Overview	  Magonote	  Philippines	  is	  a	  non-­‐stock	  non-­‐profit	  organization	  that	  aims	  to	  support	  the	  abandoned	  Japanese-­‐Filipino	  children	  as	  well	  as	  their	  mothers.	  	  Magonote	  Philippines	  started	  December	  05,	  of	  2009	  and	  our	  main	  goal	  is	  to	  retrieve	  the	  citizenship	  of	  Japanese-­‐Filipino	  Children	  and	  send	  them	  back	  to	  Japan	  where	  they	  rightfully	  belong	  to	  exercise	  their	  right	  to	  education	  and	  normal	  living.	  The	  man	  behind	  this	  dream	  which	  has	  now	  turned	  to	  reality	  is	  no	  other	  than	  MR.	  HIDEKAZU	  KOBAYASHI.	  “	  (source:	  https://www.facebook.com/pages/Magonote-­‐Philippines-­‐Inc/137758706273066?id=137758706273066&sk=info	  ,	  accessed	  on	  30th	  June	  2013)	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fathers. The legal change has made it possible for Japanese-Filipinos to obtain 
nationality and citizenship from the Japanese state by going through the Japanese 
embassy, rather than through family courts in Japan. This has to some extent 
facilitated the transformation of consanguinal capital into citizenship and thus into 
economic capital or status. Nevertheless, Maligaya House and the CNJFC remain 
crucial as they provide legal expertise and support in the numerous cases where 
Japanese-Filipinos have not yet been formally recognized by their fathers.  
The law change has also led to the establishment of organizations like 
Maganote which specialize in the deployment of new migrants to Japan, thus 
providing Japanese-Filipinos with an alternative avenue to DAWN, Batis, and the 
CNJFC/Maligaya House in their efforts to mobilize consanguinal capital. In turn, 
NGOs that have been opposing labour migration, such as DAWN and Batis, have 
seen their memberships dwindling as numerous clients now have the choice to 
pursue overseas employment without being subjected to the requirements of 
participating in the ideologically and morally infused activities of such NGOs. 
Thus ensuing developments since the change in Japan’s nationality law have 
ironically posed new problems to its original proponents. Moreover, DAWN, 
Batis and Maligaya House have expressed great concern over numerous Japanese-
Filipinos and their mothers being subjected to exploitative working conditions and 
to indentured labour in Japan. A number of newly established organizations, 
catering to Japanese-Filipinos and their mothers, act as Philippine-based recruiters 
deploying eligible workers to Japan-based employers. Individuals migrating 
through these channels often find themselves saddled with high debts.  
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Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I have critically evaluated individuals’ perception of self, 
based upon available discourses on ‘race’, class, ‘Japanese culture’ and the social 
realities of prejudice and deprivation which a number of respondents are 
confronted with. Intertwined with the significance of emotional struggles, pain 
and frustration felt by some of my respondents and many Japanese-Filipinos in 
similar circumstances, the claim for Japanese nationality, the identification as 
half-Japanese, and the performance of Japaneseness are contingent upon 
strategies of capital accumulation and access to resources. As Jenkins (2008) 
writes, ethnicity is strategic and instrumental, but “calculations and emotions are 
not alternatives” (p. 48). 
With ‘race’ and ‘culture’ being largely conflated and individual family ties 
being used interchangeably with ‘blood’ ties to a nation, descent can be mobilized 
as a form of capital. Consanguinal capital is a form of capital which Japanese-
Filipinos based in the Philippines can fall back on in the event of lacking cultural 
(sought after skills and accredited training), social (family ties enabling visa 
sponsorship) and economic capital (assets enabling residency or citizenship by 
investment) to cross borders. Consanguinal capital is utilized in anticipation of a 
comparatively higher income and the access to amenities associated with a 
"modern" lifestyle via overseas employment while it is also a means to gain 
prestige via association with an esteemed national and cultural identity. However, 
numerous Japanese-Filipinos are being funnelled into low-status and low-income 
occupations upon migrating to Japan.  
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In the course of claims-making, the ‘blood’ ties linking Japanese fathers to 
their children have been conflated with behaviour, culture, as well as with a 
belonging to an imagined Japanese ‘race’ by expanding actual filiation into 
a ’blood’ metaphor and thereby positioning “JFC” as “children of Japan”. 
Furthermore, the highlighting of ‘homeland nostalgia’ and cultural reasons in 
claims for Japanese nationality has unintentionally reaffirmed primordial and 
essentialist ideas which undermine efforts of broadening the conception of 
Japaneseness. Moreover, the amended Japanese nationality law has made it more 
conducive for potential migrants to cross-borders which has led to the 
establishment of new organizations participating in the deployment of migrant 













Ethnic phenomena are still widespread as ethnicity, in political discourse 
as well as in the everyday social experience, remains “a, if not the, dominant 
paradigm for interpreting, ordering and marking difference in the world.” (Fox & 
Jones 2013, p. 391) The power of imagined ethnic communities can be clearly 
seen in instances of political mobilization, wherein ethnic identities are 
constructed and ascribed for purposes of claims-making (p.387). In this 
dissertation I have analysed the discursive construction of Japanese-Filipino 
children and their mothers by NGOs, the strategic use of Japanese descent in 
claims towards the Japanese state, and the construction of a “JFC” identity which 
emphasizes the importance of Japaneseness in Japanese-Filipinos’ ethnic 
identities. I have thus considered consanguinal capital as a pivotal element in 
claims for resources, and in this case for Japanese nationality and citizenship in 
particular.  
This study therefore ties in with debates about the constitution and 
reproduction of social hierarchies, the formation of social identities, and the 
access to resources, recognizing the intersectionality 141  of various social 
categories in the structuring of societies. In this thesis I have focused on ethnicity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  Anthias	   (2012,	   p.126)	   defines	   intersectionality	   as	   a	   conceptual	   approach	  which	   “posits	  that	  different	  social	  divisions	  interrelate	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  production	  of	  social	  relations	  and	  in	  terms	  of	   people’s	   lives	   and	   they	   are	   seen	   as	   ‘mutually	   constitutive’	   in	   terms	  of	   experience	  and	  practice.”	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and citizenship as important factors constituting social hierarchies, identities and 
providing or denying access to resources. The various forms of capital as 
discussed by Bourdieu (1986) are important factors in the constitution and 
reproduction of social class, social hierarchies, and social identities. But ethnicity 
(and gender for that matter) as well as citizenship are also significant factors 
influencing individuals’ and groups’ access to resources and their place in the 
social hierarchy. Bourdieu’s approach to class has largely left unmentioned the 
structuring effects of ethnicity and citizenship. Moreover, Bourdieu’s analysis 
remained centred on a presumably bound social space demarcated by national 
borders.  
By utilizing consanguinal capital as a conceptual tool, I observed the 
strategic endorsement of a Japanese descent in claiming resources. Moreover, I 
showed that expectations of higher income and greater social status have 
underpinned the construction of a Japanese ethnic identity among “JFC”.  As 
Anthias (2012, p.132) points out, claims for various resources are pivotal in social 
relations, but we also need to look beyond economic, social, and cultural capital 
to see “how class relates to mobilizations around ethnic resources, for example.” 
In the particular case observed in this study, I have analysed the discursive 
mobilization of ‘Japanese blood’ in the construction of a “JFC” identity by NGOs 
and by a number of Japanese-Filipino individuals in claims for Japanese 
citizenship. I have argued that not only potential migrants availing of sufficient 
social, cultural or economic capital could cross national borders and make 
citizenship claims, but that consanguinal capital was equally a resource under the 
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condition that ‘blood’ remains symbolically salient and thus recognized as valid 
basis for claims.  
Fox and Jones (2013) point out that ethnicity has been employed as a 
powerful tool for claims-making utilized by political entrepreneurs and grassroots 
activists alike. Ethnic difference and imagined ethnic communities have grown 
out of conflict and out of political opportunities. The case of Japanese-Filipinos in 
the Philippines illustrates how ethnic identification has become an important 
politically strategic tool in claims-making toward a foreign government, and 
indeed a means employed in hopes of ensuing material gain. The performance of 
Japaneseness suggests Japanese ethnic identity and thus supports claims for 
recognition and belonging. Community is often constructed around the idea of a 
common culture and/or a common descent, even if these may be questionable 
(Fenton 2010), thus linking ethnic performance to consanguinity (real or 
assumed). Therefore, the performance of Japaneseness has not merely served the 
purpose of familiarizing Japanese-Filipinos with things Japanese, supposedly to 
satisfy their curiosity, but also made them more relevant to a Japanese audience 
that has to be convinced of Japanese-Filipinos’ rightful claims and membership in 
Japanese society.  
By virtue of their direct blood-tie with a Japanese national, Japanese-
Filipinos also have the potential of acquiring a “First World” passport if they 
succeed to either fulfil or challenge the additional criteria set by Japanese law that 
limit access to citizenship. While this does not mean that nationality claims have 
had solely the purpose of enabling upward social mobility, I argued that the 
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affective dimensions of identity claims articulate with economic concerns. I thus 
considered claims for Japanese nationality primarily within the context of 
economic and income inequalities between Japan and the Philippines, as well as 
highly managed borders and labour markets. In doing so, I have not only linked 
citizenship claims to efforts of gaining cross-border and material mobility, but I 
also related ethnic identity formations to political and material concerns. I thus 
concur with Fenton (2010, p.2) when he writes that “...a theory of ethnicity has to 
be a theory of the contexts under which it is situationally relevant.” 
Acquiring a Japanese passport has increased its bearers’ cross-border 
mobility and enabled them to find higher paid employment in Japan than in the 
Philippines. However the material ascent experienced by Japanese-Filipino youth 
by way of migration to Japan has also been coupled with experiences of 
discrimination, labour in precarious, dead-end jobs, and in some cases, with high 
debts occurred in obtaining these jobs. Lastly, for a number of Japanese-Filipinos, 
the experience of migrating to Japan meant leaving behind a well-provided for life 
in the Philippines and forgoing tertiary education. It is thus questionable to what 
extent migrating to Japan led to the achievement of the “better life” envisaged by 
many migrant youth and their mothers, given that the “Japanese dream” has also 
entailed a rude awakening for numerous Japanese-Filipinos.  
The amendment in Japan’s Nationality law has opened doors, even if 
merely ajar142, to Japanese nationality for numerous children born to Japanese 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  The	  exact	  numbers	  of	  successful	  Japanese-­‐Filipino	  applicants	  for	  Japanese	  nationality	  and	  citizenship	   is	   unknown.	   According	   to	   Suzuki	   (2010)	   there	   were	   only	   a	   dozen	   children	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fathers and foreign mothers. This change had rekindled hopes for many Japanese-
Filipinos and their Philippine-based mothers to find a way (back) to Japan. 
Following the news of the Supreme Court decision, numerous press reports told 
of Japanese-Filipinos leaving for Japan, many in tow with their mothers. This 
legal change could only have occurred because of precedent cases already 
problematizing Japan’s nationality law prior to its amendment, because of the 
recognition of increasing variety in family forms in Japan, and due to the 
Japanese-Filipino plaintiffs’ accomplished Japaneseness convincing the judges 
that parental marriage was no longer required to guarantee the “tie to Japan” 
expected from the next generation of nationals and citizens. A general shift in 
norms and values pertaining to family ideals as well as the successful 
performance of Japaneseness during court hearings were thus crucial elements 
contributing to the legal amendment.  
But have NGOs actually won their symbolic and political struggles against 
institutionalized exclusions? On the one hand, the use of litigation has lowered the 
barriers to obtaining Japanese citizenship and nationality at birth, and has enabled 
numerous Japanese-Filipinos to become Japanese nationals and citizens 
retroactively. However, Japan’s nationality law remains premised on ethno-
cultural definitions of a child’s ‘tie’ to Japan. Dominant perceptions of who can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  granted	   visas	   by	   the	   Japanese	   embassy	   in	  Manila	   as	   of	  March	   16th,	   2009.	   Suzuki	   does	   not	  clarify	  what	  kind	  of	  visas	  these	  were.	  The	  new	  nationality	  law	  requires	  eligible	  applicants	  for	  Japanese	  nationality	  and	  citizenship	   to	  reside	   in	   Japan	   for	  a	  six-­‐month	  period	  before	  being	  able	   to	   obtain	   Japanese	   nationality	   and	   citizenship.	   It	   is	   likely	   that	   Suzuki	   refers	   to	   visas	  obtained	   for	   that	   purpose.	   According	   to	   numbers	   provided	   by	   the	   Japanese	   Ministry	   of	  Justice	   (2012)	   3,849	   individuals	   have	   submitted	   notices	   of	   acquisition	   of	   nationality,	   of	  whom	  3,505	  have	  been	  issued	  certificates	  of	  acquisition	  of	  nationality	  since	  January	  1st	  2009	  (Hara	  2013,	  p.12).	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  certain	  which	  nationality	  these	  applicants	  initially	  held	  since	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  does	  not	  list	  the	  nationality	  of	  the	  applicants	  (ibid.).	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be acknowledged as ethnically Japanese in Japan have therefore not changed.  
NGOs and activist Japanese-Filipinos have not been able to broaden the definition 
of who ought to be Japanese in cultural and linguistic terms. On the contrary, the 
need to develop and exhibit a ‘tie’ to Japan remains a central rationale for not 
further relaxing the requirements to acquire birthright citizenship.  
Consequently, the arrival in one’s ‘father’s homeland’ has turned out to be 
a disappointing experience for some of my respondents. The difficulties of 
communicating and of being identified as a foreigner, not as Japanese, have 
complicated ethnic identifications held prior to migration. Consanguinal capital 
may have enabled a number of individuals to access to Japan, but once in the 
country, Japanese-Filipinos’ sense of being Japanese is met by more stringent 
definitions of who ought to be Japanese thereby contributing to bitter 
disappointment. Ethnic identity ascriptions emphasizing Japaneseness as those 
promoted by NGOs and communicated by a number of Filipino mothers of 
Japanese-Filipinos, inadvertently added to such disappointments. Indeed, ethnic 
categories are flexible and contextual, requiring individual Japanese-Filipinos to 
rethink what it means to be “JFC” once they arrive and settle in Japan.  
Consanguinal capital cannot always be translated into other forms of 
capital across socio-cultural borders. This is because ethnicity is contextual and 
ethnic categories as well as ethnic groups differ in various socio- cultural 
contexts. The identification as Japanese in the Philippines entails a different set of 
meanings and expectations than in Japan. In the Philippines, consanguinal capital 
can be mobilized through the performance of Japaneseness with reference to 
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globally circulating images of Japan: through knowledge of the Japanese 
language, familiarity with popular or ‘traditional’ culture or actual travel 
experience of Japan. Moreover, holding a Japanese travel document and bearing a 
Japanese name in contrast to other, ‘regular’ Filipinos, establish a symbolic 
connection which may entail heightened social status. However in Japan the 
norms of comparison differ. Migrant youth from the Philippines do not exhibit the 
ethnic habitus commonly expected from Japanese in Japan. The rules of 
recognition of consanguinal capital fluctuate in various socio-cultural and socio-
economic143 contexts.  
As exemplified through the experiences of Japanese-Filipinos, ethnicity is 
contextual, malleable and its boundaries change over time and space. What it 
means to be “JFC” and what it takes to be Japanese changes depending on 
whether one is in or outside Japan. The transformability of consanguinal capital 
thus has its limitations as consanguinity is only recognized as a valid claim and as 
a potential source of privilege in certain contexts. Japanese-Filipino children may 
have gained the right to obtain Japanese passports, yet citizenship alone neither 
shields them from discrimination, nor does it guarantee a secure and affluent life. 
Certainly, citizenship does contribute to different prospects for the well-being, 
safety and freedom of individuals (Shachar 2009a, p.8), but important 
stratifications persist within societies, dividing people along lines of class, gender, 
ethnicity and ‘race’.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  143	  Tsuda	   (2010)	   shows	   that	   economic	  pragmatism	  generated	  an	   inclusive	  discourse	  when	  Japan	   recruited	   affordable,	   manual	   labour	   among	   its	   diaspora,	   which	   developed	   into	   an	  exclusive	  discourse	  following	  Japan’s	  economic	  recession.	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In Japan, foreigners have been slotted into ‘racial’ hierarchies144. Migrant 
Japanese-Filipinos thus experience contradictory processes of gaining status in the 
Philippines through their association with cosmopolitan Japan, their increased 
cross-border mobility provided by their Japanese passports, and their increased 
ability to consume, while losing status in Japan by entering a migrant working 
class. Having ‘Japanese blood’ and carrying a Japanese passport have not 
prevented migrant Japanese-Filipinos from being treated as foreigners in the 
county of their fathers. Ethnicity thus articulates with class and produces 
contradictory outcomes in differing social contexts. 
Migrants’ experiences of inhabiting contradictory class positions within 
different social hierarchies have been explored among others by Aguilar (1999), 
Kelly (2007; 2012), Parreñas (2001), and Pinches (2001). These explorations 
largely relate to the processes of “deprofessionalization, deskilling, and 
downward class mobility” (Kelly 2012, p.154) which frequently accompany 
cross-border migrations of people of the ‘Global South’ seeking employment in 
the ‘Global North’. While migrants are often relegated to low-pay, low-status 
jobs, they enjoy heightened status within the family and the larger community 
through the monetary contributions they could afford through their overseas 
employment (Aguilar 1999). Parreñas’ (2001) well-educated Filipina respondents 
deal with “the pain of contradictory class mobility” by “performing servitude 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  A.Shipper	  (2002)	  has	  observed	  the	  ‘racial’	  hierarchies	  organizing	  foreign	  labour	  in	  Japan.	  He	  writes	  that	  “[j]obs	  are	  organized	  hierarchically	  by	  race	  and	  nationality	  such	  that	  those	  of	  “superior”	  origins	  (nikkeijin	  i.e.,	  or	  foreign-­‐born	  Japanese)	  are	  at	  the	  high	  end,	  obtain	  better	  jobs,	   enjoy	   legal	   rights,	   and	   are	   subjected	   to	   less	   direct	   surveillance	   by	   immigration	   and	  police	   officials.	   “Inferior”	   workers,	   such	   as	   “darker”	   South	   Asians,	   are	   at	   the	   low	   end	   and	  have	  casual	  jobs,	  poor	  pay,	  and	  few	  benefits;	  they	  are	  also	  subject	  to	  more	  coercion	  by	  police	  and	  yakuza	  (organized	  crime).”	  (p.42)	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under the fantasy of reversal, in other words, the fantasy of eventually returning to 
the Philippines to be served by their own domestic workers” and by “downplaying 
servitude by emphasizing the higher racial status that employers accord them than 
their black and Latina counterparts” (p.153). Ethnic identity also plays a part in 
Pinches’ (2001) study; to endure and resist the class degradation whilst in 
migration Filipino workers invoke and celebrate their ethnic and national 
identities as Filipinos. Japanese-Filipinos experience contradictory class mobility 
as well as incongruities with regards to their ethnic identities.  
The NGOs which have largely contributed to the construction of the 
“JFC” identity- and by doing so, to the endorsement of a Japanese ethnic identity 
among many Japanese-Filipinos- face constraints and challenges related to 
sustaining their work, justifying their existence, and surviving financially. This 
has required NGOs to emphasize stories of victimization, injustice, and 
helplessness. The need for accounts of hardship and suffering has engendered a 
selection and framing of clients’ stories for the purpose of publication. The 
discursive construction of the “JFC” thus relies on generalizations at the expense 
of the narratives of individuals who do not feel disadvantaged due to their 
Japanese-Filipino parentage, and of individuals opposing some aspects and 
methods of NGO-led claims-making. This has led to discord and resistance 
among some of my respondents. 
Conversely, the prevailing narrative of the “JFC” has also produced 
situations wherein clients themselves readily adjust their stories to the desired 
309	  	  
frames. Mifune recently related to me his reaction to an NGO-organized sharing 
session: 
“So when I realized how we were like performing stories I kind of really 
felt bad, as in I couldn't breathe and I got a little teary eyed. Well it’s like 
this, since we don't have any other capital, some of us think that suffering 
is some sort of capital. It's probably a catholic thing [...] So I kind of got 
disgusted and walked out while trying to maintain sympathy for the person 
[who told his/her story]. But really, my days of doing drama camp are 
over. Yes, there is no graduation mechanism in JFC organizations. So you 
see a lot of the kids still portraying that sort of [victimization] discourse 
even if they're old. It stunts [sic] the children. It got to me also. [...] this is 
really about the capitalization of other people's tears.” 
NGOs have played a crucial role in organizing the objection against 
Japanese-Filipinos being treated as second rate offspring both by their Japanese 
fathers and under Japan’s nationality law. At the same time, the mobilization of 
consanginal capital has also benefitted NGOs insofar as Japanese-Filipinos have 
been made relevant to Japanese funders and thus qualified NGOs for financial 
support. These funds have been utilized by NGOs to finance projects and 
programs which have been positively received by many of their Japanese-Filipino 
members and clients. Others, as mentioned above, have welcomed these 
interventions with less enthusiasm.  
I have examined the various discourses utilized by NGOs involved in the 
issue, showing that Japanese-Filipinos’ “mixedness” has prompted NGOs to 
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engage in discourses on ‘Japanese blood’ and the importance of knowing and 
experiencing Japan. NGO workers, leaders, as well as a number of Japanese-
Filipinos endorse essentialist understandings of ‘blood’ and ‘mixedness’ and 
therefore support the provision of imaginary resources to acquaint Japanese-
Filipinos with things Japanese. This essentialism remains largely unchallenged 
because it resonates with popular conflations of ‘race’ and culture pertinent in 
society and as such, also with NGO’s target audiences in Japan and the 
Philippines. Moreover, essentialist ideas prove very useful in politicizing 
Japanese-Filipinos’ Japanese descent and appeal to audiences and potential 
funders.  
The identities ascribed to their clients by NGOs have however been 
challenged. Some of my respondents have expressed dissatisfaction with how 
NGOs have dealt (or failed to deal) with the issues faced by Japanese-Filipinos, 
and have criticized what they consider NGOs making money and fuelling their PR 
machinery on the backs of Japanese-Filipinos’ fates. Other expressions of 
discontent have taken form of clients leaving their NGO. Since the change in 
Japan’s nationality law concluded in mid-2008, DAWN has for instance 
witnessed a number of its clients quitting the NGO and instead joining other 
groups in the hopes of migrating to Japan. Also, earlier experiences of clients 
remaining in Japan undocumented following a study tour have reminded NGO 
staff of the appeal of the country and the popularity of overseas migration to 
achieve social upward mobility.  Such developments put into question the 
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homogenous depiction of Filipina migrant returnees as victims and “survivors” of 
migration to Japan, having renounced the draw of the yen.  
Despite knowing the lure of the yen, the NGOs included in this study have 
for the longest time opposed the idea of migration as part of their protest against 
labour export policies as national economic strategy. Migration to Japan has 
largely been portrayed as fraught with the danger of exploitation and even 
violence, a depiction used to support the victimization discourse on Filipina 
migrant returnees. At the same time Japan has been elevated to the status of the 
‘other homeland’, vital in Japanese-Filipino Children’s development and growth. 
Japan has thus become a place of ambivalence, a country to which Japanese-
Filipinos should foster closer bonds, but also a country having attracted thousands 
of young Filipino women to work in its red-light district, a place which is now 
luring numerous Japanese-Filipinos to work in factories, in homes for the elderly, 
or once more in its red-light districts.  
With numerous Japanese-Filipinos reaching adulthood and thus the 
capacity and the right to cross borders by themselves, the depiction of Japan for 
Japanese-Filipinos has also become more nuanced. Although understandable as a 
legacy of NGOs’ ideological stand-points, discouraging Japanese-Filipinos and 
their mothers from seeking blue-collar jobs in Japan has inadvertently led NGO-
clients to search for opportunities and information in the wrong places. Newly 
established organizations in the Philippines operating under the banner of NGOs, 
Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs), or foundations have found new sources of 
revenue by acting as agents recruiting eligible Japanese-Filipinos and their 
312	  	  
mothers and by matching them with employers in Japan for a substantial fee. 
Lacking the social and cultural capital to secure white-collar employment, 
Japanese-Filipinos form a new migrant working-class in Japan who, despite 
possessing Japanese passports remains treated as foreign and often is short of 
information, resources, and language ability to fully take advantage of their rights 
as citizens.  
Global migration has complicated ethnic and national identities beyond 
the definitions set by the nation-state. Increasing numbers of children born from 
‘international’ relationships challenge us to think not only about the current 
location of the socio-cultural borders of the nation, but also about who defines the 
latter, especially when the nation is tackled from outside its supposed boundaries. 
Ethnicity and ethnic identity have been symbolically salient ideological tools in 
process of establishing membership and recognition. Ethnicity remains a crucial 
fact of everyday social practice and political mobilization, but this does not mean 
that we should take ethnicity for granted since ethnicities appear, disappear, and 
boundaries of ethnic groups and identities vary over time and space. Fox & Jones 
(2013, p.393) remind us that “[e]thnicity is the phenomenon to be explained, not 
to do the explaining with”, and so this study of Philippine-based Japanese 
Filipinos and NGO advocacy has aimed at explaining ethnicity, the construction 
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Descriptions of NGOs (The Batis Center for Women/ Batis YOGHI, DAWN, 
and the CNJFC/Maligaya House) 
 
The Batis Center for Women and Batis YOGHI 
Established: 1988 in Ermita, Manila and later moved to Quezon City (Batis Center for 
Women); 2002 (Batis YOGHI) 
 
The Batis Center for Women (Batis) was founded as a joint initiative between the 
Division of Family Ministries of the National Council of Churches in the Philippines 
(NCCP) and the House in the Emergency of Love and Peace (HELP) Asian Women's 
Shelter of the Japan Women's Christian Temperance Union as a non-profit, non-
governmental organization in Manila in 1988.  Batis’ set-up also coincided with the 
surfacing of the notorious “Lapin” case145, an event which shed light on practices of 
forced prostitution by club owners in Japan employing Southeast Asian women on 
“entertainer” visas (Matsui 1995, p.311). The event has received intense media coverage 
and, along with the mysterious death of the Filipina entertainer Maricris Sioson in 1991, 
has exposed the potential vulnerabilities of foreign women “entertainers” in Japan, but 
has also stirred overgeneralizations of hostessing as forced prostitution.  
The goal of Batis’ establishment was to address the needs and concerns of 
returned Filipina migrants from Japan as well as other countries. Services provided by 
Batis include training (sewing, candle-making, small-scale entrepreneurship), educational 
assistance, medical assistance as well as counselling. Batis has also facilitated the 
organization of a women’s group in 1996, Batis AWARE, through which Filipina 
members were encouraged to organize and advocate for themselves. In 2000, Batis 
YOGHI was formed as an independent organization led by and for Japanese-Filipino 
youth. As numbers of new members dwindled following the change in Japan’s 
Immigration act in 2005, Batis made its services available to women migrant returnees 
from the Middle East and from Southeast Asia. Batis used to publish a newsletter, but 
had to discontinue the printing for lack of funds. Batis’ web-presence is limited to its 
Facebook page after websites maintained in the past have expired. Batis is the oldest 
NGO catering to Japanese-Filipino children and their Filipino mothers via the provision 
of counselling services and training.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	  The	  Lapin	  case	  involved	  four	  Filipino	  women	  aged	  21	  to	  26	  forced	  into	  prostitution	  by	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  snack-­‐bar	  they	  worked	  at.	  They	  were	  locked	  in,	  beaten	  and	  one	  of	  the	  women	  was	  raped	  by	  employees	  of	  the	  club	  (Matsui,	  1990).	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Batis YOGHI emerged from a special program created by Batis for children and 
youth in 1992. The additional program was offered upon noticing some of their Filipino 
women clients having had children with Japanese men. Despite catering to the relatively 
small number of only six children at the time, NGO staff believed they were just the tip 
of the iceberg. The then-director of the Batis Center stated in an interview:”…we only 
have to look for them, I‘m sure we’ll have more” (Kyodo News Int., 1992). Many of the 
group’s programs tackle issues faced by young people, rather than specifically by 
children born out of ethnically ‘mixed’ relationships. Batis YOGHI provides, among 
others, sex education, information about Japan, workshops on presentation skills, and 
small-scale entrepreneurship. Batis YOGHI organizes occasional study tours to Japan for 
some of its members, a yearly summer camp. Batis YOGHI also provides information 
sessions and orientations for students from Japan on their study tours and fieldtrips to the 
Philippines. The organization’s leading voices became more perceptible notably after the 
2008 amendment in Japan’s Nationality Law and throughout a project exploring safe 
migration to Japan for Japanese-Filipinos, led by the IOM in 2009.  
 
The Development Action for Women Network (DAWN) 
Established: 1996 in Ermita, Manila 
A few years into its existence, Batis experienced organization-internal conflicts 
resulting in a split and the launch of The Development Action for Women Network 
(DAWN) in 1996. The newly established organization picked up with a similar vision, 
mission and client base, making it the second organization catering to Filipino migrant 
returnees from Japan and their Japanese-Filipino children in the Philippines. DAWN 
offers similar services as Batis, including training and psycho-social interventions. 
DAWN engages its clients through workshops, trainings, psychological and counselling. 
Recently, the organization has made efforts to establish a women’s cooperative and a 
children’s group, DAWN JFCs for Change. 
DAWN is supported by a group of volunteers based in Japan (commonly referred 
to as DAWN Japan) who assist the organization with locating Japanese fathers and in 
organizing its yearly theatre tours to Japan. DAWN publishes the quarterly newsletter 
SINAG since 1996. DAWN has also published four books, and has been featured in 
television segments in both Japan and the Philippines146. Among all four NGOs, DAWN 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  In	  1999,	  DAWN	  was	   featured	   in	   three	   television	   shows:	   “Sa	  Bayan”	   	   and	   “Balikatan”	  on	  RPN-­‐9	  as	  well	  as	  in	  “Usapang	  Business”	  on	  ABS-­‐CBN.	  All	  these	  segments	  focused	  on	  DAWN’s	  contributions	  to	  uplifting	  the	  status	  of	  Filipino	  women	  and	  improving	  their	  situation	  (DAWN,	  1999	   b).	   DAWN	   staff	   and	   six	   members	   were	   featured	   in	   the	   talk	   show	   “Pilipinas	   Online:	  Bantay	  OCW”	  on	  May	  4th,	  2006	  (Barcelona,	  2006).	  DAWN	  and	  two	  of	  its	  clients	  were	  featured	  in	  a	  report	   for	   the	  TV	   format	  “Draw	  the	   line”	  aired	  on	  GMA	  Network	  throughout	   the	  years	  2008-­‐	  2009	  (cf.	  http://youtu.be/JLM2-­‐X-­‐lzPI	  ,	  accessed	  on	  19	  November,	  2013).	  DAWN	  was	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has been the most active in publishing, networking, and displaying its networks through 
its publications147. DAWN is part of a wider network of transnational organizations 
involved in issues pertaining to migration as well as human trafficking.  
 
The Citizen’s Network for Japanese-Filipino Children (CNJFC) and 
Maligaya House 
Established: 1994 in Tokyo (CNJFC); 1998 in Quezon City, Metro Manila (Maligaya 
House) 
                The most prominent Japan-based organization supporting Japanese-Filipino 
children, the CNJFC, was created following a symposium organized by the International 
Children’s Rights Centre. The CNJFC differs from DAWN and Batis in its capacity to 
provide legal aid; the organization’s association with lawyers in Japan (the JFC Lawyers 
Association) enables it to effectively file court cases against Japanese fathers unwilling to 
acknowledge paternity, handle matters of child support on behalf of their clients, as well 
as to legally support their clients’ claims for Japanese nationality. The securing the 
child’s Japanese citizenship has become a primary concern, not only to solve individual 
legal dilemmas but also to push for the acknowledgment of Japan’s changing society.  
               The organization was initiated by members of Japanese society who had shown 
great concern over the adverse effects of Japan’s post-war economic expansion into its 
Asian neighbour countries. One such effect was the surge of sex-tourism by Japanese 
men since the 1970s, and another that of the funnelling of Southeast Asian women into 
Japan’s sex-industry. The concern over Filipino women working as “entertainers” in 
Japan has thus been shared by groups in Japan and in the Philippines and has produced 
continuing transnational cooperation among NGOs in both countries. The support of 
Japanese-Filipino children, resulting from relationships brought about by migration, was 
one way of reinstating justice for people considered victims of Japan’s immigration 
policies, poverty abroad and the irresponsible behaviour of Japanese men. Supporters in 
Japan and the Philippines have made it their purpose to mend the wrongs that have 
stricken children of Japanese-Filipino unions in both countries. In 1998, the CNJFC 
established its Manila-branch, Maligaya House (happy house). The Tokyo-based 
organization had previously cooperated with both Batis and DAWN but with its 
establishment, Maligaya House became the only avenue for Philippine-based clients to 
gain support by the CNJFC. The formation of DAWN Japan was DAWN’s response to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  also	   featured	   in	   the	   NHK	   documentary	   “I	   Wish	   to	   See	   My	   father”	   by	   Shin	   Yasuda	   which	  focuses	  on	  Teatro	  Akebono’s	  theatre	  tour	  to	  Japan	  in	  1999	  (DAWN,	  1999	  e).	  	  147	  The	   section	   “Events!	   Visitors!	   Events!”	   later	   titled	   “DAWN	   Visitors”	   or	   “People,	   Places,	  Events”	   within	   SINAG	   is	   a	   collection	   of	   photographs	   displaying	   the	   Executive	   Director	   at	  meetings	  or	  workshops,	  with	  visitors	  of	  political	  rank	  or	   importance,	  or	  with	  visitors	   from	  Japan.	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the loss of their Japan-based partner.  
Maligaya House fully relies on the funds provided by the CNJFC. With these, Maligaya 
House is able to support some of their clients through scholarships, distributed to students 
with good grades who do not receive any support from their Japanese fathers. Maligaya 
House rarely holds any other workshops or trainings unlike DAWN, Batis YOGHI and 
Batis. The organization organizes monthly information sessions to be attended by their 
clients and from time to time arranges short talks given by visitors about various topics. 
One of their visitors from Taiwan talked about the Taiwanese and Chinese minorities in 
Japan, while another visitor from Germany gave a presentation on the relationship 
between Japan and Germany during World War Two. Although such sessions were 
meant to broaden Japanese-Filipinos’ horizons beyond their knowledge of the Philippines 
and Japan, both presentations covered aspects of Japanese history.   
               Yayori Matsui, an activist feminist and journalist, was one of the initial 
founders of the CNJFC. The establishment of the NGO was meant to confront Japanese 
men with the legal consequences of their behaviour. Japanese men, according to Matsui, 
“treat Filipino women as they please, taking advantage of the vast gap in economic power 
between Japan and the Philippines... [and view] Filipino women as mere sex objects.” 
(Matsui 1999, p.58) Matsui’s activism has notably been driven by her discontent with the 
Japanese government’s attitude towards the atrocities committed by the Japanese army 
during World War II, as well as towards the aftermath of its rapid economic 
development. Her standpoint was shared by others, notably by late Reverend Toshifumi 
Aso who was also part of the initial organizers of the CNJFC. Reverend Aso was born to 
Japanese parents in 1940 in Japanese occupied Korea. At the dusk of the war, his family 
fled the country, returning to Japan impoverished, striving to make a living of selling 
candy and sweet potatoes. Both Aso and Matsui, who were children during World War II, 
experienced poverty which later on made them more sensible to situations of poverty in 
Asia (Yamane, 2008; United Japanese Filipino Children, 2010). Aso became a pastor in 
the 1960s, a period of turmoil and historical changes in Japan; in 1964 the country hosted 
the Olympic Games, four years later students protested against the Vietnam War and 
Japan’s support of the U.S. forces (United Japanese Filipino Children 2010). He also 
travelled through Southeast Asia to countries affected by World War Two. These trips 
brought him to the Philippines. In an interview he recounts:  
“The first time I visited the Philippines was in 1971. [...] I didn’t have any interests in the 
Philippines but I was very concerned with the situation in the Asian countries 
particularly those connected to the Japanese. In the history of Japanese Imperialism and 
the war, Japan had made a lot of mistakes.  We need to apologize to the Asian people, 20 
million people endured this period of war.  [...]Its [sic!] our responsibility to see the 
realities of the people, the poor people oppressed by Japanese money.  That’s my way 
and my criticism of Japanese policies. Then a friend mentioned about mothers of JFCs 
asking for lawyers.  That’s when I started the CNJFC network and Maligaya House.” 
(United Japanese Filipino Children, 2010)  
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Table 1: Japanese-Filipino Respondents 
 Pseudonym  Age at time 
of the latest 
interview 
 Nationality at 
time of latest 
interview.  
Country based 
in at time of 
latest 
interview 
Client or former 
client of any of the 




1 Yukari (F) 22 PH Philippines Yes 
2 Natsumi (F) 23 PH Philippines Yes 
3 Mike (M) 16 PH Philippines Yes 
4 Alina (F) 20 PH Japan No 
5 Dharma (F) 24 PH Japan Yes 
6 Hayate (M) 20 PH Japan No 
7 Amal (M) 20 PH Japan No 
8 Sachiko (F) 16 PH Philippines Yes 
9 Yoko (F) 17 PH Philippines Yes 
10 Fumiko (F) 17 PH Philippines Yes 
11 Mari (F) 19 PH Philippines Yes 
12 Kenta (M) 21 PH Philippines Yes 
13 Mifune (M) 34 PH Japan Yes 
14 Akira (M) 24 PH Philippines Yes 
15 Atsushi (M) 23 PH Philippines Yes 
16 Tommy (M) 23 PH Philippines Yes 
17 Kaori (F) 20 PH Philippines Yes 
18 Shingo (M) 18 PH Philippines Yes 
19 Daisuke (M) 23 PH Philippines Yes 
20 Jun (M) 23 JP Australia Yes 
21 Yuzuki (F) 21 JP Japan No 
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22 Felix (M) 21 JP Philippines Yes 
23 Haru (F) 21 JP U.S.A. No 
24 Toshiro (M) 16 JP Philippines Yes 
 
 
















Number of interviewees 
(workers and volunteers 
at support organizations) 
3 1 2 2 2 1 2 
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